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This research undertakes the investigation of ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī’s (d. 973/ 
1565) defence of Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ʿArabī’s (d. 638/ 1240) mysticism. It aims to clarify 
the theological project on which al-Shaʿrānī embarked in an attempt to promulgate Ibn 
ʿArabī’s thought to a wider audience. The thesis challenges the reductive view agreed 
upon in recent scholarship that al-Shaʿrānī was an uncritical apologist of Ibn ʿArabī and 
a mediocre thinker who was not interested in the latter’s mystical worldview. 
Contrary to the current reading of al-Shaʿrānī, the study argues how he systematically 
presents Ibn ʿArabī’s ontology of ‘the oneness of existence’ (waḥdat al-wujūd) as a 
perceptual and visionary experience. It is shown that this interpretive method emerged 
against a backdrop of polemics over Ibn ʿArabī. I will further demonstrate that, by 
situating Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrines in the context of theological issues, al-Shaʿrānī 
integrates them into his own worldview, thereby merging the mystical and theological 
disciplines. I will also discuss that al-Shaʿrānī was supportive of Ibn ʿArabī’s monistic 
teachings on condition that the audience are advanced enough to fully understand them. 
The thesis therefore provides an account of al-Shaʿrānī’s biography, intellectual milieu, 
and oeuvre (Chapter 1), investigates his interpretation of the oneness of existence as 
experiential oneness (Chapter 2), considers his support of the monistic worldview (the 
first part of Chapter 3), then studies his treatment of some of Ibn ʿArabī’s controversial 
doctrines, focusing in particular on al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to the anthropomorphic 
attributes of God (the second part of Chapter 3, and Chapters 4 and 5). It will become 
clear that al-Shaʿrānī’s theological project was formulated through innovative 
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interpretive efforts and in the context of his own intellectual milieu. The research 
concludes that al-Shaʿrānī’s defence of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought ought to be received in a 
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1. Research Aims 
 
    Hailing from Ottoman Egypt, the sixteenth-century Shāfiʿī jurist and Sufi, ʿAbd 
al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī (d. 973/1565), is known for his ardent support of the Andalusian 
mystic Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240), who proposed the controversial notion 
of ‘the oneness of existence’ (waḥdat al-wujūd). The overarching objective of this thesis 
is to investigate the details of al-Shaʿrānī’s defence of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought in a 
theological context. Al-Shaʿrānī’s prominence in the legal sphere has been widely 
recognised and his jurisprudential works have received due scholarly attention. On the 
other hand, although scholarship on the significance of al-Shaʿrānī’s works in the 
history of medieval Sufism does exist,1 his contributions to the defence of Ibn ʿArabī 
have not been thoroughly studied. This is puzzling, given al-Shaʿrānī’s major role in 
popularising Ibn ʿArabī.2 One of al-Shaʿrānī’s most famous writings with this purpose, 
al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, which aims to reconcile Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings with those of 
the Ashʿarīs, was favoured by Damascene intellectuals of the late nineteenth-century.3 
To this day, however, the text is barely studied. Many other theological works by 
                                                
1 MacDonald, Development of Muslim Theology, 179-180; Arberry, Sufism, 123; Trimingham, 
2 Chodkiewicz, An Ocean without Shore, 10-11; Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 4. 
3 Hudson, ‘Reading al-Shaʿrānī,’ 39-68. Hudson’s study attests to al-Shaʿrānī’s popularity in 
late nineteenth-century Damascus. According to her, his works appear in forty-five percent of 
the inventories of private collections in Damascus, a proportion greater than the thirty-six 
percent of inventories in which works of the Syrian Sufi ʿAbd al-Ghanī Nābulusī (d. 1143/1731) 
are present, and the thirty percent in which works by al-Suyūṭī are found. The most circulated 
work of al-Shaʿrānī was al-Mīzān al-kubrā, the jurisprudential work that calls for a return to the 
source of the Law, i.e. the Qurʾān and Sunna while acknowledging the equal status of all the 
schools of Law. The second most well-read book was his biography al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā and 
al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir. It is notable that the works of al-Shaʿrānī were by far more popular 
than those of Damascus saint Ibn ʿArabī, and that his al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir was relatively 
well-read by Damascene intellectuals during this period, despite al-Shaʿrānī’s Egyptian origin. 
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al-Shaʿrānī are also little known in modern scholarship. This is partly because they were 
either recently published (al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya in 2006 and al-Mīzān al-dharriyya in 
2007) or remain in manuscript form (al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya and al-Qawāʿid 
al-sunniyya).  
    The lack of attention to this subject can also be attributed to the reductive view that 
is currently taken of al-Shaʿrānī. Previous studies have tended to regard al-Shaʿrānī as a 
Law-abiding, moderate Sufi who hesitated to accept the extreme, antinomian mysticism 
of Ibn ʿArabī. This has resulted in al-Shaʿrānī’s defence of Ibn ʿArabī being considered    
merely apologetic; that is to say that he is viewed as having respected Ibn ʿArabī purely 
because the latter was already regarded as a great saint by the sixteenth-century, but that 
he nevertheless kept a distance from his monistic worldview.4 Such observations have 
been drawn from al-Shaʿrānī’s abundant quoting of Ibn ʿArabī’s al-Futūḥāt 
al-Makkiyya, whereby he arbitrarily recontextualised excerpts, distorted their originally 
intended meanings, or avoided the more controversial passages altogether. 5  This 
simplistic analysis seems to have led recent scholarship to overlook the intricate 
structure and context of al-Shaʿrānī’s writings, to the dismissal of his meticulous efforts 
to reinterpret Ibn ʿArabī as uncritical and contradictory.  
    The impetus for the present study is therefore to consider al-Shaʿrānī’s reception of 
Ibn ʿArabī’s thought in a new light, using hitherto uninvestigated materials. The recent 
publication of some of al-Shaʿrānī’s works, as well as the present author’s research trip 
to the manuscript library in Istanbul made the pursuit of this subject possible. I will 
especially argue against the current scholarly consensus of Winter, Trimingham, and 
El-Rouayheb that paints al-Shaʿrānī as a mediocre apologist who was indifferent to Ibn 
                                                
4 Winter, Society and Religion, 127-129. 
5 Winter, Society and Religion, 129-130; El-Rouayheb, Intellectual History, 238-240. 
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ʿArabī’s mystical worldview. Contrary to their view, we shall see in this study how his 
approach to Ibn ʿArabī was based on critical methodology and systematicity. The 
contribution of this thesis is thus to fill a gap in modern scholarship in order to better 
understand al-Shaʿrānī’s endorsement of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought through extensive and 
thorough analysis.  
    To this end, the study primarily examines the strategies that al-Shaʿrānī carefully 
adopted in his defence of Ibn ʿArabī. I will demonstrate that, in keeping with the 
opinions of other allegedly ‘apologetic’ supporters of Ibn ʿArabī in fifteenth- and 
sixteenth-century Egypt, al-Shaʿrānī reinterprets the ontological doctrine of the oneness 
of existence from a different perspective by regarding it as a visionary, perceptual 
experience. It is also argued that by adopting the structure of the tripartite hierarchy of 
the articles of faith, al-Shaʿrānī presents Ibn ʿArabī’s theories differently depending on 
the readership. Furthermore, I will also investigate how al-Shaʿrānī discusses the 
individual teachings of Ibn ʿArabī in relation to various theological issues, such as 
divine creation, divine knowledge, and the anthropomorphic attributes. Through these 
observations, the thesis will highlight al-Shaʿrānī’s unique attempts to integrate Ibn 
ʿArabī’s views into his own theological worldview, thereby establishing Ibn 
ʿArabī-inspired mysticism as an independent discipline for treating theological issues 
and making the latter’s thought more acceptable for a wider audience.  
 
2. Structure of the Study 
 
    This study is composed of five main chapters. Following the literature review, in 
Chapter 1, I provide a biographical sketch of al-Shaʿrānī’s life along with his 
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intellectual milieu. This will be followed by an account of the polemics over Ibn 
ʿArabī’s thought before al-Shaʿrānī. I examine the arguments of four of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
famous adversaries: the Syrian Ḥanbalī Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), the Timurid 
Ḥanafī-Ashʿarī Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390), the Yemeni Ashʿarī Ḥusayn ibn 
al-Ahdal (d. 855/1451), and the Egyptian Shāfiʿī jurist Burhān al-Dīn al-Biqāʿī (d. 
885/1480). I then consider the views of three of Ibn ʿArabī’s supporters who were also 
teachers and colleagues of al-Shaʿrānī: the Egyptian Shāfiʿī Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 
911/1505), Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī (d. 926/1520), and Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī (d. 
973-4/1566-7). The investigation focuses on the methodologies that these pro-Ibn 
ʿArabī scholars in the Arabic-speaking world uniquely employed in their defence of him. 
In opposition to the currently agreed upon view that, like al-Shaʿrānī, they were mere 
apologists of Ibn ʿArabī, I argue that they strategically adapted the arguments of 
anti-Ibn ʿArabī scholars, presenting ‘the oneness of existence’ as something similar to 
‘the oneness of witnessing’ (waḥdat al-shuhūd). Lastly, the chapter introduces 
al-Shaʿrānī’s oeuvre of theology. Here, I pay attention to the underlying structure of his 
works, namely, the tripartite hierarchy of the articles of faith (ʿaqāʾid), clarifying who 
the readers were – whether such texts were addressed to advanced mystics, 
non-advanced mystics, or commoners. The analysis will allow us to explore and 
demystify al-Shaʿrānī’s various theological opinions.  
    In Chapter 2, in order to contextualise al-Shaʿrānī’s views in his scholarly milieu, I 
will examine his general approach to Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, focusing on his explicit 
endorsement of reading the oneness of existence as the oneness of witnessing or 
experiential oneness. As I shall demonstrate, al-Shaʿrānī’s discussions of this subject 
are intended for the mystics who were not advanced enough to accept the full scale of 
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Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical worldview, as well as for theologians who were suspicious of his 
teachings. For our purpose, this second chapter will provide a brief sketch of the history 
of the doctrine of the oneness of witnessing. I then consider how al-Shaʿrānī reinterprets 
passages in Ibn ʿArabī’s writings based on this tenet. It will become clear that 
al-Shaʿrānī’s defence of Ibn ʿArabī was built on the dichotomous framework proposed 
by Ibn ʿArabī’s adversaries, and that al-Shaʿrānī’s position needs to be understood 
against the backdrop of the polemics over Ibn ʿArabī in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries.  
    Chapter 3 contains two main arguments. It first sets out to demonstrate 
al-Shaʿrānī’s reception of Ibn ʿArabī’s ontological monism. Here, I disagree with 
present scholarship claiming that al-Shaʿrānī was not interested in Ibn ʿArabī’s monistic 
worldview. In contrast to the findings of Chapter 2, it is argued that al-Shaʿrānī actually 
promotes the tenet of the oneness of existence and the ontology of God’s 
self-manifestation in the world’s beings (tajallī). This stance is not contradictory to his 
thought elsewhere, since, in his discussion of this topic, he is addressing advanced 
mystics who are ready to embrace such cosmological teachings – not the average 
mystics and theologians who cannot fully grasp them. The investigation will highlight 
al-Shaʿrānī’s multi-layered approaches to Ibn ʿArabī’s thought. In relation to this, and 
as the second main argument of the chapter, I turn towards al-Shaʿrānī’s treatment, in 
works written for conventional non-advanced mystics and theologians, of the 
immutable entities (aʿyān thābita), a theory which is essential to Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical 
cosmology. The investigation will specifically examine the extent to which al-Shaʿrānī 
endorses the theory of the immutable entities in terms of his adherence to some of its 
key features, with the objective of clarifying its functions within his theological thought. 
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It will emerge that some of al-Shaʿrānī’s discussions of this teaching are presented as 
responses to its opponents, placing his views, once again, in the polemical context of 
Ibn ʿArabī’s legacy. 
    The findings of Chapter 3 inform Chapter 4, where I look at al-Shaʿrānī’s 
treatment of the anthropomorphic attributes of God. Here, I will explore the central 
question of this thesis concerning al-Shaʿrānī’s integration of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings 
into his own theological worldview. For the purpose of this survey, I will delineate 
al-Shaʿrānī’s refutation of figurative interpretation, investigate his understanding of the 
notion of divine self-assimilation through perceptual similarity (tashbīh), and analyse 
his treatment of God’s visionary self-manifestation. As I will explain, these ideas are 
provided as alternatives for Ibn ʿArabī’s endorsement of divine immanence and God’s 
ontological self-manifestation in the world’s beings. These observations will establish 
the originality of al-Shaʿrānī in his attempts to reinterpret Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings in a 
systematic manner, incorporating them into his own theology. In order to further detail 
al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to the question of the anthropomorphic attributes, I will also 
consider his view on the interpretive method of the Ḥanbalī scholars. I will argue that 
al-Shaʿrānī’s theological project, in keeping with a traditionalist approach and based on 
Ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism, focuses on offering answers to the issue of the 
anthropomorphic attributes of God.  
    Lastly, furthering the analysis on the anthropomorphic attributes, Chapter 5 is 
concerned with al-Shaʿrānī’s understanding of ‘God’s with-ness’ (maʿiyya), as 
suggested in verses including ‘He [God] is with you wherever you are’ [Q. 57:4]. After 
reviewing the theologians’ and Ibn ʿArabī’s stances on this notion, I will focus my 
attention, once again, on the extent of al-Shaʿrānī’s reception of the latter’s thought. The 
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chapter considers the views of the little known Shādhilī Sufis in Mamluk Egypt, 
Muḥammad al-Maghribī (d. 910-911/1504-1506) and his disciple Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī 
(d. 914/1508-9), both of whom were influenced by Ibn ʿArabī in their interpretation of 
God’s with-ness. As will become clear, al-Shaʿrānī incorporates Ibn ʿArabī’s thesis of 
the relationship between God’s essence and His essential attributes, as well as the 
theological opinions of these mystics, into his own approach to the subject of God’s 
with-ness. The analysis here confirms al-Shaʿrānī’s adherence to Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings, 
demonstrating that his thought needs to be understood against the intellectual backdrop 
of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.   
    The thesis is thus founded on three broad themes: (1) the investigation of 
al-Shaʿrānī’s general approach in his defence of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought and the 
contextualisaion of this stance within his own theological milieu (Chapters 1 and 2); (2) 
a survey of al-Shaʿrānī’s endorsement of the ontology of Ibn ʿArabī for advanced 
mystics (Chapter 3); and (3) the interrogation of al-Shaʿrānī’s treatment of the 
individual teachings of Ibn ʿArabī, the discussions of which are intended for the broader 
audience of average, non-advanced mystics and theologians (Chapters 3, 4, and 5).  
    This thesis will demonstrate the complexity of al-Shaʿrānī’s presentation of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s thought, against the reductive assessment of previous studies. As I shall argue, 
al-Shaʿrānī’s main aim is to discuss Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical teachings within the context 
of certain theological issues, with the objective of defending Ibn ʿArabī from the 
theologians’ attacks. We will see in Chapter 1 that this attempt to fuse theological and 
mystical doctrines was first embarked upon by al-Shaʿrānī’s teacher Zakariyyāʾ 
al-Anṣārī. Taking over this theological project, al-Shaʿrānī advanced it by further 
integrating Ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism into the subject of theology. The present study will 
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thus establish al-Shaʿrānī’s position as an ingenious, strategic supporter of Ibn ʿArabī. 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
    Al-Shaʿrānī’s texts first received attention because they provided western 
researchers with historical insights into late Mamluk and early Ottoman Egypt, the 
details of which are only scarcely recorded by other historians of his age.6 Scholars 
such as MacDonald, Arberry, and Trimingham introduced al-Shaʿrānī as one of the 
finest Sufi thinkers who, in their view, appeared at a time when Sufism was stagnating.7 
However, they did not give his actual teachings much in-depth attention. Later, Winter, 
Johnson, and most recently Sabra wrote significant monographs on al-Shaʿrānī that 
greatly contributed to the understanding of his thought. In what follows, I first review 
three studies by these recent scholars (Winter, Johnson, and Sabra). I will then take a 
brief look at three more articles that feature al-Shaʿrānī’s jurisprudential views. 
Although the objective of this study does not concern his jurisprudence per se, some of 
the suggestions these articles make, especially concerning al-Shaʿrānī’s efforts to 
integrate Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching into society at large and to make it accessible to a wider 
audience, are pertinent to the current thesis. Lastly, I consider four Arabic studies 
dedicated to clarifying al-Shaʿrānī’s thought.  
    Apart from these texts, a few more recent studies will be referenced in due course.8 
                                                
6 Padwick, Muslim Devotions; Garcin, ‘Index des Tabaqāt,’ 31-94; Schimmel, ‘Sufismus,’ 
274-289.  
7 MacDonald, Development of Muslim Theology, 179-180; Arberry, Sufism, 123; Trimingham, 
The Sufi Order, 220-225. The idea of intellectual decline or stagnation in the medieval Islamic 
world and Arab worlds has been refuted in recent research. See, for example, El-Rouayheb, 
‘Opening the Gate of Verification,’ 263-281; Islamic Intellectual History.  
8 McGregor, ‘Notes on the Transmission,’ 380-392; Geoffroy, Le soufisme. 
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While they are not as substantial as other studies, they nonetheless give us useful insight 
into al-Shaʿrānī’s mystical thought.  
 
Winter, Society and Religion, 1982. 
    Winter’s work investigates the details of al-Shaʿrānī’s background as well as the 
cultural, religious, and social milieu of sixteenth-century Egypt. It covers a wide range 
of topics – from popular Sufi orders and scholarly life to the daily toil of rural living – 
as described in the writings of al-Shaʿrānī. This study is still frequently referred to when 
discussing al-Shaʿrānī and the history of early Ottoman Egypt. It must be noted, 
however, that the author’s position is based on the misleading assumption that Ibn 
ʿArabī was an extreme, antinomian Sufi whereas his follower al-Shaʿrānī was a 
representative of the moderate, Law-abiding Sufis.9 This reductive assumption, which 
might hold true in the views of Ibn ʿArabī’s antagonists, is not accurate, not least 
because current scholarship agrees that Ibn ʿArabī never disregarded the Law.  
    The purported orthodox-unorthodox dichotomy, in which al-Shaʿrānī is pitted 
against Ibn ʿArabī, seems to have made Winter and others such as Trimingham struggle 
to explain al-Shaʿrānī’s fervent support for Ibn ʿArabī. For these scholars, Ibn ʿArabī’s 
extreme monism seemed irreconcilable with al-Shaʿrānī’s modest Sufism. Winter 
therefore describes al-Shaʿrānī’s defence of Ibn ʿArabī as ‘unexpected’ and ‘apologetic’, 
maintaining that the reason behind his espousal of Ibn ʿArabī does not lie in the 
theological sphere, but is, rather, an expected attitude in the socio-political context of a 
time during which Ibn ʿArabī was widely revered and upheld as a symbol of Sufism.10 
    Based on this observation, Winter proceeds to list al-Shaʿrānī’s ways of 
                                                
9 See also a comment by Knysh in his Ibn ʿArabī, 313, 173n. 
10 Winter, Society and Religion, 128. 
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approaching Ibn ʿArabī and his beliefs concerning Ibn ʿArabī. They are as follows: (1) 
al-Shaʿrānī tries not to associate himself entirely with Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings, as he 
admits in the beginning of al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir his incapacity to comprehend some 
of the latter’s passages in al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya; (2) al-Shaʿrānī believes that Ibn 
ʿArabī’s works have been interpolated by others, and consequently contain some 
anti-Law statements; (3) according to al-Shaʿrānī, Ibn ʿArabī and other Sufis use their 
terminologies in a specific way, and hence their writings should not be accessible to 
those who are not adept in Sufism; (4) in al-Shaʿrānī’s view, since no one knows Ibn 
ʿArabī’s real intentions, it is better for a Muslim not to declare other Muslims 
unbelievers; (5) in al-Shaʿrānī’s mind, Sufis may profess utterances that go against the 
Law upon being enraptured by their love towards God, but their remarks in this 
particular state of mind should be sanctioned; (6) al-Shaʿrānī interprets Ibn ʿArabī’s 
phrases out of context, twisting the originally intended meaning, without necessarily 
presenting the latter’s theological system in a more favourable manner.11   
    In reference to this, Winter notes that al-Shaʿrānī’s overall apologism and 
subsequent distortion of Ibn ʿArabī’s arguments were effective, as Ibn ʿArabī’s 
opponents, while aware of his most popular statements, were probably unfamiliar with 
the details of his actual teachings. Therefore, it could not have been that difficult to 
clear Ibn ʿArabī of the heretical charges against him.12 Winter then adduces several 
cases, in which he believes al-Shaʿrānī to have unsystematically interpreted Ibn ʿArabī’s 
statements. One of them – the interpretation of a line from a poem, taken from Ibn 
ʿArabī’s Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, Chapter 5 – reads: ‘He praises me and I praise Him, He 
                                                
11 Winter, Society and Religion, 129-131. 
12 Winter, Society and Religion, 131. 
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worships me and I worship Him.’13 Based on Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical and cosmological 
view that God brings the world’s beings into existence by manifesting Himself in them 
while they manifest His inner realities upon themselves, 14  this particular poem 
highlights the mutual dependency between God and His creation. As we shall see in 
Chapter 1, this ostensibly pantheistic theory earned Ibn ʿArabī criticism, for it implies 
that God is in want of the world and that He is identified with His creation. As Winter 
observes, al-Shaʿrānī takes a different approach to the poem by interpreting ‘He praises 
me’ as ‘He thanks me when I praise Him,’ and ‘He worships me and I worship Him’ as 
‘He obeys me by answering my prayer.’15 Winter also treats al-Shaʿrānī’s interpretation 
of another one of Ibn ʿArabī’s controversial remarks, which goes: ‘there is no existence 
but God [lā mawjūda illā Allāh].’ The statement was later condemned for promoting 
ontological monism. In reply to this, al-Shaʿrānī maintains that ‘if indeed he [Ibn 
ʿArabī] did say so, it must mean that nothing exists independently except God and 
everything else exists through others,’ thus excluding the monistic implication.16  
    For Winter, these examples of superficial and justificatory reinterpretation 
demonstrate al-Shaʿrānī’s uncritical and apologist attitude towards Ibn ʿArabī. In 
                                                
13 Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 69/83; Winter, Society and Religion, 132. For the sake of 
precision, in this study, I referred to two editions of Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam: (1) that published by Dār 
al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī in 1980 and (2) the edition published by Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya in 2003.  
14 Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 68-69/83. In Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, the passage prior to this poem goes 
as follows:  
 
If it is affirmed that existence belongs to God, and not to you, then the 
determinations (ḥukm) [of your states] belong to you without doubt but in existence 
of God […] He only gives you existence, while you determine your states. Hence, 
do not praise anyone except yourself, and do not accuse anyone except you. God 
deserves praise for granting existence to you, for it belongs to Him, not you. You 
nourish God with your determinations, whereas God nourishes you with [His] 
existence [Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 68/83]. 
 
15 Winter, Society and Religion, 131-132; al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 17. 
16 Winter, Society and Religion, 131; al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 17. This 
interpretation is also referred to by El-Rouayheb as attesting to al-Shaʿrānī’s attempt to make 
ontological monism innocuous. See El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 344-345. 
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opposition to this current reading, and based on the thorough investigation of hitherto 
unstudied materials, I will argue that al-Shaʿrānī meticulously reinterprets Ibn ʿArabī’s 
worldview in a positive manner by taking a different approach to it.   
 
Johnson, ‘The Unerring Balance: A Study of the Theory of Sanctity (Wilāyah) of 
‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī,’ 1985. 
    Johnson’s elaborate thesis on al-Shaʿrānī’s concept of sainthood (wilāya) explores 
his attempt to contextualise Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings in society. After explaining 
metaphysical theories such as the hierarchy of the saints and the seal of the saints which 
al-Shaʿrānī learnt from Ibn ‘Arabī, Johnson sets out to describe the unique role that the 
former attributed to the saints; namely, the role of saints as the guardians of Egyptian 
society. Johnson argues that in the eyes of al-Shaʿrānī, who was well aware of the dire 
situation of the commoners suffering from poverty and social upheavals, the 
conventional theory of saints and sainthood sounded too abstract and detached from 
society. What was urgently needed was an image of a saint who could help reduce 
people’s afflictions. Based on this premise, Johnson gathers numerous descriptions of 
saints who can shoulder the suffering of the people from al-Shaʿrānī’s al-Baḥr 
al-mawrūd, Laṭāʾif al-minan wa-l-akhlāq, and al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā. She describes in 
detail how these saints, using their spiritual power, can take upon themselves individual 
diseases or injuries as well as impending disasters that are expected to occur in Egypt. 
She further refers to al-Shaʿrānī’s theory that the saints receive different degrees of 
affliction in accordance with the rank that they occupy in the hierarchy of saints.  
    Although Johnson’s account of the sayings and actions attributed to various 
Egyptian saints is highly valuable, her study seems to be embedded within the static 
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two-tier framework of Sufism: the modest and Law-abiding al-Shaʿrānī on one pole and 
the extreme and antinomian Ibn ʿArabī on the other. As Johnson explicitly states, her 
study starts with the assumption that Ibn ʿArabī severed the link and complementary 
relationship that had up until then existed between the Law and sainthood. This is based 
on her understanding that for Ibn ʿArabī the saints could attain the truth without 
adherence to the Law. It was al-Shaʿrānī, argues Johnson, who tried to restore the place 
of sainthood within the bounds of orthodox Islam, granting popular Sufism authority. In 
order to underpin this point, she reiterates how the saints who are depicted as the 
guardians of Egypt in al-Shaʿrānī’s texts remain subjected to the injunctions of the 
Law.17 This conclusion is no longer sustainable, since the premise that Ibn ʿArabī was 
antinomian has been repeatedly disproven in recent scholarship. Ibn ʿArabī did not take 
Islamic Law lightly; rather, he regarded its abidance as necessary in order to attain the 
state of perfection, whilst criticising those who dismissed the Law. 18  This 
misconception leads Johnson, just like Winter and Trimingham, to dismiss al-Shaʿrānī, 
in his espousal of Ibn ʿArabī, as an unsystematic apologist. She therefore reductively 
concludes that al-Shaʿrānī only apologetically defended Ibn ʿArabī by insisting that the 
latter’s works had been misinterpreted or falsified by his antagonists.  
  Johnson’s assessment of al-Shaʿrānī as a restorer of Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching of 
sainthood within the sphere of the Law was later refuted by McGregor. Surveying 
al-Shaʿrānī’s al-Kibrīt al-aḥmar, McGregor demonstrates that he faithfully upheld Ibn 
                                                
17 Later, Johnson published articles based on her dissertation in which she presents al-Shaʿrānī 
as a Sufi who attempts to retrieve the link between the Law and the Reality shattered by Ibn 
ʿArabī. See Johnson, ‘The Unerring Balance (Part 1),’ 284-300 and ‘The Unerring Balance (Part 
2),’ 24-41. She also published another article as a summary of her dissertation, focusing more 
on al-Shaʿrānī’s biography (Johnson, ‘ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī,’ 15-39).  
18 Addas, The Voyage of No Return, 121; Chittick, The Sufi Path, 256-262; Imaginal Worlds, 
43-45. 
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ʿArabī’s key beliefs on the theory of sainthood. Al-Shaʿrānī does replace some of its 
terms with less problematic ones, notes McGregor, but the terms he employs make 
sense in the wider context of Ibn ʿArabī’s worldview. Based on this observation, 
McGregor concludes that al-Shaʻrānī is not only an apologist of Ibn ʿArabī but also an 
exponent and transmitter of his thought.19 McGregor’s evaluation of al-Shaʿrānī’s role 
in a more positive light accords with what this study aims to achieve. 
 
Sabra, The Guidebook for Gullible Jurists and Mendicants to the Conditions for 
Befriending Emirs and the Abbreviated Guidebook for Gullible Jurists and 
Mendicants to the Conditions for Befriending Emirs, 2013. 
    In the introduction to two of al-Shaʿrānī’s translated works, Sabra explains 
al-Shaʿrānī’s political views and his connections with the Mamluk and Ottoman elites. 
According to the study, al-Shaʿrānī’s widespread influence lies in his combination of 
the culture of literate religious scholars (ʿulamāʾ) with that of popular religion, 
represented by his Sufi teacher ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ al-Burullusī (d. 939/1532-1533). As 
Sabra explores in another article, ‘Illiterate Sufis and Learned Artisans: The Circle of 
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī’, whilst al-Shaʿrānī himself was a well-educated scholar of 
rural origin, many members of his Sufi circle were learned artisans who would never 
been counted amongst the ʿulamāʾ, and illiterate Sufis belonging to the lower classes.20 
For this reason, and unlike other scholars of his age, al-Shaʿrānī showed a remarkable 
knowledge of the lives of ordinary people. His experience of different classes of 
Egyptian society, argues Sabra, greatly affected his political and social attitudes. 
    Sabra then proceeds to investigate al-Shaʿrānī’s political theory, that is to say, his 
                                                
19 McGregor, ‘Notes on the Transmission,’ 390. 
20 Sabra, ‘Illiterate Sufis and Learned Artisans,’ 153-168.  
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separation between the manifest government exercised by sultans and the hidden 
government exercised by saints. He does so by focusing on the proper relationship 
between the ruling class and the Sufi teachers. According to Sabra, al-Shaʿrānī believes 
that one must obey the government even when it is tyrannical, as the source of political 
power is divinely determined, just like the authority of sainthood is of divine origin. In 
other words, a religious scholar has no right to challenge the political authorities. What 
the Sufi teacher can do in this situation is to be a spiritual advisor and intercede on 
behalf of ordinary Muslims both with God and the political authorities. Moreover, the 
Sufi teacher should intervene for the sultans and officials through interceding for their 
salvation and giving them protection. Sabra’s study illustrates how al-Shaʿrānī achieved 
popularity in the community by standing not only on the side of political authorities but 
also with the popular classes. It is thus evident that al-Shaʿrānī was indeed a meticulous 
thinker who knew how to appeal to different groups of society, acting ‘in accordance 
with the best interest (maṣlaḥa) of each Muslim individual’.21  
    Later, Sabra published a completed translation of al-Shaʿrānī’s second work, which 
he examined in the study, entitled ‘Advice for Callow Jurists and Gullible Mendicants 
on Gullible Mendicants on Befriending Emirs.’ Although the current thesis does not 
intend to contribute to the subject of al-Shaʿrānī’s political views and his relationship 
with the authorities, Sabra’s observation about his interest in the welfare of each 
Muslim individual, regardless of class, is a subject that is relevant to this study.  
 
Studies on al-Shaʿrānī’s Jurisprudence  
    Al-Shaʿrānī’s jurisprudential works, especially Kashf al-ghumma and Mīzān 
                                                
21 Sabra, The Guidebook to Gullible Jurists, 17. 
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al-kubrā, were extensively studied by Pagani, Ibrahim, and Dajani. Highlighting the 
concept of ‘the differences of opinion amongst the schools of law’ (ikhtilāf 
al-madhāhib), Pagani argues that al-Shaʿrānī’s jurisprudential objective was to remove 
the controversies from the schools of law whilst letting their differences continue to 
coexist. 22  In his view, al-Shaʿrānī combined Sufi and legal discourses by 
accommodating Ibn ʿArabī’s hermeneutics into the cultural history of the early Ottoman 
period. His claim that al-Shaʿrānī’s texts, such as al-Mīzān al-kubrā, helped control 
access to Ibn ʿArabī’s al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya merits attention. As we shall see, this is 
how al-Shaʿrānī most likely popularised the latter’s mystical teachings to the wider 
audience.23   
    Ibrahim’s study stresses the importance of reading al-Shaʿrānī’s works within the 
contexts of the Ottoman Ḥanafization and the debates over the validity of pragmatic 
eclecticism. According to Ibrahim, the Ottoman government started conformity 
reformism during the sixteenth century in order to unify the legal system under the 
Ḥanafī school of law. This was to abolish Mamluk legal pluralism whereby the four 
schools were given equal orthodoxy. Al-Shaʿrānī opposed this reform and supported the 
practice of pragmatic eclecticism. According to the notion of pragmatic eclecticism, 
vulnerable laypeople are automatically allowed to change their school of law for 
pragmatic reasons. In al-Shaʿrānī’s view, argues Ibrahim, they can follow a more lenient 
juristic opinion without having to consult a scholar. This is in sharp contrast to the 
purist position that there is only one correct juristic opinion. Ibrahim maintains that 
al-Shaʿrānī aimed to develop Ibn ʿArabī’s view on pragmatic eclecticism into a theory 
of legal pluralism. To conclude, Ibrahim writes that al-Shaʿrānī’s jurisprudential 
                                                
22 Pagani, ‘The Meaning of the Ikhtilāf al-Madhāhib,’ 177-212. 
23 Pagani, ‘The Meaning of the Ikhtilāf al-Madhāhib,’ 211. 
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approach should be read as a response to the social needs of that period, rather than as 
legal or mystical speculation.24  
    In his recent study, Dajani considers the extent of the influence of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
teachings on al-Shaʿrānī’s jurisprudential writings. Through thorough analysis and 
comparison of the texts, Dajani demonstrates how faithfully the ideas of Ibn ʿArabī 
were represented in al-Shaʿrānī’s. He observes that just as Ibn ʿArabī approved of the 
different opinions of jurists and gave them spiritual justification, so did al-Shaʿrānī. The 
difference between the two thinkers is that al-Shaʿrānī’s arguments were much simpler, 
making them more accessible to laypeople. This view is underpinned by the premise 
that al-Shaʿrānī showed great concern and respect towards laypeople. Dajani concludes 
that ‘by making these [jurisprudential] ideas more accessible to the layperson, one could 
argue that al-Mīzān al-kubrā was able to achieve Ibn ʿArabī’s own goals of making the 
law easier for the laypeople more than the Futūḥāt itself.’25  
 
Studies on al-Shaʿrānī in Arabic 
      There are several Arabic monographs that undertook the examination of 
al-Shaʿrānī’s thought and that deserve special attention here: (1) al-Shaʿrānī: Imām 
al-taṣawwuf fī ʿaṣri-hi by Tawfīq (1945); (2) al-Taṣawwuf al-islāmī wa-l-imām 
al-Shaʿrānī by Surūr (ca. 1952)26; (3) ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī: Imām al-qarn 
al-ʿāshir by al-Qarnī (1985); (4) Khiṭāb al-siyāsī al-ṣūfī fī Miṣr: Qirāʾa fī khiṭāb ʿAbd 
al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī lil-sulṭa wa-l-mujtamaʿ by al-Dālī (2011).  
    Described by Winter as one of the most important studies on al-Shaʿrānī written in 
                                                
24 Ibrahim, ‘Al-Shaʿrānī’s Response to Legal Purism,’ 110-140. 
25 Dajani, ‘Ibn ʿArabī’s Conception of Ijtihād,’ 192-193. 
26 At the end of the book, the editor’s concluding remark is dated as 1952. However, there is no 
reference to the exact publication date. 
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Arabic,27 Tawfīq details al-Shaʿrānī’s life and scholarly atmosphere by focusing on his 
role as a teacher in his Sufi lodge. In particular, he surveys al-Shaʿrānī’s relations with 
other Sufi teachers and disciples, jurists, and the Ottoman officials; Tawfīq also 
delineates al-Shaʿrānī’s ideas on religious duties and ethics that a mystic ought to 
follow. The study stresses al-Shaʿrānī’s uniqueness as a Sufi of his period. This is 
observed, for example, in al-Shaʿrānī’s refusal to receive a gift from the officials on 
their first visit to him and in his insistence upon obtaining different types of knowledge 
of the Law and Sufism. With regard to al-Shaʿrānī’s support of Ibn ʿArabī, Tawfīq 
ascribes it to the clichéd reasons that Ibn ʿArabī’s works are falsified and that his 
remarks should appropriately be interpreted in the way that complies with the Law (and 
henceforth, Ibn ʿArabī is excused from the charge of heresy). On the whole, the study is 
well structured and its arguments are plain and straightforward. However, it does not 
examine the details of al-Shaʿrānī’s understanding of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, let alone 
discussing the methodologies behind al-Shaʿrānī’s espousal of it.  
    Similarly to Tawfīq’s work, Surūr sets out to investigate al-Shaʿrānī’s general 
approach to Sufism, in addition to providing a vivid account of his biography and 
intellectual life. Surūr’s arguments centre around the apologetic defence of Sufism; that 
is to say, he insists that true Sufism follows the Law and is hence unrelated to the 
heretical idea of the oneness of existence, and that al-Shaʿrānī, as well as Ibn ʿArabī, 
was amongst the Law-abiding, modest Sufis who do not belong to the advocates of the 
oneness of existence. In order to reiterate these points, Surūr selectively quotes 
al-Shaʿrānī’s remarks that display an agreement between Sufis and jurists/theologians 
regarding their understanding of the Law and religious belief. The study also refers to 
                                                
27 Winter, Society and Religion, 3. 
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several important ideas expressed by al-Shaʿrānī, including descriptions of his 
miraculous deeds, his view on the ruling class, and his intention to harmonise the 
teaching of Sufism and that of theology – which this thesis aims to illuminate. Although 
Surūr’s work is a good introduction to al-Shaʿrānī’s thought and his intellectual context 
in general, unfortunately it does not analyse any of these subjects in detail. Furthermore, 
the explanations proceed by accepting al-Shaʿrānī’s statements uncritically. 
Consequently, like other studies on al-Shaʿrānī, Surūr’s work overlooks the intricate 
structure that al-Shaʿrānī adopts to defend Ibn ʿArabī.  
    Recognising al-Shaʿrānī as an important Sufi in the medieval history of Islam, 
al-Qarnī elucidates al-Shaʿrānī’s scholarly life by covering a wide range of subjects. 
They include al-Shaʿrānī’s opinions on certain Sufi practices and ethics, along with his 
relations to and views of some of his Sufi teachers and other mystics, his attempt to 
unify different schools of the Law, his emphasis on attaining religious knowledge and 
basing his actions upon it, and his aim of reconciling the theological and mystical group. 
By quoting al-Shaʿrānī’s famous works as well as his biography which was written a 
few centuries after his death,28 al-Qarnī discusses each theme in a more detailed 
manner than the two studies reviewed above, presenting al-Shaʿrānī as a modest and 
sensible scholar. In spite of his careful analysis of al-Shaʿrānī, however, al-Qarnī’s 
arguments remain descriptive, without giving enough attention to the methodologies 
and the worldview based on which al-Shaʿrānī developed his ideas. This results, once 
again, in a failure to properly examine al-Shaʿrānī’s reception of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought.  
    In his recent survey of al-Shaʿrānī’s political discourse, al-Dālī clarifies 
al-Shaʿrānī’s discussions of the authority of the Mamluk and Ottoman governments, of 
                                                
28 The text is entitled as al-Manākib al-kubrā written by Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Mālijī in 
the year 1109/1697. 
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the influence that government policies can exert on shaping society, and of the desirable 
relationship between the ruling class and people in society. To this end, al-Dālī 
interrogates several famous works of al-Shaʿrānī by reading the related passages closely. 
The study concludes that al-Shaʿrānī was not only a mystic who kept teaching in his 
Sufi lodge, but also a man of flexible opinions who aimed, in this case, to reconcile the 
position of the government with that of the Egyptian society and to represent the 
interests of both as much as possible. Although al-Dālī does not discuss al-Shaʿrānī’s 
theological discourse, the work is insightful in that it casts light on the versatility of 
al-Shaʿrānī’s teachings and their relevance to the present time. The work is timely, 
especially because it was published in the the year when the political demonstrations 
against the Egyptian government began.29  
    To summarise, previous studies on al-Shaʿrānī were concerned with the following 
points: (1) his religious/cultural milieu (discussed by Winter, Surūr, Tawfīq, and 
al-Qarnī; (2) his theory of saints and sainthood (Johnson); (3) his political theory and 
the theory of the ideal relationships between Sufi teachers and the ruling class (Sabra 
and al-Dālī); and (4) his jurisprudential teachings (Pagani, Ibrahim, and Dajani). 
However, these important studies, as I have repeatedly mentioned, do not consider the 
details of al-Shaʿrānī’s theological defence of Ibn ʿArabī.  
    The central aim of this thesis is therefore to investigate al-Shaʿrānī’s presentation 
of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings in a theological context through a close reading of his works 
of theology. It will expose the systematicity in al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to Ibn ʿArabī’s 
mysticism, situate his defence in the intellectual, theological milieu of his period, and 
demonstrate al-Shaʿrānī’s unique attempt to integrate Ibn ʿArabī’s thought into his own 
                                                
29 Although the year of publication is 2011, the date noted in the editor’s preface shows that the 
book was already complete in 2004. 
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Al-Shaʿrānī’s Life, Intellectual Milieu, and Oeuvre 
 
This chapter explores al-Shaʿrānī’s biography, scholarly context, and writings. 
There has so far been little analysis of how al-Shaʿrānī’s teachers and colleagues 
influenced his views on Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, nor of what factors contributed to shaping 
the structure of his works of theology. It is therefore important to situate al-Shaʿrānī’s 
ideas within the scholarly trends of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Egypt in order to get 
a better understanding of his theological project of defending Ibn ʿArabī. To this end, I 
will read the texts of al-Shaʿrānī’s teachers and colleagues closely, detail their attitudes 
to Ibn ʿArabī, and identify some correspondences in ideas between al-Shaʿrānī’s 
approach and that of his contemporaries to Ibn ʿArabī.  
The current chapter consequently explores three themes in three different sections. 
In the first section, I outline al-Shaʿrānī’s biography, emphasising in particular his role 
as a Sufi, and then introduce some of his most important teachers and colleagues, 
paying special attention to their stance on Ibn ʿArabī. They include Jalāl al-Dīn 
al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī (d. 926/1520), Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad 
al-Ramlī (d. 957/1550), Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī (d. 973-4/1566-7), Abū Ḥasan al-Bakrī (d. 
ca. 951-954/1544-1547), his son Muḥammad al-Bakrī (d. 994/1586), and ʿAlī 
al-Khawwāṣ al-Burullusī (d. 939/1532-1533).   
In the second section, I investigate the controversies concerning Ibn ʿArabī’s 
teachings, which raged well into the late Mamluk period. First, I provide an overview of 
Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, looking in particular at his ideas on ‘the oneness of existence’ 
(waḥdat al-wujūd) and ‘God’s self-manifestation’ (tajallī). Next, I analyse the thought 
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of four of his adversaries – Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 
792/1390), Ḥusayn Ibn al-Ahdal (d. 855/1451), and Burhān al-Dīn al-Biqāʿī (d. 
885/1480). Here, I will clarify the criticisms of Ibn ʿArabī that were of most concern to 
his supporters in late Mamluk and early Ottoman Egypt. Finally, I examine the 
arguments and strategies that al-Suyūṭī, al-Anṣārī and Ibn Ḥajar adopted from Ibn 
ʿArabī’s antagonists in order to defend him. Against the currently agreed view that the 
Arabic-speaking advocates of Ibn ʿArabī in this period were uncritical apologists, I will 
argue that they methodically defended him by drawing on the theological framework 
already defined by his opponents. This finding will inform Chapter 2, where I shall 
contextualise al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to Ibn ʿArabī’s thought by focusing on how 
al-Shaʿrānī adopts this framework and further advances it. 
The third section introduces al-Shaʿrānī’s theological oeuvre. I first consider the 
structure of his writings, examining his treatment of Ibn ʿArabī’s tripartite hierarchy of 
creeds (ʿaqāʾid). I then describe the contents of al-Shaʿrānī’s eight theological works. 
This will give us a clearer picture of what he was trying to achieve through his 
theological project. 
 
1.1. Al-Shaʿrānī’s Life and Scholarship 
 
Most of the biographical details concerning al-Shaʿrānī are recorded in the 
following texts: al-Shaʿrānī’s biography al-Manākib al-kubrā, which was written by his 
admirer Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Mālijī30 in the year 1109/1697; al-Shaʿrānī’s 
autobiography al-Laṭāʾif al-minan wa-l-akhlāq; his biographical dictionaries of Sufis 
                                                
30 I have not yet found any information on al-Mālijī’s death date.  
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al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā and of jurists al-Ṭabaqāt al-ṣughrā; and a Sufi biography, 
al-Kawāqib al-dhurriyya, which was authored by his prominent disciple ʿAbd al-Raʾūf 
al-Munāwī (d. 1031/1621).31 By examining these primary materials along with the 
studies conducted by Winter and others, in this section, I will highlight some important 
factors that may have affected al-Shaʿrānī’s thought.  
 
1.1.1. Al-Shaʿrānī’s Life 
  
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn Aḥmad al-Shaʿrānī is primarily known as a prominent Shāfiʿī 
jurist, and for his jurisprudential works (Kashf al-ghumma and al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 
amongst others). He is also famous as a mystic, who stressed the importance of various 
Sufi etiquettes, as well as being an ardent supporter of Ibn ʿArabī. Al-Shaʿrānī was born 
in 897-8/1492-3 in the village of Qalqashanda in the province of Qalyūbiyya, which is 
north of Cairo. He was then brought to a village called Sāqiyat Abū Shaʿra by the river 
Nile in the province of Minūfiyya, west of the Qalyūbiyya province, and is hence called 
Shaʿrānī or Shaʿrāwī.32  
His paternal grandfather, Nūr al-Dīn ʿAlī al-Anṣārī (d. 891/1486), was a student of 
al-Azhar and a colleague of the then young Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī, the future chief judge 
of the Shāfiʿī school of law and later an important teacher of al-Shaʿrānī.33 Al-Shaʿrānī 
revered ʿAlī al-Anṣārī as a devoted mystic who belonged to the Sufi group led by the 
illiterate Ibrāhīm al-Matbūlī (d. ca. 877/1472).34 One of al-Matbūlī’s disciples, ʿAlī 
                                                
31 For more information on the sources on al-Shaʿrānī’s life, see Winter, Society and Religion, 
31-33. 
32 Winter, Society and Religion, 37; al-Malījī, al-Manāqib, 38. 
33 Winter, Society and Religion, 35. 
34 Winter, Society and Religion, 35; al-Malījī, al-Manāqib, 14; al-Shaʿrānī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā, 
423-440. 
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al-Khawwāṣ, became the most influential Sufi teacher of al-Shaʿrānī.  
Al-Shaʿrānī’s father, Shihāb al-Dīn al-Aḥmad (d. 907/1501), was an educated 
scholar who learnt from some prominent Shāfiʿī scholars like Ṣāliḥ al-Bulqīnī (d. 
868/1464) and Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449), both of whom also taught al-Suyūṭī. 
It is highly probable that al-Aḥmad was acquainted with al-Suyūṭī through them. With 
al-Aḥmad, the young al-Shaʿrānī studied the Qurʾān and hadith. After his father died in 
907/1501, al-Shaʿrānī was looked after by his brother ʿAbd al-Qādir (d. 956/1549) for a 
period of time.35 Then in 911/1505, at the age of twelve, he moved to Cairo.36 
Al-Shaʿrānī regards this journey from the countryside to Cairo as something symbolic 
in his life, describing it as a journey from a land of roughness and ignorance to a land of 
benevolence and knowledge.37  
    In Cairo, al-Shaʿrānī studied at the Ghamrī mosque in Bāb al-Shaʿriyya in the 
north of the city for seventeen years.38 The mosque was founded by Sufi Muḥammad 
Ibn ʿUmar al-Ghamrī (d. 850/1446-47), a disciple of Aḥmad al-Zāhid (d. 820/1417) of 
the Aḥmadī order.39 Al-Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣarī was initiated into Sufism by Muḥammad 
al-Ghamrī.40 His son, Abū Abbās al-Ghamrī once visited al-Shaʿrānī’s village when the 
latter was eight years old.41 This encounter could explain why al-Shaʿrānī chose the 
Ghamrī mosque upon his arrival in Cairo. Muḥammad al-Ghamrī’s grandson, Abū 
                                                
35 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Laṭāʾif, 68.  
36  Sabra, ‘Introduction’ in The Guidebook, 9; al-Malījī, al-Manāqib, 39-40; al-Shaʿrānī, 
al-Laṭāʾif, 67. 
37 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Laṭāʾif, 69. 
38 Johnson, ‘Unerring Balance,’ xv; al-Dālī, al-Khiṭāb al-siyāsī, 41. 
39 Winter, Society and Religion, 38, 73-74. 
40 al-Shaʿrānī, Anwār al-qudsiyya, 50-51; al-Ṭabaqāt al-ṣughrā, 27; al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā, 454. 
According to al-Ghazzī, al-Shaʿrānī recounts the episode when al-Anṣāri visited al-Ghamrī 
while the latter was in khalwa. Al-Anṣāri saw seven eyes on al-Ghamrī with which he could 
watch what was going on in the world. When he visited him again, al-Anṣāri found al-Ghamrī 
floating in the air (al-Ghazzī, al-Kawākib, vol. 1, 200; see also Ingalls, ‘Recasting al-Qushayrī’s 
Risāla,’ 98-99). 
41 al-Shaʿrānī, Tabaqāt al-kubrā, 451. I have not found the death date of Abū Abbās al-Ghamrī. 
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al-Ḥasan al-Ghamrī (d. 939/1532-1533), was a friend of al-Shaʿrānī.42 During his stay 
at al-Ghamrī, in 914/1508, al-Shaʿrānī became a student of Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī. In 
923/1517, he witnessed the invasion of Cairo by the Ottoman Sultan Selīm I (r. 
918/1512-926/1520) and the subsequent defeat of the Mamluks. While he was at the 
Ghamrī mosque, al-Shaʿrānī also frequently visited al-Azhar in order to pursue further 
knowledge.43 
As al-Shaʿrānī’s popularity as a Sufi rose, the members of the Ghamrī mosque 
started to harass him out of jealousy. This eventually led him to leaving the mosque in 
around 928/1522. A few years later, his own Sufi lodge (zāwiya) was built by an official 
called Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Uzbakī on land that he had endowed as a 
religious foundation (waqf).44 Al-Shaʿrānī’s Sufi lodge gradually attracted a lot of 
people, and through its management he gained wealth and fame.45 Its attendants were 
mainly educated, non-scholarly artisans and illiterate laypeople.46 Sabra maintains that 
being a renowned scholar, al-Shaʿrānī was favoured by different classes of society, 
because he combined the culture of the literate religious intellectuals with the popular 
religion of illiterate people.47  
Al-Shaʿrānī kept teaching at his Sufi lodge until he died in 923/1565 at the age of 
seventy-four. The Egyptian vizier ʿAlī Pasha, officials, judges, scholars, Sufis, and 
                                                
42 Winter, Society and Religion, 38. 
43 al-Dālī, al-Khiṭāb al-siyāsī, 32. 
44 Winter, Society and Religion, 38-40. It is believed that this endowment is related to the defeat 
of the Egyptian governor Aḥmad Pāshā (d. 931/1524) in 1524; after the revolt was suppressed, 
the authorities started land registration, including for land owned by the former Mamluk 
officials. Many landholders donated their lands in order not to have them confiscated by the 
new government. See also Sabra, ‘Introduction’ in The Guidebook, 4-5. On the revolt by Aḥmad 
Pasha, see Behrens-Abouseif, Egypt’s Adjustment, 48-49.  
45 Winter, Society and Religion, 39-41; Sabra, ‘Introduction’ in The Guidebook, 4.  
46 This made al-Shaʿrānī acutely aware of the suffering of the laypeople from poverty and 
heavy taxation, which, according to Sabra, was unusual for the scholars of his age (Sabra, 
‘Introduction’ in the Guidebook, 8-13; Winter, Society and Religion, 50-52). 
47 Sabra, ‘Introduction’ in the Guidebook, 3. 
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commoners are said to have attended his funeral.48 He was buried next to his lodge. 
Al-Shaʿrānī was succeeded by his son ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (d. 1011/1603), and the lodge 
ultimately survived at least until the early nineteenth century.49  
Al-Shaʿrānī’s most famous student is without doubt Shāfiʿī-Ashʿarī ʿAbd al-Raʾūf 
al-Munāwī (d. 1031/1621).50 Al-Munāwī left a biographical dictionary of Sufis called 
al-Kawākib al-dhurriyya fī tarājim al-sāda al-ṣūfiyya and Fayḍ al-qadīr sharḥ al-jāmiʿ 
al-ṣaghīr, which is a mystical commentary on al-Suyūṭī’s collection of rare hadiths, 
al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaghīr. In both works, he occasionally refers to al-Shaʿrānī. However, little 
is known about how al-Munāwī was affected by al-Shaʿrānī, nor how the latter’s 
teaching was embraced in later generations.  
With regard to al-Shaʿrānī’s affiliation to the established Sufi institutions, he did 
not declare himself a member of one particular Sufi order, but maintained connections 
with various orders, including the Aḥmadī, the Shādhilī, and its sub-order the Wafāʾī 
which was founded by Muḥammad Wafāʾ (d.765/1363) and his son ʿAlī Wafāʾ (d. 
807/1405) in Mamluk Cairo.51 Belonging to more than one order was not unusual in 
this period. His teacher Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī also joined several Sufi orders without 
showing loyalty to a specific institution. Despite this, al-Shaʿrānī’s relationships to the 
Shādhilī and Wafāʾī orders seem to have been the strongest. This is observed in 
al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā, in which he devotes a substantial number of pages to certain 
Shādhilī and Wafāʾī Sufis: eleven pages on the founder of the Shādhilī order Abū 
                                                
48 Winter, Society and Religion, 55; al-Munāwī, al-Kawākib, vol. 4. 72.  
49 Winter, Society and Religion, 56-57. 
50  El-Rouayheb briefly introduces al-Munāwī’s position as the Ashʿarī theologian. 
El-Rouayheb, ‘From Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī,’ 283-284. 
51 Winter, Society and Religion, 69-92. The Wafāʾī order traces its esoteric lineage to the early 
Shādhilī shaykhs: Dāʾūd ibn Bākhilā, Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh Iskandarī (d. 709/1309), al-Mursī and 
al-Shādhilī. For more information on this order, see the arguments in McGregor, Sanctity. 
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l-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī (d. 656/1258), ten pages on his successor Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Mursī (d. 
686/1287), eighteen pages on Muḥammad Wafāʾ’s teacher al-Shadhilī Dāʾūd ibn 
Bākhilā (d. 733/1332), fifty-nine pages on ʿAlī Wafāʾ which is by far the lengthiest 
entry, and nineteen pages on Shādhilī Muḥammad Abū al-Mawāhib (d. ca. 
911-4/1505-9), who was an ardent follower of ʿAlī Wafāʾ and a teacher of the Shādhilī 
Ibrāhim al-Mawāhibī (d. 914/1508-9). 52  I will discuss the teaching of Ibrāhim 
al-Mawāhibī concerning his view on the notion of God’s with-ness (maʿiyya) in Chapter 
5.  
The lengths of these entries, especially on ʿAlī Wafāʾ, stand out in comparison to 
just one page on Ibn ʿArabī and three pages on Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī. Even al-Shaʿrānī’s 
important Sufi teacher ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ (twenty-six pages) is not given as long an entry 
as ʿAlī Wafāʾ. In one of his theological works, al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya fī tawḥīd ahl 
al-khuṣūṣiyya, al-Shaʿrānī also dedicates a whole chapter to the sayings of ʿAlī Wafāʾ. 
Al-Shaʿrānī’s strong interest in ʿAlī Wafāʾ can be attributed to the popularity that the 
latter’s order rapidly gained in Egypt.53 There is also a striking similarity between ʿAlī 
Wafāʾ’s thought and that of Ibn ʿArabī. For example, similarly to Ibn ʿArabī, ʿAlī Wafāʾ 
upholds the theories of God’s self-manifestation and the oneness of God and creation.54 
                                                
52 See al-Shaʿrānī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā. On the other hand, he spends merely a few sentences 
on al-Mursī’s disciple Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh and two pages on another founder of the Wafāʾī order, 
Muḥammad Wafāʾ. 
53 According to al-Munāwī’s report, ʿAlī Wafāʾ’s order had a great number of followers. 
Reportedly, some of them were too extreme in their love for him, so much so that they started to 
offer him a lot of money. When Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī once joined ʿAlī Wafā’s gathering, he 
had to prohibit the followers from prostrating themselves in the direction of ʿAlī Wafā. He also 
saw ʿAlī Wafā rotating at the centre of the circle during the samāʿ session while chanting: 
‘wherever you may turn, there is a face of God’ [Q: 2.115]. When a person who was present at 
that time declared him an unbeliever, ʿAlī Wafā and his followers left the room (al-Munāwī, 
al-Kawākib, vol. 3, 136-146; Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Inbāʾ al-ghumr, vol. 2, 308).   
54 McGregor, Sanctity, 123-127. Al-Munāwī also admits that ʿAlī Wafāʾ follows the path of Ibn 
ʿArabī and Ibn al-Fāriḍ. See al-Munāwī, al-Kawākib, vol. 3, 147. It has to be mentioned that 
ʿAlī Wafāʾ does not mention Ibn ʿArabī’s name nor cite his works. The latter’s actual influence 
on the former needs further scholarly investigation. 
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It is most probably due to ʿAlī Wafā’s monistic leanings that a number of Egyptian 
scholars who were adversaries of Ibn ʿArabī – amongst others, the Shāfiʿī Zayn al-Dīn 
al-ʿIrāqī (d. 806/1403),55 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqālānī,56 and the Shāfiʿī historian and Ibn 
Ḥajar al-ʿAsqālānī’s student ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sakhāwī (d. 903/1497)57 – condemned 
ʿAlī Wafāʾ as heretical, whereas Ibn ʿArabī’s advocates al-Suyūṭī and al-Shaʿrānī 
defended him.58  
With respect to al-Shaʿrānī’s close relation to the Shādhilī order, there is an 
intriguing similarity between his approach to Ibn ʿArabī’s thought and that of some 
Shādhilīs in this period. As we shall see later, they try to understand Ibn ʿArabī’s 
doctrine as something visionary, not ontological nor cosmological. This raises a 
possibility that al-Shaʿrānī was part of the wider scholarly trend of reinterpreting Ibn 
ʿArabī’s worldview in this specific manner.  
In relation to his theological affiliation, al-Shaʿrānī held Ashʿarism in faith.59 
Ashʿarism was a major theological group in Mamluk Egypt and remained prominent in 
the early Ottoman era, that is, between the nineth/fifteenth and late tenth/sixteenth 
century, despite the fact that the Ottomans generally favoured Māturīdism. With regard 
to this, Haidar argues that Ashʿarism greatly influenced Māturīdism even in this period 
and its texts remained popular in the religious schools before the latter took a more 
                                                
55 al-Munāwī, al-Kawākib, vol. 3, 147. 
56 al-Munāwī, al-Kawākib, vol. 3, 146; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-ghumr, vol. 2, 308-309. Ibn Ḥajar 
castigated ʿAlī Wafā’s poetry for preaching the union of God with His creation (ittiḥād) as a 
form of heresy (ilḥād).  
57 al-Sakhāwī, al-Dawʾ, vol. 6, 21 (n. 46). On their attacks on Ibn ʿArabī, see Knysh, Ibn 
ʿArabī. 
58 Al-Suyūṭī, for example, defended ʿAlī Wafāʾ by quoting the latter’s statement as follows: 
‘people think of me [ʿAlī Wafāʾ] as an upholder of the union with God and incarnation of God, 
but my heart is actually filled with the notion of God’s unity (tawḥīd)’ [al-Suyūṭī, al-Ḥāwī 
lil-fatāwī, vol. 2, 135]. 
59 al-Mālijī, al-Manāqib, 38; Spevack, The Archetypal, 89. 
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definitive form towards the end of eleventh/seventeenth century.60 Al-Shaʿrānī also 
notes in his al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir that what is meant by the people of Sunna are the 
followers of Abū Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935-6) and Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/ 
944) from Samarkand, an eponym of Māturīdism. According to him, while Ashʿarism 
spread in many parts of the Islamic world, including Khorasan, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, 
Māturīdism was only upheld in Central Asia.61  
The popularity that Ashʿarism retained in early Ottoman Egypt would explain 
al-Shaʿrānī’s attempts to reconcile some of the school’s teachings with those of Ibn 
ʿArabī. However, al-Shaʿrānī’s theological views do differ from those of the majority of 
the Ashʿarīs in many aspects. Most markedly, following Ibn ʿArabī, al-Shaʿrānī opposes 
the application of figurative interpretation to scripture. As we shall see in Chapters 4 
and 5, al-Shaʿrānī also takes a different approach to the issue of the divine attributes. 
 
1.1.2. Al-Shaʿrānī’s Teachers and His Scholarly Community 
 
The aim of this section is to clarify al-Shaʿrānī’s intellectual milieu as a defender 
of Ibn ʿArabī. Al-Shaʿrānī studied with some fifty teachers from different schools of 
law and Sufi orders. Incorporating the findings and trajectory of insights provided by 
Geoffory, Ingalls, and El-Rouayheb, I introduce below some of al-Shaʿrānī’s most 
important teachers and colleagues. I will first look at Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Zakariyyāʾ 
al-Anṣārī, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Ramlī, Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, and Abū Ḥasan 
al-Bakrī and his son Muḥammad al-Bakrī. These were renowned Shāfiʿī-Ashʿarī 
                                                
60 Haidar, ‘The Debates,’ 17, 116-121, 204-211.  
61 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 4. Quoting al-Taftāzānī, al-Shaʿrānī notes that 
differences between the two theological groups are merely trivial. See al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ 
al-maqāṣid, vol. 5, 231-232. See also Haidar, ‘The Debates,’ 116-117. 
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scholars who held central positions in Egyptian society. The reasons for selecting these 
particular figures include, first of all, the fact that they were favoured by and close to 
al-Shaʿrānī, as indicated in his works. More importantly, they were strong advocates of 
Sufism and of Ibn ʿArabī, just like al-Shaʿrānī. In fact, as we shall see later, there is an 
intriguing resemblance between them and al-Shaʿrānī in their approach to the defence of 
Ibn ʿArabī. Considering the scope of this study, which aims to elucidate al-Shaʿrānī’s 
reception of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, an observation of these scholars will lead us to 
delineate the intellectual trend which al-Shaʿrānī was most likely to have been part of. 
For this reason, in this section, I will especially describe their relationships with 
al-Shaʿrānī, along with their view of Sufism and on Ibn ʿArabī in general.  
    This is followed by a reference to al-Shaʿrānī’s most influential non-scholarly Sufi 
teacher, ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ al-Burullusī, and his acceptance of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought. 
Aside from Ibn ʿArabī, al-Shaʿrānī quotes ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ more than anyone else in 
his works on Sufism. This indicates the significance of ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ’s role in 
moulding al-Shaʿrānī’s thought.  
 
1.1.2.1. Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī 
 
Al-Shaʿrānī considers the Shāfiʿī polymath and the renewer of Islam (mujaddid) 
for the ninth-century, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, as one of his major teachers in 
jurisprudence.62 As a theologian, al-Suyūṭī belonged to the Ashʿarī school, yet he 
denounced the study of logic for theology.63 Al-Suyūṭī was also familiar with mystical 
                                                
62 For al-Suyūṭī’s view on jurisprudence, see Hernandez, The Legal Thought. With regard to his 
view on angelology, see Burge, Angles in Islam. 
63 For al-Suyūṭī’s position on the Ashʿarī school and logic, see El-Rouayheb, ‘Sunni Scholars,’ 
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teaching, and his main teacher in the Sufi path was Shādhilī Muḥammad al-Maghribī (d. 
910/1504) who was influenced by Ibn ʿArabī’s tenet of the oneness of existence.64 
Although al-Suyūṭī did not become a member of a particular Sufi order, it has been 
pointed out that he favoured the Shādhilī order.65   
With regard to al-Shaʿrānī’s encounter with al-Suyūṭī, it is reported that the latter 
granted the then around the ten-year-old al-Shaʿrānī, whom he had never met before, a 
permission to promulgate his teachings and to lecture about all his books (ijāza).66 
According to al-Malījī, this was made possible through the request of al-Shaʿrānī’s 
father Shihāb al-Dīn al-Aḥmad to al-Suyūṭī who shared the same teachers with 
al-Aḥmad.67 When al-Shaʿrānī moved to Cairo in 911/1505, he finally had a chance to 
meet al-Suyūṭī in person for the first and only time. The meeting took place a month 
before the latter’s death. On this occasion, al-Shaʿrānī recited several hadiths and 
passages from jurisprudential books. Al-Suyūṭī then allegedly put a piece of cloth 
(khirqa) on him, a symbolic act that a Sufi teacher performs when admitting a disciple 
to his group.68 Whether or not the account is historically true, it is unlikely that 
al-Shaʿrānī learnt anything from al-Suyūṭī directly during this short period. Winter 
nonetheless believes that, considering al-Shaʿrānī’s constant reference to al-Suyūṭī’s 
opinions in religious and legal issues, the latter’s influence over the former should not 
be ignored.69  
According to Geoffroy, al-Suyūṭī was an ardent supporter of Sufism; so much so 
                                                                                                                                          
215-216; Spevac, ‘The Intolerant Ecumenist,’ 36-44; Hernandez, ‘Framing the Jurist.’   
64 Geoffroy, ‘al-Suyūṭī as a Sufi,’ 9-10. I will discuss the teachingx of Muḥammad al-Maghribī 
in Chapter 5. 
65 Sartain, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, vol. 1, 35-36. 
66 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-ṣughrā, 8. 
67 al-Malījī, al-Manāqib, 28. 
68 al-Malījī, al-Manāqib, 27. 
69 Winter, Society and Religion, 45. 
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that he included his approval of the discipline of Sufism in his collection of legal 
opinions, called al-Ḥāwī lil-fatāwī, something that no Muslim scholar had ever done 
before. 70  In this regard, Geoffroy argues that al-Suyūṭī is deemed a pioneer in 
advocating Sufism formally within the legal field of fatwā, paving the way for later 
scholars to do the same. Indeed, Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī and two of al-Anṣārī’s students, 
Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Ramlī and Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, followed al-Suyūṭī’s path and 
included their official endorsement of Sufism in their collections of legal opinions.71 
Al-Suyūṭī also ‘apologetically’ excused Ibn ʿArabī. Based on the observation that Ibn 
ʿArabī’s works had been falsified, al-Suyūṭī tried to dissociate Ibn ʿArabī from the 
heretical ideas of unificationism, incarnationism, and ontological monism, while calling 
for a ban on the reading of his texts. I will come back to the details of al-Suyūṭī’s 
defence of Ibn ʿArabī later in this chapter. 
 
1.1.2.2. Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī 
 
In 914/1508, a couple of years after al-Shaʿrānī arrived in Cairo, he was initiated as 
a Sufi novice at the age of fifteen, by the then eighty-five-year old Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī, 
by being vested with the Sufi mantle. Al-Anṣārī was a chief judge of the Shāfiʿī school 
from 886/1481-905/1500 during the reign of the Mamluk sultan al-Qāʾitbāy (r. 
872/1468-901/1496).72 Like al-Shaʿrānī, al-Anṣārī is believed to have belonged to all of 
the major Sufi orders in Egypt, including the Shādhilī order.73 His widely circulated 
                                                
70 Geoffroy, ‘al-Suyūṭī as a Sufi,’ 9-13. 
71 Geoffroy, ‘al-Suyūṭī as a Sufi,’ 9-10; Ingalls, ‘Subtle Innovation,’ 235-237. 
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27. For his legal thought as a jurist, see Hernandez, The Legal Thought of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī. 
73 Geoffroy, ‘Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī,’ in EI2; McGregor, ‘al-Anṣārīʾ, Zakariyyāʾ,’ in EI3. For the 
details of emergence of the Shādhilī order in Egypt, see Hofer, The Popularisation of Sufism.  
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mystical work is Iḥkām al-dalāla ʿalā taḥrīr al-risāla. It is a commentary on the mystic 
al-Qushayrī’s (d. 465/1072) Sufi manual al-Risāla. Al-Shaʿrānī relied on Iḥkām when 
reading al-Qushayrī’s epistles with the help of al-Anṣārī.74 According to Ingalls, the 
range of theological subjects that al-Anṣārī refers to in Iḥkām suggests that its main 
readership is a group of non-intellectuals, who nevertheless possess at least a basic 
understanding of the scholarly sciences – not the pure commoners who have no 
knowledge in these fields at all – and who are also eager to pursue the Sufi path.75 This 
indicates that, educated and spiritually advanced as he might have been, al-Anṣārī was 
concerned with addressing those who were outside of scholarly institutions.76 As we 
shall see, al-Shaʿrānī also prefers to speak to a group of people who are not members of 
the intellectual elite, yet who are educated to a certain extent, with aspirations to learn 
mysticism.  
Al-Anṣārī spoke favourably of Ibn ʿArabī and of the controversial Egyptian Sufi 
poet Ibn Fāriḍ (d. 632/1235).77 The legal opinion that al-Anṣārī issued against the 
Shāfiʿī al-Biqāʿī in the year 874/1469, with the objective of defending the mystical 
utterances of Ibn Fāriḍ through a metaphorical interpretation, is well known. 78 
According to one of his students, Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, al-Anṣārī once stated that 
whoever declared Ibn ʿArabī an infidel was himself an infidel and that a mystic who 
expressed what sounds like unificationism and incarnationism in the state of 
experiencing God’s unity did not actually mean them (and hence, he should be 
                                                
74  al-Shaʿrānī, al-Tabaqāt al-kubrā, 452; al-Munāwī, al-Kawākib, vol. 4. 70; al-Malījī, 
al-Manāqib, 44. 
75 Ingalls, ‘Recasting Qushayrī’s Risāla,’ 107. 
76 Ingalls, ‘Subtle Innovation,’ 133-134. 
77 al-Ghazzī, al-Kawākib, vol. 1, 205. 
78 Ingalls, ‘Subtle Innovation,’ 59-61. For Ibn Fāriḍ, see Homerin, From Arab Poet. 
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sanctioned).79 In spite of his favourable view on Ibn ʿArabī, al-Anṣārī does not speak 
much of the teachings of Ibn ʿArabī. A lack of reference to the latter’s actual sayings is 
a tendency that is often observed amongst his supporters, including al-Suyūṭī, Shihāb 
al-Dīn al-Ramlī, and Ibn Ḥajar. 
In my view, al-Anṣārī was more of an advocate of Ashʿarī theology than of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s teachings. In contrast with al-Shaʿrānī who, like Ibn ʿArabī, denounces the 
figurative interpretation of scripture (as will be discussed in Chapter 3), al-Anṣārī 
positively upholds it, together with the majority of the Ashʿarīs. In contrast with Ibn 
ʿArabī and al-Shaʿrānī, al-Anṣārī also maintains – following the Ashʿarīs – that the 
divine attributes are not identical to God yet they are not other than Him.80 For example, 
when explicating the meaning of God’s with-ness in ‘He is with you wherever you are’ 
[Q. 57:4], al-Anṣārī insists that God is with you, not in the sense of physical closeness 
but through His knowledge and help, an interpretation that is typical of the major 
Ashʿarīs.81 This view differs from that of al-Shaʿrānī whose approach to this verse is 
firmly grounded in Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of God’s attributes. I will discuss this in 
Chapter 5. 
Aside from their aforementioned concern for non-scholarly but relatively educated 
people, another interesting similarity between al-Anṣārī and al-Shaʿrānī is their attempts 
to integrate Sufi discussions into the sphere of theology. With respect to al-Anṣārī’s 
view on this, Ingalls writes as follows: 
 
Elsewhere in his [al-Anṣārī] commentary, he explains that the Sufis should 
                                                
79 Ibn Ḥajar, al-Fatāwī al-ḥadīthiyya, 52. 
80 al-Anṣārī, Iḥkām, vol. 1, 197; 
81 al-Anṣārī, Iḥkām, vol. 1, 59; 
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be considered ‘to be a part of the larger body of religious scholars’ (min 
jumlat ṭawāʾif al-ʿulamāʾ) and expressly analogizes their discipline and its 
terms of art with those of the theologians (ahl ʿuṣūl al-dīn). In this manner, 
al-Anṣārī links Sufism and theology as mutually inclusive spheres of 
scholarly insight.82  
 
According to Ingalls, al-Anṣārī analyses theological subjects such as the vision of God 
or the issue of freewill by turning to the mystical discipline.83 True as this may be, 
however, as far as his Iḥkām is concerned, al-Anṣārī does not extensively examine how 
he can actually explain theological problems through the realm of mysticism. He 
certainly tries to combine mystical and theological terms by employing 
mysticism-charged expressions, such as the hearts of Sufis (ʿārifūn) or mystical 
knowledge (maʿrifa), when discussing theological issues. However, he does not add any 
thorough analysis. This shows that al-Anṣārī’s attempt to intermingle the mystical and 
theological disciplines remains rather preliminary.  
As we shall see, it is precisely this theological project that al-Shaʿrānī took over. I 
will discuss in Chapters 3 and 4 how al-Shaʿrānī gives answers to certain theological 
conundrums by drawing on Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings, thereby making an inextricable 
connection between theology and Ibn ʿArabī-inspired Sufism. Although al-Shaʿrānī 
states that he esteems al-Anṣārī not as a primary guide on the mystical path, but more as 
a prominent legal scholar, 84  their shared attempt to establish mysticism as an 
independent scholarly discipline should not be dismissed.  
                                                
82 Ingalls, ‘Reading the Sufis,’ 463. See also Ingalls, ‘Subtle Innovation,’ 164-165. 
83 Ingalls, ‘Subtle Innovation,’ 164-165. 
84 Ingalls, ‘Subtle Innovation,’ 48. 
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1.1.2.3. Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Ramlī, Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, and 
Muḥammad and Abū Ḥasan al-Bakrī 
 
One of al-Anṣārī’s students, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Ramlī (d. 957/1550), is 
known as a distinguished Shāfiʿī jurist. Al-Ramlī taught al-Shaʿrānī and they read 
al-Rawḍa, a jurisprudential work by the Shāfiʿī jurist Abū Zakariyyāʾ al-Nawawī (d. 
676/1277-8), together. Al-Ramlī also read through some of al-Shaʿrānī’s jurisprudential 
works (Kashf al-ghumma and Manhaj al-mubīn fī bayān adillat madhāhib 
al-mujtahidīn) and commented on them.85 Al-Shaʿrānī held al-Ramlī in high regard as a 
jurist, and so did ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ.86 
Al-Ramlī was also a defender of Sufism and a supporter of Ibn ʿArabī and Ibn 
Fāriḍ. In his Fatāwā, he excuses a notorious declaration by the mystic Abū Yazīd 
al-Bisṭāmī (d. 261/875) – ‘Glory be to me!’ – by associating it with the mystical 
experience of annihilation into God’s unity (fanāʾ fī l-tawḥīd). In al-Ramlī’s view, 
annihilation is the state where a mystic loses sight of himself and witnesses nothing but 
God. 87  This would mean that, in al-Ramlī’s mind, al-Bisṭāmī’s utterance only 
represents a psychological, visionary state, not the world’s reality in which his existence 
ontologically becomes one with God. This reading can be understood against Ibn 
ʿArabī’s view of al-Bisṭāmī as a mystic whose hearing, sight, tongue, and physical 
faculties become those of God as a result of loving Him passionately – so much so that 
he sees himself as the same as God.88 In contrast to this view, al-Ramlī seems rather to 
believe that God’s unity, which the mystics experience at the end of their mystical path, 
                                                
85 al-Shaʿrānī, Laṭāʾif, 93-94. 
86 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-ṣughrā, 45. 
87 al-Ramlī, Fatāwā al-Ramlī, vol. 4, 252. 
88 Ernst, ‘The Man without Attributes,’ 11; Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 2, 361. 
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should be separated from the ontological oneness of God and creatures. That is to say, a 
mystic’s loss of awareness of himself does not lead to identification of himself with 
God. This position accords with that of his contemporaries such as al-Anṣārī and Ibn 
Ḥajar. I will discuss their method of defending Ibn ʿArabī’s thought in the next section. 
Al-Ramlī s son, the renowned Shāfiʿī jurist and a contemporary of al-Shaʿrānī, Shams 
al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Ramlī (d. 1004/1595), was also a strong champion of Sufism.89 
He learned to admire Ibn ʿArabī from his father, Aḥmad al-Ramlī.90 
The Shāfiʿī Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī (d. 973-4/1566-7), who is also called Shihāb 
al-Dīn Ibn Ḥajar, was a prominent student of al-Anṣārī and a contemporary of 
al-Shaʿrānī.91 He is famous for his commentary on al-Nawawī’s jurisprudential work 
al-Minhāj. 92  Ibn Ḥajar seems to have had a relatively good relationship with 
al-Shaʿrānī; he was one of the witnesses when the latter was given a license to train Sufi 
novices by his Aḥmadī Sufi teacher, Muḥammad al-Shināwī.93 He also shared with 
al-Shaʿrānī a hostile attitude towards Ibn Taymiyya. Like al-Anṣārī, Ibn Ḥajar expresses 
his support of Sufis in his Fatāwā. He also defends Ibn ʿArabī by carefully associating 
him with the group of legitimate mystics. I will detail this point in the next section in 
regards to the controversies over Ibn ʿArabī’s thought.  
Ibn Ḥajar names Abū Ḥasan al-Bakrī (d. ca. 951-954/1544-1547) as one of his 
teachers of jurisprudence and leaves a summary of the latter’s teaching in the text 
entitled Sharḥ mukhtaṣar Abū Ḥasan al-Bakrī.94 Abū Ḥasan al-Bakrī was from an 
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aristocratic family of Shāfiʿī-Shādhilī Sufis and also taught al-Anṣārī and al-Shaʿrānī.95 
According to al-Shaʿrānī, Abū Ḥasan al-Bakrī excelled both in the spheres of 
jurisprudence and of Sufism, and was popular amongst the intellectual elites and 
commoners in this period.96 He wrote books on Qurʾānic interpretation, jurisprudence, 
and Sufism, and left commentaries on al-Nawawī’s al-Minhāj and al-rawḍā.97 His son, 
the Sufi poet Muḥammad al-Bakrī (d. 994/1586) was a student of al-Anṣārī in 
jurisprudence.98 He was also a good friend of al-Shaʿrānī and they met each other on 
many occasions. 99  Muḥammad al-Bakrī had a profound knowledge of Qurʾānic 
interpretation and Sufism, and al-Shaʿrānī eulogised his knowledge in religious 
matters.100  
As El-Rouayheb insightfully noted, while expressing his respect for Ibn ʿArabī, 
Muḥammad al-Bakrī rejects his ontological doctrine of the oneness of existence by 
reinterpreting it as ‘the unity of mystical witnessing/experience,’ or what I later call 
experiential oneness.101 In respect of this, El-Rouayheb writes: 
 
Bakrī summarized his own view […]: ‘The unity is experiential, not 
ontological (waḥdatu shuhūdiyyatun lā wujūdiyyatun).’ This is a remarkable 
anticipation of the position expressed by the later Indo-Muslim Naqshbandi 
Sufi Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1624). Sirhindī’s position has often been presented 
as a radical break with earlier Sufi thought and as ushering in a new period 
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in which ‘neo-Sufis’ abandoned the idea of ‘the unit of existence’ (waḥdat 
al-wujūd) and exchanged it for the alternative formula ‘the unity of mystical 
witnessing/experience’ (waḥdat al-shuhūd). This narrative clearly ignores a 
powerful Sufi tradition in the Arab world in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries that explicitly rejected (or explained away) waḥdat al-wujūd while 
at the same time endorsing classic Sufi notions of ‘annihilation’ in the 
experience of the divine.102 
 
 
Later in this chapter, I will show that al-Anṣārī and Ibn Ḥajar promote a similar position 
by presenting the oneness of existence as the oneness of mystical witnessing/experience. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 2, we shall see that al-Shaʿrānī also strikingly endorses this 
view. 
 
1.1.2.4. ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ al-Burullusī 
 
Despite his connections with some highly educated intellectuals, al-Shaʿrānī did 
not teach at al-Azhar. He preferred to be amongst the local non-scholarly Sufis led by 
illiterate mystics like ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ al-Burullusī (d. 939/1532-33). As is clear from 
al-Shaʿrānī’s constant reference to ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ’s words, the latter was indisputably 
his greatest influence.103 Al-Shaʿrānī does not state when he first became a student of 
ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ.104 Yet, since one of his first works was written around 931/1525, 
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soon after his becoming ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ’s disciple, their encounter must have 
happened sometime before this year.105 
ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ was an uneducated Sufi who made his living by selling everyday 
items like soap, sycamore, dates, and oil and by braiding palm leaves. He was illiterate, 
and hence neither read nor wrote any books.106 In spite of this, some renowned 
Egyptian jurists, such as the Shāfiʿī Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Ramlī, the Mālikī Nāṣir 
al-Dīn al-Laqānī (d. 958/1551), and the Ḥanbalī Shihāb al-Dīn al-Futūḥī (d. 
949/1542-43) used to visit ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ and heeded his remarks. 107  ʿAlī 
al-Khawwāṣ’s teacher Ibrāhīm al-Matbūlī (d. ca. 877/1472), whose mystic group 
al-Shaʿrānī’s grandfather belonged to, was also illiterate and worked for his living.108  
One thing that deserves attention regarding ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ’s thought is his 
endorsement of Ibn ʿArabī’s worldview. ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ’s statements, frequently 
quoted in al-Shaʿrānī’s works, exhibit the undeniable influence of Ibn ʿArabī’s monism, 
which ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ must have learnt by word of mouth. Al-Shaʿrānī left two 
writings as collections of ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ’s sayings. They are entitled al-Jawāhir 
wa-l-durar mimmā istafādahu sayyidī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī min shaykhihi 
sayyidī ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ (written in 940/1533) and Durar al-ghawwāṣ ʿalā fatāwī sīdī 
ʿAlī Khawwāṣ (written in 955/1548).109 The texts are full of mystical terms, including 
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those employed by Ibn ʿArabī such as immutable entities (aʿyān thābita),110 exclusive 
oneness (aḥadiyya) and inclusive oneness (wāḥidiyya),111 God’s self-manifestation 
(tajallī) in the world’s beings,112 and the world of imagination (ʿālam al-khayāl) where 
God’s attributes are manifested.113  
Another work in which al-Shaʿrānī often adduces ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ and one which 
displays the strong effect of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought is al-Mīzān al-dharriyya 
al-mubayyina li-ʿaqāʾid al-firaq al-ʿaliyya. I will look at this work in detail later in this 
chapter. Suffice it to note here that through the words of ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ, al-Mīzān 
al-dharriyya promotes the dogma of the oneness of existence, whereby God is 
considered to be the only real existence and everything else is merely His reflection. 
Even though ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ does not mention the formula ‘the oneness of existence’ 
itself, this evidence confirms his support of Ibn ʿArabī’s ontological monism.114 
Regardless of a certain familiarity with Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrines, ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ 
most likely did not possess a deep understanding of the former’s thought, nor much 
knowledge of speculative theology, due to his illiteracy and lack of education. This 
would explain why al-Shaʿrānī employs his own words or relies on Ibn ʿArabī and other 
scholars, but not on ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ, when discussing theological issues in his texts on 
theology, such as al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, and al-Qawāʿid 
al-kashfiyya. 
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1.1.3. Concluding Remark 
 
     The above discussion shows that al-Shaʿrānī’s interactions with various scholarly 
and non-scholarly figures influenced his overall attitude towards Ibn ʿArabī. On the one 
hand, he was strongly inspired by the local and uneducated Sufi Alī al-Khawwāṣ who 
wholeheartedly embraced the mystical worldview of Ibn ʿArabī. On the other hand, 
al-Shaʿrānī was affected by the renowned and established Shāfiʿī scholars of his period, 
who favoured Sufism and Ibn ʿArabī, all the while avoiding supporting his monistic 
worldview.115 As we shall see, belonging to both these communities, with their 
different stances on Ibn ʿArabī, contributed to making al-Shaʿrānī’s thought 
multifaceted. 
   
 
1.2. Controversies over Ibn ʿArabī 
   
The objective of this section is to investigate the polemics over Ibn ʿArabī’s 
thought prior to al-Shaʿrānī. There are three themes. First, I will provide an account of 
Ibn ʿArabī’s ontological doctrine known as ‘the oneness of existence’. This subject has 
so far received much scholarly attention.116 I therefore confine myself to a brief 
overview of the doctrine.  
Secondly, I consider the opposition to Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings by examining the 
four of his adversaries who are the most relevant to my thesis. These are: (1) the 
                                                
115 For further information on al-Shaʿrānī’s contemporaries from other schools of law, see 
Winter, Society and Religion, 170-174. 
116 For example, Izutsu, Sufism; Chittick, The Sufi Path, The Self-Disclosure, and Imaginal 
Worlds. 
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Ḥanbalī theologian Ibn Taymiyya, from Damascus, whom al-Shaʿrānī himself refers to 
as one of the most formidable critics of mysticism; (2) the Timurid Ḥanafī-Ashʿarī 
theologian Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, whose method of classifying mysticism into two 
types was adopted not only by Ibn ʿArabī’s opponents in later generations but also by 
his supporters in al-Shaʿrānī’s period; (3) the Yemeni Shāfiʾī-Ashʿarī theologian 
Ḥusayn Ibn al-Ahdal, whose attack on Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings, especially on the idea of 
the tripartite hierarchy of creeds, bears a certain relevance to the structure of 
al-Shaʿrānī’s works; (4) the Mamluk Shāfiʿī jurist Burhān al-Dīn al-Biqāʿī, from Egypt, 
who disputed with al-Suyūṭī and al-Anṣārī. In terms of chronology and geography, 
al-Biqāʿī is the figure most relevant to al-Shaʿrānī and his scholarly circle.  
There have been extensive studies of the attacks on Ibn ʿArabī advanced by these 
scholars. Knysh and Akkach examine Ibn Taymiyya’s castigation of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
thought, focusing on the notions of divine predestination (qadar), sainthood (walāya), 
and noetic beings called the immutable entities (aʿyān thābita). 117  Knysh and 
El-Rouayheb analyse al-Taftāzānī’s metaphysical critique of the oneness of 
existence.118 Knysh also refers to al-Taftāzānī’s distinction between ontological Sufis 
(al-ṣūfiyya al-wujūdiyya) – who believe that their mystical experience of God’s unity 
represents the objective reality of the cosmos – and moderate Sufis – who only speak of 
the subjective, visionary truth.119 Knysh’s study further attempts to contextualise Ibn 
al-Ahdal and al-Biqāʿī’s critiques against the historical backgrounds of Yemen and 
Egypt respectively. 120  These insightful studies, however, have not paid in-depth 
                                                
117 See Akkach, Letters of a Sufi Scholar, 42-51; Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 88-111. I will consider his 
refutation of immutable entities in Chapter 3. 
118 Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 153-158; El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 313-319. 
119 Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 146-152. 
120 Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 209-223, 234-246. 
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attention to how the arguments of these scholars were perceived in later generations, 
especially amongst Ibn ʿArabī’s supporters. Therefore, I will focus on the points of 
criticism that were raised by Ibn Taymiyya, al-Taftāzānī, Ibn al-Ahdal and al-Biqāʿī 
against Ibn ʿArabī, and which were of great concern to al-Shaʿrānī’s teachers and 
colleagues. 
Lastly, building on the findings from the previous section, I detail the method that 
some of Ibn ʿArabī’s defenders – namely, al-Suyūṭī, al-Anṣārī, and Ibn Ḥajar – employ 
for treating his thought. A close reading of their texts in regards to their defence of Ibn 
ʿArabī will demonstrate that they read the oneness of existence, intriguingly, as a 
visionary experience.  
Ingalls and Geoffroy recently conducted a study of al-Suyūṭī and al-Anṣārī’s 
defence of Ibn ʿArabī. However, and unfortunately, they did not consider the attitudes 
of al-Suyūṭī and al-Anṣārī vis-à-vis Ibn ʿArabī in a positive light. As I noted earlier, 
current scholarship agrees that Ibn ʿArabī’s supporters in the fifteenth- and sixteenth- 
century Arabic-speaking world were apologists for Ibn ʿArabī.121 This is based on the 
observation that they revere Ibn ʿArabī as a great saint of Islam for his piety and 
sanctity, while at the same time keeping distance from his monistic worldview.122 For 
example, al-Suyūṭī, al-Anṣārī, and Ibn Ḥajar agree that Ibn ʿArabī’s writings have been 
                                                
121 El-Rouayheb, ‘Opening the Gate,’ 271; Ingalls, ‘Subtle Innovation,’ 239; Winter, Society 
and Religion, 127-133.  
122 Al-Suyūṭī issued the statement that one should have faith in Ibn ʿArabī’s sainthood but 
refrain from studying his books (al-Suyūṭī, Tanbīh al-ghabī, 114). In the face of the attack from 
al-Biqāʿī, al-Anṣārī also ordered a ban on the reading of Ibn ʿArabī’s works out of fear that it 
could cause dissention in the community (fitna) (al-Munāwī, al-Kawākib al-dhurriyya, vol. 2, 
163). In a similar vein, Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī ruled that Ibn ʿArabī’s writings should not be 
accessible to those who are not familiar with Sufi terminology, for if innocent laypeople 
(aqwām awāmm jahala ṭaghām) try to comprehend the subject, they might get perplexed with 
its complexity, so much so that they would stop practising their religious duties. Other scholars 
expressed the same opinion, notes Ibn Ḥajar, not because they were against the author himself 
but because of the danger his writings might bring to a reader (Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, al-Fatāwā 
al-ḥadīthiyya, 296, 336). 
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falsified and should not be read. They also maintain that Ibn ʿArabī’s statements ought 
to be interpreted appropriately in accordance with the mystical discipline, for, if taken 
literally, they would be deemed outright heretical. Despite these comments, none of 
al-Suyūṭī, al-Anṣārī, or Ibn Ḥajar actually explains how such an interpretation is 
possible; rather, they avoid discussing his actual teachings. 123  Consequently, 
El-Rouayheb and Geoffroy concluded that this combination of admiration for Ibn 
ʿArabī and wariness of his ideas was the standard attitude shared by Ibn ʿArabī’s 
apologists in this period, and that this also applies to al-Shaʿrānī.124 
  El-Rouayheb and Geoffroy’s observations on the position of Ibn ʿArabī’s ‘apologists’ 
are partially true. However, I disagree with their conclusions, as these ‘apologists’ took 
a more methodical and innovative approach to defending Ibn ʿArabī. Strikingly, this 
approach was formulated within the context of the polemics over his thought. In order 
to prove this point, in this section, I will argue that al-Suyūṭī, al-Anṣārī, and Ibn Ḥajar 
carefully incorporate the views of Ibn ʿArabī’s adversaries into their own arguments, 
thereby reinterpreting Ibn ʿArabī’s thought as visionary and experiential.  
                                                
123 See, for example, Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, al-Fatāwā al-ḥadīthiyya, 335. 
124 El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 248; Geoffory, Le Soufisme, 461. In respect of 
their apologetic attitudes, El-Rouayheb writes as follows: 
 
[A]n outright defence of the most controversial aspects of Ibn ʿArabī’s view was 
not a live option among Arab-Islamic religious scholars in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. Those who dissented from outright condemnations of Ibn 
ʿArabī were rather inclined to express respect for him as a Sufi saint while 
remaining uncommitted to – or explaining away – the content of some of his works, 
especially the deeply divisive Fuṣūṣ [El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 
248]. 
  
    For Geoffroy, these apologists of Ibn ʿArabī secretly admired his monistic worldview as 
the ‘défenseurs de la waḥdat al-wujūd’. However, they hid it in public in order to maintain the 
social order and only apologetically defended him (Geoffory, Le Soufisme, 475). It must be 
noted that Geoffroy’s designation of Ibn ʿArabī’s apologists as ‘défenseurs de la waḥdat 
al-wujūd’ is irrelevant and lacks sufficient evidence, for, as I shall show, they do not defend the 
doctrine of the oneness of existence itself; instead, they try to reinterpret it as experiential 
oneness.  
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1.2.1. Ibn ʿArabī’s Divine Self-Manifestation: Overview 
 
I begin this section by introducing Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical thought. Ibn ʿArabī is 
known as a mystic who preached the tenet known as ‘the oneness of existence’. As 
previous studies have pointed out, he never used this expression; it was actually his 
disciple Sadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 673/1274) who first mentioned it in his writing, and 
al-Qūnawī’s student Saʿīd al-Dīn al-Farghānī (d. 699/1300) later started to employ it as 
a technical term. Despite this, the doctrine of the oneness of existence itself is clearly 
laid down in Ibn ʿArabī’s works. Later, Ibn Taymiyya’s criticism strengthened the 
association between Ibn ʿArabī and the expression by identifying him and his followers 
as the proponents of the oneness of existence.125  
The oneness of existence is grounded in the Islamic dogma of God’s unity (tawḥīd). 
This is often declared in the following statement, ‘there is no god but God’ (lā ilāh illā 
Allah), which simply means that Allah is the only god and no one else is comparable 
with Him. This formula came to assume an ontological implication amongst certain 
mystics. To put it briefly, they took it as a declaration of the absolute oneness of God’s 
existence, and that nothing else exists except Him. Ibn ʿArabī is viewed as the first 
mystic who gave this idea a concrete structure.126 
In Ibn ʿArabī’s view, God is the necessary being, by which he means that God does 
not need anything else in order to exist, and that His existence cannot not exist. This is 
in contrast with the status of things other than God, that is, the world, the existence of 
which depends on something other than itself, primarily on God and His act of creation, 
and which can thus stop existing at any moment. In contrast to God’s existence, which 
                                                
125 Chittick, ‘Waḥdat al-Wujūd in India,’ 30-31. 
126 Chittick, ‘Rumi and Waḥdat al-Wujūd,’ 70-71. 
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is necessary, the existence of creation is contingent and possible (mumkin), a term 
which Ibn ʿArabī borrows from Islamic philosophers like Avicenna.127 In this respect, 
only God’s existence is real; or rather, He is the sole existence in the cosmos. In other 
words, God is identical to existence itself, because it is impossible for His existence to 
be separated from His essence. If His essence were not His existence, then His essence 
would have to receive existence from somewhere else in order for Him to exist, which 
violates the definition of the necessary being who does not need anything else to be able 
to exist.  
This is compared to the situation of the world, the essence of which is separable 
from its existence. The world remains possible in the divine knowledge unless God 
brings it into being. Accordingly, the world’s beings do not have existence of their own, 
for if they did, this would contradict the principle of God’s unity that posits Him as the 
only existence. Nothing truly and absolutely exists except God and anything other than 
Him is thus viewed as mere illusion and imagination. 
In order to explain how the world comes into being without violating the principle 
of the oneness of God’s existence, Ibn ʿArabī interprets creation as God’s 
self-manifestation. He classifies the notion of divine unity into two parts: the exclusive 
oneness of God’s essence (aḥadiyya dhātiyya) and inclusive oneness in respect of the 
world’s plurality (aḥadiyya al-kathra, or simply wāḥidiyya).128 Exclusive oneness is 
the divine unity that precludes any of the modes of the contingent beings as it stands as 
sheer oneness. Inclusive oneness is the divine unity that relates to the world’s beings 
through God’s names and attributes. This is the oneness of God in the sense of unifying 
His names and attributes, and carrying the possibilities of the world’s beings within 
                                                
127 Chittick, The Sufi Path, 12, 81-88. 
128 For these terms, see Chittick, The Self-Disclosure, 168-169. 
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itself.129  
At the first stage of God’s self-manifestation, God at the level of exclusive oneness 
reveals His essence to Himself, but not to the outside existence, as His essence is never 
known to anyone except Him. Through this initial self-manifestation, He becomes 
manifest as the god of inclusive oneness of His names and attributes. This is where He 
comes to be recognised as Allah, who is the object of worship of creation.130 The 
inclusive oneness of His names and attributes does not mean that God is made many 
through them, as they are mere non-existent relationships that are envisaged between 
God and the world.131 
God at the level of inclusive oneness requires the world’s entities, as it is through 
them that His names and attributes can become manifest. For example, He needs 
worshippers (maʾlūh) and servants (marbūb) for His nature of divinity (ilāhiyya) and 
lordship (rubūbiyya) to be realised, and the same is true of His being the Merciful one 
(al-raḥmān), the Creator (al-khāliq) and so on.132 It is for this reason that God further 
manifests Himself to His creation in order for His names and attributes to be realised in 
it. This is carried out in accordance with the nature of each possible being, which are 
pre-eternally known to God as immutable entities (aʿyān thābita). Thus, the world’s 
entities come into being, each manifesting a certain divine name and attribute.133 In Ibn 
ʿArabī’s view, inasmuch as the world is the locus of God, it is given a certain degree of 
independence. However, since it is a mere manifestation of God, the world does not 
                                                
129 Chittick, ‘The Five Divine Presences,’ 116-117. 
130  Izutsu, Sufism, 23-29; Chittick, ‘The Five Divine Presences,’ 111-112; Ibn ʿArabī, 
al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 460; vol. 4, 276. 
131 Chittick, The Sufi Path, 35-36. 
132 Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 105/119. 
133 Ibn ʿArabī’s view on immutable entities will be discussed in Chapter 3. For more on divine 
names and God’s self-manifestation, see Chittick, The Sufi Path, 47-58, 212-220. 
 59 
possess independent existence. The tenet of the absolute oneness of God’s existence in 
the cosmos is therefore retained.134 
According to Ibn ʿArabī, the one who can manifest all of God’s names and 
attributes at a perfect equilibrium is the perfect man (al-insān al-kāmil). He was created 
in the image of God at the level of inclusive oneness, as is seen in the hadith ‘God 
created Adam in His image’. Being attributed with all the divine names and attributes, 
the perfect man carries within himself the realities of all the world’s beings together.135 
In this regard, the perfect man is often described as the microcosm in whose single 
reality the entire cosmos becomes manifest, whereas the world that manifests God as a 
whole is viewed as the macrocosm.136  
The teaching of God’s self-manifestation into the world’s beings establishes the 
thesis known as ‘He/not He.’137 This means that the world is God as His loci, yet it is 
not God in a real sense. In other words, He is immanent in the world’s beings (tashbīh) 
but also simultaneously incomparable to them (tanzīh). In order to support this thesis, 
Ibn ʿArabī references the following verse: ‘there is nothing like God and He is the 
hearing and seeing’ [Q. 42:11]. The notion of divine incomparability and immanence 
are also described as ‘the non-delimitation of God’ (iṭlāq) and ‘the delimitation of God’ 
(taqyīd) respectively.138 The perfect mystic combines these opposing ideas and finds 
God in every entity, while denying their identity to Him at the same time.139 In other 
                                                
134 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 2, 516. 
135 On the theory of the perfect man, see, Burckhardt, Introduction, 63-68; Chittick, The Sufi 
Path, 27, 46, 369-381; Izutsu, Sufism, 218-243. 
136 Izutsu, Sufism, 218-223; Little, ‘al-Insān al-Kāmil,’ 43; Ebstein, Mysticism and Philosophy, 
162, 170. 
137 Chittick, The Sufi Path, 112-115, 361-369. 
138  For these notions of incomparability/similarity and non-delimitation/delimitation, see 
Chittick, Sufi Path, 68-76, 109-111. 
139  Chittick, The Sufi Path, 277-278; Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 54-55, 167-168/69-70, 
180-181.  
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words, he sees God’s self-manifestations everywhere in creation but perceives God as 
the only real existence.  
The doctrine of the oneness of existence is thus understood to represent the actual 
situation of the world. However, as Chittick observes, the word existence (wujūd) 
originally derives from the root w-j-d, which means ‘to find.’ Therefore, wujūd refers to 
being ‘found in an objective sense (in other words, to exist out there), but also the act of 
finding as a subjective experience.’140 Based on this observation, Chittick argues that 
Ibn ʿArabī explains God’s self-manifestations both objectively and subjectively, and in 
fact there is no clear distinction between them.141 He also stresses that in Ibn ʿArabī’s 
texts, the terms wujūd and shuhūd (witnessing or seeing God) are used as synonyms and 
it is impossible to draw a line between them.142 Chittick consequently concludes that 
one should not label Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching simply as existential monism, pantheistic 
monism, and so on.143  
Chittick’s insightful suggestion should not be dismissed. However, it also needs to 
be remembered that Ibn ʿArabī’s detractors understood his thought as an expression of 
ontological monism. For them, it discloses the existential reality of the world and blurs 
the distinction between God and creation. It is this perception of Ibn ʿArabī that his 
defenders in the fifteenth- and sixteenth-centuries reacted to, and not to the true 




                                                
140 Chittick, ‘Rumi and Waḥdat al-Wujūd,’ 74-75. 
141 Chittick, ‘Rumi and Waḥdat al-Wujūd,’ 74. 
142 Chittick, ‘Waḥdat al-Wujūd in India,’ 34-35. 
143 Chittick, ‘Rumi and Waḥdat al-Wujūd,’ 73. 
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1.2.2. Opposition to Ibn ʿArabī 
 
In order to understand the approaches of Ibn ʿArabī’s defenders in context, I now 
turn to the arguments advanced by Ibn Taymiyya, al-Taftāzānī, Ibn al-Ahdal and 
al-Biqāʿī. I will especially focus on the points of their criticisms that were of most 
concern to Ibn ʿArabī’s supporters in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Egypt. They are as 
follows: (1) Ibn Taymiyya’s reception in medieval Egypt and his rejection of the 
oneness of existence by refuting unificationism and incarnationism at a linguistic level; 
(2) al-Taftāzānī’s classification of mystical beliefs into existential oneness (heretical) 
and experiential oneness (legitimate); (3) Ibn al-Ahdal’s attacks on Ibn ʿArabī, focusing 
on the tripartite hierarchy of creeds; and (4) al-Biqāʿī’s accusation of ontological 
monism based on al-Taftāzānī’s teaching.  
 
1.2.2.1 Ibn Taymiyya 
 
I begin by providing a brief account of Ibn Taymiyya’s reception in Egypt. He is 
known as one of the most vociferous critics of monistic Sufism, as well as being hostile 
to the theology of the Ashʿarīs, a dominant theological group in Mamluk Egypt.144 As 
such, it is easy to find negative views on Ibn Taymiyya in the medieval period. For 
example, Bori identified anti-Ibn Taymiyya debates amongst the intellectuals of 
fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Damascus and Cairo, such as the Shāfiʿī-Ashʿarī 
scholars Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 756/1355) and Taqī al-Dīn al-Ḥisnī (d. 829/1426).145  
                                                
144 With regard to Ibn Taymiyya’s position on the Ashʿarīs, see el Omari, ‘Ibn Taymiyya’s 
“Theology of the Sunna,”’ 101-119. 
145 Bori, ‘Ibn Taymiyya,’ 97-102. Adem also refers to al-Subkī’s criticism that Ibn Taymiyya’s 
 62 
Furthermore, according to Geoffroy, al-Suyūṭī supports Ibn Taymiyya’s arguments 
against various types of heresies, while at the same time denouncing Ibn Taymiyya’s 
disapproval of some Sufi practices, such as recitation (dhikr) and the celebration of the 
birthdays of spiritual figures (mawlid).146 Al-Suyūṭī also refers to Ibn Taymiyya in 
narrating the episode of Ibn ʿArabī’s advocate and the Mamluk historian, Khalīl ibn 
Aybak al-Ṣafadī (d. 764/1363). In this anecdote, al-Ṣafadī reports that he once told Ibn 
Taymiyya that Ibn ʿArabī was a man of nobility whose words were full of goodness; 
however, when encountering the passages whose meanings are ambiguous, al-Ṣafadī 
recommended that it would be better to leave the knowledge of them to God, as it is not 
necessary to uphold all of Ibn ʿArabī’s statements.147 Here, al-Suyūṭī intends to defend 
Ibn ʿArabī against the accusations advanced by scholars like Ibn Taymiyya.  
El-Rouayheb analyses Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī’s condemnation of Ibn Taymiyya for 
the latter’s literalistic approach to anthropomorphic attributes.148 El-Rouayheb observes 
that Ibn Ḥajar also excuses the position of the founder of the Ḥanbalī school, Aḥmad 
Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) from the charge of anthropomorphism (tashbīh). 149 
Interestingly, Ibn Ḥajar’s view coincides with that of al-Shaʿrānī. As I will show in 
Chapter 4, al-Shaʿrānī similarly respects Ibn Ḥanbal as a scholar who advocated God’s 
incomparability (tanzīh) while dismissing Ibn Taymiyya as one who deviated from 
                                                                                                                                          
espousal of the infinite regress of the divine will entails the world’s eternity. See Adem, ‘Ibn 
Taymiyya as Avicennian?’ 125-133. For Ibn Taymiyya’s idea on infinite regress, see Hoover, 
Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy, 70-102. 
146 Geoffroy, Sufisme, 448-450, mentioned in Bori, ‘Ibn Taymiyya,’ 102.  
147 al-Suyūṭī, Tanbiʾat al-ghabī, 164-165. 
148 Ibn Taymiyya stayed in Cairo between 705/1306 and 712/1313, during which period he was 
accused of anthropomorphism for his theological views and sentenced to imprisonment. For 
more on this, see Jackson, ‘Ibn Taymiyyah,’ 41-85; Holtzman, ‘Accused of Anthropomorphism,’ 
561-587. 
149 El-Rouayheb, ‘From Ibn Ḥajar,’ 271-275. 
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this.150  
It is intriguing that al-Shaʿrānī expresses his animosity towards Ibn Taymiyya in 
his Sufi biography al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā. In its introduction, he makes defensive 
comments concerning the mystics who were accused of being heretical, and writes as 
follows: 
 
It [an accusation against the mystics] is pure prejudice, as we can see in our 
age in Ibn Taymiyya’s denunciation of us and of our brothers [i.e. the 
mystics]. Therefore, my brother, beware of anyone who is biased and stay 
away from his gathering.151 
 
Significantly, the above passage tells us that the legacy of Ibn Taymiyya’s bitter attack 
on Ibn ʿArabī and his followers was still acutely felt in sixteenth-century Egypt.152 This 
raises a possibility that al-Shaʿrānī considered Ibn Taymiyya as one of his main 
opponents in defending Ibn ʿArabī. In fact, as I will show in Chapter 3, al-Shaʿrānī’s 
discussions of immutable entities show some correspondence with Ibn Taymiyya’s 
critique of this concept.  
Now I turn to Ibn Taymiyya’s attack on Ibn ʿArabī, focusing on the way in which 
he refutes the dogma of the oneness of existence by disproving unificationism (ittiḥād) 
and incarnationism (ḥulūl). There have not been many studies that specifically treat this 
subject. It is, however, important to detail his critique of it, as Ibn ʿArabī’s supporters, 
whom I will discuss later, try to respond to it. 
                                                
150 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fols. 59a, 62b. 
151 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā, 13.  
152 For the details of Ibn Taymiyya’s reception during the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries, 
see Bori, ‘Ibn Taymiyya,’ 87-123.  
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Ibn Taymiyya explicitly rejects the position of the monistic mystics, such as Ibn 
ʿArabī, al-Qūnawī, ʿAfīf al-Dīn al-Tilimsānī (d. 690/1291), Ibn Sabʿīn (d. ca. 
668-669/1269-71) and Ibn Fāriḍ, by calling them the exponents of the oneness of 
existence and unificationists (ittiḥādiyīn).153 In his view, the doctrine of the oneness of 
existence identifies the necessary existence of God with the possible existence of His 
creation, denying any distinction between God and creation.154 It follows that whatever 
creatures might do, it is actually God who performs their actions; God is the one who 
prays, speaks, eats, drinks, fasts, starves, sleeps, wakes up, becomes sick and injured, 
gets saddened, commits adultery, and so on. Ultimately, God must be attributed with all 
the wrongdoings and disgraceful behaviours of human beings.155 As Hoover explains, 
according to Ibn Taymiyya this means that He will even be identified with pigs, demons, 
idols and unbelievers, and punish Himself, which is absurd.156  
In Ibn Taymiyya’s view, the oneness of existence is intrinsically associated with 
the ideas of unificationism and incarnationism. Therefore, as long as these notions are 
proven wrong, he asserts that the fundamental tenet of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings becomes 
untenable. Based on this standpoint, Ibn Taymiyya tries to refute unificationism and 
incarnationism by drawing on the common definition of each word. For example, he 
argues that since God cannot be attributed with the imperfect attributes of creatures, and 
creatures cannot be attributed with certain divine attributes such as being eternal, 
absolute unification between the two is inconceivable. Alternatively, if one assumes 
creation’s limited and partial unification with God, the duality between God and 
                                                
153 Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 90; Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy, 110. 
154 Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy, 110; Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 1, 80-81. 
For Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn ʿArabī’s belief that God’s existence is the same as that of His creation is 
founded on the idea of immutable entities in the divine knowledge. 
155 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 1, 124; vol. 4, 87-88. 
156 Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy, 110. 
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creatures will still remain after their mystical union. For Ibn Taymiyya, this is not 
unification but pluralisation. But if God and His creation are understood to transform 
into a third thing as a result of unification, similarly to what Christians believe, this is 
strictly prohibited in Islam. This is because transformation means that something that 
has originally existed stops existing, thereby turning into a new entity. For instance, 
when water and milk are mixed up, they transform into something else, water-milk. Or 
when fire is used to melt metal, both fire and metal turn into something different from 
the original materials. However, God, whose existence and attributes are necessary, can 
neither change nor cease to exist.157 The assumption of unification between God and 
the world is therefore absurd. This also means that the first premise of the oneness of 
existence is wrong. 
With regard to the notion of incarnation, Ibn Taymiyya points out that it 
necessarily presupposes two objects: that which incarnates and that in which the 
incarnation occurs. Now, Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching that God can be seen in the images of 
His creation is a glaring testimony to his belief in divine incarnation into the world. 
However, since Ibn ʿArabī views God’s existence as identical to that of His creation, 
literal incarnation is impossible. Even if it is taken to mean the incarnation of God’s 
existence into the immutable entities of the possible beings (thubūt al-mumkināt), this is 
not logically tenable either. In Ibn Taymiyya’s understanding, as we shall see in Chapter 
3, Ibn ʿArabī’s monism leaves no distinction between God and immutable entities.158 
Therefore, Ibn ʿArabī’s tenet of the oneness of existence is implausible. 
Ibn Taymiyya regards the teaching of monistic mystics as worse than that of 
Christians. By upholding the oneness of existence, monistic mystics ascribe to a notion 
                                                
157 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol.1, 101-102. 
158 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol.1, 79.  
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of unbound incarnation (ḥulūl muṭlaq), which differs from what he calls specified or 
limited incarnation (ḥulūl muqayyad khāṣṣ). The advocates of limited incarnation, such 
as Christians, make God’s incarnation specific to Jesus (takhṣīṣ). Likewise, the Shīʿas 
limit God’s incarnation to ʿAlī, and even Sufis like Abū al-Ḥusayn ibn Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj 
(d. 309/922) – who is famous for the utterance ‘I am the Truth’ – confine it to 
themselves. On the other hand, the exponents of unbound incarnation, that is to say, the 
proponents of the oneness of existence, see God everywhere in any objects. According 
to Ibn Taymiyya, they boldly claim that Christians and idol worshippers are wrong in 
restricting divine incarnation to Jesus or to certain idols, while they, that is, the 
upholders of unbound incarnation, rightly embrace worshipping all idols unlimitedly in 
an unspecified manner (al-iṭlāq wa-l-ʿumūm). In Ibn Taymiyya’s view, this kind of 
statement derives from their belief that everything is God and that He can be immanent 
in every entity. This is tantamount to declaring that whomever you worship, whether it 
is a human, plant, or mineral, you worship God. From here, Ibn Taymiyya concludes 
that this teaching is far more heretical than that of Christians.159  
It is noteworthy that by disproving incarnationism and unificationism, which Ibn 
Taymiyya believes to be inseparable from the oneness of existence, he attempts to 
uproot the fundamental doctrine of Ibn ʿArabī altogether. As we shall see, Ibn ʿArabī’s 
supporters deny the notions of incarnationism and unificationism using a similar 




                                                
159 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 1, 68. 
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1.2.2.2. Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī 
 
The Timurid Ḥanafī-Ashʿarī theologian and Ibn ʿArabī’s antagonist Saʿd al-Dīn 
al-Taftāzānī is famous for his commentary on Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī’s (d. 537/1142) 
Hanafī creed, Sharḥ al-ʿaqāʾid al-nasafiyya. Al-Taftāzānī also left another text, Sharḥ 
al-maqāṣid, in which he analyses different theological subjects, including the issues of 
unificationism and incarnationism. Sharḥ al-maqāṣid was popular amongst Egyptian 
scholars during the fifteenth- and sixteenth-centuries and was also read by al-Shaʿrānī. 
In his Risāla waḥdat al-wujūd, which aims at refuting the claims of the exponents of the 
oneness of existence, al-Taftāzānī introduces a framework for classifying mysticism 
into two kinds – experiential and existential – in order to defend the former while 
castigating the latter. Knysh and Geoffory have already explained the basic structure of 
this teaching.160 Nevertheless, considering that not only al-Taftāzānī’s disciples but also 
Ibn ʿArabī’s supporters in later generations adopt the same framework (as we shall see 
later in the section), it is important to discuss al-Taftāzānī’s teaching on this point again, 
further clarifying its details.    
Early defenders of Sufism stressed abidance by the Law in order to justify their 
own discipline and to distinguish genuine Sufis, who follow the Law, from 
pseudo-Sufis, who dismiss it.161 Al-Taftāzānī added another yardstick to this, whereby 
Sufis are judged based on whether their experience concerns subjective or objective one. 
As Knysh notes, in al-Taftāzānī’s view, authentic and legitimate mystics are those 
                                                
160 Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 150-151, 206; Geoffory, Le Soufisme, 474-475.  
161 See, for example, Ibn al-Ahdal’s description of early Sufi defenders in Ibn al-Ahdal, Kashf 
al-ghiṭaʾ, 170-177/vol. 2, 594-621. For the sake of precision, in this study, I referred to two 
editions of Kashf al-ghiṭaʾ: (1) that published by Aḥmad Bakīr in 1964 and (2) the edition 
published by Dār al-Fataḥ in 2016 (2 volumes).  
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whose experience of God’s unity only reflects their visionary, psychological perception, 
whereas heretics like Ibn ʿArabī and his followers declare that their experience discloses 
the ontological truth of the world (i.e. the oneness of existence). Al-Taftāzānī expounds 
this view by relating it to the concept of ‘absolute unity’ (al-waḥda al-muṭlaqa). This 
tenet was first introduced by Ibn Sabʿīn in order to describe his monistic worldview. 
According to it, nothing truly and absolutely exists, except God who is the one and 
ultimate reality, and everything else is mere illusion.162 The doctrine soon came to be 
denounced by the Andalusian polymath Ibn al-Khaṭīb (d. 776/1375) as heretical.163  
Al-Taftāzānī finds two meanings in the teaching of absolute unity. On the one hand, 
it is employed by a true mystic to express the final stage of his path, wherein he 
witnesses God’s existence and nothing else.164 Al-Taftāzānī compares the situation of 
the world at this stage to that of the stars, which become hidden by the daylight even 
though they still exist. Once this state is over, a mystic starts to see the world again. 
This means that his mystical experience of God’s unity is based only on a visionary, 
perceptual phenomenon without signifying the actual situation of the world.  
On the other hand, when taken up by the exponents of the oneness of existence 
(al-wujūdiyya), absolute unity points to the reality that only God exists and every entity 
in the objective world (aʿyān al-akwān fī l-khārij) is perceived as ontologically pure 
imagination.165 Al-Taftāzānī asserts that this is downright heretical, because a belief 
that everything is illusion amounts to denying the existence of prophets, angels, the 
Islamic community, the Law, heaven and hell, reward and punishment, and 
                                                
162 Geoffroy, Introduction to Sufism, 98; Le Soufisme, 470-471; Ibn Sabʿīn, Rasāʾil, 65, 141, 
170, 357. 
163 Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 176-184. 
164 al-Taftāzānī, Risāla waḥdat al-wujūd, 3, 32. 
165 al-Taftāzānī, Risāla waḥdat al-wujūd, 6, 26, 33; Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 150-151.  
 69 
revelation.166 Furthermore, if God is the only being, He becomes identical with the 
existence of all possible beings. He is the one who worships and is worshipped, 
prostrates and receives prostration, and the one who thanks and is thanked. This is 
absurd.167  
Referring to this typology, Geoffroy identifies those who advocate the subjective 
truth as the exponents of the oneness of witnessing (waḥdat al-shuhūd).168 As we shall 
see in more detail in the next chapter, the oneness of witnessing is an expression 
conventionally associated with the later Naqshbandī Sufi Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 
1034/1625) in India, who objected to the oneness of existence. 169  Geoffroy’s 
suggestion makes al-Taftāzānī one of the earliest proponents of the oneness of 
witnessing, with his aim of separating the legitimate, experiential mystics from the 
heretical, monistic mystics. Strikingly, as I will show, Ibn ʿArabī’s defenders adopt 
al-Taftāzānī’s approach, thereby placing Ibn ʿArabī in the group who advocate the 
oneness of witnessing, but not in the camp of the oneness of existence.  
As El-Rouayheb carefully demonstrates, al-Taftāzānī does not regard Ibn ʿArabī 
and his followers as exponents of unificationism and incarnationism. These notions 
presuppose the existence of at least two entities, yet the latter’s monism lacks dualism in 
principle.170 In this al-Taftāzānī differs from Ibn Taymiyya, who believes that Ibn 
                                                
166 al-Taftāzānī, Risāla waḥdat al-wujūd, 11, 14-15, 26.  
167 al-Taftāzānī, Risāla waḥdat al-wujūd, 3, 24, 33. For al-Taftāzānī’s metaphysical critique of 
the oneness of existence, see Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 153-165; El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual 
History, 313-319. 
168 Geoffroy, Le Soufisme, 475. 
169 On Sirhindī, see Haar, Follower and Heir. For his reaction against the oneness of existence, 
see Chittick, ‘Waḥdat al-Wujūd in India.’  
170 El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 315. On this issue, al-Taftāzānī writes: 
 
One might imagine that the proponents of the oneness of existence (wujūdiyya) are 
not actually advocates of unificationism and incarnationism. This is because these 
two notions occur between two different beings, yet the exponents of the oneness 
of existence make God identical to the existence of possible beings, denying their 
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ʿArabī’s thought is fundamentally inseparable from unificationism and incarnationism. 
Despite this, Ibn Taymiyya and al-Taftāzānī share the same conclusion: Ibn ʿArabī is 
more heretical than the advocates of these teachings in that he sees God not only in one 
individual but everywhere, thus identifying Him with all beings in the world. It is this 
ontology of Ibn ʿArabī that his defenders attempted to reinterpret. 
 
1.2.2.3. Ḥusayn Ibn al-Ahdal 
 
The Yemeni theologian and historian Ḥusayn Ibn al-Ahdal (d. 855/1451) is a 
strong supporter of Ashʿarism, an opponent of the late Ḥanbalīs, and a critic of Ibn 
ʿArabī.171 There is no reference to his name in the writings of the defenders of Ibn 
ʿArabī whom I will discuss. However, in Tanbīh al-ghabī, al-Biqāʿī names Ibn al-Ahdal, 
along with his text, entitled Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ ʿan ḥaqāʾiq al-tawḥīd wa-ʿaqāʾid 
al-muwaḥḥidīn fī l-radd ʿalā Ibn ʿArabī wa taqrīr qawāʿid ʿaqāʾid ahl al-sunna 
(‘Unveiling the Realities of God’s Unity and the Creeds of Those Who Declare God’s 
Unity Against Ibn ʿArabī and the Confirmation of the Creeds of the People of 
Sunna’).172 This would raise the possibility that Ibn al-Ahdal was known to a certain 
                                                                                                                                          
difference as well as duality. Hence, one may not associate unificationism and 
incarnationism [with their teaching]. However, their heresy is worse than the two 
and it is logically fallacious. The adherents of these notions [i.e. Christians and the 
Shīʿa] […] only speak of God’s unification and incarnation within a few 
individuals. On the other hand, the proponents of the oneness of existence […] 
make God identical to the existence of all things, including filthy things 
[al-Taftāzānī, Risāla waḥdat al-wujūd, 37]. 
 
As I shall discuss, the above passage is quoted by both Ibn ʿArabī’s adversaries and his 
supporters. In Sharḥ al-maqāṣid, al-Taftāzānī further tries to dissociate monistic teaching 
from unificationism and incarnationism. See al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-maqāṣid, vol. 4, 
59-60.  
171 For more details on Ibn al-Ahdal and his milieu, see Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 234-242; Bori, ‘Ibn 
Taymiyya,’ 105-112. 
172 al-Biqāʿī, Tanbīh al-ghabī, 151. 
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extent amongst those who disputed with al-Biqāʿī, such as al-Suyūṭī and al-Anṣārī. 
Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ is dedicated to the refutation of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings, as well as 
to the defence of the Ashʿarī position. In it, Ibn al-Ahdal accuses Ibn ʿArabī of 
upholding the following notions: the world’s eternity, determinism, anthropomorphism 
(tashbīh), corporealism (tajsīm) in the sense of the extreme literalists (ḥashwiyya), the 
oneness of existence, unificationism and incarnationism.173 It is of interest that Ibn 
al-Ahdal portrays Ibn ʿArabī’s heresy as that of an anthropomorphist (mushabbiha) and 
corporealist (mujassima), whereby God’s attributes are attributed to creation. These 
terms are not conventionally used to condemn Ibn ʿArabī’s position. In fact, neither Ibn 
Taymiyya nor al-Taftāzānī attacks Ibn ʿArabī in this way. Nevertheless, as I will discuss 
in Chapter 4, al-Shaʿrānī tries to excuse Ibn ʿArabī from the charge of 
anthropomorphism by reinterpreting his teaching of tashbīh in a non-ontological, 
visionary sense. 
What is pertinent to this study concerning Ibn al-Ahdal is his critique of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s tripartite hierarchy of the articles of belief (ʿaqāʾid). As Morris briefly notes, 
Ibn ʿArabī identifies three different levels in the articles of belief.174 They are: (1) creed 
of the commoners (ʿaqīda al-ʿawāmm) amongst the people of Islam, who rely only on 
their natural disposition (fiṭra), (2) creed of the people of distinction amongst the people 
of God who are positioned between reasoning and unveiling (ʿaqīda ahl al-ikhtiṣāṣ min 
ahl Allah bayna naẓar wa-kashf), and (3) creed of the most distinguished elites amongst 
those who are dedicated to God (ʿaqīdat khulāṣat al-khāṣṣa fī Allah), that is to say, the 
                                                
173 It must be noted that none of these charges are true of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings. See Chittick, 
The Sufi Path.  
174 Morris, ‘Ibn ʿArabī and His Interpreters: Part II,’ 743-44; ‘How to Study “al-Futūḥāt,”’ 
81-82. 
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advanced mystics like Ibn ʿArabī.175 The first and second creeds are written in the 
introductory chapter of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, whereas the details of the third creed, 
as Ibn ʿArabī writes, are explained throughout the rest of the oeuvre.  
In Ibn al-Ahdal’s view, the three types of creed that Ibn ʿArabī proposes can be 
identified as follows: (1) creed for the commoners who do not possess any ability to 
reason, (2) creed for the elite, whom Ibn al-Ahdal believes to be the philosophers, and 
(3) creed for the elites of the elites, who are the proponents of unificationism, like Ibn 
ʿArabī. The second and third creeds are characterised as pure heresy.176  
According to Ibn al-Ahdal, it is wrong to classify the articles of belief in this way, 
because there should only be one creed, whether a person is a commoner or a member 
of the intellectual elite. In his view, this creed is the articles of belief upheld by the 
Ashʿarīs.177 Ibn al-Ahdal then explains the reason Ibn ʿArabī came to assert separate 
articles of belief for different types of people. It goes as follows: in case of 
jurisprudence, all the interpreters of the Law (mujtahid) are correct in issuing their legal 
rulings on the practical application of the Law (furūʿ). On the contrary, when it comes 
to the basic principles of religion (uṣūl al-dīn), there is only one truth (i.e., what the 
Ashʿarīs believe), not multiple. Anyone who objects to this view should be condemned 
by a consensus of Muslims (ijmāʿ). Only certain scholars, such as the Basran jurist 
ʿUbaydallah ibn al-Ḥasan al-ʿAnbarī (d. 168/784-5) 178  and the Basran Muʿtazilī 
theologian Abū Uthmān ibn Baḥr al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868-9),179 claimed that all the 
                                                
175 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 34-47. 
176 Ibn al-Ahdal, Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ, 100/vol. 1, 424. 
177 Ibn al-Ahdal, Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ, 100/vol. 1, 423. 
178 For more information on al-ʿAnbarī, see Tillier, ‘al-ʿAnbarī, ʿUbaydallāh b. al-Ḥasan” in 
EI3.  
179 For more details on al-Jāḥiẓ, see Cooperson, ‘JĀḤEẒ’ in Encyclopædia Iranica XIV/4, 
386-389. 
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interpreters were right even in the field of the principles of religion. According to Ibn 
al-Ahdal, based on this idea al-ʿAnbarī further declared that even the Jewish and 
Christians were correct in their faith.180 Ibn al-Ahdal believes that Ibn ʿArabī follows 
the teachings of al-ʿAnbārī and al-Jāḥiẓ, thereby urging people to affirm three types of 
beliefs as multiple truths without confining themselves to one specific creed and 
disbelieving others.181 For Ibn al-Ahdal, this was a repulsive utterance of heresy.  
Ibn al-Ahdal’s rejection of the tripartite hierarchy of creeds is an intriguing finding, 
especially because, as I will discuss later in the chapter, al-Shaʿrānī’s theological 
writings are clearly underpinned by this framework. Despite the criticism, al-Shaʿrānī 
endorses the structure of the hierarchy of creeds in order to spread Ibn ʿArabī’s thought 
to a wide range of people. 
 
1.2.2.4. Burhān al-Dīn al-Biqāʿī 
 
The Mamluk Shāfiʿī jurist Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm al-Biqāʿī was a zealous 
opponent of monistic Sufism. He studied in Damascus and then in Cairo with Shāfiʿī 
Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, who was a teacher of al-Suyūṭī and a critic of Ibn ʿArabī and 
ʿAlī Wafāʾ. Al-Biqāʿī was in dispute with al-Suyūṭī and Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī over his 
accusation of Ibn ʿArabī, Ibn Fāriḍ and others, and left two polemical texts entitled 
Tanbīh al-ghabī ilā takfīr Ibn ʿArabī (Drawing the Attention of the Ignorant to Ibn 
ʿArabī’s Unbelief) and Taḥdhīr al-ʿibād min ahl al-ʿinād bi-bidʿat al-ittiḥād (Warning 
to the Servants of God against the Stubborn Exponents of the Innovation of 
                                                
180 Ibn al-Ahdal, Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ, 182/vol. 2, 626. Ibn al-Ahdal’s understanding of al-Jāḥiẓ on 
this point is incorrect. See Van Ess, Theology and Society. 
181 Ibn al-Ahdal, Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ, 182/vol. 2, 626-627; Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 99/113. 
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Unificationism). In Tanbīh al-ghabī, al-Biqāʿī quotes various opponents of Ibn ʿArabī, 
including Ibn Taymiyya, al-Taftāzānī, and Ibn al-Ahdal, and condemns monistic 
mystics as exponents of unificationism and incarnationism who believe in the doctrine 
of the oneness of existence.182   
Knysh lists the heretical doctrines for which al-Biqāʿī criticises Ibn ʿArabī – 
although he does not examine each tenet in detail. Some of them, such as the tenets that 
God is identical to His creatures and that God is immanent in every object of the world, 
overlap with points which other critics like Ibn Taymiyya have already raised.183 
Al-Biqāʿī’s criticism of the idea of God’s immanence in His creation needs further 
explanation, as it becomes relevant when I discuss al-Shaʿrānī’s refutation of this idea.  
With respect to the tenet of God’s immanence, al-Biqāʿī refers to the story of the 
prophet Nūh, which is recounted in Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam. In al-Biqāʿī’s understanding, Ibn 
ʿArabī believes that God is present in every object of worship, whether a stone, tree, or 
stars, as He can be present in the world’s beings.184 Hence, if one is to reach perfection 
on the mystical path and become a real knower of God, one has to grasp God’s 
immanence (tashbīh) as well as His incomparability (tanzīh) to the world. Based on this 
idea, Ibn ʿArabī judges Nūh to be imperfect as a prophet, because Nūh admonished his 
people, who were idol-worshippers, to abandon their idols when God was actually 
present in them.185 Referencing an Egyptian Shāfiʿī critic of Ibn ʿArabī, Zayn al-Dīn 
al-ʿIrāqī (d. 806/1403), al-Biqāʿī declares it objectionable to claim a defect in a prophet, 
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183 Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 214.   
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185 al-Biqāʿī, Tanbīh al-ghabī, 46-49. 
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let alone to promote idolatry and unificationism between God and creatures.186  
Al-Biqāʿī’s discussion of the notion of absolute unity also requires closer analysis. 
Borrowing the words of Zayn al-Dīn al-ʿIrāqī, al-Biqāʿī ascribes to Ibn ʿArabī the 
doctrine of absolute unity in the sense that all of His creation is ultimately God 
Himself.187 Yet, while condemning this ontological formula as heretical, al-Biqāʿī 
proposes a different interpretation of absolute unity in the non-ontological, visionary 
sense through the words of al-Taftāzānī’s close disciple ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad 
al-Bukhārī (d. 841/1437).188  
Drawing on al-Bukhārī’s words, which he most probably took from al-Taftāzānī, 
al-Biqāʿī acknowledges that certain mystical terms, such as annihilation (fanāʾ), 
subsistence (baqāʾ) and absolute unity, have two meanings: the legitimate, original one 
and the heretical, distorted one.189 The former is advocated by the group of authentic 
mystics (ʿārifūn), whereas the latter is promoted by the heretical exponents of the 
oneness of existence who are in his view considered the philosophers (kafara wujūdiyya 
min al-falāsifa). According to al-Biqāʿī, the monistic mystics cunningly attempt to hide 
their heresy by taking advantage of the terminology of authentic mystics and altering its 
originally intended meaning. Hence, they employ annihilation in the sense of causing 
the realities of the thing to disappear – which in their view are nothing but illusions, 
subsistence in the sense of subsequent realisation of the absolute existence of God 
(al-wujūd al-muṭlaq), and absolute unity to describe their monistic worldview. That is to 
say, the existence of every being except God’s existence is purely imagination, and each 
                                                
186 al-Biqāʿī, Tanbīh al-ghabī, 50-53. 
187 al-Biqāʿī, Tanbīh al-ghabī, 66.  
188 For more information on al-Bukhārī, see Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 204-209. 
189  Al-Biqāʿī’s argument is almost identical to that of al-Taftāzānī. Compare al-Biqāʿī’s 
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entity in the world, including filthy things, is ultimately God Himself.190  
Al-Biqāʿī argues that these meanings stand in sharp contrast to authentic mystics’ 
use of the same terms in a manner which accords with the Islamic Law. For instance, 
they employ annihilation in the sense of effacement of the world’s entities from the 
mystics’ vision (naẓar), while their actual existence continues. In this mystical state, 
they lose sight of a connection between their actions and themselves, without losing the 
actual realities of worldly beings. Furthermore, in the view of authentic mystics, 
subsistence only means assuming the good, ethical character of God (takhalluq 
bi-akhlāq ilāhiyya) and withdrawing from the impure attributes of human beings.191 In 
a similar vein, absolute unity is given the non-ontological, visionary sense, meaning 
witnessing God alone (mushāhada) as a result of working hard to focus on Him. At this 
stage, all other entities appear to have vanished within the divine light, yet their 
existence is never lost. 
Following al-Taftāzānī’s argument, this is compared to the situation of stars; they 
may appear invisible in the sunlight, though they do actually exist. If a mystic remains 
aware of himself in this state, it is called annihilation in the divine unity (fanāʾ fī 
l-tawḥīd) for advanced mystics (khawāṣṣ). If he completely forgets himself, including 
his state and annihilation itself, and witnesses nothing but God, just as he sees nothing 
of the stars during the daytime except the sun, it is called annihilation of annihilation in 
                                                
190 al-Biqāʿī, Tanbīh al-ghabī, 186-187, 189. The passage is briefly mentioned in Geoffroy, Le 
Soufisme, 469. 
191 Ibn ʿArabī also employs the expression ‘assuming the traits of God’, yet he uses it both in 
the sense of a spiritual obligation for the mystics, and on the ontological plane for the advanced 
mystics to reach perfection and to fully manifest the divine names and attributes. However, as 
Esbstein notes, in Sufi thought in general, the expression can only mean the assumption of the 
good characteristics of God ‘as an ethical-spiritual obligation’, and ‘not an ontological 
statement concerning the essential nature of God’s friends’. Ebstein, Mysticism and Philosophy, 
149. In the current context, al-Biqāʿī clearly only meant the former, non-ontological, visionary 
sense. See more on this subject, Chittick, The Sufi Path, 21-26, 283-288. 
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the divine unity (fanāʾ al-fanāʾ fī l-tawḥīd); this is for the elite of the elites (khawāṣṣ 
al-khawāṣṣ). In either case, a mystic has achieved absolute unity by being veiled from 
everything except God, while he and other beings firmly retain their ontological 
status.192  
By painting it this way, absolute unity, which some monistic mystics associate 
with the existential reality of the world, is turned into an innocuous expression to 
signify a mystic’s perceptual, visionary experience. In al-Biqāʿī’s view, the latter is the 
correct, original meaning of absolute unity. This is no other than the typology proposed 
by al-Taftāzānī – experiential mysticism as sanctioned and ontological mysticism as 
errant. It is evident that Ibn ʿArabī and his followers were placed in the second group.193 
Most significantly, this idea was even adopted by Ibn ʿArabī’s defenders. 
 
1.2.3. Defence of Ibn ʿArabī before al-Shaʿrānī 
 
     Having considered the criticisms against Ibn ʿArabī, I now set out to investigate 
the arguments of his supporters in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Egypt – al-Suyūṭī, 
al-Anṣārī, and Ibn Ḥajar. First, I discuss al-Suyūṭī’s approach to Ibn ʿArabī, focusing on 
how he excuses the latter from the charges of unificationism and incarnationism. I 
incorporate Ingalls’s study on al-Suyūṭī and further analyse his defence of Ibn ʿArabī, 
paying special attention to al-Suyūṭī’s references to the ideas of the latter’s 
adversaries.194 This will enable us to understand al-Suyūṭī’s methods in context.  
     I then turn to al-Anṣārī and Ibn Ḥajar’s approaches to Ibn ʿArabī’s defence. I will 
                                                
192 al-Biqāʿī, Tanbīh al-ghabī, 188-189.  
193 See also Geoffroy, Le Soufisme, 469-470. 
194 Ingalls, ‘Suble Innovation,’ 228-231. 
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consider Ibn Ḥajar’s refutation of unificationism and incarnationism and examine the 
interesting attempts of al-Anṣārī and Ibn Ḥajar to place Ibn ʿArabī in the circle of 
legitimate mystics. I will look in particular at their treatment of al-Taftāzānī’s teaching. 
The examination of this subject, which has not yet been studied in modern scholarship, 
will provide us with an intriguing finding concerning the widespread influence of 
al-Taftāzānī on Ibn ʿArabī’s supporters in this period.195 It will emerge that despite the 
reticence of al-Suyūṭī, al-Anṣārī, and Ibn Ḥajar to Ibn ʿArabī’s actual teachings, their 
defence of him was actually very strategic and carefully considered. 
 
1.2.3.1. Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī 
 
Al-Suyūṭī’s unquestionable support of Ibn ʿArabī is expressed in his short treatise 
Tanbiʾat al-ghabī bi-tabriʾat Ibn ʿArabī (‘Informing the Ignorant of the Soundness of 
Ibn ʿArabī’s Belief’), which was written in response to al-Biqāʿī’s criticism of Ibn 
ʿArabī.196 In this work, al-Suyūṭī provides apologetic reasons for discouraging others 
from declaring Ibn ʿArabī an infidel. They are summarised as follows: (1) Ibn ʿArabī’s 
statements that sound heretical should not be taken in the literal sense, as he might have 
used certain words differently from their conventional, apparent meaning; this is in 
relation to some Qurʿanic expressions, such as God’s face, hands, and eyes, that ought 
                                                
195  Explicating al-Taftāzānī’s metaphysical denunciation of the oneness of existence, 
El-Rouayheb mentions that al-Taftāzānī’s arguments were cited with approval in later 
generations by Ibn ʿArabī’s critic al-Biqāʿī, his advocate Muḥammad al-Bakrī, and others. My 
analysis of al-Anṣārī and Ibn Ḥajar will clarify the details of how al-Taftāzānī’s arguments were 
accepted amongst Ibn ʿArabī’s supporters, proving his favourable reception by both pro- and 
anti-Ibn ʿArabī scholars in late Mamluk and early Ottoman Egypt. See El-Rouayheb, Islamic 
Intellectual History, 313-319.  
196 As I noted in f.n. 182, this work is more commonly known as Tanbīh al-ghabī bi-tabriʾat 
Ibn ʿArabī (or Tanbīh al-ghabī fī takhtiyyat Ibn ʿArabī). Since the copy of the published text to 
which I have access is entitled as Tanbiʾat al-ghabī bi-tabriʾat Ibn ʿArabī, I will refer to the 
work by this alternative title. 
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not be interpreted literally to mean His actual body parts. (2) There is a chance that Ibn 
ʿArabī’s works were interpolated by his opponents; therefore, he should not be blamed 
for the remarks one can find in his writings. (3) No one truly knows Ibn ʿArabī’s real 
intention when he utters something, except God; therefore, one ought not judge him an 
infidel.197  
Following this, al-Suyūṭī quotes several episodes concerning Ibn ʿArabī in order to 
prove his veracity, virtues, and sainthood, as well as introducing the remarks of various 
pro-Ibn ʿArabī scholars. This includes a reference to al-Ṣafadī’s aforementioned speech 
to Ibn Taymiyya. At the end of the treatise, al-Suyūṭī quotes al-Ṣafadī again and makes 
the striking remark that Ibn ʿArabī’s articles of belief as mentioned in al-Futūḥāt 
al-Makkiyya are identical with those of al-Ashʿarī.198 It is not entirely clear which part 
of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya al-Ṣafadī meant exactly, except that he is referring to the first 
volume of the work.199 If he had in mind the articles of belief for commoners that are 
found in the introductory chapter of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, they do seem to agree with 
the position of the Ashʿarīs. It must be mentioned, however, that the creedal view that 
Ibn ʿArabī expresses in the rest of the text is grounded in his mystical experience and 
does not necessarily accord with that of the Ashʿarīs. Whether or not al-Ṣafadī and 
al-Suyūṭī were aware of Ibn ʿArabī’s real intention, it is certain that by referring to 
al-Ṣafadī’s statement, which associates Ibn ʿArabī’s stance with that of the Ashʿarīs, 
al-Suyūṭī aimed at promoting the latter’s legitimacy. This attempt to defend Ibn ʿArabī 
from a theological perspective probably laid the foundation for al-Shaʿrānī to pronounce, 
at the beginning of his al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, that there is no difference in creed 
                                                
197 al-Suyūṭī, Tanbiʾat al-ghabī, 114-118, 135-137.  
198 al-Suyūṭī, Tanbiʾat al-ghabī, 166.  
199 al-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī, vol. 4, 125. Knysh also refers to al-Ṣafadī’s association of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
creeds with those of the Ashʿarīs. See Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 118, 325, n. 22. 
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between mystics like Ibn ʿArabī and the theologians represented by the Ashʿarīs.  
Apart from in Tanbiʾat al-ghabī, al-Suyūṭī also announces his legal opinion on the 
heretical speeches of some Sufis in his al-Ḥāwī lil-fatāwī, in the section entitled: 
‘Removing one’s faith from unificationism and incarnationism’ (Tanzīh al-iʿtiqād ʿan 
al-ḥulūl wa-l-ittiḥād).200 Although al-Suyūṭī does not directly mention Ibn ʿArabī’s 
name in this section, there is no doubt that he intends to refute the critics of the latter. 
The beginning of the section reads as follows: 
 
It is reported that a group of extreme Sufis (ghulāt min al-mutaṣawwifa) 
preached what is similar to the Christians’ unificationism and 
incarnationism, and they went further than Christians by multiplying the 
objects [with which God is unified and into which He is incarnated] while 
the latter limited it to Jesus. If this were true, then they would become more 
heretical than Christians.  
  The best example to defend those who professed this kind of position is 
the statement that ‘I am God (anā al-ḥaqq).’ For, he [al-Ḥallāj] declared it 
in the state of mystical intoxication (sukr) and absence of reason, and hence 
God did not impose upon him any sanctions and He revoked his speech.201  
 
The above statement was most likely issued against al-Biqāʿī’s critique of Ibn ʿArabī 
and his followers. According to al-Biqāʿī, while Christians or Shīʿas confined God’s 
unification only to Jesus or ʿAlī, extreme Sufis such as Ibn ʿArabī, amongst others, 
                                                
200 Cf. Geoffroy, Le Soufisme, 473; Ingalls, ‘Subtle Innovations,’ 229. 
201 al-Suyūṭī, al-Ḥāwī lil-fatāwī, vol. 2, 130. 
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extended the object of God’s unification to themselves.202 I have also discussed earlier 
how Ibn Taymiyya expresses a similar opinion on incarnationism. He maintains that 
extreme Sufis like Ibn ʿArabī are worse than Christians, because they multiply the 
objects into which God is incarnated, instead of confining His incarnation to one 
person.  
Responding to this kind of attack from al-Biqāʿī and Ibn Taymiyya, al-Suyūṭī first 
argues that those who profess what sounds like a heretical teaching of unificationism or 
incarnationism should be condoned, as they were in a state of mystical intoxication at 
that moment. After this, al-Suyūṭī demonstrates the impossibility of the occurrence of 
actual unification between God and creation. According to him, a person cannot become 
one with another person due to a difference in their essences. Based on this observation, 
it is all the more impossible that a man becomes one with God due to the absolute 
distinction between the two. Consequently, when the mystics referred to the idea of 
unificationism, they did not employ it in the sense of literal and ontological unification 
between God and creation. They rather intended the effacing of their own ego (fanāʾ), 
whereby they annihilate their disgraceful attributes, retreat from worldly matters, and 
firmly affirm God’s reality.203  
Borrowing the words of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), al-Suyūṭī compares 
the non-ontological sense of unification – wherein the mystics annihilate their human 
attributes and retreat from the world – to the Qurʾanic episode of the women who cut 
their hands with a knife at the sight of Joseph’s beauty [Q. 12:30-31]. Just as the women 
were unaware of their hands’ being cut when they were attracted to him, the mystics are 
                                                
202 al-Biqāʿī, Tanbīh al-ghabī, 172-173. 
203 al-Suyūṭī, al-Ḥāwī lil-fatāwī, vol. 2. 134. In regards to this, al-Suyūṭī references the opinion 
of an early Sufi Sahl al-Tustarī (d. 283/896). 
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completely oblivious to their attributes and even to themselves in the state where they 
perceive nothing but God.204 Al-Suyūṭī’s reference to this passage shows that he takes 
the idea of unification with God as sound, as long as it only concerns a mystic’s 
perception without indicating an ontological oneness between God and creation.  
Hence, in al-Suyūṭī’s view, the term unificationism can be used both in the 
despicable sense of pure unification and incarnation and in the licit sense of mystical 
annihilation. By the latter, he means a mystic’s psychological state, wherein his 
awareness of himself disappears temporarily as a result of being enraptured by the 
divine reality while his existence remains in the meanwhile.205 As Ingalls points out, 
al-Suyūṭī justifies this view by treating unificationism as an equivocal term (lafẓ 
mushtarak). This is based on a conventional usage of the term ittiḥād. For example, a 
person may say that ‘there is an accord between me and my friend Zayd (baynī wa 
bayna ṣāhibī zayd ittiḥād).’206 The hadith scholars and the jurists also employ the word 
to mean ‘the agreement of the source of the hadith (ittiḥād makhraj al-ḥadīth)’ and ‘the 
union of the type of cattle (ittiḥād nawʿ al-māshiyya)’ when defining the act of 
alms-giving.207  
This observation shows that, similarly to al-Taftāzānī and al-Biqāʿī’s approach to 
certain mystical terms, al-Suyūṭī finds two meanings in the mystics’ profession of 
unificationism: that which is professed by authentic mystics (muḥaqqiq al-ṣūfiyya) in 
order to describe their perceptual experience – wherein their ego, will and choice are 
                                                
204 al-Suyūṭī, al-Ḥāwī lil-fatāwī, vol. 2. 130-131.  
205 al-Suyūṭī, al-Ḥāwī lil-fatāwī, vol. 2, 134. In respect of this, he also quotes ʿAlī Wafāʾ’s 
poem that goes: ‘Your knowledge that everything belongs to Me is what is meant by ittiḥād.’ 
Ittiḥād in this poem means only the psychological awareness that everything is entrusted to God 
(taslīm). al-Suyūṭī, al-Ḥāwī lil-fatāwī, vol. 2, 135.  
206 Ingalls, ‘Subtle Innovation,’ 230. 
207 al-Suyūṭī, al-Ḥāwī lil-fatāwī, vol. 2, 134. See also Geoffroy, Le Soufisme, 473. 
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annihilated within God – and is hence legitimate, and that which stands for the 
ontological oneness of God and the world and is therefore detestable. Regarding this, 
al-Suyūṭī interestingly references a disciple of Ibn Taymiyya and a critic of Ibn ʿArabī, 
the Ḥanbalī theologian Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350). 208  According to 
al-Suyūṭī, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya also differentiates a correct, authorised meaning of 
unificationism from a prohibited one. The first type of unificationism only means the 
oneness of God’s intention and that of a servant (murād), whereby the servant faithfully 
follows and performs the divine order. In contrast, the second type of unificationism 
signifies the ontological oneness of God and a servant. This is claimed by the 
proponents of absolute unity and is accordingly objectionable.209 There can be little 
doubt that, by the proponents of absolute unity, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya intends Ibn 
ʿArabī and his followers, who deny the world’s plurality and identify the world as being 
the same as God.210  
Following Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s position, al-Suyūṭī rejects absolute unity in 
the ontological sense.211 Furthermore, by referring to al-Taftāzānī’s aforementioned 
classification of mysticism – experiential and visionary mysticism on one pole and 
ontological and monistic mysticism on the other – al-Suyūṭī expresses his support for 
the former kind of experiential mysticism.212 However, it needs to be remembered that, 
in contrast to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya and al-Taftāzānī, al-Suyūṭī does not regard Ibn 
ʿArabī as an advocate of the existential formula of absolute unity, nor as a heretical 
                                                
208 One of al-Suyūṭī’s teachers, Ibn Ḥajar al-Asqalānī, who also taught his rival al-Biqāʿī, was a 
student of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. This would suggest that al-Suyūṭī was acquainted with Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s texts through Ibn Ḥajar al-Asqalānī to a certain extent. 
209 al-Suyūṭī, al-Ḥāwī lil-fatāwī, vol. 2, 137.  
210 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Madārij al-sālikīn, 116. I will return to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s 
view on absolute unity in the next chapter. 
211 Al-Suyūṭī sees the idea of absolute unity as an infiltration of Avicennan philosophy into 
Sufism. See El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 241. 
212 al-Suyūṭī, al-Ḥāwī lil-fatāwī, vol. 2, 136.  
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member of monistic mysticism. For al-Suyūṭī, Ibn ʿArabī belongs to a group of 
authentic mystics whose controversial statements – if they are interpreted appropriately 
in the context of experiential mysticism – pose no threat to religion.  
The above discussions show that, by drawing on the arguments of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
adversaries such as al-Taftāzānī, al-Biqāʿī, and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, al-Suyūṭī 
understands Ibn ʿArabī as a mystic who declares his mystical experience of God’s unity 
as a perceptual and subjective truth which does not represent actual reality. This 
approach is more distinctly observed in Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī’s and Ibn Ḥajar’s defences 
of Ibn ʿArabī, which I will consider now. 
 
1.2.3.2. Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī and Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī 
 
Like al-Suyūṭī, Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī and Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī show their respect 
for Ibn ʿArabī, while discouraging commoners from reading his books.213 Al-Anṣārī and 
Ibn Ḥajar also agree on their rejection of the tenet of the oneness of existence. For 
example, Ibn Ḥajar explicitly denies the monistic worldview expressed in statements 
such as: ‘There is no being but for God’ (lā mawjūd illā Allāh).214 In Iḥkām, al-Anṣārī 
also rejects the ontological doctrine by remaining reticent on this subject, and also by 
stressing the importance of the role of the ‘heart’ (qalb) in the mystical experience. 
According to al-Anṣārī, the perfect state for a mystic is when he sees God alone in his 
                                                
213 Ibn Ḥajar describes Ibn ʿArabī as a man of abstinence (zuhd), worship (ʿibāda), and miracles 
(karāmāt) who combined religious knowledge and practice (ʿilm wa ʿamal) See Ibn Ḥajar, 
al-Fatāwā al-ḥadīthiyya, 296-297, 336. Ibn Ḥajar’s attitude towards Ibn ʿArabī is also recorded 
by al-Munawī. The story goes that an unnamed teacher of Ibn Ḥajar and a critic of Ibn ʿArabī 
became ill one day. Ibn Ḥajar ascribed it to his criticism of Ibn ʿArabī and exhorted him to 
repent his attitude. Al-Munawī reports that as soon as the teacher regretted his attitude he got 
better (al-Munāwī, al-Kawākib, vol. 2, 165). As for al-Anṣārī’s order to prohibit Ibn ʿArabī’s 
books, see al-Munāwī, al-Kawākib, vol. 2, 163. 
214 Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, al-Fatāwā al-ḥadīthiyya, 335. 
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heart, nothing else. With respect to this, he notes that the highest stage of divine unity 
occurs when a mystic’s heart is filled with the notion of the oneness of God, so much so 
that he temporarily forgets everything but Him.215 This idea suggests that in al-Anṣārī’s 
view, the mystical experience of divine unity is concerned only with a mystic’s 
perception, but not with the actual reality of the world where God is taken as the only 
real existence.  
In what follows, I will further investigate al-Anṣārī’s and Ibn Ḥajar’s view on Ibn 
ʿArabī’s mysticism, clarifying their support for visionary, experiential oneness in 
opposition to the oneness of existence. To this end, it is first relevant to discuss the fact 
that in an attempt to excuse Ibn ʿArabī and his fellow mystics, Ibn Ḥajar disproves the 
notions of unificationism and incarnationism through the words of Ibn ʿArabī’s critic, 
al-Taftāzānī. Ibn Ḥajar dedicates one of the sections in his collection of legal opinions, 
al-Fatāwī al-ḥadīthiyya, to this subject. It is entitled ‘the meaning of God’s unity 
according to the Sufis that makes one imagine unificationism and incarnationism 
between the necessary being and the world’s plurality, and which the jurists oppose’.216  
According to Ibn Ḥajar, the reason for which the divine unification with creation is 
prohibited is that it would require either cases of the necessary being (al-wājib) turning 
into the possible beings (al-mumkin), or of the possible being changing into the 
necessary being, both of which are absolutely impossible.217 He then adduces three 
reasons that prove the implausibility of God’s incarnation. First, the incarnation of a 
thing into something else, whether it is the incarnation of body into a place, a form into 
a matter, substance into accident, or a quality into an object of qualification, means that 
                                                
215 al-Anṣārī, Iḥkām, vol. 1, 61; vol. 2, 837, 847, 877, 880, 895, 1063, 
216 Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, al-Fatāwā al-ḥadīthiyya, 332. 
217 Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, al-Fatāwā al-ḥadīthiyya, 333. 
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the former is in want of the latter (iftiqār). This contradicts the idea of God as the 
necessary being who does not need any other beings except Himself. Secondly, the 
incarnation of God into something else – if He were to incarnate into something 
imperfect – violates the doctrine of God as the necessary being who is perfect by 
Himself. If He incarnates into something perfect instead, it follows that the necessary 
being only becomes perfect through this thing, which is absurd. Thirdly, if one assumes 
that God incarnates into a body – as some unbelievers claim – He comes to be divided 
or becomes part of the body, which is also impossible.218  
Ibn Ḥajar’s argument here is in fact a summary of what is originally found in 
Sharḥ al-maqāṣid of al-Taftāzānī.219 In the section entitled ‘the necessary being is not 
unified with anyone else nor incarnated in it’, al-Taftāzānī explains how the notion of 
incarnationism is logically impossible, giving six reasons, of which Ibn Ḥajar quotes the 
first, third and fourth point.  
It bears reiterating that this is not the only time Ibn Ḥajar draws on al-Taftāzānī’s 
teaching. As I discussed earlier, in al-Taftāzānī’s view, Ibn ʿArabī’s monism is not 
characterised by unificationism and incarnationsm, as it does not presuppose the 
existence of two entities to begin with. Intriguingly, Ibn Ḥajar summarises 
al-Taftāzānī’s statement on this subject, with the objective of defending Ibn ʿArabī. In 
order to indicate a difference between al-Taftāzānī’s original text and Ibn Ḥajar’s actual 
quotation of it, I have translated below a rather long passage from al-Taftāzānī’s Sharḥ 
al-maqāṣid. It reads: 
      
When a traveller [i.e. a mystic] completes his path and reaches God, that is to 
                                                
218 Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, al-Fatāwā al-ḥadīthiyya, 333-334. 
219 al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-maqāṣid, vol.4, 57-59. 
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say, to the level of His nearness and witnessing, […] he immerses himself in 
the ocean of God’s unity and knowledge in the sense that his essence 
disappears into His essence and his attributes into His attributes, and he 
becomes hidden from everything but for God and he sees nothing in existence 
but for God. This is what the Sufis call self-effacement in the divine unity 
(fanāʾ fī l-tawḥīd) and is indicated by the hadith, ‘My servant keeps drawing 
near Me until I love him; and when I [God] love him, I am his hearing with 
which he hears […].’ Hence, he [the mystic] might issue utterances that 
sound like unification with God and incarnation of God into His creation. 
This is due to the lack of expressions to describe his state, but the mystical 
unveiling will sanction his speech […]. 
There is a second group that makes you imagine this [unificationism and 
incarnationism], but they are not [the advocates of these notions] either. Their 
position is that the necessary being is absolute existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq) 
that is solely one and has no plurality at all. Plurality only emerges through 
relations (iḍāfāt) and entifications (taʿayyunāt) at the level of imagination and 
illusion. Everything is one in reality and it becomes many in the loci 
(maẓāhir) […]. Therefore, there is neither incarnation nor unification with 
God, because in reality there is no duality (ithnayniyya) and no otherness 
(ghayriyya) […].220 
 
In al-Taftāzānī’s view, the members of the first group are legitimate mystics who view 
their experience only as visionary and psychological. On the other hand, those of the 
                                                
220 al-Taftāzānī, al-Sharḥ al-maqāṣid, vol. 4, 59-60. The passage is referred to in El-Rouayheb, 
Islamic Intellectual History, 315. It is also translated in Geoffroy, Le Soufisme, 474.   
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second group are heretical mystics like Ibn ʿArabī who, by upholding the absolute 
oneness of God’s existence, believe that their experience represents the ontological truth. 
Al-Biqāʿī quotes the same passage with the aim of condemning Ibn ʿArabī’s monism.221  
Significantly, Ibn Ḥajar attempts to recontextualise al-Taftāzānī’s statement. 
According to Ibn Ḥajar, neither early nor late Sufis declared anything like pure 
unificationism and incarnationism. If they had done so, their real intention would have 
been something different. Therefore, Ibn ʿArabī’s remarks have to be interpreted 
appropriately in order to prove his innocence from any heretical charges. It is in this 
context that Ibn Ḥajar quotes al-Taftāzānī’s passage translated above, whereby he 
associates Ibn ʿArabī with the first camp of authentic and experiential mysticism. When 
doing so, Ibn Ḥajar inserts his own comment to further clarify the passage’s meaning. In 
the following passage, Ibn Ḥajar refers to the first group of the mystics and writes as 
follows (his comment is highlighted in bold): 
      
That is to say, his [a mystic’s] essence disappears into His essence and his 
attributes into His attributes, not in the sense of the world’s reality, but as 
the expression of their witnessing (bi-iʿtibāri al-shuhūd lā al-ḥaqīqa), and 
he is hidden from everything but God and he sees nothing in existence 
except God.222  
 
As the passage suggests, Ibn Ḥajar supports al-Taftāzānī’s view that the authentic 
mystics’ experience is perceived as a perceptual, visionary truth that does not represent 
actual reality. He then paraphrases al-Taftāzānī’s latter passage concerning the second 
                                                
221 al-Biqāʿī, Tanbīh al-ghabī, 82-83. 
222 Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, al-Fatāwā al-ḥadīthiyya, 334. 
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group of monistic mystics, adding the following comment at the end. It reads:  
              
It is known by this statement [of al-Taftāzānī] that the utterances issued by 
Ibn ʿArabī, Ibn Fāriḍ and their followers – may God show them mercy and 
facilitate them in the presences of His unity – are [at] the station (manzil) of 
which al-Taftāzānī spoke [with regard to the first group of authentic 
mystics].223 
       
Considering Ibn Ḥajar’s denial of the monistic doctrine, it is assumed that his intention 
in this remark is to relate Ibn ʿArabī and his followers to the first group of legitimate 
and experiential mystics, but not to the second group.224 This reading is further 
supported by Ibn Ḥajar’s reference to his teacher, Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī, who quotes the 
same part of al-Taftāzānī’s passage in question. Below is a translation from al-Anṣārī’s 
Sharḥ al-rawḍ, which is excerpted by Ibn Ḥajar. In the first paragraph, al-Anṣārī 
expresses his own opinion regarding Ibn ʿArabī and others. In the second paragraph, he 
paraphrases al-Taftāzānī’s text, employing it as an interpretive comment on the first 
paragraph. Al-Anṣārī writes: 
 
With regard to disbelieving a group of Ibn ʿArabī [and others], their remarks 
– if taken literally – may signify unificationism in the view of those who do 
not belong to them [i.e. Ibn ʿArabī’s group]. This is because of what the 
literal meaning [of their remarks] implies […]. A group of the mystics, such 
as [the Shādhilī Sufi] Tāj al-Dīn ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh (d. 709/1309) and [the 
                                                
223 Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, al-Fatāwā al-ḥadīthiyya, 334. 
224 Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, al-Fatāwā al-ḥadīthiyya, 335. 
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Yemeni mystic] ʿAbd Allāh al-Yāfiʿī (d. 768/1367), have already issued a 
statement regarding Ibn ʿArabī’s sainthood (walāya), that the literal 
meaning of their remarks – which are reported by the non-Sufis – does not 
actually malign Ibn ʿArabī and his group for the following reason.  
 That is to say, when a mystic immerses himself in the ocean of God’s 
unity and knowledge until his essence disappears into His essence and his 
attributes disappear into His attributes – and [at this stage] he is covered 
from everything except for God – he might issue utterances that sound like 
unificationism and incarnationsim. This is due to a lack of [proper] 
expressions to describe the state he has reached. Yet, there is nothing like 
unificationism and incarnationism in reality, just as al-Taftāzānī and others 
[e.g. al-Biqāʿī] have asserted.225  
 
In al-Anṣārī’s view, when Ibn ʿArabī and his followers uttered what could have been 
taken as the espousal of unificationism and incarnationism, they were in the mystical 
state of witnessing nothing but God. Hence, they should be condoned. It is important to 
note that al-Anṣārī associates this view with al-Taftāzānī. As al-Anṣārī’s second passage 
vividly shows, by recontexualising al-Taftāzānī’s argument, al-Anṣārī places Ibn ʿArabī 
                                                
225 al-Anṣārī, Sharḥ al-rawḍ, vol. 4, 119. Ibn Ḥajar’s summary of this statement goes as follows:  
 
By quoting al-Taftāzānī, our teacher [Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī] stated in his Sharḥ 
al-rawḍ […] that whoever disbelieves a group of Ibn ʿArabī [and his followers] is 
himself an unbeliever, because they are in fact great teachers; that al-Yāfiʿī, Ibn ʿAṭāʾ 
al-Allāh, and others acknowledged Ibn ʿArabī’s status as a friend of God; that his 
technical term is correct amongst his group based on the way they employ it; and that 
a mystic who immerses himself in the ocean of God’s unity can issue the statements 
that may make a person imagine unificationism and incarnationism, but they are not 




in the group of legitimate mystics whose experience of God’s unity only concerns their 
visionary and perceptual experience. 
It is clear by now that both al-Anṣārī and Ibn Ḥajar interpret Ibn ʿArabī’s 
worldview as experiential mysticism. Most markedly, they attribute this view to 
al-Taftāzānī. This reading of al-Anṣārī and Ibn Ḥajar is certainly misleading, as there 
can be little doubt that al-Taftāzānī tried to accuse Ibn ʿArabī of being a member of the 
heretical group of monistic mystics.226 Considering al-Taftāzānī’s formidable attack on 
Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, it is hard to imagine that al-Anṣārī and Ibn Ḥajar failed to notice 
al-Taftāzānī’s real intention. A possible explanation for this is that their 
misinterpretation was deliberate. By borrowing al-Taftāzānī’s typology of legitimate 
and heretical mystics, al-Anṣārī and Ibn Ḥajar modified the original meaning of his 
statement, with the objective of presenting Ibn ʿArabī as a legitimate mystic whose 
mystical teaching should only be taken as visionary, not as ontological. 
    Thus, our observation demonstrates that Ibn ʿArabī’s supporters in fifteenth- and 
sixteenth-century Egypt established their own method of reinterpreting his ontological 
worldview as experiential. As El-Rouayheb showed, a similar view was also proposed 
by Ibn Ḥajar’s contemporary, Muḥammad al-Bakrī.227 However, al-Anṣārī and Ibn 
Ḥajar’s defence of Ibn ʿArabī is considered unique in that they draw on the very 
teachings of Ibn ʿArabī’s antagonists. This evinces that their approaches to defending 
Ibn ʿArabī’s thought were innovatively formulated in relation to the polemical context 
of this period, and that they were too methodical to be dismissed as merely apologetic. 
 
                                                
226 Geoffroy has already noted that some ‘défenseurs de la waḥdat al-wujūd’ make reference to 
a part of al-Taftāzānī’s passage in question. However, Geoffroy does not analyse this subject 
further. See Geoffroy, Le Soufisme, 475, n. 419. 
227 El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 242-246. 
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1.2.4. Concluding Remark 
 
 This section’s objective was to consider the polemics over Ibn ʿArabī’s thought 
before al-Shaʿrānī by focusing on how the arguments of anti-Ibn ʿArabī scholars were 
adopted by later generations, especially amongst Ibn ʿArabī’s supporters. I discussed 
how, by employing the arguments of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya and al-Taftāzānī, 
al-Suyūṭī and Ibn Ḥajar reject the tenets of pure unificationism and incarnationism in 
order to refute the attacks of Ibn Taymiyya and al-Biqāʿī. I further demonstrated that by 
recontextualising al-Taftāzānī’s passage, which is also quoted by al-Biqāʿī, al-Anṣārī 
and Ibn Ḥajar present Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching as visionary and experiential and hence 
legitimate, thereby dismissing the very doctrine of the oneness of existence for which 
Ibn ʿArabī was criticised.  
 As I noted earlier, Chittick certainly reiterates that existential oneness and 
visionary oneness are two sides of the same coin and inextricable from each other, 
because Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of oneness exhibits both ontological/objective and 
psychological/subjective implications.228 However, this analysis does not necessarily 
mean that all of Ibn ʿArabī’s supporters should endorse the two notions of oneness and 
that – in contrast to Chittick’s comment – those who do not do so are mistaken in their 
interpretation of Ibn ʿArabī. Our observation of al-Suyūṭī, al-Anṣārī, and Ibn Ḥajar’s 
arguments reveals that they intentionally distinguish existential oneness from visionary 
oneness, thus taking the two types of oneness as fundamentally distinctive principles. In 
their view, whether one expresses one’s mystical experience as an objective truth or as a 
subjective truth is a crucial threshold that divides orthodoxy from heresy. It is most 
                                                
228 Chittick, ‘Rumi and Waḥdat al-Wujūd,’ 74-75; ‘Waḥdat al-wujūd in India,’ 32-36.  
 93 
probable that the context of Ibn ʿArabī being accused of upholding the oneness of 
existence prompted his defenders to present him as an advocate of experiential oneness.  
 These findings establish the distinction of al-Suyūṭī, al-Anṣārī and Ibn Ḥajar’s 
approaches to the defence of Ibn ʿArabī. They carefully and ingeniously incorporate the 
teachings of Ibn ʿArabī’s critics into their own arguments. This confirms that Ibn 
ʿArabī’s supporters during the fifteenth- and the sixteenth-century Arabic-speaking 
world were more strategic than previously thought and that their defensive techniques 
should be understood against the backdrop of the polemics over Ibn ʿArabī.  
 As I shall discuss in Chapter 2, the method of reading Ibn ʿArabī’s oneness of 
existence as experiential oneness is more explicitly promoted by al-Shaʿrānī. He further 
elaborates on it by reinterpreting the latter’s actual statements. Before discussing this 
subject, the next section will examine al-Shaʿrānī’s theological works.   
 
 
1.3. Al-Shaʿrānī’s Theological Oeuvre and Project 
 
This section introduces al-Shaʿrānī’s theological oeuvre. I first examine the idea of 
the tripartite hierarchy of creeds proposed by Ibn ʿArabī. I then consider how 
al-Shaʿrānī adopts this teaching in his own theological project. Finally, I look at eight of 
al-Shaʿrānī’s theological works. The analysis will fill the gap in scholarship by 
providing an understanding of al-Shaʿrānī’s scholarly goal in these writings, as well as 




1.3.1. Ibn ʿArabī on the Tripartite Hierarchy of Creeds 
 
As noted earlier, the Ashʿarī, Ibn al-Ahdal upholds the view that there should be 
only one set of creedal doctrines for the believers, that is to say, those of the Ashʿarīs. 
Based on this idea, he castigates Ibn ʿArabī’s idea of separating the articles of belief 
into three different levels as mentioned in the introduction of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya. 
To repeat them here, the first level is the creed for commoners (ʿaqīdat al-ʿawāmm). 
The second level is the creed for the people of distinction amongst the people of God 
who are positioned between reasoning and unveiling (ʿaqīdat ahl al-ikhtiṣāṣ min ahl 
Allah bayna-l-naẓar wa-l-kashf). The third is the creed for the most distinguished 
amongst those who are dedicated to God (ʿaqīda khulāṣa al-khāṣṣa fī Allah). The third 
group includes Ibn ʿArabī himself, and those who fully embrace his thought. 
Ibn ʿArabī regards these three types of creed as being true and legitimate. In his 
view, the creed for commoners is sound, because it is simply taken from the apparent 
sense of revelation (ẓāhir al-kitāb) through the natural disposition (fiṭra) of 
commoners.229 Some of the articles of belief that he writes down for commoners 
include the following: that Allah is the only god and nothing is compared with Him, that 
the world exists through Him, that He is neither an atom (jawhar), accident (ʿaraḍ), nor 
body, that He sits upon the throne in the way He intends, and so on. These articles may 
sound similar to what is commonly upheld by the Ashʿarīs. However, Ibn ʿArabī rejects 
the rational discipline adopted by the Ashʿarīs and asserts that anyone can affirm this 
creed without the employment of reason – as long as he has faith in the divine word.230 
Ibn ʿArabī does not explain whom exactly he means by the second group (the 
                                                
229 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 34-47. 
230 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 34, 
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people of God between reasoning and unveiling), except by mentioning that they are 
aware of the limit of human reason and understand that what reason cannot explain can 
be explained through the mystical discipline.231 He lists sixty-five articles for this level 
of creed, each of which starts with the heading ‘a problem’ (masʾala). These articles 
cover various theological issues ranging from humans’ acquisition of their actions 
(kasb), figurative interpretation, to the divine knowledge of creation. Some of the 
creedal tenets, such as the relationship between God’s essence and His attributes, are 
clearly proposed against those of the Ashʿarīs.  
Considering that the third group are the elite of the elites amongst the mystics who 
are fully ready to receive Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, the second group can be surmised as 
being mystics who are not as advanced as the third group, and who are unprepared for 
the complete reception of his worldview. In fact, the creedal beliefs that are addressed 
to the second group do not make any references to Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical teachings. 
Nevertheless, some articles of belief show a certain similarity to those upheld by the 
third group of the elitists. For example, one of the articles for the second group goes as 
follows: 
 
A problem (masʾala): that the creator is knowing, living, powerful, and so 
on, through the rest of His attributes, is due to His relations and connections, 
not due to entities that are additional to Him, as this would lead to His 
imperfection. This is because anyone who is perfect through additional 
beings is imperfect in his essence […] the statement that the divine 
attributes are not God Himself but they are not other than Him is far from 
                                                
231 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 41. 
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the point. For anyone who believes in this doctrine [madhhab, i.e., the 
Ashʿarism] has already confirmed an additional entity that is other than 
God.232  
 
As opposed to the standard Ashʿarī view, the passage reveals that the second group 
should believe that God’s attributes are identical to God Himself and that they are not 
concrete entities that exist by themselves. Ibn ʿArabī also promotes this teaching as a 
creed of the elitist mystics. This is observed in that the same argument recurs in the 
main part of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, wherein he discusses the mystical tenets for the 
third group of the elite of the elites. It needs to be pointed out that the elitist mystics 
understand this tenet from a different perspective; in their view, God’s attributes are the 
same as God Himself, based on their observation that He is ultimately the only real 
being, and nothing else exists except Him. They are aware that God’s attributes do not 
exist on their own and only become manifest within God as a result of divine 
self-manifestation. This awareness that God is the sole existence is not in the creed of 
the second group, as they are not advanced enough to appreciate the existential truth.  
In this regard, the third group (the elite of the elites, that is, the mystics who 
endorse the doctrine of the oneness of existence) can be called advanced mystics. In 
contrast, the second group of mystics, who have faith in similar beliefs to those in the 
elitist group, but who have not yet grasped the ontological reality of the world, can be 
described as non-advanced mystics. In what follows, I will employ the expressions of 
‘advanced mystics’ and ‘non-advanced mystics’. 
At the end of the introductory chapter of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, Ibn ʿArabī states 
                                                
232 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 42. 
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that the creed for the third group is explained throughout the rest of the text. This is an 
announcement that his main audience is advanced mystics and that his goal is to 
explicate his mystical discipline for them, based on the tenet of the oneness of existence. 
Most of Ibn ʿArabī’s famous disciples, such as al-Qūnawī and al-Qāshānī, shared this 
aim and further elaborated on the monistic doctrines for advanced mystics. Significantly, 
unlike Ibn ʿArabī and his followers, al-Shaʿrānī dedicates himself to presenting Ibn 
ʿArabī’s teachings to non-advanced mystics, while adopting the framework of different 
creeds for believers at different stages. 
 
1.3.2. Al-Shaʿrānī’s Reception of the Tripartite Hierarchy of Creeds 
 
Although there is no explicit reference to Ibn ʿArabī’s tripartite hierarchy of creeds, 
there is little doubt that al-Shaʿrānī supports this framework and regards the creeds of 
commoners, non-advanced mystics, and advanced mystics as being legitimate. 233 
Following Ibn ʿArabī, al-Shaʿrānī believes that a theological discipline based on 
reasoning is not suited to establishing religious creeds, because human reason always 
errs and ends up producing contradicting theological opinions. On the other hand, 
borrowing Ibn ʿArabī’s words, al-Shaʿrānī maintains that the commoners’ creed, 
derived through the natural disposition of commoners, is sound and that God will 
reward them for their belief in His revelation.234 He then refers to Ibn ʿArabī’s list of 
what the commoners should have faith in.235  
                                                
233 Interestingly, this accords with al-Shaʿrānī’s legal position that the truth in jurisprudential 
rulings is not one but plural. See Ibrahim, ‘Response to Legal Purism,’ 126-129. 
234 Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī expresses the same opinion (al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 96). 
235 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 30-31; al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 82-88. For 
al-Shaʿrānī as well as for Ibn ʿArabī, the commoner’s creed is made up of the basic principles of 
faith that one should return to whenever it is necessary, and is not something that should be 
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Having thus acknowledged the soundness of the commoners’ creed, al-Shaʿrānī 
argues that the mystics can draw their creed through both revelation and unveiling. 
Unlike human reason, the unveiling given by God is always correct and reveals the truth 
of things as they really are.236 According to al-Shaʿrānī, the mystics’ creeds are further 
divided into two types: those of non-advanced mystics and those of advanced mystics 
(qawm makhṣūṣīn/al-firaq al-ʿaliyya). For al-Shaʿrānī, advanced mystics correspond to 
the third group, the elite of the elites in Ibn ʿArabī’s expression. As we shall see, in 
al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, al-Shaʿrānī supports Ibn ʿArabī’s monistic teachings the 
theological text addressed to advanced mystics. However, it must be noted that 
al-Shaʿrānī was not concerned with addressing advanced mystics as much as 
non-advanced mystics. In fact, and to my knowledge, he only dedicated one work to the 
explication of the teachings of advanced mystics.  
Al-Shaʿrānī’s main audience was, rather, non-advanced mystics. The relatively 
large number of books written for this group supports this view.237 Although he does 
not employ Ibn ʿArabī’s expression to describe the second group (i.e. the people 
between reasoning and unveiling), al-Shaʿrānī clearly addresses the mystics who are not 
advanced enough to understand Ibn ʿArabī’s ontological monism. In al-Yawāqīt 
wa-l-jawāhir, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya and others, by drawing on the words of 
advanced mystics, including Ibn ʿArabī amongst others, al-Shaʿrānī expounds on the 
creed of mystics – whom al-Shaʿrānī calls the people who follow the path (al-qawm), or 
the people of unveiling (ahl al-kashf). It must be noted that, in these works, he avoids 
referring to Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical teachings of the oneness of existence and the 
                                                                                                                                          
disbelieved. See al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fol. 111b. 
236 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 32-33. 
237 As far as I am aware, at least five out of eight of the theological works of al-Shaʿrānī are 
dedicated to this group.  
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cosmological theory of God’s self-manifestation. In this regard, the readership of these 
texts is identified as non-advanced mystics who correspond to the second group, the 
people between reasoning and unveiling.  
Al-Shaʿrānī’s works addressed to non-advanced mystics are also written for 
theologians who have doubts about Ibn ʿArabī’s thought. In these works, al-Shaʿrānī 
attempts to demonstrate the superiority of the latter’s teachings by presenting them as 
solutions to certain theological issues, such as, amongst others, the problem of the 
divine anthropomorphic attributes.  
Following these observations, a main goal of al-Shaʿrānī’s theological project is to 
provide non-advanced mystics and theologians with the articles of belief that strike a 
middle ground between the theological discipline and Ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism. To this 
end, al-Shaʿrānī selectively quotes passages from al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya and discusses 
them in a theological context, without referring to Ibn ʿArabī’s monistic worldview 
except in the text intended for advanced mystics. This approach to Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, 
– which is based on the structure of the tripartite hierarchy of creeds – makes 
al-Shaʿrānī’s defence of Ibn ʿArabī distinctive. Interestingly, as I showed earlier, this is 
contrasted with the approach of Ibn ʿArabī’s other supporters before al-Shaʿrānī 
(al-Suyūṭī, Ibn Ḥajar and al-Anṣārī), who stayed aloof from discussing the former’s 
actual teachings.  
 
1.3.3. Al-Shaʿrānī’s Theological Works 
 
Al-Shaʿrānī himself notes that he authored around three hundred works, amongst 
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which eighty to one hundred are currently known to be extant.238 Nearly fifty of them 
have been published so far and the rest remain in manuscript form. They cover a wide 
range of subjects. Sufi etiquette makes up by far the biggest sector, including around 
forty titles or more. This is followed by theology, biography, jurisprudence and 
others.239 The abundance of his works on Sufi etiquette led al-Shaʿrānī to be recognised 
in the modern period as one of the major Sufis who contributed to this field.240 Winter, 
al-Dālī, and others examined some of these works on Sufi etiquette in order to discuss 
al-Shaʿrānī’s views on different issues of society, religion, and politics.241 There, 
al-Shaʿrānī’s arguments often proceed by meticulously listing the manners and 
behaviours that a Sufi ought to follow when confronting certain situations. 
Al-Shaʿrānī’s biographical and jurisprudential works have also been subject to much 
scholarly examination, as I mentioned in the introduction of this study. 
 Unfortunately, it is outside of the scope of this thesis to analyse al-Shaʿrānī’s 
works on Sufi etiquette, let alone those on biography and jurisprudence. Rather, the 
current study sheds light on his theological oeuvre. These works are the most relevant to 
                                                
238 The total number of titles recorded in Brockelman, İslâm Ansiklopedisi and WorldCat 
catalogue, including a few more works I have found, reaches 80. İslâm Ansiklopedisi states that 
more than 100 works of al-Shaʿrānī are presently extant. Based on this I make the number 
between 80 and 100. Al-Dālī, on the other hand, maintains that he has come across 165 works. 
It must be noted that these include the titles which are only reported in al-Shaʿrānī’s own works 
and in his biography, and they are not necessarily extant. Al-Dālī further includes the writings 
that have come down to us bearing slightly different titles as separate texts of al-Shaʿrānī. 
However, they are most probably the same work (for example, al-Anwār al-qudsiyya fī bayān 
ʿaqīdat al-ṣūfiyya and al-Anwār al-qudsiyya fī maʿrifa qawāʿid al-ṣūfiyya. Or, al-Mīzān 
al-Shaʿrāniyya al-muqarrara [bi-]jamīʿ ʿaqāʾid ahl al-sunna al-Muḥammadiyya and Mīzān 
al-ʿaqāʾid al-Shaʿrāniyya al-mushayyada bi-l-kitāb wa-l-sunna al-Muḥammadiyya). These 
factors explain the larger number of al-Shaʿrānī’s writings that al-Dālī proposes. See al-Dālī, 
al-Khiṭāb al-siyāsī, 87, 317-332.  
239 For a list of the main titles in each subject, see Kaplan, ‘Šaʿrânî,’ İslâm Ansiklopedisi. 
240 al-Aṭṭār, Hāshiyat al-Aṭṭār ʿalā jamʿ al-jawāmiʿ, vol. 2, 513. The author is the Egyptian 
Shāfiʿī scholar and then Shaykh al-Azhar, Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad al-Aṭṭār (d. 1250/1835), who 
comments on al-Shaʿrānī’s texts along with Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī’s Qūt al-qulūb (d. 386/996) 
and al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyāʾ (d. 505/1111) as the texts that delineate Sufi etiquettes and rituals. 
241 They analysed in particular al-Anwār al-qudsiyya fī bayān ādāb al-ʿubūdiyya, Baḥr 
al-mawrūd fī al-mawāthiq wa-l-uhūd, Lawāqiḥ al-anwār al-qudsiyya fī bayān al-ʿuhūd al- 
Muḥammadiyya and its abridgement, al-Kibrīt al-aḥmar fī bayān ʿulūm al-shaykh al-akbar.   
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the theme that I intend to highlight; indeed, it is in these writings of theology that 
al-Shaʿrānī exhibits his unique approach to the defence of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought and his 
interpretation of it.  
 Theology is al-Shaʿrānī’s second most popular subject, yet remains largely 
unstudied.242 As far as I am aware, he left behind eleven works in the field of theology, 
of which I have access to eight.243 The titles are as follows (listed in chronological 
order as far as the date is known): 
 
(1) al-Mīzān al-dharriyya al-mubayyina li-ʿaqāʾid al-firaq al-ʿaliyya  
(2) Mukhtaṣar iʿtiqād ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa lil-ḥāfiẓ Abī Bakr 
 al-Bayhaqī  
(3) al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir fī bayān ʿaqāʾid al-akābir 
(4) Kashf al-ḥijāb wa-l-rān ʿan wajh asʾilat al-jānn 
(5) al-Qawl al-mubīn fī l-radd ʿan al-shaykh Muḥyī al-Dīn 
(6) al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya fī ʿaqāʾid akābir al-ṣūfiyya 
(7) al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya al-muwaḍḍiḥa li-maʿānī al-ṣifāt al-ilāhiyya  
(8) al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya fī tawḥīd ahl al-khuṣūṣiyya 
      
Amongst the above, I will mainly examine the five texts indicated in bold, i.e. numbers 
(1), (3), (6), (7), and (8). With regard to the rest, (2) Mukhtaṣar iʿtiqād, which is an 
                                                
242  As a comparison, al-Shaʿrānī composed about seven biographical works and six 
jurisprudential works.  
243 The three titles that I do not have access to are as follows: Muqaddima fī ʿilm al-tawḥīd; 
Farāʾid al-ʿaqāʾid fī ʿilm al-ʿaqāʾid; Ṭahārat al-jism wa-l-fuʾād min sūʾ al-ẓan bi jamīʿ 
al-ʿibād; Tadhkirat bi aḥwāl al-mawtā wa umūr al-ākhira (also known as Mukhtaṣar Tadhkirat 
al-Imām Abū ʿAbd Allāh). İslâm Ansiklopedisi further includes Asrār arkān al-Islām (also 
known as Fatḥ al-mubīn fī jumlat min asrār al-dīn) as a theological text by al-Shaʿrānī. I did not 
include this text, as its objective is to explain the details of the five pillars of Islam and the 
etiquette that should be observed in performing them, rather than exploring theological issues. 
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abridgement of al-Bayhaqī’s iʿtiqād, does not provide much information about 
al-Shaʿrānī’s view on theology and his reception of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought. For this 
reason, and in the context of the aims of the current thesis, I will not conduct an 
in-depth and an independent analysis of Mukhtaṣar iʿtiqād. (4), that is, Kashf al-ḥijāb, 
appears to be a much shorter version of al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, and I will 
occasionally draw on this work as a reference. The content of (5) al-Qawl al-mubīn is 
repeatedly discussed in different parts of al-Shaʿrānī’s works of theology and therefore, 
I will restrict myself to briefly mentioning this work when discussing other texts on the 
same subject.  
    The topics of each of the five texts that I will survey – (1), (3), (6), (7), and (8) – 
are more or less similar, and so is their style. As the titles inform us, they aim to 
explicate the articles of faith (ʿaqāʾid) or creedal principles (qawāʾid) that the mystics 
uphold when drawing on Ibn ʿArabī’s al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya and the works of other 
mystics, especially ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ. In what follows, I will outline the structure of 
al-Shaʿrānī’s texts listed above, with a special focus on these five texts. 
It bears reiterating that al-Shaʿrānī takes different positions in accordance with his 
readership. In a text intended for commoners and those who are not inclined to 
mysticism, that is (2), he keeps silent on any mystical thought. In the works addressed 
to non-advanced mystics and theologians, that is (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), he defends Ibn 
ʿArabī’s teachings but excludes his monistic tenet. For advanced mystics, that is (1), 
al-Shaʿrānī endorses the latter’s ontological worldview. The audience of (8) is not 
entirely clear. However, it is most likely addressed to theologians who object to the 
formula of the oneness of existence. 
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(1) al-Mīzān al-dharriyya al-mubayyina li- -ʿaqāʾid al-firaq al-ʿaliyya (‘Fine balance 
in explaining the creeds of a group of the elevated people’)  
 Composed between 945-951/1538-1545, this is one of al-Shaʿrānī’s relatively early 
works.244 One of the manuscripts contains eighty folios with twenty-one lines on each 
page, making it a middle-length work of his.245 It stands apart from the rest of 
al-Shaʿrānī’s theological writings in terms of its readership and content; as he clearly 
states in the introduction, it is addressed to a group of the most advanced mystics (qawm 
makhṣūṣīn) who, in his view, are ready to appreciate Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching in full.246 It 
is the most esoteric work of al-Shaʿrānī, and clearly displays the influence of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s mystical worldview. To my knowledge, al-Shaʿrānī does not discuss the idea 
of divine self-manifestation – through which God as the sole being in the cosmos 
manifests Himself in His creation – in any other text. This explicit endorsement of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s most controversial tenet led some later scholars to perceive the work as a 
profession of heretical teaching. For example, the Egyptian scholar ʿUmar al-Fārisukūrī 
(d. 1018-1019/1610) denounced the work as advocating unificationism.247 On the other 
hand, mystics under the influence of Ibn ʿArabī, such as the Syrian Sufi and defender of 
oneness of existence, ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī (d. 1143/1731), amongst others, were 
in favour of the work.248  
 The text starts by explaining the reason for its composition. According to 
al-Shaʿrānī, he was inspired to write down what is in his view the legitimate creed 
                                                
244 For analysis by the editor of this work on the completion date, see the introduction of 
al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 14-16. 
245 al-Shaʿrānī, in the introduction of al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 13. 
246 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 19. 
247 El-Rouayheb, ‘Heresy and Sufism,’ 364-367. 
248 According to the editor of this work, al-Nābulusī left some comments on one of the existing 
manuscripts. See the editor’s introduction to al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 10-14. 
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(ʿaqīdat sharīʿa) of advanced mystics, after reading the words of some great friends of 
God (awliyāʾ). These include the Andalusian mystic Abī al-Qāsim ibn Qasī (d. 
546/1151-2), Ibn ʿArabī, a follower of Ibn ʿArabī in Yemen, ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī (d. 
815/1412) who is famous for the work entitled ‘The Perfect Man’ (al-insān al-kāmil), 
Muḥammad Wafāʾ, and ʿAlī Wafāʾ. 249  In al-Shaʿrānī’s view, their statements 
ultimately lead one to realise what he calls ‘the balance’ (al-mīzān) between the two 
divine self-manifestations of non-delimitation and delimitation or divine 
incomparability and similarity (tashbīh). This balance facilitates the understanding of 
the anthropomorphic attributes of God.250 In regards to this, al-Shaʿrānī writes: 
 
The scholars who take a look at this balance will find it to confirm all the 
verses, sayings, and reports on divine attributes as well as confirming all the 
statements of people who have discussed the divine essence and 
attributes.251 
 
 After the introduction, the first half of the text is dedicated to examining subjects 
such as the vision of God, the knowledge of God, the denial of unificationism, and the 
anthropomorphic attributes of God, quoting Ibn ʿArabī’s al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya. The 
latter half of the text analyses the dogma of divine unity and the relationship between 
God and creation through the theory of divine self-manifestation. There, al-Shaʿrānī 
discusses the idea of God being the only existence and Adam being the perfect man who 
– being created in the divine image – can manifest all the realities of the world. The 
                                                
249 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 17. 
250 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 20. 
251 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 18. 
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discussion in many cases proceeds in the form of a dialogue between al-Shaʿrānī and his 
teacher, ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ. The intimate relationship between the two suggests that 
al-Shaʿrānī’s words reflect his teacher’s view. 
 Towards the end of the work, al-Shaʿrānī begins to explain the concept of the 
balance that peacefully resolves the issue of the divine anthropomorphic attributes. This 
balance is repetitively mentioned in his other writings, playing an important role in his 
thought.252 Its meaning will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Let it suffice to 
mention here that in this work, al-Shaʿrānī aims at bringing harmony to the disputes on 
divine attributes through the notion of the balance, while introducing the creed of 
advanced mystics.  
 The work concludes with a warning against declaring fellow Muslims infidels 
(takfīr), by referring to the definition of takfīr. Al-Shaʿrānī also stresses the superiority 
of mystics, who can affirm all the anthropomorphic attributes without relying on 
reasoning, over rational theologians. 
 
(2) Mukhtaṣar iʿtiqād ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa lil-ḥāfiẓ Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī (‘The 
Abridgement of the Creed of the People of Sunna written by Abū Bakr 
al-Bayhaqī’) 
 This work was completed in 953/1546 and is relatively short in length. The editor 
of the work notes that the manuscript he has access to only contains twenty-seven folios 
with twenty lines on each page.253 It beings with the following statement: ‘this [text] is 
                                                
252 The balance in al-Shaʿrānī’s theological works is related to but should not be confused with 
the balance discussed in his jurisprudential works, in which it means a balance between 
stringency and leniency in legal rulings. For more on this, see Dajani, ‘Ibn ʿArabī’s Conception 
of Ijtihād,’ 166-172, 176-182, 191-193. I will discuss the details of al-Shaʿrānī’s understanding 
of a balance in his theological writings in Chapter 4.  
253 See the introduction to al-Shaʿrānī, Mukhtaṣr iʿtiqād edited by Yūsf Riḍwān al-Kūd, 197. 
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[concerning] the creed of the people of Sunna recounted by Imām Aḥmad al-Bayhaqī in 
his work entitled al-Iʿtiqād  (‘the Creed’) and I [al-Shaʿrānī] selected some of it in the 
hope that it would benefit the brothers.’254 The whole text is thus presented as a much 
shorter version of al-Iʿtiqād written by the Shāfiʿī jurist and Ashʿarī theologian Abū 
Bakr al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066), and al-Shaʿrānī rarely adds his own comments on it. It 
summarises from al-Iʿtiqād the subjects of divinity, God’s attributes, the vision of God, 
the creation of humans’ actions, divine punishment, prophethood, the prophet’s 
followers, his family, and his successors.  
 The reason al-Shaʿrānī chooses to abridge al-Iʿtiqād is not explained. The author’s 
name scarcely appears in his other theological writings. One possible reason for this is 
the fact that al-Bayhaqī leant towards traditionalism rather than rationalism. 
Furthermore, his theological works relied on scriptural evidence much more than other 
Ashʿarī theologians of his age who put stress on rational thinking. This might have 
made al-Shaʿrānī, who was against the usage of the rational discipline, interested in 
traditional al-Bayhaqī. 
 It is worth noting that al-Shaʿrānī does not refer to any mystical terms in this work. 
This suggests that its intended audience is a group of ordinary Muslims, written in order 
to provide them with the Sunni creed that they ought to believe in, rather than for those 
who are engaged in the mystical path, nor those who have an interest in Ibn ʿArabī’s 
teaching. This would explain why some of the views that al-Shaʿrānī expresses in this 
text do not accord with his opinions in other works. For example, he cites from 
al-Iʿtiqād the representative view of the Ashʿarī theologians concerning the relationship 
                                                                                                                                          
Unless otherwise indicated, in what comes below, I chiefly refer to Mukhtaṣar iʿtiqād edited by 
Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī. 
254 al-Shaʿrānī, Mukhtaṣar iʿtiqād, 219. 
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between God’s essence and His attributes. Quoting al-Bayhaqī, al-Shaʿrānī writes that 
according to the majority of the Ashʿarīs, the essential attributes of God, such as life, 
knowledge, power, will, hearing, seeing, and speech, are inherent in God’s essence and 
additional to it. These attributes are not God Himself, yet neither are they other than 
God.255 On the other hand, in works in which he explicates the creed of non-advanced 
mystics, al-Shaʿrānī dismisses this tenet, thereby maintaining that God’s attributes are 
identical to Himself.256 I will come back to this subject in Chapter 5. This observation 
shows al-Shaʿrānī’s flexibility in supporting different positions depending on the 
readers’ spiritual or intellectual level.  
 
(3) al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir fī bayān ʿaqāʾid al-akābir (‘Precious Gems and Jewels 
in Explicating the Creed of the Great Masters’) 
Composed in 955/1548, this became one of the most famous and widely read texts 
of al-Shaʿrānī. It is available in various editions up to the present day. The findings of 
Hudson confirm that it was popular in Ottoman Syria well after al-Shaʿrānī’s death.257 
Chodkiewicz also points out that it was well circulated in the Muslim world and that its 
heavy reliance on al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya helped spread Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching.258 It is 
also one of al-Shaʿrānī’s lengthiest works. The edition at hand is composed of two 
volumes and has nearly five hundred pages with thirty-two lines on each page.  
In the introduction, al-Shaʿrānī states that the purpose of the work is to build a 
                                                
255 al-Shaʿrānī, Mukhtaṣar iʿtiqād, 227.  
256 Other passages from al-Iʿtiqād concur with a general position of al-Shaʿrānī. For example, 
he quotes al-Bayhaqī’s emphasis on affirming the anthropomorphic attributes of God, such as 
His eyes and face, as divine attributes without questioning their modality or assuming any 
corporeal features. This view is upheld elsewhere by al-Shaʿrānī (al-Shaʿrānī, Mukhtaṣar iʿtiqād, 
229, 234-235). 
257 Hudson, ‘Reading al- Shaʿrānī,’ 39-68.  
258 Chodkiewicz, An Ocean Without Shore, 10. 
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bridge between the creeds of the people of unveiling [ahl al-kashf, i.e., the mystics, or 
more specifically non-advanced mystics] and the people of speculation and proof [ahl 
al-naẓar wa-l-istidlāl, i.e., the rational theologians].259 By the people of speculation and 
proof, al-Shaʿrānī means the Ashʿarīs and the Māturīdīs – who were minorities in early 
Ottoman Egypt. 260  As mentioned earlier, al-Suyūṭī’s reference to a harmonious 
relationship between Ibn ʿArabī’s creed and that of the Ashʿarīs might be behind this 
work.  
At the beginning of the work, al-Shaʿrānī declares his intention not to differ from 
the position of the major theologians. Despite this, he occasionally expresses views that 
do differ from theirs. In fact, based on mystical teaching, al-Shaʿrānī proposes 
alternative solutions to certain theological conundrums, thereby demonstrating the 
mystics’ superiority to theologians. The objective of the work is thus to establish the 
Sunni articles of belief, not through theological reasoning and speculation, which is 
prone to error, but through revelation and unveiling that discloses things as they really 
are.261 For this purpose, al-Shaʿrānī turns to al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, which is in his 
view the articulation of Ibn ʿArabī’s creed, while carefully dismissing its monistic 
aspects.262 As this observation indicates, the work is an attempt to fuse the mystical and 
theological disciplines. It especially endeavours to establish the mystical discipline as a 
scholarly approach to probing the creedal issues which were conventionally taken up by 
theologians. As I noted earlier, this was briefly attempted by Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī.  
As this objective suggests, the work’s readership is primarily the mystics in 
                                                
259 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 3. This passage is translated in El-Rouayheb, 
Islamic Intellectual History, 238-239. 
260 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 4 
261 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 28-38. 
262 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 4, 32. 
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al-Shaʿrānī’s circle. His reticence on Ibn ʿArabī’s monistic teaching implies that it is 
specifically intended for non-advanced mystics. It is also addressed to rational 
theologians who are suspicious of Ibn ʿArabī, with the aim of convincing them of the 
legitimacy of his teachings.  
The structure of the writing is very clear. After a brief introductory remark, 
al-Shaʿrānī inserts four small sections in defence of Ibn ʿArabī. This is followed by the 
main part, which is divided into seventy-one chapters and is presented in a style 
reminiscent of Sunni creedal texts. 263  Each chapter begins by introducing the 
theologians’ opinions on different theological subjects, quoting the Minhāj of Taqī 
al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 756/1355), Jamʿ al-Jawāmiʿ by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Maḥallī (d. 
864/1459), a commentary on Jamʿ al-Jawāmiʿ by Kamāl al-Dīn ibn Abī Sharīf (d. 
905/1500), Sharḥ al-Maqāsid by al-Taftāzānī, and others. These theologians’ views are 
compared to those expressed in al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya and other mystical works.264 A 
summary of the structure of the text is as follows:  
 
Introductory Part: 
     (1) The explanation of Ibn ʿArabī’s status amongst prominent Sunni scholars and 
        how they defended him.265 
                                                
263 At the beginning of al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, al-Shaʿrānī notes that he does not necessarily 
support the statements he has quoted from al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, nor does he understand 
everything he has cited (al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 3). Scholars such as 
Winter and El-Rouayheb reference the same remark as evidence of al-Shaʿrānī’s apologetic 
stance on Ibn ʿArabī. However, in my view, the remark should not be taken as indicating 
al-Shaʿrānī’s reluctant support for Ibn ʿArabī. As the study will demonstrate, al-Shaʿrānī 
positively engages with some of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings and innovatively reinterprets them, 
thereby incorporating them into his own theological and mystical worldview. Considering this, 
al-Shaʿrānī’s remark is rather viewed as his careful strategy for evading criticism from his 
readers. 
264 See also El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 238-239. 
265 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 9-15.  
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  (2) Interpretation of some controversial remarks that are attributed to Ibn ʿArabī. 
     (3) Excusing the mystics’ statements that are abstruse for non-mystics. 
 (4) Principles that are necessary for exploring the theological discipline, and how 
    one only needs the scripture and the unveiling.  
Main part: 
Chapters 1 to 28: issues related to divinity (ulūhiyya) 
Chapters 29 to 50: the concepts of prophethood (nubūwa), apostleship (risāla), and  
                  sainthood (walāya) 
Chapters 51 to 60: the issue of faith 
Chapters 61 to 71: the concepts of death and the hereafter266 
 
In the current study, I will mainly investigate the first part, concerning divinity 
(Chapters 1 to 28). The discussions in this part are the most pertinent to the objective of 
this study. They also concerned al-Shaʿrānī the most, as he treats the similar subjects in 
his other theological works.  
The work ends by mentioning that al-Shaʿrānī’s contemporaries in all four 
different schools of Law highly praised the book. He also notes that he read al-Futūḥāt 
al-Makkiyya every single day in order to select the appropriate passages for each 
subject.267 This would imply that al-Shaʿrānī’s quotation from al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya 
                                                
266 Amongst the various subjects he covers, al-Shaʿrānī dedicates relatively many pages to the 
following chapters: Chapter 4, a belief that God’s reality is different from all other realities in 
the world; Chapter 16, an explanation about eight [essential] names of God; Chapter 22, an 
explanation that God is seen by the believers in this world by heart and by sight in the hereafter 
without modality; Chapter 32, an affirmation of the prophethood of Muḥammad and an 
explanation that he is God’s best creation; and Chapter 71, an explanation that heaven and hell 
are real and both were created before the creation of Adam. The selection of Chapters 4, 32, and 
71 can be understood in relation to criticism against Ibn ʿArabī for identifying God with His 
creation and denying the existence of revelation, prophets, and heaven and hell. 
267 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 2, 493. 
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is a carefully considered attempt to choose only what suits the intellectual level of his 
audience. 
  
(4) Kashf al-ḥijāb wa-l-rān ʿan wajh asʾilat al-jānn (‘Removing the Veil from the 
Questions of the Jinn’) 
Al-Shaʿrānī was inspired to compose this when he received eighty theological 
questions raised by his teachers and other scholars. It was shortly after he completed 
al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir in the year 955/1548. The published text at hand contains a 
hundred and twenty-five pages with seventeen lines on each page, making it one of his 
shorter works. It refers to the remarks of several mystics, such as Ibn ʿArabī, ʿAlī Wafā, 
and ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ. However, it is mainly composed of al-Shaʿrānī’s own words. 
The text is addressed to the mystics, whom al-Shaʿrānī strangely describes as 
believers in the jinn (al-jānn). These mystics are not well advanced on their mystical 
path, but are eager to understand divine issues through the mystical discipline. Some of 
the subjects the work covers are as follows: the legitimate sense of unificationism 
(ittiḥād) that a servant’s will becomes God’s will; the interpretation of the hadith ‘I 
[God] am his hearing with which he hears […]’ without pure unificationism and 
incarnationism; the concepts of annihilation and subsistence; the relationship between 
the divine pre-eternal knowledge and the world prior to the creation; the understanding 
of the anthropomorphic attributes of God and figurative interpretation; the issue of 
human actions; and the concepts of prophethood and sainthood. Many of these topics 
are also discussed in the aforementioned al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir. Similarly to the 
position taken in his other works addressed to non-advanced mystics, al-Shaʿrānī 
stresses in this text that sometimes only the mystical unveiling can offer better solutions 
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to these theological problems.268  
In his concluding remarks, al-Shaʿrānī writes that if there are any questions that the 
readers do not understand, they should bring them to him or to other mystics so that 
they can be elevated further than where they are now.269 As in al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, 
the work does not refer to Ibn ʿArabī’s monistic worldview, because the intended 
readers are not advanced mystics. It is much shorter version of al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir 
and serves as a concise handbook for non-advanced mystics, answering different 
questions that they may encounter in a simple way. 
 
(5) al-Qawl al-mubīn fī l-radd ʿan al-shaykh Muḥyī al-Dīn (‘A Clear Word in 
Defence of Ibn ʿArabī’) 
This was written in 964/1557, nine years before al-Shaʿrānī’s death, making it one 
of his last works.270 It is a very short treatise, with the published text containing just 
twenty-one pages in total. Its main focus is to discharge Ibn ʿArabī from charges of 
belief in the world’s eternity, unificationism, and incarnationism. To this end, 
al-Shaʿrānī mainly quotes al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya and another work Ibn ʿArabī called 
al-Lawāqiḥ al-anwār, as well as referring to ʿAlī Wafāʾ.271 This would indicate that 
adversaries of Ibn ʿArabī, who accused him of propagating these ideas were still present 
and influential during al-Shaʿrānī’s lifetime.  
The work is a recapitulation of al-Shaʿrānī’s position, as most of its arguments are 
found in his earlier writings. Of particular interest is his comment in the text that none 
                                                
268 See, for example, al-Shaʿrānī’s treatment of the hadith, ‘I am his hearing [...]’ (al-Shaʿrānī, 
Kashf al-ḥijāb, 10-12). 
269 al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ḥijāb, 131 
270 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawl al-mubīn, 31. 
271 Al-Lawāqiḥ al-anwār was recently published. Al-Shaʿrānī often makes a reference to this 
work. Unfortunately, however, I do not have access to it. 
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of the copies of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya that he found in Damascus and Cairo were true 
to the original, as they had been falsified to contain passages that oppose the Islamic 
Law. Following this remark, al-Shaʿrānī notes that he came across the original copy of 
al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, written by Ibn ʿArabī himself. Al-Shaʿrānī rejoiced upon 
reading it, because he did not find in it anything that went against the Law.272 It is 
impossible to confirm the veracity of this statement, as there are no other available 
sources. It is hard to believe al-Shaʿrānī’s claim that every copy of al-Futūḥāt 
al-Makkiyya in Damascus and Cairo was interpolated. The implication of this remark 
would then be that no one has access to the original version of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya 
except al-Shaʿrānī, who luckily found it. Therefore, people ought to read al-Shaʿrānī’s 
books, since they give a concise summary of what is written in al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya.  
  
(6) al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya fī ʿaqāʾid akābir al-ṣūfiyya (‘The Balance of al-Khiḍr in 
Explicating the Creeds of the Sufi Masters’)273  
 A copy of this work exists in manuscript form.274 The title page of the existing 
manuscript attributes the authorship to al-Shaʿrānī. Its writing style, the subjects it 
covers, the scholars and the writings it refers to support this attribution. It contains one 
hundred and seven folios with twenty-five lines on each page and is relatively long 
among al-Shaʿrānī’s theological texts. The date of completion is not entirely clear. 
There is a reference at the end of the work stating that he finished writing this in the 
year 933/1527, making it one of his earliest works. However, significantly, it refers to 
                                                
272 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawl al-mubīn, 30-31. 
273  This is different from al-Shaʿrānī’s jurisprudential work al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, which 
became the basis for his later jurisprudential work al-Mīzān al-kubrā.  
274 The manuscript details are as follows: MS, Süleymaniye Ktp., Haci Mahmud Efendi, no. 
1281, 107 fols.  
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his al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, which was composed in 955/1548.275 This makes the 
completion date of the text sometime after 955/1548, or within this year at the earliest. 
There is a chance that it was revised after the composition of al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, 
but this is unverifiable. 
 The work starts by explaining that its objective is to provide a precious balance 
based on the Qurʾān, the Sunna and the statements of Sunni scholars (aʾimma), in order 
to remove differences amongst theologians concerning their understanding of the divine 
attributes.276 Following this, al-Shaʿrānī briefly defines the meaning of the balance as 
representing the two levels of divine self-manifestation of incomparability and 
similarity. It should be remembered, as we shall see in Chapter 4, that divine 
self-manifestation is not employed in this text in the ontological sense of God’s 
manifesting Himself in the world’s beings, but in relation to the scriptural report 
through which He describes Himself with various attributes. The introductory chapter 
ends with al-Shaʿrānī’s definition of a sound belief. It reads: 
 
Most of those who do not walk on the [mystics’] path with the help of a 
shaykh are ignorant of the knowledge of God […] The sound belief (ʿaqīda 
ṣāliḥa) which is safe from doubt (shabah) is that you worship God alone who 
is incomparable to all attributes of the creatures that you can think of, and this 
was the case of the pious predecessors.277 
 
This passage is partly directed against the rational theologians who compare divine 
                                                
275 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fols. 97b, 103b.  
276 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 2a. 
277 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 6a. 
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attributes to those of creatures in order to interpret them figuratively. Elsewhere too, 
al-Shaʿrānī tries to link what he believes to be the correct belief of the mystics with that 
of the pious predecessors, while rejecting the reasoning of the rational theologians.  
    In order to expound the notion of the balance, al-Shaʿrānī divides the rest of the 
work into eight chapters, each being dedicated to examining various anthropomorphic 
attributes of God and showing how the balance relates to them. The text also serves to 
defend Ibn ʿArabī against charges of believing in the world’s eternity, incarnationism, 
and unificationism, and to prove his legitimacy. Since the titles of each chapter describe 
the work’s content well, I translate them below:  
 
Chapter 1: Poems of the Sufis who witnessed two divine self-manifestations/ 
What I saw among the poems of the Sufis who witnessed the level of God’s 
incomparability along with the level of His descent to human minds (tanazzul 
lil-ʿuqūl)278 or just the level of God’s incomparability.279 
Chapter 2: The calls from God (hawātif rabbānī)280on witnessing the 
aforementioned two divine self-manifestations/ What I saw amongst the calls 
from God issued by those who witnessed the two levels of incomparability 
and descent to reason, including the words of Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Jabbār 
al-Niffarī (ca. 366/976-7).281 
                                                
278 The meaning of this expression will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
279 The latter title is what appears at the beginning of the chapter, while the former is what 
al-Shaʿrānī writes in the introductory chapter. 
280 The calls from God (hawātif rabbānī) are the divine speeches that are recounted through the 
mouths of the mystics, with God being their subject. One example of this is: ‘I [God] am the 
Light without shadow, while you [creation] are the light mixed with your possibility [for 
coming into being]; hence, you stand between existence and nonexistence’ [al-Shaʿrānī, 
al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 121].  
281 Little is known about al-Niffarī. He is believed to be a Sufi from Iraq who was under the 
great influence of al-Ḥallāj. A main commentator on al-Niffarī’s works is al-Tilimsānī. See 
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Chapter 3: What I understood from the words of the people of unveiling and 
the most eminent theologians in explicating the temporal origination of the 
world, and an explanation of Ibn ʿArabī’s innocence and that of other mystics 
of utterances about the world’s eternity, unificationism and incarnationism.  
Chapter 4: Explanation of the impossibility of the creatures’ knowing the 
divine essence, that God is different from the creatures’ attributes through His 
incomparability, that divine self-manifestation through striking similitudes 
came as a way of having Himself understood and getting closer to feeble 
reason, and that the confusion of the great mystics (akābir al-khalq) over God 
strengthens knowledge of God. 
Chapter 5: Explanation that God’s essence does not accept increase nor 
decrease and that it is not temporally originated through His origination of the 
world in His essence, and an explication of the impossibility of talking about 
incarnationism, unificationism, corporealism, and direction on the side of 
God in the view of all Sufis and Ḥanbalīs, and a reference to their remarks 
about its impossibility in contrast to what is often attributed to them, 
especially to Ibn ʿArabī. 
Chapter 6: Comments of Ibn ʿArabī and others amongst the friends of God 
about the meaning of God’s statement that ‘the Merciful one sat upon the 
throne.’ 
Chapter 7: Comments of the scholars about the expression of the vision of 
God during waking and sleeping and that it is through hearts in this world and 
                                                                                                                                          
Arberry, ‘al-Niffarī’ in EI2; Karamustafa, Sufism, 59-60. Ibn ʿArabī also mentions al-Niffarī’s 
work entitled al-Mawāqiḥ, in which the author describes various stations for the mystics to 
reach. See Chittick, The Sufi Path, 318. A reference to al-Niffarī’s remarks also appears in 
al-Shaʿrānī’s al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya.  
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through eyes in the hereafter/ Clarifying the meaning of a vision of God 
based on the two levels of the balance. 
Chapter 8: Elucidation of the sound section [nubdha ṣāliḥa] in theology 
regarding divine names and attributes and whether they are identical to God 
or other than Him, or neither identical to God nor other than Him, and an 
explication that God’s names are dependent and that the names of His essence 
are clearly specified as eight, and an explanation of the first names that 
appeared in the world, which you will not find in any texts of the Sufis 
[except Ibn ʿArabī]. 
 
    Al-Shaʿrānī begins every chapter by describing the agreed view of the Sunni 
theologians, followed by lengthy quotations from Ibn ʿArabī and other mystics to 
clarify their position on each subject. Its occasional reference to al-Yawāqīt 
wa-l-jawāhir and overlapping topics between that text and this suggest that this work 
was written based on al-Yawāqīt. A noteworthy difference between the two writings is 
that while al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya focuses on expounding the notion of the balance in 
relation to the two levels of divine self-manifestation (in the non-ontological sense), 
al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir does not refer to the balance nor to divine self-manifestation. 
In this regard, the main readership of al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya is considered to be 
mystics, rather than theologians who are unfamiliar with these ideas, but not advanced 
mystics who rather endorse the ontological theory of divine self-manifestation. 
    The work ends by listing the basic articles of belief in which Muslims ought to 
believe, whether advanced mystics, scholars or pious people.282 It is taken from the 
                                                
282 a1l-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol.106a. 
 118 
commoners’ creed in al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, quoted almost verbatim.283 However, 
there, al-Shaʿrānī makes some subtle changes. For example, Ibn ʿArabī’s statement 
that ‘No attributes of His creation are attributed to Him with which He was not 
characterised before’284 becomes: ‘His essence does not resemble any of the essences 
[of the creatures] and His attributes are not similar to any of the attributes [of the 
creatures].’ 285  This correction would suggest that al-Shaʿrānī took the original 
passage by Ibn ʿArabī to be inappropriate for the commoners, as it could mean that the 
attributes of His creation always correspond to those of God, undermining the 
absolute incomparability of the divine to the world’s beings. Similar changes are also 
made in al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, which I will discuss next.  
 
(7) al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya al-muwaḍḍiḥa li-maʿānī al-ṣifāt al-ilāhiyya (Unveiling 
Foundations in Explicating the Meanings of Divine Attributes)  
    The date of completion of the work is unknown. In the introduction, al-Shaʿrānī    
hints that he was inspired to write this after the year 961/1553.286 Since he died in 
973/1565, it must have been completed at some point within the last thirteen years of 
his life.287 It is relatively long in length, with each manuscript containing one hundred 
and ten to one hundred and thirty folios, with roughly twenty lines on each page.288 
    Its objective is to answer the issue of the anthropomorphic attributes of God in 
order to refute the heretics’ position and to respond to people of lower intelligence so 
                                                
283 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fols. 104a-106b. 
284 Lā tarjiʿ ilayhi ṣifatun lam yakun ʿalayhā min ṣanʿat al-maṣnūʿāt [Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt 
al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 36]. 
285 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 104a. 
286 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 63. 
287 The text ends with reference to the completion date as being the year 979/1571, six years 
after his death (al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 63). 
288 al-Shaʿrānī, in the introduction of al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 44-46; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, 
vol. 2, 493. 
 119 
that they will not harbour heretical ideas. 289  After his introductory remarks, 
al-Shaʿrānī states the correct belief of the people of Sunna as a reference for the 
readers to return to if they get confused at any point. Although he does not mention 
the source, this is without doubt taken from the articles of the commoners’ creed in 
al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, with some changes. One of the changes al-Shaʿrānī makes is 
the aforementioned statement that ‘no attributes of His creation are attributed with 
which He was not attributed before,’ which becomes: ‘nothing of His attributes 
resembles the attributes of the created beings.’290 As is the case with al-Mīzān 
al-khiḍriyya, this alteration indicates al-Shaʿrānī’s intention to avoid a pantheistic 
meaning of the original sentence. 
    As already mentioned in relation to his other works, in al-Shaʿrānī’s view, the 
commoners who follow their natural disposition and hold belief in revelation as it is 
reported are correct, in contrast to the rational theologians, who establish their creed 
by relying on rational proof (adilla) or interpretation (taʾwīl), which can lead to 
mistakes.291 At the same time, al-Shaʿrānī firmly believes, quoting ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ, 
that only the mystical experience of unveiling, which discloses things as they really 
are, can break the theological impasse over the understanding of divine attributes.292  
    Based on this standpoint, the main part of the work discusses various theological 
subjects, starting with the following sentence: ‘amongst the things that I have said to 
to those who imagined (tawahhama) that […], the answer is […]’. The argument often 
develops by first describing the fallacy at hand, then giving a summary of the agreed 
view of major theologians, and lastly presenting the position of mystics like Ibn 
                                                
289 al-Shaʿrānī, in the introduction of al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 63, 97. 
290 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 83. 
291 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 96.  
292 al-Shaʿrānī, in the introduction of al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 65 
 120 
ʿArabī and ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ, without referring to their mystical worldview. The main 
subjects it covers are as follows: God’s creation ex nihilo; God’s knowledge of His 
creation; the relationship between God and His attributes; the understanding of the 
anthropomorphic attributes of God; the vision of God; and the relationship between 
God’s creation and humans’ actions. In many cases, the conclusion that al-Shaʿrānī 
arrives at disagrees with that of the rational theologians.  
    Apart from this, al-Shaʿrānī dedicates a few sections to excusing Ibn ʿArabī from 
the charges of advocating the world’s eternity, unificationism, and incarnationism. He 
also explicitly denies the idea of absolute unity in the ontological sense, for which the 
latter was criticised.293  
    The work ends by recalling the warning of al-Ashʿarī and other Ashʿarī 
theologians against declaring other Muslims unbelievers. Compared to al-Yawāqīt 
wa-l-jawāhir which covers similar subjects without treating Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical 
cosmology, the argument in al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya is more succinct and 
straightforward and is primarily dedicated to the issue of anthropomorphic 
expressions in scripture. Hence, the intended readership is considered to be 
non-advanced mystics, as well as theologians who are not entirely happy with their 
methodology. 
 
(8) al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya fī tawḥīd ahl al-khuṣūṣiyya (‘The Sunni Principles 
Regarding the Divine Unity amongst a Group of the Elites’) 
    A copy of this work exists in manuscript form.294 His biographer, Abū Ṣāliḥ 
                                                
293 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 120-122. 
294 MS, Süleymaniye Ktp., Esad Efendi, nr. 1621, 118 fols. 
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Muḥammad al-Malījī, counts this as one of al-Shaʿrānī’s major works. 295  Īḍāḥ 
al-maknūn also attributes the work to al-Shaʿrānī.296 Its writing style, the topics it 
covers, and certain expressions and passages that it employs, support this attribution. 
The copy at hand contains a hundred and nineteen folios with twenty-one lines on each 
page. Unfortunately, it finishes abruptly halfway through. This tells us that the original 
text was much longer, making it one of al-Shaʿrānī’s lengthiest works. There is no 
reference to the date of composition. It is difficult even to surmise the approximate date, 
as it does not refer to any of al-Shaʿrānī’s other works. 
    The objective of the work is to introduce the legitimate articles of belief promoted 
by elite mystics such as Ibn ʿArabī, ʿAlī Wafāʾ, al-Niffarī, a Baghdad mystic Sitta 
al-ʿAjam (who died after 852/1448),297 and Ibn ʿArabī’s disciple and contemporary Ibn 
Sawdakīn (d. 646/1248). Its intended readers are primarily the scholars who were 
suspicious of Ibn ʿArabī and his followers. The work begins as follows:  
 
This book is full of signs and symbols for the principles of God’s unity […] 
which I gathered from al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya […] so that the scholars of 
Islam who are well-versed in theology (ʿilm al-kalām) can have a look at this 
work and determine what is true and what is wrong. […] For those who 
declare the Shaykh [Ibn ʿArabī] to be wrong without any proof of what is said 
of him, I extracted [this book] from the branches of his statements with 
reference to their beginning and what comes after. This is because most of the 
people copy each other in condemning the Shaykh for his creeds […], so 
                                                
295 al-Malījī, Manāqib al-kubrā, 70. 
296 Pasha, Īḍāḥ al-maknūn, vol. 2, 242. 
297 Pasha, Īḍāḥ al-maknūn, vol. 2, 485. 
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much so that some of them prohibit others from reading his texts due to their 
ignorance of his intention. The truth is to follow, because they have only 
prohibited it for their lack of capacity [to understand Ibn ʿArabī’s words].298 
 
In another passage, al-Shaʿrānī expresses his intention to help those people of reasoning 
(aṣḥāb al-ʿuqūl), who do not walk on the mystic path, to understand some ideas of the 
mystics.299 Furthermore, he also spends several pages introducing Ibn ʿArabī’s remarks 
against the notions of incarnationism and unificationism.300 
    In the introduction, al-Shaʿrānī briefly states the articles of belief held by the 
people of Sunna (ʿaqīdat ahl al-Sunna wa-l-jamāʿa) – which is actually an abridgement 
of the commoners’ creed written in the introduction of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya. This is 
followed by the quotation of another passage from al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya regarding 
the soundness of the commoner’s creed (ʿaqīdat al-ʿawāmm).301  
    After this, al-Shaʿrānī begins the main text by citing the selected passages from 
al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, starting from Chapter 1 and very occasionally inserting his 
own comments. On the whole, it is presented as a summary of Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching in a 
manner that is reminiscent of the Sunni creedal texts. The main topics it includes are as 
follows: the notion of God’s unity; the divine essential attributes; the relation between 
His attributes and His essence; the tenets of divine incomparability and immanence; the 
divine anthropomorphic attributes; the divine names; and the vision of God. As I have 
shown, similar arguments are also recorded in other theological works of al-Shaʿrānī.  
                                                
298 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fol. 2a.  
299 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fol. 22b-23a. 
300 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fols. 54a, 61a, 83a, 89a. 
301 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fol. 61a. 
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    Despite its being addressed to theologians, the text strangely refers to several 
controversial ideas held by Ibn ʿArabī (e.g. the perfect man as the divine image,302 the 
interdependent relationship between God and creation as explained through a metaphor 
of a mirror,303 and the idea that the world is He and yet not He304). This implies that 
while being addressed to theologians, the work’s objective is to expound on the creed of 
the advanced mystics. Nevertheless, unlike al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, wherein al-Shaʿrānī 
openly upholds the doctrine of the oneness of existence, the current text avoids 
promoting this teaching; rather, and more markedly, it tries to reinterpret the passages 
concerning the oneness of existence as ‘the oneness of witnessing’ or experiential 
oneness. This will be discussed further in Chapter 2. 
    Al-Shaʿrānī dedicates the first part of the work to a summary of the creeds upheld 
by advanced mystics, with abundant references to Ibn ʿArabī’s al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya 
and ʿAlī Wafāʾ’s Waṣāyā. 305  After this, al-Shaʿrānī introduces Ibn ʿArabī’s 
commentary on his Tarjmān al-ashwāq and Ibn al-Sawdakīn’s recount of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
Lawāqiḥ al-anwār. Unfortunately, the manuscript at hand ends abruptly while quoting 
Ibn Sawdakīn’s view on the issue of the divine anthropomorphic attributes. As is 
indicated at the beginning of the work, the text is meant to proceed to the statements of 
al-Niffarī from his al-Mawāqiḥ and Sitta al-ʿAjam from her commentary on Ibn 
ʿArabī’s Sharḥ mashāhid.  
                                                
302 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʾid al-sunniya, fol. 71a-b. 
303 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʾid al-sunniya, fol. 75a. According to al-Shaʿrānī, the world is a mirror 
in which God reflects Himself, and creation sees the divine image within itself. A similar idea 
was proposed by Ibn ʿArabī. 
304 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʾid al-sunniya, fols. 72a, 82a-b. Quoting Ibn ʿArabī, al-Shaʿrānī writes 
that the world becomes manifest within God, and God is manifested within the world. For this 
reason, the world receives the two properties of God and His creation, and so does God. In the 
meantime, al-Shaʿrānī repeatedly refers to Ibn ʿArabī’s denial of the identification between God 
and the world. 
305 Many of ʿAlī Wafāʾs statements excerpted in this text are also quoted in al-Shaʿrānī’s 
al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā. 
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    The overall stance of this text remains unclear. It is certainly addressed to 
theologians who are doubtful of Ibn ʿArabī, with the aim of removing their suspicion. 
Nevertheless, it treats several controversial ideas of Ibn ʿArabī that are not considered in 
other works of al-Shaʿrānī intended for non-advanced mystics. The structure of the text 
also seems unelaborate in comparison to his theological works that have been treated 
earlier in this section. This would entail that al-Shaʿrānī wrote the text at a relatively 
early stage in his career, while pursuing a way to present Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching in the 
best way possible to people of different intellectual and mystical levels. However, this 
is unverifiable. 
 
1.3.4. Concluding Remark 
 
    Al-Shaʿrānī’s theological oeuvre that I have examined above is thus written for the 
following readership: advanced mystics who are prepared to appreciate Ibn ʿArabī’s 
oneness of existence; non-advanced mystics who have not yet reached this highest stage, 
including theologians who are suspicious of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought; and ordinary 
Muslims who do not need any mystical discipline. Each work is dedicated to 
establishing the creed of each level. Amongst them, non-advanced mystics were 
al-Shaʿrānī’s main readership, as evidenced by the relatively large number of texts that 
explain the creed of this group. In this respect, he differs significantly from Ibn ʿArabī 
and his famous followers, whose main concern was to explicate the monistic creed of 
advanced mystics.  
    Building on this structure of the tripartite hierarchy of creeds, as the subsequent 
chapters will show in detail, al-Shaʿrānī endorses Ibn ʿArabī’s monistic worldview for 
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advanced mystics. At the same time, and intriguingly, al-Shaʿrānī reinterprets Ibn 
ʿArabī’s teachings differently in his works for non-advanced mystics. This multi-faceted 
approach to Ibn ʿArabī’s thought demonstrates the remarkable prominence of 























Al-Shaʿrānī’s Reinterpretation of Ibn ʿArabī  
 
    In Chapter 1, I explored how Ibn ʿArabī’s advocates in the fifteenth- and 
sixteenth-century Arabic speaking world approached his teachings, clarifying the 
strategies that they carefully adopted from his antagonists. As I showed, these 
supporters refute the notions of unificationism and incarnationism just like Ibn 
Taymiyya. They also employ the spectrum of experiential/legitimate and 
monistic/heretical mysticism, which was originally proposed by al-Taftāzānī and 
endorsed by other scholars, whereby they read Ibn ʿArabī’s thought as promoting 
experiential oneness.  
    In order to present Ibn ʿArabī’s worldview as less problematic, al-Shaʿrānī also 
applies a similar methodology in his theological texts written for non-advanced mystics 
and theologians. However, compared to other contemporary advocates of Ibn ʿArabī, 
al-Shaʿrānī’s approach is distinctive in that he selectively cites Ibn ʿArabī’s passages 
and comments on them, thus formalising the interpretation of the oneness of existence 
as experiential oneness. In this sense, al-Shaʿrānī can be considered as one of the 
earliest thinkers to have read Ibn ʿArabī in this particular way. Some of al-Shaʿrānī’s 
discussions also bear a striking similarity to those of anti-Ibn ʿArabī scholars, implying 
that al-Shaʿrānī’s view is aptly constructed in the intellectual context of Mamluk and 
Ottoman Egypt. 
    The current chapter consequently considers the interpretive method that al-Shaʿrānī 
took in defence of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings. While previous studies on al-Shaʿrānī 
explained his general, apologetic presentation of Ibn ʿArabī, they did not pay in-depth 
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attention to its underlying scheme.306 They therefore concluded that al-Shaʿrānī’s 
interpretation of Ibn ʿArabī is haphazard and occurs only at the textual level. Contrary 
to this existing thesis, I will argue that there is underlying systematicity in al-Shaʿrānī’s 
approach to the latter’s thought. By using the hitherto unstudied texts (al-Qawāʿid 
al-kashfiyya and al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya), I bring this topic to light for the first time. 
Moreover, our investigation will show that al-Shaʿrānī’s reading method actually 
emerged against the backdrop of the polemics over Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings, thereby 
contextualising his defence of Ibn ʿArabī. 
    In the first section of this chapter, I provide an account of what is commonly 
known as the ‘oneness of witnessing’ (waḥdat al-shuhūd). This formula has been 
subject to much attention in modern scholarship.307 Hence, I will briefly review it in 
order to highlight the meaning of what I describe as the notion of ‘experiential oneness’. 
   In the following section, I examine al-Shaʿrānī’s attempt to read Ibn ʿArabī’s 
oneness of existence as experiential oneness; I will do this by treating three subjects. 
First, the section investigates al-Shaʿrānī’s interpretation of the popular hadith ‘When I 
[God] love Him, I am his hearing [...]’. This will be followed by an analysis of 
al-Shaʿrānī’s view on the notion of absolute unity. In each discussion, I will point out an 
interesting resemblance between al-Shaʿrānī’s position and that of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
antagonists – most notably, al-Taftāzānī and al-Biqāʿī. Lastly, I will consider the 
position of another adversary of Ibn ʿArabī – Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya – regarding the 
issue of ontological and experiential oneness. In keeping with the insights given by 
Anjum and Schallenbergh into Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s approach to mysticism, in the 
                                                
306 Especially Winter, Society and Religion, 124-133; El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 
237-247. 
307 For example, Rahman, Islam; Friedman, Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī, 59; Haar, Follower and 
Heir. 
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present study, I will discuss his view by relating it to the polemical context of Ibn 
ʿArabī.308  
 
2.1. Oneness of Witnessing (waḥdat al-shuhūd): A Brief Account 
 
    As I briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, the tenet of the oneness of existence is 
attributed to the Naqshbandī Sufi, Aḥmad Sirhindī of India. He has long been known as 
a scholar who, by abandoning the concept of the oneness of existence, became a pioneer 
of so-called ‘neo-Sufism’.309 According to Friedman, Sirhindī interprets Ibn ʿArabī’s 
oneness of existence as ‘to consider Existence as one, to regard everything else as 
nonexistent and to consider the manifestations of that [One] as one, despite their 
nonexistence.’310 The proponents of this dogma are compared to those who look at the 
sun and deny the existence of the stars. In Sirhindī’s view, this tenet amounts to the 
declaration that the world is essentially the same as God.311 
    Sirhindī objected to the notion of the oneness of existence when he observed that it 
had been employed as a pretext to avoid abidance with the Law.312 According to this 
theory, if the world’s existence is identical with that of God, and if the world is merely 
imaginary, there is no point in following the Law that God has imposed upon His 
creatures. In order to refute this idea, Sirhindī proposed the tenet of the oneness of 
witnessing. This claims that the mystics’ experience of the oneness of God’s existence 
                                                
308 There are two main studies which have already investigated Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s view 
on mysticism: Anjum, ‘Sufism without Mysticism?,’ 161-188; Schallenbergh, ‘Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya’s Manipulation,’ 94-122. 
309 On the notion of neo-Sufism, see Rahman, Islam, 148, 164, 195, 202. The idea of 
neo-Sufism has since been reconsidered. See Voll, ‘Neo-Sufism.’ 
310 Friedman, Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī, 59. 
311 Friedman, Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī, 60. 
312 Chittick, ‘Waḥdat al-Shuhūd,’ in EI2. 
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in the cosmos only amounts to their subjective witnessing and experience, and not to 
actual reality.313 The exponents of this tenet see nothing but God in their mystical state, 
while firmly acknowledging the world’s existence. The situation is compared to a 
person seeing the sun without losing the awareness that, in reality, the stars continue to 
exist.314 
    Noting that Sirhindī’s position presents a useful case for understanding the ongoing 
debates on the oneness of existence in later generations, Chittick views Sirhindī’s 
reading of this doctrine of the oneness of existence – as entailing absolute identification 
between God and creation – as being a misreading. This is because Ibn ʿArabī 
simultaneously affirms and denies the view that the world is He, and espouses the 
theory of the oneness of existence both in the ontological and experiential sense. Thus, 
in Chittick’s view, Sirhindī’s failure to grasp the subtleties of Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching 
leads Sirhindī to correct the tenet of the oneness of existence, presenting it as the 
oneness of witnessing.315 Whether or not Chittick’s suggestion on Sirhindī’s ‘failure’ in 
his understanding of Ibn ʿArabī holds true, al-Shaʿrānī was undoubtedly aware of the 
difference between the two meanings of oneness (ontological and experiential). 
Nevertheless, as we shall see, al-Shaʿrānī deliberately examined them separately in 
order to make Ibn ʿArabī’s thought more acceptable for a wider audience.   
    Interestingly, Sirhindī’s approach to the oneness of witnessing coincides with the 
aforementioned positions of al-Taftāzānī and al-Biqāʿī on the authentic mystics who, for 
their part, only advocate a perceptual, rather than an existential, truth. Although 
                                                
313 Chittick, ‘Waḥdat al-Shushe,’ in EI2.   
314 Friedman, Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī, 59-60. 
315 Chittick, ‘Waḥdat al-Shuhūd’ in EI2, where he writes: ‘his [Sirhindī] interpretation of 
waḥdat al-wujūd exhibits no understanding of the subtleties of Ibn ʿArabī’s position or of the 
various meanings that had been given to the term over the centuries […]’. See also Chittick, 
‘Waḥdat al-wujūd in India,’ 29-40. 
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al-Taftāzānī and al-Biqāʿī did not intend to interpret the oneness of existence as the 
oneness of witnessing, this similarity suggests that the foundation of the tenet of the 
oneness of witnessing was laid down well before Sirhindī. With regard to this, 
El-Rouayheb recently established that the trend of interpreting the oneness of existence 
as the oneness of witnessing had started among Ibn ʿArabī’s supporters by the 
sixteenth-century. According to El-Rouayheb, Muḥammad ʿAlī Ibn ʿAllān al-Ṣiddiqī (d. 
1058/1648), a Meccan contemporary of Sirhindī, employed the expression ‘the oneness 
of witnessing’ independently of al-Sirhindī to describe the position of the Shādhilī Sufis 
in the sixteenth century Arabic speaking world.316 In order to highlight this point, 
El-Rouayheb references al-Shaʿrānī’s contemporary, the Shādhilī Muḥammad al-Bakrī, 
whom I mentioned in Chapter 1, as being a representative of this interpretive trend.317 I 
have also demonstrated that, by turning to al-Taftāzānī’s work, Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī and 
Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī uphold a similar view. Most significantly, as we shall see below, 
al-Shaʿrānī applies this interpretive method and further elaborates on it. 
    It must be noted that neither al-Bakrī, al-Anṣārī, Ibn Ḥajar nor al-Shaʿrānī directly 
use the expression ‘the oneness of witnessing’, although there is little doubt that they 
interpret the doctrine of the oneness of existence in relation to this concept. Considering 
this, in what follows, I will approach their reading method by describing it as 
‘experiential oneness’. Experiential oneness stands for the same tenet as the oneness of 
witnessing by Sirhindī. However, their contexts do differ. Whereas the oneness of 
witnessing was formulated against the antinomian mystics, who dismissed the Law by 
using the notion of the oneness of existence as an excuse, experiential oneness was 
conceived in response to the criticisms of Ibn ʿArabī’s ontological monism. 
                                                
316 El-Rouayheb, Intellectual Islamic History, 245. 
317 El-Rouayheb, Intellectual Islamic History, 244.  
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2.2. Oneness of Existence (waḥdat al-wujūd) versus Experiential 
Oneness  
 
    In the introduction to this thesis, in discussing the study conducted by Winter, I 
referred to several apologist techniques al-Shaʿrānī applied in his defence of Ibn ʿArabī. 
I argued that al-Shaʿrānī’s interpretation of Ibn ʿArabī’s monistic remark – ‘There is no 
existence but God’ – led Winter and others scholars to the view that al-Shaʿrānī was 
mediocre and uncritical in his understanding of Ibn ʿArabī.318 Unfortunately, while 
judging al-Shaʿrānī in this reductive manner, Winter did not pay attention to 
al-Shaʿrānī’s further comment on the same statement. Crucially, the subsequent 
comment demonstrates that al-Shaʿrānī’s stance on Ibn ʿArabī’s thought should not be 
treated this simply. It reads:  
 
If the Shaykh [Ibn ʿArabī] indeed stated ‘There is no existence but God’, he 
must have said it when all beings (kāʾināt) became annihilated (talāshat) in 
his view, as a result of witnessing (shuhūd) God alone in his heart. This is 
similar to [the situation of] Abū al-Qāsim al-Junayd, who said ‘Whoever 
witnesses God does not see His creation [as a result of seeing nothing but 
God]’.319  
 
The above passage underlines al-Shaʿrānī’s intention to reinterpret one of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
                                                
318 Winter, Society and Religion, 131; El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 344-345. As 
noted in the introduction, al-Shaʿrānī excludes the monistic implication of this statement by 
commenting on it as follows: ‘If indeed he [Ibn ʿArabī] did say so, it must mean that nothing 
exists independently except God and everything else exists through others’ [translation taken 
from Winter, Society and Religion, 131].  
319 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 17. 
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monistic statements within the context of experiential oneness. Here, al-Shaʿrānī 
stresses that the statement is ascribed to Ibn ʿArabī’s experience of perceiving God 
alone in his heart as a result of focusing only on Him. This view indicates that, to 
al-Shaʿrānī’s mind, Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical experience is not concerned with the actual 
reality of the world, but only with a person’s perception. Al-Shaʿrānī then associates Ibn 
ʿArabī’s position with that of al-Junayd, the representative of the moderates Sufis.  
    Building on this preliminary observation, in the following section, I aim to 
investigate al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to Ibn ʿArabī’s ontological worldview in greater 
depth, illuminating in particular al-Shaʿrānī’s interpretation of the oneness of existence 
as experiential oneness. For this purpose, I will especially examine al-Shaʿrānī’s 
treatment of the meaning of the popular hadith (‘When I [God] love him I am his 
hearing [...]’), as well as the tenet of absolute unity, with a reference to the opinions of 
al-Taftāzānī and al-Biqāʿī on these tenets. The study of these two cases will expose 
al-Shaʿrānī’s espousal of the idea of experiential oneness.  
    Following these discussions, as a second thread to this section, I will consider a 
similarity between al-Shaʿrānī and one of the anti-Ibn ʿArabī scholars prior to 
al-Shaʿrānī, namely, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, by drawing attention to their shared 
endorsement of the dichotomous framework of the oneness of existence and experiential 
oneness. As I will show, al-Shaʿrānī interprets Ibn ʿArabī’s thought within the context 
of this spectrum in order to defend him, whereas Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya employs the 
same idea with the objective of denying monistic, ontological mysticism on the one 
hand, and excusing moderate, visionary mysticism on the other. The arguments in this 
section will contribute to our understanding of al-Shaʿrānī’s efforts to promote Ibn 
ʿArabī’s thought within this intellectual context. 
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2.2.1. Experiential Oneness in Interpretation of the Hadith 
 
    In an attempt to clarify al-Shaʿrānī’s interpretation of Ibn ʿArabī’s oneness of 
existence as experiential oneness, it is important to examine al-Shaʿrānī’s reading of the 
famous hadith, ‘When I [God] love him, I am his hearing with which he hears […]’.320 
Here, al-Shaʿrānī treats the hadith by relating it to the idea of experiential oneness.  
    Ibn ʿArabī originally references the hadith in order to express his monistic 
worldview – that is, that there is nothing in existence but God and that He is identified 
with creation.321 In this regard, a passage in Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam reads:  
 
So He is the spirit of the cosmos, its hearing, its sight, and its hand. Through 
Him the cosmos hears, through Him it sees […]. When the servant draws 
near to Him through supererogatory works, He loves him, when He loves 
him He says, ‘I am his hearing, his sight, and his hand […]’. God’s words ‘I 
am’ show that this was already the situation, but the servant was not aware. 
Hence, the generous gift this nearness gives to him is the unveiling and the 
knowledge that God is his hearing and his sight. He had been imagining that 
he hears through his own hearing, but he was actually hearing through his 
Lord.322 
 
                                                
320 The entire hadith goes as follows: ‘Whosoever is hostile to me and towards My friend, I 
declare with him. My servant does not draw near to Me with anything more loved by Me than 
what I have imposed as his duties. And My servant continues to draw near to Me with 
supererogatory actions until I shall love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with which he 
hears, his seeing with which he sees, his hand with which he strikes and his foot with which he 
walks’.  
321 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 3, 67-68; Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 175/189. 
322 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 3, 67-68. Translation taken from Chittick, The Sufi 
Path, 326.  
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In a different section, Ibn ʿArabī similarly interprets the hadith to mean that the essence 
called a servant is in reality God, for there is nothing but His essence in the cosmos.323 
Thus, in his view, the hadith attests to the doctrine of the oneness of existence. 
    It must be noted that on other occasions, Ibn ʿArabī explicates the hadith 
differently by associating it with the affirmation of the duality of God and His creation. 
According to him, the hadith confirms the existence of someone other than God through 
the third-person pronoun [i.e. ‘his’]. Clearly, this reading demonstrates Ibn ʿArabī’s 
rejection of the notion of unificationism.324  
    Ibn ʿArabī’s reference to the denial of the notion of unificationism, however, did 
not hinder his antagonists from accusing him of upholding this tenet. For example, Ibn 
Taymiyya condemns Ibn ʿArabī and his followers for interpreting the hadith in the 
context of their ontological worldview. Ibn Taymiyya argues that, for these monistic 
heretics, God is meant to retain His absolute oneness before and after He shows His 
love for His servant; accordingly, when He becomes his hearing, his sight and so on, He 
has to become his limbs, organs, hair, and everything else. This is because affirming 
someone’s existence is to admit plurality in existence, which violates the principle tenet 
of the oneness of existence. Consequently, according to Ibn Taymiyya, the proponents 
of the oneness of existence must interpret the hadith as attesting to (1) the identification 
of creatures’ existence with that of God, (2) the immanence of God’s existence in each 
entity in the world, and (3) the unification between God and His creation.325 For him, 
this conclusion is nothing but pure heresy.326  
                                                
323 Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 175/189. 
324 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 194-195; Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 4, 
372. 
325 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿa fatāwā, vol. 2, 245-246. Cf., Majmūʿa fatāwā, vol. 5, 84, 149. 
326 Ibn Taymiyya maintains that the content of the hadith attests to the existence of someone 
who loves (i.e. God) and that of the one who is loved (i.e. servant), as well as the existence of a 
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    Ibn Taymiyya’s attack on the heretical interpretation of the hadith would explain 
the different approaches al-Shaʿrānī took to the hadith depending on his readership. On 
the one hand, addressing most advanced mystics, and in keeping with Ibn ʿArabī’s 
thought, al-Shaʿrānī interprets the hadith within the context of ontological monism to 
mean the identification of God with His creation. I will discuss this point in Chapter 3. 
On the other hand and quite intriguingly, in the writings addressed to non-advanced 
mystics and theologians, al-Shaʿrānī denies such an interpretation and explains the 
hadith in relation to a mystic’s visionary experience, the details of which I will now 
discuss.  
    In al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya and al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, as well as in al-Ṭabaqāt 
al-kubrā, al-Shaʿrānī expresses his objection to interpreting ‘I was his hearing […]’ as 
signifying the ontological oneness between God and the world. He quotes ʿAlī Wafāʾ on 
this point and writes as follows:  
 
With regard to [the meaning of] the hadith, ‘When I [God] love him, I am 
his hearing with which he hears […]’, in accordance with ʿAlī Wafāʾ’s 
statement, it does not concern the existential occurrence [of God becoming 
his hearing] in actual fact (ḥudūth fī nafs al-amr). If this were the case, it [i.e. 
God becoming a servant’s hearing] would be through His essence [which is 
                                                                                                                                          
servant’s sight, hearing and so on. According to him, this contradicts the very principle of the 
oneness of existence (See Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿa fatāwā, vol. 2, 245).  
    In Ibn Taymiyya’s view, the hadith in question should rather be taken to mean that God 
comes to love a servant when he practises all religious duties and supererogatory actions, so 
much so that ‘he comes to know things through [the order of] God, act through [the order of] 
God, hear, sees, and strikes through [the order of] of God’. By interpreting the hadith in this 
way, Ibn Taymiyya believes that one can avoid the implication of literal unificationism between 
God and a servant, thereby disproving the tenet of the oneness of existence [Ibn Taymiyya, 
Majmūʿa fatāwā, vol. 8, 204].  
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illogical, as the divine essence is absolutely incomparable to creation].327 
    Rather, the hadith means that the attainment of [His] love is based on 
(murattab) a visionary thing (kawn shuhūdī); [that is to say,] it [i.e. God 
becoming his hearing] has to occur as being based on a visionary order 
(tartīb shuhūdī), rather than through existential confirmation (taqrīr 
wujūdī).328 
 
There are two important implications in the above passage. Firstly, as the first paragraph 
indicates, al-Shaʿrānī rejects the monistic view that God literally becomes identical with 
a servant’s hearing and that this represents the actual situation of the world. Secondly, 
and further to this idea, al-Shaʿrānī insists that the hadith only concerns a mystic’s 
visionary experience. Therefore, his understanding of the hadith is that by experiencing 
God’s unity as a visionary, perceptual truth, rather than ontological, a mystic feels that 
God becomes as if He is his hearing and so on, thereby attaining His love for him.  
                                                
327 This expression ‘for if this were the case, it would be through essence’ appears in 
al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya and al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā, but not in al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya. 
328  al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 193-194; al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fol. 99a-b; 
al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā, 317. To this passage, al-Shaʿrānī adds the following comment: 
 
This is similar to what God said in revelation, ‘No message comes from their Lord 
anew (muḥdath)’ [Q. 21:2]. The intention of this report is that it [His revelation] is 
newly originated in terms of its descent to His creatures (muḥdath al-nuzūl), but [it 
is] not [newly originated] as existence [for it existed pre-eternally as the divine 
speech] (lā muḥdath al-wujūd). This [meaning] is similar to [that of] the following 
expression, ‘One evening a visitor happened to us (ḥadatha)’. The expression is 
[true] despite the fact that the visitor is more than a hundred years old [that is to say, 
that which is newly originated is his visit to us, but not the visitor’s existence itself] 
[al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 194; al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fols. 99b]. 
 
Similarly to the idea of divine revelation, which is pre-eternal, and a visitor who is aged, 
al-Shaʿrānī believes that, based on the notion of experiential oneness, God becoming a servant’s 
hearing does not actually occur as a temporally originated being; rather, the situation was 
always like this, and the servant only needs to perceive it through mystical experience. Within 
this context, the hadith in question means that when God loves a servant and becomes his 
hearing, it is imperative that he experiences this situation as a perceptual, visionary truth, rather 
than as the ontological one that Ibn ʿArabī asserts. 
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    Noticeably, al-Shaʿrānī’s interpretation of the hadith here is similar to that of 
al-Taftāzānī. Al-Taftāzānī explains the meaning of the hadith in relation to his 
understanding of the two types of legitimate annihilation (fanāʾ) of a mystic. According 
to him, in the first stage of annihilation, a mystic withdraws from seeing any beings 
other than himself when things visually disappear from his eyes through his 
contemplation of himself. This is followed by the second stage of annihilation, during 
which a mystic contemplates nothing but God, withdrawing from witnessing himself as 
well as from being aware of his external and internal conditions. In this state, he 
becomes completely absorbed in the divine orders. At this second stage of annihilation, 
a mystic loses consciousness of himself until he feels as if God is one with him and He 
becomes as if He is his hearing, yet without this involving the denial of his own 
existence.  
    In al-Taftāzānī’s view, such is the situation described by the hadith in question, 
wherein a mystic feels one with God through his visionary, perceptual experience, but 
this is not the existential truth. As noted in Chapter 1, al-Taftāzānī regards this second 
type of annihilation as being legitimate, because it only concerns a mystic’s psychology. 
In contrast, he condemns yet another form of annihilation, the one wherein the things’ 
realities ontologically disappear as mere illusion, as advocated by Ibn ʿArabī.329  
   Al-Taftāzānī’s position of rejecting monistic teaching while supporting the mystical 
discipline based on the idea of experiential oneness is in accordance with al-Shaʿrānī’s – 
as long as the audience addressed are non-advanced mystics and theologians, rather than 
advanced mystics. As I will show next, al-Shaʿrānī’s treatment of the notion of absolute 
unity further reveals his endeavour of reinterpreting the doctrine of the oneness of 
                                                
329 al-Taftāzānī, Risāla waḥdat al-wujūd, 33. 
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existence as experiential oneness. It also discloses another intriguing similarity between 
al-Shaʿrānī and al-Taftāzānī, as well as al-Taftāzānīs’s disciple al-Biqāʿī.    
 
2.2.2. Experiential Oneness in Absolute Unity (al-waḥda al-muṭlaqa) 
 
    In Chapter 1, I discussed that Ibn Sabʿīn promoted the doctrine of absolute unity 
with the aim of expressing his monistic worldview where there is only God, nothing 
else. I noted that the monistic implication of this tenet was rejected by Ibn ʿArabī’s 
antagonists. Despite this, as I demonstrated in the same chapter, al-Taftāzānī and 
al-Biqāʿī find two meanings in the concept of absolute unity: (1) that which is founded 
on a visionary, perceptual experience (legitimate), and (2) that which relates to the 
ontological reality of the world (heretical). Strikingly, in the texts addressed to 
non-advanced mystics and theologians (especially in al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya and 
al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya), al-Shaʿrānī treats the notion of absolute unity by drawing on a 
similar typology to that of al-Taftāzānī and al-Biqāʿī, whereby al-Shaʿrānī 
simultaneously denies and promotes this teaching.  
    In one of the sections in al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, al-Shaʿrānī explicitly disproves 
the ontological implication of absolute unity. According to him, the exponents of 
absolute unity falsely assume that whatever a person sees in the world is actually God. 
Hence, they boldly declare that nothing exists but God, thereby disregarding the Law 
and the divine orders. In order to refute this teaching, al-Shaʿrānī recounts an episode in 
which he was visited by a Persian mystic.330 The mystic introduced himself by saying 
                                                
330 ‘By Persian mystics,’ it is not clear whether al-Shaʿrānī meant those who were influenced by 
Ibn ʿArabī’s monism, such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-ʿIrāqī (d. 688/1289), Maḥmūd al-Shabistarī (d. 
720/1320-1321), and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī (d. 898-9/1492). 
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that ‘I am God, Iblis, a Prophet, a pig, and everything in existence’. When asked by 
al-Shaʿrānī how he could make such an audacious statement, the mystic answered: ‘For 
every entity derives from God when there was nothing but God, and to Him it returns’. 
Al-Shaʿrānī declared the mystic’s belief to be wrong and contrary to what the people of 
the Sunna hold.331 In his view, the real mystics (ahl al-kashf) firmly believe in the 
existence of both God and His creation. Hence, they should not be confused with this 
kind of heresy ascribed to the advocates of absolute unity.332  
    While objecting to the existential formula of absolute unity (i.e. that everything is 
in reality God), al-Shaʿrānī espouses its legitimate meaning. In al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, 
he quotes several passages from al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya concerning the meaning of 
God’s unity amongst those who declare Him one (muwaḥḥid). To summarise the 
arguments there, the principle definition of God’s unity is that it is ascribed to God 
alone. The implication is that as long as a person relies on human reason, it is 
impossible to attain the understanding of God’s unity and declare Him one. This is 
because assuming its possibility (that human reason can declare divine unity) would 
entail judging God with what He has created (i.e. human reason). This results in 
violating the basic principle of God’s unity as belonging only to Him, which is absurd. 
Therefore, no created being can declare divine unity, as this would undermine the 
definition of God’s unity.333 Consequently, in order to achieve the pure oneness of God, 
He has to declare Himself one, not His creation.334  
    In al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, Ibn ʿArabī relates these passages on the issue of divine 
                                                
331 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 122. 
332 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 120-121. 
333 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 2, 83; al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fols. 
23a-b. 
334 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 2, 93.  
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unity to his ontological worldview – that is, that there is in reality no plurality, and that 
there is only God’s oneness. In his view, no one can declare God’s unity but He, for 
God is the only real being and other beings are nothing but His manifestations. 
    In contrast, and most markedly, in quoting the same section of al-Futūḥāt 
al-Makkiyya, al-Shaʿrānī avoids the passages that would suggest the idea of ontological 
monism and the unification of God’s existence with that of His creation.335 Al-Shaʿrānī 
then comments on the passages which he has carefully selected, thereby helping the 
rational theologians understand the mystics’ ultimate goal; that is to say, the denial of 
plurality and the witnessing of the oneness of God, based on a non-ontological, 
visionary experience. Al-Shaʿrānī’s comment reads as follows: 
 
 While I was writing on this subject [of God’s unity from al-Futūḥāt 
al-Makkiyya], the idea occurred to me that would make the concept of 
denying [the world’s] plurality (nafy al-kathra) and witnessing [divine] 
oneness (shuhūd al-waḥda) more approachable for the rational theologians 
(ahl al-ʿuqūl), who do not walk on the mystics’ path (ṭarīq al-qawm).  
     It [denying plurality and witnessing oneness] means, my brother, that 
you see yourself with God and existent (mawjūd) when nothing else is 
with Him except you; no time, no location, and no creatures are with Him, 
as expressed in ‘There is God, and nothing is with Him’. Then, God 
necessarily finds Himself taking a space (mutaḥayyz) in your mind (waḥm) 
[but not actually in you]. If this [God being present only in a person’s 
                                                
335 For example, ‘you are the loci for My existence’ (antum al-maẓāhir li-ʿaynī) and ‘the 
plurality is nothing but Him’ (mā thumma illā Allāh) are not quoted in al-Shaʿrānī’s text. See 
Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 2, 83; al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fol. 23b. 
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mind] is the case, there is no [ontological] incarnation and no unification 
between God and His creation. This is the stage of the Lord and His 
servant alone, nothing else.336  
 
As the above passage shows, for al-Shaʿrānī, when a mystic completes his mystical path, 
he reaches a state wherein he sees nothing but God’s oneness, all the while being aware 
of his existence with Him. Al-Shaʿrānī explains this situation as occurring in the 
mystic’s mind alone, without entailing the ontological notions of incarnationism and 
unificationism. Thus, the mystical experience of denying the world’s plurality and 
witnessing divine oneness is a representation of his perception, not actual reality. 
    Following this comment, al-Shaʿrānī further explains his understanding of denying 
plurality and witnessing oneness, by focusing on the difference between those who are 
mystics and those who are not. According to him, ordinary people can only perceive the 
world’s plurality, whilst being veiled from truly witnessing divine oneness. On the other 
hand, the mystics, through the process of practicing mystical discipline, stop seeing 
things in the world and experience a state wherein nothing remains except the one who 
witnesses God’s oneness (mushāhid; i.e. a mystic) and the One who is witnessed by him 
(mashhūd; i.e. God). Al-Shaʿrānī maintains that this is the furthest a traveler who is 
along the mystical path (sālik) can go in denying the witnessing of plurality and 
achieving divine oneness. Here, al-Shaʿrānī does not assume a sheer rejection of the 
existence of the external world, nor an acceptance of the oneness of existence. In his 
view, the world remains as it is even after a mystical experience, and the essence (ʿayn) 
of the world continues to exist. Therefore, the tenet of denying plurality only signifies a 
                                                
336 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fol. 23b. 
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denial of the world’s beings in his vision and mind.337  
    It is important to notice that al-Shaʿrānī describes this highest stage for the mystics 
as ‘the most holy place of witnessing’ (mashhad aqdas), wherein ‘absolute unity’ 
becomes manifest (tajallī) in a mystic’s heart after he ceases to see things other than 
God.338 His reference to the notion of absolute unity needs close attention. In the 
present context, the doctrine is not employed in the ontological sense of the denial of 
the world’s existence or the absolute unity of God’s existence. Instead, it relates to a 
mystic’s experience of witnessing God alone in his heart, during which the world’s 
entities disappear from his sight, although they continue to exist in reality.  
    In order to further elucidate the meaning of absolute unity in this context, 
al-Shaʿrānī adduces the example of a father grieving the loss of his son. In his 
devastation, the father does not notice when someone visits him and sits near him from 
early morning to midday. Sometime later, when the father has somewhat recovered, he 
finds the guest and asks him why he was so late to come see him. The guest tells him 
that he had been sitting at the entrance to his home from the early morning, yet 
remained unnoticed. The father replies that he did not see his guest because of his 
distress and grief, even though there was nothing wrong with his eyesight and he was 
roaming in and out of the room during this time.339  
    After narrating this episode, al-Shaʿrānī notes that this is the best he can say to the 
rational theologians (aṣḥāb al-ʿuqūl), who do not follow the mystical path, about the 
denial of seeing plurality. He argues that, at this stage of mystical experience, the 
mystics may declare that ‘I witness nothing but God’, which should not be taken to 
                                                
337 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fol. 24a. 
338 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fol. 24a. 
339 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fol. 24a. 
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mean the rejection of the world’s existence and its properties (aḥkām) altogether.340 For 
al-Shaʿrānī, the mystics’ psychological and visionary state makes them temporarily 
unaware of anything other than God’s oneness. However, this does not concern the real 
situation of the world.  
    The above analysis confirms al-Shaʿrānī’s approval of the notion of absolute unity 
by understanding it as a perceptual experience in a person’s mind. At the same time, he 
disproves the concept of absolute unity as attesting to the existential reality of the world. 
It is thus clear that, as far as his texts written for non-advanced mystics and theologians 
are concerned, al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to mystical experience differs from that of Ibn 
ʿArabī. On Ibn ʿArabī’s part, in the process of completing a mystical path, it is 
necessary for a mystic to realise that God is the only real existence and that the world is 
merely His manifestation, thereby experiencing the oneness of God’s existence and the 
ontological disappearance of the world’s plurality.  
    In contrast to this position, al-Shaʿrānī associates a mystic’s goal of witnessing 
oneness and denying plurality with a visionary state, wherein he sees God alone while 
being veiled from seeing other beings. In this sate, nothing is existentially lost. And 
when his sensation comes back, he starts to see things again. This is no other than the 
expression of the oneness of witnessing, or experiential oneness. As I have shown in the 
analysis so far, in order to reinforce this interpretive method, al-Shaʿrānī selectively 
quotes passages from al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya. Most prominently, he recontextualises 
the chosen passages by commenting on them in his own words, whereby he remarkably 
reinterprets Ibn ʿArabī’s oneness of existence as experiential oneness. These intellectual 
efforts are not seen amongst al-Shaʿrānī’s teachers and colleagues, who adopt a similar 
                                                
340 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fol. 24a. 
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stance on Ibn ʿArabī’s worldview but do not engage with the interpretation of or even a 
reference to his actual statements. In this regard, al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to Ibn ʿArabī 
exhibits his theological uniqueness, establishing him as one of the earliest proponents of 
this reading method. Furthermore, our analysis here exposes a careful methodology and 
systematicity that al-Shaʿrānī applies in his defence of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings.  
    Although al-Shaʿrānī does not refer to al-Taftāzānī and al-Biqāʿī in his discussions 
on the principle of absolute unity, as we have seen, his approach is much like theirs; by 
taking two approaches to the notion of absolute unity, al-Shaʿrānī, al-Taftāzānī, and 
al-Biqāʿī endorse its experiential meaning, but reject its ontological implication. Despite 
this, their goals are clearly different. Whereas al-Taftāzānī and al-Biqāʿī associate the 
ontological tenet of absolute unity with Ibn ʿArabī, accusing him of upholding this 
teaching, al-Shaʿrānī rather ascribes the perceptual, visionary (and hence legitimate) 
meaning of absolute unity to Ibn ʿArabī. Al-Shaʿrānī then maintains that Ibn ʿArabī 
should not be condemned, because his worldview is only based on the idea of 
experiential oneness. 
 
2.2.3. Ibn ʿArabī’s Opponents on Experiential Oneness: Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya 
 
      With regard to the classification of mystical discipline into two types, which was 
widely shared by Ibn ʿArabī’s adversaries as well as by his supporters, in what follows, 
I further consider a position of yet another opponent of Ibn ʿArabī; namely, Ibn 
al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya. Previous studies on one of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s famous 
texts – Madālij al-sālikīn, which is a commentary on Manāzil al-sāʾilīn of the Ḥanbalī 
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Sufi, Abū Ismāʿīl al-Anṣārī al-Harawī (d. 481/1089) – vividly describe Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya’s favourable view of moderate Sufis as well as his refutation of the 
monistic mystics.341 Building on the findings provided by Anjum and Schallenbergh, 
this section explains Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s approach to mysticism – his criticism of 
ontological monism and his tolerance of experiential oneness – in relation to the debates 
over Ibn ʿArabī’s notion of the oneness of existence. The examination of this subject 
will add further clarification to the polemical context, which al-Shaʿrānī closely 
engaged with.  
    Preceding al-Taftāzānī by a few decades, the legacy of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s 
attack on heretical mysticism was most probably still felt in al-Shaʿrānī’s period. In 
al-Ajwiba al-marḍiyya, al-Shaʿrānī repeatedly mentions Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s 
critical comments on certain Sufi practices, teachings and remarks, excusing the Sufi 
positions. 342  As discussed in Chapter 1, al-Suyūṭī also references Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya with regard to the latter’s differentiation between a correct, authorised 
meaning of unificationism and a prohibited one, i.e. the one claimed by Ibn ʿArabī and 
his followers. Furthermore, as we shall see in Chapter 5, the Shādhilī Ibrāhīm 
al-Mawāhibī, whose epistle on the idea of God’s with-ness or divine presence 
al-Shaʿrānī quotes in his theological works, makes an interesting reference to Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s classification of legitimate mystics and heretical ones. To put it 
                                                
341 Anjum, ‘Sufism without Mysticism?’, 172-177; Schallenbergh, ‘Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s 
Manipulation,’ 94-120. 
342 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Ajwiba al-marḍiyya, 440, 443, 452-455, 458, 460, 462, 473-474, 477, 
487-512. For example, al-Shaʿrānī excuses the Sufi practices of throwing money into the river 
to focus on God and rubbing salt on the eyelids to stay awake, which were condemned by Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya. Al-Shaʿrānī also defends al-Shiblī’s monistic remark, denounced by Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya, that says ‘the one whose heart is God’. According to al-Shaʿrānī, al-Shiblī 
issued this statement as a comment on the Qurʾānic verse 50:37, understanding it as an 
abbreviation of ‘the one whose heart is [supported] by God’. See al-Shaʿrānī, al-Ajwiba 
al-marḍiyya, 452. For al-Shiblī’s own explanation of his statement, see Avery, Shiblī, 21. 
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briefly here, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya admits the possibility that the mystics experience 
divine presence (or ‘divine with-ness’, as we shall see later) in their heart as a result of 
remembering God and drawing near to Him. In his view, the mystical state of divine 
presence is acceptable, as long as the mystics remain conscious of the distinction 
between the pre-eternal God and temporally originated beings. If the situation is taken 
as representing the ontological reality, their position will become the same as that of the 
heretical advocates of the oneness of existence, who repulsively identified God with the 
world.343 These observations suggest that al-Shaʿrānī was aware to a certain extent of 
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s view on the two types of mystical discipline.  
    Let us now turn to the analysis of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s own text. In Madālij 
al-sālikīn, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya castigates the position of ‘the proponents of the 
oneness of existence’ and ‘the exponents of unificationism’ by perceiving their tenet of 
divine oneness as signifying both ontological and experiential truths. With regard to this, 
he writes as follows: 
 
There is a difference between denying a thing its existence at an intellectual, 
visionary level (wujūd ʿilmī shuhūdī) and at an external, existential level 
(wujūd khārijī ʿaynī) […]. As for the exponents of the oneness of existence, 
their intention is that the presence of synthesis and existence (ḥaḍrat al-jamʿ 
wa-l-wujūd)344 refuses pluralisation (takaththur) and delimitation (taqyīd) 
both in witnessing and existence (fī l-shuhūd wa-l-wujūd) – so much so that 
nothing remains except the reality that the object of knowledge (maʿrūf), 
                                                
343 Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Wābil al-ṣayyib, 157-159. 
344 The expression ‘synthesis and existence’ is associated with al-Qūnawī who views it as 
belonging to the higher stage on his mystical path. See Tod, The Sufi Doctrine, 32. 
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knowledge (maʿrifa), and the knower (ʿārif) are one and the same thing 
(ʿayn wāḥid, i.e. God) […]. Then they arrive at what lies behind the veil, 
that is, witnessing absolute unity (al-waḥda al-muṭlaqa) without any 
delimitation (qayd) and attribution (waṣf).345  
 
As the above passage shows, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya distinguishes the denial of the 
existence of worldly beings on a visionary level from that on an existential level. That is 
to say, in his view, it is possible to assume the denial of the thing’s existence 
perceptually in a person’s mind, but not ontologically. Despite this, the exponents of the 
oneness of existence claim the rejection of the world’s plurality in both an existential 
and a visionary sense, thereby espousing the doctrine of absolute unity (wherein there is 
only God, and nothing else). According to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, this amounts to 
identifying God with creation and denying Him as the Lord of the world, which is 
downright heretical.346  
    Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya further censures the advocates of the oneness of existence 
by associating their mystical state of annihilation with the ontological tenet of absolute 
unity. He writes:  
 
With regard to ‘annihilation from any other beings except God’s existence’ 
(fanāʾ al-wujūd al-siwā), this is heretical annihilation advocated by the 
proponents of the oneness of existence. It means that there is nothing but 
God and that the ultimate state of the mystics and the travelers is to 
annihilate themselves in absolute unity (al-waḥda al-muṭlaqa), that is to say, 
                                                
345 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Madārij al-sālikīn, 115. 
346 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Madārij al-sālikīn, 116. 
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to deny plurality and pluralisation in existence by all means. Hence, they 
only see God, nothing else; rather, they see the existence of His creation the 
same as being His existence; or rather, in their view, there is neither the 
Lord nor the servants in reality.347  
 
Thus for Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, the proponents of the oneness of existence are 
condemnable, as they understand their experience of annihilation as representing the 
ontological reality of the world, thereby refusing the world’s plurality at an existential 
level. As a result, they identify God with creation and deny any distinction between the 
divine and the world.  
    Following the argument of the above quotation, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 
intriguingly separates the heretical notion of annihilation from the excusable one, 
describing the latter as ‘annihilation from witnessing nothing but God’ (fanāʾ al-shuhūd 
al-siwā). As Anjum points out, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s opinion on the latter type of 
annihilation is mixed. With regard to this, Anjum writes: 
 
The normative judgment of this type of annihilation is mixed: it is praised 
for love, fear, hope, reliance, and attention, inner and outer, towards God 
that it entails, and blamed for the loss of reason and distinction that it entails. 
More specifically, this type of annihilation may have one or two causes: 
either the weakness of the recipient (ḍuʿf al-mawrūf), caused by the 
overwhelming power of the experience (quwwat al-wārid), which is 
excusable, or the loss of knowledge and normative distinction, which is 
                                                




In Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s view, annihilation from witnessing nothing but God, 
which was supported by many of the late Sufis, means the mystics’ being unconscious 
of themselves temporarily so that they can contemplate God alone, yet without 
involving a denial of the existence of worldly beings. In this mystical state, the mystics 
remain aware of the ontological difference between God and creation.  
    It bears reiterating here that, while Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya decries the ontological 
notion of annihilation as entailing the tenet of absolute unity or the oneness of existence, 
he does not deem the experiential notion of annihilation, which is only concerned with 
an individual’s perception and vision, as heretical in itself. 349  For Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya, an upholder of what can be described as experiential annihilation is 
excusable (maʿdhūr) due to his weakness of mind (ḍuʿf qalb-hu), unlike a proponent of 
the oneness of existence who heretically promotes what can be called existential 
annihilation – even though experiential annihilation is regarded a deficient and 
unnecessary state for those who walk on the path of God (sālikīn).350  
    Thus in Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s view, the mystical discipline is accepted, if not 
praised, inasmuch as it is related to the attainment of experiential, perceptual knowledge, 
which does not entail any ontological implications. According to Anjum, by classifying 
the concept of annihilation in this manner (existential and hence heretical, versus 
experiential and therefore tolerable), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya aims to place al-Anṣārī – 
whose statements a monistic mystic, al-Tilimsānī, interpreted as preaching monism – in 
                                                
348 Anjum, ‘Sufism without Mysticism?,’ 174-175. 
349 Anjum, ‘Sufism without Mysticism?,’ 184.  
350 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Madārij al-sālikīn, 117. See also Anjum, ‘Sufism without 
Mysticism?,’ 174.  
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the camp of ‘testimonial’ (shuhūdī), rather than monistic (wujūdī) mystics, and to 
understand al-Anṣārī’s mysticism within the context of epistemology, rather than 
ontology.351 This is a framework that al-Shaʿrānī was most likely aware of.  
    In addition to these two types, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya further identifies another, 
third type of annihilation, that is, ‘annihilation from willing anything except what God 
wills’ (fanāʾ ʿan irādat al-siwā). It allows a mystic’s will to become one with God’s 
(ittiḥād), making him an obedient servant who performs only what God wills. 
According to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, this state is attainable by the elitist friends of 
God (khawāṣṣ al-awliyāʾ).352  
    There is little doubt that Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s argument on mystical 
annihilation is borrowed from his teacher, Ibn Taymiyya, who similarly classifies it into 
three types.353 According to Ibn Taymiyya, the first and correct type of annihilation is 
imposed by God and is defined as a withdrawal from obeying and relying on anything 
except God and His orders. He regards this annihilation as signifying the true meaning 
of God’s unity. 
    The second type of annihilation, less perfect than the first one, is upheld by most of 
the Sufis. It means to annihilate oneself from witnessing anything other than God. In 
this state, they cease to see any difference between God and His creation; however, as 
soon as their reason returns after this experience, their realisation of fundamental 
difference between God and the world also comes back into their mind. This stage 
corresponds to what I earlier described as the notion of experiential oneness. Admitting 
                                                
351 Anjum, ‘Sufism without mysticism,’ 176-177. See also Schallenbergh, ‘Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya’s Manipulation,’ 97-100. 
352 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Madārij al-sālikīn, 124-125.  
353 The passages are translated in Michot, ‘Textes spirituels,’ 6-9. See also Bori, ‘Ibn 
Taymiyya,’ 108-110; Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya, 62-63. 
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a certain benefit (faḍīla) to this annihilation (or experiential annihilation) in the sense 
that the mystic’s heart is fully focused on God, Ibn Taymiyya is also concerned about 
its deficiency; it makes the mystic dismissive of the distinction between God and the 
world or between divine command and prohibition even temporarily. For this reason, 
the second type of annihilation is not recommended. Nevertheless, like Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya, Ibn Taymiyya considers the mystics’ weakness and incapability to 
perceive the difference between the divine and creation at this stage of annihilation to 
be excusable (maʿdhūr).354  
    The third type of annihilation is endorsed by the exponents of the oneness of 
existence and unificationism, i.e. Ibn ʿArabī and his followers. It is defined as 
annihilating oneself from any existence except God, which results in the belief that the 
world’s existence is ontologically identical with that of God. For Ibn Taymiyya, this is a 
heretical notion of annihilation (or ontological annihilation) and utterly unacceptable.355  
    Thus, building on the tripartite classification of annihilation, both Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya and Ibn Taymiyya tolerate – if not approve of wholeheartedly – the mystics 
who uphold experiential oneness, which is associated with the second type of 
experiential annihilation, attributing their mystical state to the weakness of mind. At the 
same time, the two scholars harshly denounce the mystics who advocate the oneness of 
existence, which is represented by the third type of ontological annihilation. Their 
position coincides with that of al-Taftāzānī and al-Biqāʿī, who similarly sanction 
unificationism and annihilation inasmuch as they are concerned with one’s perception 
                                                
354 According to Ibn al-Ahdal’s report, Ibn Taymiyya regards the second type of annihilation, 
which is only upheld by some Sufis, as being deficient and unnecessary. Interestingly, Ibn 
al-Ahdal does not mention here Ibn Taymiyya’s view that this annihilation is excusable. Ibn 
al-Ahadl, Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ, 123; Bori, ‘Ibn Taymiyya,’ 109-110. 
355 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿa fatāwā, vol. 2, 224; Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vols. 1-3, 96-97.  
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and experience, all the while denying these notions when they are related to the 
existential reality.  
    Strikingly, al-Shaʿrānī adopts the same typology in drawing a line between 
experiential and authentic (or ‘excusable’ in the eyes of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya) mystics and ontological and heretical ones. It is clear that al-Shaʿrānī’s 
objective is to place Ibn ʿArabī in the camp of experiential mysticism, rather than 
ontological mysticism, and in this regard, his position is fundamentally different from 
that of Ibn ʿArabī’s detractors. Nevertheless, considering that Ibn ʿArabī’s supporters, 
such as al-Suyūṭī or Ibrāhīm al-Matbūlī (as will be discussed in Chapter 5), refer to Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s way of differentiating existential from experiential mysticism, it 
is likely that the dichotomous framework employed by Ibn ʿArabī’s opponents prior to 
al-Shaʿrānī urged him to present Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings using the same framework.  
    Our findings here tell us that Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s approach to mysticism can 
be understood within the polemical context of Ibn ʿArabī. They also indicate that, as the 
controversies on Ibn ʿArabī continued, his supporters came to internalise the discourse 
of his critics. Hence, al-Shaʿrānī’s reading method was aptly formulated in response to 





    In this chapter, I have argued that, contrary to the currently agreed upon view of 
al-Shaʿrānī as an uncritical apologist for Ibn ʿArabī, there is a certain systematicity in 
his defence of Ibn ʿArabī; namely, he presents Ibn ʿArabī as an advocate of experiential 
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oneness. Although al-Shaʿrānī’s teachers and contemporaries, whom I discussed in 
Chapter 1, uphold a similarly interpretive approach, his position is especially 
remarkable in that he meticulously reinterprets Ibn ʿArabī’s passages by 
recontextualising them. This establishes al-Shaʿrānī’s prominence as one of the earliest 
proponents of reading the oneness of existence as experiential oneness, and indeed one 
of the precursors of Sirhindī’s oneness of witnessing.  
    Moreover, this chapter detailed certain similarities in thought between al-Shaʿrānī 
and Ibn ʿArabī’s most famous adversaries in the fifteenth and sixteenth-centuries – 
al-Taftāzānī, al-Biqāʿī, and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, the teachings of whom al-Shaʿrānī 
was most probably familiar with – over their employment of the typology of 
experiential/ authentic (or excusable at least) and ontological/heretical mysticism. I did 
this by focusing on their approach to the hadith of ‘when I love him’, the tenet of 
absolute unity, and the notion of annihilation. As I have shown, similarly to al-Suyūṭī, 
Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī, and Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, al-Shaʿrānī adopts the spectrum of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s adversaries and converts it into another model, thereby placing Ibn ʿArabī in 
the group of authentic mystics. Al-Shaʿrānī’s arguments in defence of Ibn ʿArabī are 
thus carefully conceived in relation to the intellectual milieu of his period. This analysis 
greatly contributes to our understanding of al-Shaʿrānī’s engagement with other 
scholars, about which we have so far known so little.  
    Most markedly, the finding of this chapter (that al-Shaʿrānī reinterprets Ibn 
ʿArabī’s mystical teachings as being founded on a visionary, rather than ontological, 
experience) is pertinent to the central question of this thesis – that is, al-Shaʿrānī’s 
approach to the issue of the anthropomorphic attributes of God, and most importantly, 
his integration of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought into his own mystical and theological worldview. 
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I will discuss this subject in Chapter 4.  
    As we shall see in the subsequent chapters, many of al-Shaʿrānī’s theological 
works are dedicated to clarifying Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings, while at the same time 
suppressing their ontological and monistic implications. If al-Shaʿrānī’s works indeed 
helped spread Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, it must have been this approach of reading the 
oneness of existence as experiential oneness that enabled the latter’s ideas to be widely 
accepted in the Arabic speaking world. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean 
that al-Shaʿrānī was entirely dismissive of Ibn ʿArabī’s monistic worldview. I will show 
in the next chapter that al-Shaʿrānī in fact supports the ontological doctrines of Ibn 






















Chapter 3  
The Ontology of God’s Self-Manifestation and Immutable Entities 
 
    In Chapter 2, I argued that, when addressing non-advanced mystics and 
theologians, al-Shaʿrānī reads Ibn ʿArabī’s oneness of existence as experiential oneness 
in order to defend the latter’s thought. As I mentioned, this does not necessarily mean 
al-Shaʿrānī’s complete rejection of Ibn ʿArabī’s monistic worldview. Interestingly, as 
long as the intended audience is advanced mystics, al-Shaʿrānī openly supports the tenet 
of the oneness of existence and other monistic theories related to it. On the other hand, 
in his texts for non-advanced mystics and theologians, al-Shaʿrānī presents one of the 
controversial teachings of Ibn ʿArabī’s ontology, that is, the theory of the immutable 
entities, in a way that does not entail any ontological implications. 
    In order to illuminate his multi-faceted stance on Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, this chapter 
concerns two subjects. Firstly, I set out to investigate al-Shaʿrānī’s endorsement of the 
doctrine of the oneness of existence and the theory of ontological divine 
self-manifestation as discussed in al-Mīzān al-dharriyya. It needs to be remembered 
that this text is addressed to advanced mystics who are ready to accept Ibn ʿArabī’s 
ontological monism, and not to non-advanced mystics who are unprepared for it. In this 
chapter, I will examine al-Shaʿrānī’s treatment of the ontology of God’s 
self-manifestation. This is distinguished from his approach to the non-ontological, 
visionary aspect of God’s self-manifestation at a perceptual level, which I will discuss 
in Chapter 4. 
    As I will show shortly, al-Shaʿrānī does not try to develop Ibn ʿArabī’s theory of 
ontological divine self-manifestation, nor does he differ from it. Nevertheless, it is 
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important to discuss this subject, as it has barely been examined. The existing scholarly 
consensus is that al-Shaʿrānī was not interested in Ibn ʿArabī’s monistic worldview. For 
example, Trimingham clearly stated that al-Shaʿrānī had no pantheistic leanings and no 
thought of God as immanent in His creation.356 This seems to have inhibited further 
scholarly interest in the subject. However, by examining al-Mīzān al-dharriyya – which 
remains largely unstudied357 – I will argue that al-Shaʿrānī in fact upholds Ibn ʿArabī’s 
monistic teachings for advanced mystics. Considering al-Shaʿrānī’s reinterpretation of 
the oneness of existence as experiential oneness, this argument will highlight his 
flexibility in terms of his reception of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought.  
    As the second thread of the chapter, I turn to examine al-Shaʿrānī’s view of the 
immutable entities. In Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, the theory of the immutable entities is 
closely related to the structure of ontological divine self-manifestation, according to 
which God manifests Himself in the world’s beings following what has been 
predetermined by each immutable entity from eternity. In the current chapter, I will 
draw attention to al-Shaʿrānī’s presentation of the immutable entities in his texts written 
for non-advanced mystics and theologians; namely, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir and 
al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya. As I discussed in Chapter 1, al-Shaʿrānī avoids referring to Ibn 
ʿArabī’s ontology in these works. Despite this, al-Shaʿrānī endorses the idea of the 
immutable entities in them, by presenting it not within the context of ontological 
discipline but in relation to theological arguments.  
    The significance of investigating this topic is that not only does it remain 
uninvestigated in modern scholarship, but it also situates al-Shaʿrānī’s arguments in 
context. As we shall see, his discussions of the immutable entities are offered in some 
                                                
356 Trimingham, The Sufi Orders, 223. See also Winter, Society and Religion, 128. 
357 The text is mentioned in passing in El-Rouayheb, ‘Heresy and Sufism,’ 365-367. 
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parts as responses to the criticisms submitted by such scholars as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn 
al-Ahdal. Furthermore, it will underline al-Shaʿrānī’s innovative treatment of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s thought in relation to theological discourse. Thus, as in Chapter 2, the study 
will contribute to contextualising al-Shaʿrānī’s reception of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings 
within the contemporary polemics and to demonstrating the uniqueness of al-Shaʿrānī’s 
intellectual efforts of presenting Ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism to a wider audience.  
    Most importantly, building on the findings of Chapter 2, our observation in this 
chapter will show that al-Shaʿrānī’s reception of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought needs multiple 
analyses. In this regard, the study will disprove previous studies’ reductive assessment 
claiming that al-Shaʿrānī was as an uncritical, self-contradicting apologist for Ibn 
ʿArabī.358  
 
3.1. Al-Shaʿrānī on the Ontology of God’s Self-Manifestation 
 
    In this section, based on analysis of al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, I aim to expose 
al-Shaʿrānī’s acceptance of the doctrine of the oneness of existence for advanced 
mystics. This is approached by elucidating al-Shaʿrānī’s reception of the ontology of 
God’s self-manifestation. Constructing his view on this topic is a difficult task, as his 
discussions of it are very brief and are scattered throughout his work.  
    I begin by considering al-Shaʿrānī’s view of God’s oneness in the process of His 
self-manifestation, then go on to detail his understanding of the relation between God 
and the world. Al-Shaʿrānī’s arguments are based on the dialogues that took place 
between him and his Sufi teacher, ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ. Since al-Shaʿrānī does not show 
                                                
358 Winter, Society and Religion, 127-129, 233-235. 
 158 
any disagreement with his teacher’s remarks (he rather accepts them as his own views 
and comments on them if necessary), I treat the discourse in what follows as 
al-Shaʿrānī’s own opinions, even though some of the statements are attributed to ʿAlī 
al-Khawwāṣ. 
 
3.1.1. God’s Oneness in His Self-Manifestation  
 
    Al-Shaʿrānī expresses his support for the ontology of divine self-manifestation in 
the section entitled, ‘a section with respect to questions on the knowledge of God’s 
unity as I heard them from my teacher [ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ], and I have never heard 
anything like them from other mystics’. This is one of the longest sections in al-Mīzān 
al-dharriyya.359 It starts with a conversation between al-Shaʿrānī and ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ 
which goes as follows: 
 
I asked him [ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ] about the meaning of the hadith, ‘Our Lord 
descends to the world’s heaven every night’. And he said to me as follows: 
‘God is the all-knowing by virtue of His essence (bi-nafsihi) and we only 
need to have faith in the report’. Then I said to him: ‘I want a clearer 
explanation’. Then he said to me: ‘When God wished to manifest Himself in 
the delimited image (ṣūrat al-taqyīd) which is described as “descent”, He 
epitomised (ikhtaṣara) His exclusive oneness (aḥadiyya) from His essence 
to become the all-comprehensive image (ṣūra jāmiʿa) that is the totality of 
                                                
359 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 125-151. Some of the statements that are introduced as 
those of ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ actually correspond to passages of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya. 
Considering that ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ was illiterate, it is highly probable that al-Shaʿrānī composed 
the section by combining ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ’s words with the quotations of Ibn ʿArabī.  
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what is contained in His non-delimited essence (dhāt muṭlaqa). And He put 
down this image within His light, and that was the image in which Adam 
was created. When He goes up from this descent, He returns to the 
non-delimited essence’.360   
 
The passage implies that there are two possible interpretations of the hadith on God’s 
descent to the world’s heaven. Based on a traditionalist approach, one of them is simply 
to have faith in the prima facie sense of the report without questioning what it really 
means. As we shall see in Chapter 4, this reading is recommended for non-advanced 
mystics who are not prepared for the other, hidden interpretation, which is only 
approachable by advanced mystics. The second answer issued by ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ, 
when al-Shaʿrānī asked him for a clearer explanation, is addressed to advanced mystics. 
It takes God’s descent to mean that God who is at the level of exclusive oneness 
manifests Himself in the all-comprehensive image, which can be identified as the image 
of inclusive oneness, and then manifests Himself in the image of His creation, starting 
with Adam. 
    When I discussed Ibn ʿArabī’s ontology of God’s self-manifestation in Chapter 1, I 
explained the difference between exclusive oneness (aḥadiyya) and inclusive oneness 
(wāḥidiyya). Al-Shaʿrānī upholds these two notions in the same manner as Ibn ʿArabī. 
In al-Shaʿrānī’s words, exclusive oneness is a term to describe the non-delimited reality 
of God’s essence which excludes any relationship to the world’s beings. Inclusive 
oneness, on the other hand, is an expression for the delimited reality of God as the 
object of the creatures’ worship (ilāh). It is called delimited, because God as the object 
                                                
360 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 125-126. 
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of worship is only manifest through the relationships between the Lord and the servants, 
the Creator and the creatures, and so on.361  
    Al-Shaʿrānī believes that when God at the level of exclusive oneness manifests 
Himself to Himself, He becomes manifest at the level of inclusive oneness, which is 
attributed with the realities of all contingent beings that have the possibility of coming 
into existence. When God manifests Himself at the level of inclusive oneness, Adam, 
the first human being, is created in this image of God, and God sees His perfect image 
manifested in him. The above passage thus demonstrates al-Shaʿrānī’s reception of a 
worldview based on the ontology of God’s self-manifestation. He holds that this is 
composed of the level of exclusive oneness – which is also called the level of 
non-delimitation (iṭlāq) –, and the level of inclusive oneness – which is also identified 
as the level of delimitation (taqyīd).362  
    Al-Shaʿrānī does not refer to the term ‘the oneness of existence’ in any of his 
works of theology. However, in contrast to what previous studies on him maintain, my 
analysis shows that he certainly upholds this doctrine. For example, in the same section 
on questions about the knowledge of God’s unity, he encapsulates ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ’s 
teaching by stating that ‘There is nothing in existence but God’ (mā fi al-wujūd illā 
Allah). 363  The same remark is occasionally issued by Ibn ʿArabī in al-Futūḥāt 
al-Makkiyya in relation to his tenet of the oneness of existence.364 Here, al-Shaʿrānī 
explains the meaning of ‘There is nothing in existence but God’ with the example of a 
mirror. In it, God is compared to one who stands in front of a mirror, while the world is 
likened to the image of God reflected in the mirror. The implication of this metaphor is 
                                                
361 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 147.  
362 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 157-159. 
363 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 130. 
364 See Chittick, The Sufi Path, 94-96.  
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that only God exists while the world as His image does not. Intriguingly, al-Shaʿrānī 
further interprets the hadith, ‘There was God and nothing was with Him’, through the 
monistic statement that goes: ‘There is no reality in existence except God, and what is 
perceived as plurality is His manifestations and His properties’.365 These examples 
show that, in al-Shaʿrānī’s view, the world’s beings are only manifest as the divine loci 
and are deprived of concrete, independent existence; consequently, there is nothing but 
one reality in the cosmos, which is God.  
    Al-Shaʿrānī’s explanation of the inception of God’s self-manifestation also attests 
to his espousal of the oneness of existence. According to al-Shaʿrānī, when God at the 
level of exclusive oneness wishes to manifest Himself, He finds His non-delimited 
reality to be divided into two: the one who looks at Himself and the one who is looked 
at. At this stage, God comes to be attributed with His attributes. When He wishes to 
manifest these attributes, He manifests Himself in the world’s beings. Thus the world is 
the manifested image of God and His attributes. Nonetheless, existence is ultimately 
one that is God, and it only becomes many through the manifestations of His 
attributes.366 Here, it is worth taking note that al-Shaʿrānī ascribes the beginning of the 
divine self-manifestation to God’s wish to be manifested. This is a reminder of the 
hadith widely used by Sufis, ‘I [God] was a hidden treasure and I wished to be known.’ 
Ibn ʿArabī, for example, uses the hadith in support of his ontological worldview.367 
                                                
365 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 130. Al-Shaʿrānī’s approach in al-Mīzān al-dharriyya 
contrasts with that of his other works. As El-Rouayheb observes, in al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, 
al-Shaʿrānī interprets a similar statement ascribed to Ibn ʿArabī that goes ‘there is no existent 
other than God (lā mawjūda illā Allāh)’ as follows: ‘there is no self-subsisting entity besides 
God and that all other entities are in need of something, extrinsic, viz. God, to keep them in 
existence’ [El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 239]. Here, al-Shaʿrānī tries to avoid the 
tenet of the oneness of existence. As I have demonstrated in the previous chapters, this is 
al-Shaʿrānī’s stance in the texts for non-advanced mystics, but not in al-Mīzān al-dharriyya. 
366 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 88, 146-147. 
367 Chittick, The Sufi Path, 66-67, 391, no. 14. 
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Al-Shaʿrānī’s indirect reference to the idea expressed in the hadith (i.e. God’s wish to 
manifest Himself) suggests his intention to follow the discourses of this mystical 
cosmology. 
    Along with the ontology of God’s self-manifestation, al-Shaʿrānī supports the 
theory of the perfect man created in the divine image. Following Ibn ʿArabī, he finds the 
primary evidence for this teaching in the hadith ‘God created Adam in His image’ and 
maintains that the most perfect manifestation of God is the perfect man.368 Created in 
the image of God, specifically His inclusive oneness, the perfect man is capable of 
bringing together all of the realities of the world’s beings (majmūʿ al-wujūd).369 
Through his all-encompassing reality, every being is brought into existence, and to him 
they are ascribed.370  
    According to al-Shaʿrānī, there is always one perfect man in each period. He must 
be unique in the cosmos, as it is absurd to assume that two distinctive perfect men can 
arise from one divine image.371 The first perfect man was Adam, the first human being 
on earth. At the moment of his death, he was replaced by another, and the succession of 
the perfect man continues until the day of resurrection.372 The prophet Muḥammad is 
unquestionably viewed as the perfect man of his age, and so is Ibn ʿArabī, whom ʿAlī 
al-Khawwāṣ and al-Shaʿrānī admire as the greatest master.  
                                                
368 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 131-132. 
369 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 135. 
370 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 133-134, 151-152. 
371 If there were two perfect men, there must be a difference between the two individuals 
whether in their attributes or actions in order to distinguish one from another. This assumes that 
one man’s attributes or actions are more perfect than those of the other. In this case, the one 
with less perfect attributes cannot be the perfect man. If they were absolutely identical to each 
other with no difference at all and perfect on the same level, they would not be two distinctive 
individuals but one.   
372  al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 131. According to ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ’s report, the 
Baghdadi mystic Abū Bakr al-Shiblī (d. 334/945) once said: ‘there is nothing but God in my 
cloak.’ Al-Shaʿrānī notes that this remark indicates al-Shiblī’s status as the perfect man of his 
time. See al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 130.  
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    In order to reach the rank of the perfect man, a mystic has to annihilate himself 
(fanāʾ) in the divine self (huwiyya) and come to be attributed with God’s attributes. 
Everything becomes one at this stage of mystical union with God (uṣūl). Despite this 
closeness between God and the perfect man, the perfect man is not identical to God, as 
he is ultimately the image of God and does not possess a reality of his own 
independently of Him. Once again, there is only divine reality, and nothing else exists 
beside Him.373  
    In the above discussion, it is important to note that al-Shaʿrānī employs 
annihilation in the sense of a mystic’s effacing his reality in divine essence in order to 
attain the oneness of God’s absolute reality. As we saw in Chapter 2, this is a kind of 
annihilation that the aforementioned opponents of Ibn ʿArabī denied as existential and 
heretical. Nevertheless, al-Shaʿrānī endorses the concept in al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 
because the text’s readership is advanced mystics, rather than non-advanced mystics 
and theologians who may not understand such a mystical view.   
    In a different section of al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, al-Shaʿrānī mentions the idea of 
‘the immutable entities’ (aʿyān thābita), the theory that plays a central role in Ibn 
ʿArabī’s ontology of divine self-manifestation. In this work, al-Shaʿrānī only passingly 
refers to the teaching with the objective of refuting the thesis of the world’s eternity. 
According to him, the immutable entities are possible beings that are pre-eternally 
known to God in their state of non-existence, and they are in want of God’s bestowal of 
existence upon them. In this regard, the immutable entities are His servants from 
eternity, prior to the divine creation, and God is their Lord for eternity. The world is 
therefore considered pre-eternal in the divine knowledge but temporally originated in 
                                                
373 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 132, 138, 146. 
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the external world.374 Although al-Mīzān al-dharriyya does not explore this theory any 
more than what I have just explained, more details on it are discussed in the texts for 
non-advanced mystics and theologians. I will return to this topic later in the chapter.  
  
3.1.2. The World in the Image of God 
 
    It is clear by now that al-Shaʿrānī does support the ontological theory of divine 
self-manifestation, along with the doctrine of the oneness of existence and the perfect 
man. As I showed, his presentation of these teachings is very similar to that of Ibn 
ʿArabī. In order to further elucidate al-Shaʿrānī’s endorsement of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
ontological monism and to compare it to his position for non-advanced mystics, in what 
follows, I will focus on al-Shaʿrānī’s treatment of the relationship between God and the 
world.  
    As I have repeatedly mentioned, previous studies on al-Shaʿrānī agree that he tried 
to keep a distance from the monistic teaching of Ibn ʿArabī, as it was harshly criticised 
by the latter’s opponents as heretical. However, the following statement of al-Shaʿrānī, 
in the section entitled ‘with respect to denying God’s being body (jism), substance 
(jawhar), and accident (ʿarad)’ in al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, demonstrates that this thesis is 
not thorough. It reads:  
 
The truth that we have faith in is the all-encompassing nature (ʿumūm) of 
God’s self-manifestation in all of the beings, because His self-manifestation 
only occurs in the image mixed with the world (ṣūrat amzijat al-ʿālam). For 
                                                
374 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 90-91. 
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this reason, many things that are not God were worshipped: a stone, fire, an 
angel, a calf, a tree, stars, and so on. Whoever possesses the scale of the 
Law can distinguish what God permitted and what He did not.375 
 
The above passage shows al-Shaʿrānī’s acceptance of the idea of God’s immanence in 
the world’s beings through the ontology of divine self-manifestation, whereby various 
worldly objects come to be worshipped as gods.  
    Strikingly, Ibn ʿArabī employs a similar argument in Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, Chapter 3, 
in the words of Nūḥ. In it, he expresses the view that God can be manifest in different 
objects in the world, such as a stone or a tree, yet without restricting Himself to these 
particular objects, because He can be in anything.376 As I discussed in Chapter 1, Ibn 
ʿArabī’s opponents, such as al-Biqāʿī, condemned the ostensibly pantheistic view 
expressed here for justifying the idol-worshippers as those who rightly see the divine 
manifestations in the world’s beings. Perhaps in reply to this kind of criticism, 
al-Shaʿrānī tries to downplay this teaching by stating, at the end of the above passage, 
that God’s manifestation in the world’s objects does not necessarily mean that the Law 
permits the worshiping of them.  
    In keeping with the idea of divine self-manifestation in the world’s beings, 
al-Shaʿrānī interprets the hadith, ‘I [God] am his hearing with which he hears and his 
sight with which he hears […]’, as follows:  
 
It is known that he hears through God’s hearing or he hears by virtue of His 
own essence [bi-dhātihi]. Whichever the case might be, God has already 
                                                
375 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 64. 
376 Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 57. 
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made His own self (huwiyya) identical to (ʿayn) the servant’s hearing, sight, 
hand, and foot; whether He intended [being identical to] the servant’s 
essence, his attributes, or his relations [to other beings] (nisba).377 
 
In Chapter 2, I discussed that, addressing non-advanced mystics and theologians, 
al-Shaʿrānī interprets the same hadith as attesting to the idea of experiential oneness, 
whereby God becomes as if He is a mystic’s hearing, not ontologically but only 
perceptually in his mind. In contrast to this, in the above passage for advanced mystics, 
al-Shaʿrānī intriguingly admits the possibility of God’s becoming the servant’s hearing 
and other faculties through His essence. This idea implies the identification of God with 
His creation, which Ibn ʿArabī’s adversaries harshly criticised.  
    However, while interpreting the hadith within the context of the oneness of 
existence, al-Shaʿrānī carefully denies the notion of ontological unificationism (ittiḥād) 
between the essence of God and that of the world. According to him, God is the only 
essence in existence and therefore, there are no other essences in the cosmos that can be 
unified with that of God. Al-Shaʿrānī thus disproves the idea of literal unificationism.378   
    Within this ontological worldview, the distinction between the divine and the 
world only arises through the relationships that God’s essence assumes via His 
attributes. To secure the notion of the absolute oneness of God’s existence, al-Shaʿrānī 
identifies the relationships between the divine attributes and the world as non-existent 
(nisab ʿadamiyya). For example, through His attribute of hearing as is reported in ‘God 
hears those who praise Him’ or His speech in ‘then give him asylum so that he may 
listen to the words of God’ [Q. 9:6], God comes to be distinguished as the Lord to His 
                                                
377 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 77. 
378 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 74-75. 
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servants.379 The world then becomes manifest by being related to the divine attributes 
as their objects, yet without having their own existence. Following this argument, when 
human beings hear and see, it is God who actually hears and sees as the only essence in 
the cosmos; and this is the ultimate reality of this world. 
    Building on the tenet of the oneness of existence, the advanced mystics’ experience 
of divine unity becomes fundamentally different from that of non-advanced mystics. 
Al-Shaʿrānī explains the doctrine of divine unity as upheld by the devoted ones (ṣiddīq, 
who in the context of the discourse are non-advanced mystics) as being based on the 
concept of God’s uniqueness; that is to say, God is unique in that He is distinguished 
through His attribute of ever-lasting life or through His utter incomparability to His 
creation.380 This approach necessarily presupposes the existence of things other than 
God in relation to which He is declared unique. Consequently, this type of divine unity, 
supported by non-advanced mystics, does not involve the ontological doctrine of the 
oneness of existence. 
    In contrast, al-Shaʿrānī explains divine unity as understood by a mystic (ʿārif, who 
in this context is an advanced mystic) as declaring all beings as one by annihilating their 
realities in the divine reality. In their state of annihilation, advanced mystics realise that 
everything is ultimately ascribed to God, as they see attested in the verse ‘indeed to 
your Lord is the return’ [Q. 96:8],381 and that they are not fundamentally different from 
Him. In other words, advanced mystics declare the oneness of God’s essence, whereby 
they deny ontological duality (thanawiyyya) between Him and creation.382 Even after 
they leave this mystical state, the awareness of the distinction between God and the 
                                                
379 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 75-76. 
380 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 148-149. 
381 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 138. 
382 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 138. 
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world only returns to them perceptually (idrākan), not ontologically.383  
    Building on these observations, al-Shaʿrānī describes the situation of worldly 
beings as non-existence that become manifest (ʿadam ẓāhir) in God’s existence through 
His self-manifestation.384 In al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, he does not refer to Ibn ʿArabī’s 
expression ‘He/not He’ (discussed in Chapter 1) to illustrate the intricate relationship 
between God and the world. Nevertheless, as our analysis shows, there can be little 
doubt that al-Shaʿrānī supports the thesis ‘He/not He’ – that is, the world is ‘He’ as the 
image of God, but simultaneously ‘not He’ inasmuch as the world remains merely His 
image. For al-Shaʿrānī, much like Ibn ʿArabī, this worldview is not entirely monistic in 
that the world is given a certain kind of existence as the locus of God. This is not pure 
pantheism either, because the world is not in theory identical to God. 
    I have so far examined al-Shaʿrānī’s arguments in al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 
clarifying his support of Ibn ʿArabī’s ontological worldview. Admittedly, al-Shaʿrānī’s 
presentation of the oneness of existence and the ontology of God’s self-manifestation is 
not as comprehensive and not as detailed as that of Ibn ʿArabī. Nevertheless, 
al-Shaʿrānī’s espousal of these teachings is itself a very important finding. Significantly, 
the evidence gained in this study shows that Winter and Trimingham’s understanding of 
al-Shaʿrānī as being a representative of moderate ascetics, who is not inclined to Ibn 
ʿArabī’s monistic worldview, is flawed.385  
    The relatively early composition of al-Mīzān al-dharriyya – between 
945-951/1538-1545, while many of al-Shaʿrānī’s other works of theology were written 
later – would suggest a change in his doctrinal position in the later period. The 
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following analysis of al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir (composed in 955/1548) and al-Qawāʿid 
al-kashfiyya (written after 961/1553), which concentrates on al-Shaʿrānī’s presentation 
of the theory of the immutable entities, will reveal that his approach to Ibn ʿArabī is 
indeed varied; in these works, he focuses on defending Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching of the 
immutable entities by relating it to certain theological issues, and not to ontological 
teaching.   
  
 
3.2. Immutable Entities and Divine Knowledge 
 
    The objective of this section is to consider al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to the theory of 
the immutable entities in relation to God’s knowledge of His creation. As noted earlier, 
although al-Shaʿrānī only makes a fleeting reference to the notion of the immutable 
entities in al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, in his texts for non-advanced mystics and theologians, 
especially al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir and al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, he discusses the 
subject in more detail. 
    In Ibn ʿArabī’s worldview, the theory of the immutable entities is inseparable from 
the doctrine of God’s ontological, cosmological self-manifestation. For him, it is 
through the immutable entities which are pre-eternally known to God that He becomes 
manifest in the world’s beings. In this regard, the immutable entities are within God, or 
God Himself. As we shall see, some theologians, such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn 
al-Ahdal, attacked the idea of the immutable entities. Ibn Taymiyya, for example, 
maintains that it undermines not only the dogma of God’s creation ex nihilo but also His 
omnipotence and omniscience. Ibn al-Ahdal, on the other hand, believes that the 
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supposition of the immutable entities leads to the heretical idea of the world’s eternity 
as well as to determinism.  
    Considering this, it is worth observing that al-Shaʿrānī endorses the notion of the 
immutable entities in his texts for non-advanced mystics and theologians. However, it 
must be noted that his primary focus in presenting the concept of the immutable entities 
is to defend Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, rather than to elaborate on the ontology of God’s 
self-manifestation based on this teaching. As I will show, al-Shaʿrānī seems to respond, 
although not explicitly, to the accusations raised by Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Ahdal 
against the immutable entities. To this end, al-Shaʿrānī carefully selects palatable 
features of the theory, all the while excluding its problematic perspectives. 
    In order to delineate al-Shaʿrānī’s understanding of the theory of the immutable 
entities to contextualise his arguments as much as possible, this section treats four 
subjects. First, I provide an account of Ibn ʿArabī’s view on the immutable entities. The 
topic has been subject to due scholarly attention.386 Hence, I will focus on some of its 
important features, looking in particular at the thesis stating that the non-existent is a 
thing. I will then examine Ibn ʿArabī’s approach to the verse ‘until We know’ [Q. 
47:31] in relation to God’s knowledge of His creation. The investigation will help us 
understand al-Shaʿrānī’s stance on Ibn ʿArabī in context, highlighting a difference 
between the two. Next, utilising the insights offered by Knysh and Akkach’s studies on 
Ibn Taymiyya, along with my own analysis of Ibn al-Ahdal’s work, I will consider their 
critiques of the theory of the immutable entities, paying special attention to issues such 
as the world’s eternity and divine predestination. In keeping with the findings gained 
                                                
386 See, for example, Izutsu, Sufism, 159-192; Chittick, The Sufi Path, 83-89; Bashier, Ibn 
ʿArabī’s Barzakh, 97-111; Rustom, ‘Philosophical Sufism,’ 401-405; Todd, The Sufi Doctrine 
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there, lastly, this section will consider how al-Shaʿrānī responds to these attacks. In 
particular, I will analyse his interpretation of ‘until We know’. The study will 
demonstrate the extent to which he incorporates Ibn ʿArabī’s arguments and identify 
areas of departure from the latter. The outcome of this examination will also illuminate 
al-Shaʿrānī’s intellectual attempts to treat certain theological issues in the sphere of 
mysticism. 
 
3.2.1. Ibn ʿArabī on Immutable Entities 
 
    As discussed in Chapter 1, Ibn ʿArabī explains divine creation through the process 
of God’s self-manifestation. According to this theory, God, who is the only being, 
manifests Himself in the world’s beings in accordance with what they have 
pre-eternally been in His knowledge. As a general consensus amongst the major 
theologians, God’s knowledge is pre-eternal and does not change – if it did, His 
knowledge would either increase or decrease, which is impossible, as it would entail 
temporal origination or ignorance of His knowledge. Accordingly, the contents of 
God’s knowledge are pre-eternal and are not subject to change either. The unchangeable 
objects of God’s knowledge have the possibility of coming into being by receiving 
existence from Him. Ibn ʿArabī sees these possible beings, which are for eternity 
present in God’s knowledge in their state of non-existence, as immutable entities. In his 
view, it is through the courses of the immutable entities that God manifests Himself in 
the world.   
    According to Ibn ʿArabī, the immutable entities are attributed with pre-eternity as 
the objects of the pre-eternal knowledge of God. Yet their eternity is secondary and 
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dependent on God.387 Only after being given existence through the process of God’s 
self-manifestation do they come to be in the external world, having been in His 
knowledge for eternity. With regard to this, Ibn ʿArabī writes: 
 
Eternity is ascribed to the immutable entities in respect of their presence 
(thubūt) in God’s knowledge [prior to creation], and temporality (ḥudūth) is 
ascribed to them in respect of their existence [in the external world] and 
manifestation [of God] (ẓuhūr).388  
 
In this regard, as Chittick notes, Ibn ʿArabī strikes a middle ground between the Islamic 
philosophers who believe that the world is eternal and the theologians who maintain that 
it is temporally originated.389 Despite this intermediate view, as we shall see later, Ibn 
ʿArabī’s antagonists accused him of upholding the world’s eternity. 
    Ontologically speaking, the immutable entities that are pre-eternally present in the 
divine knowledge stand halfway between existence and pure non-existence.390 This 
means that their non-existence, prior to God’s bestowal of existence, is characterised as 
relative nonexistence (ʿadam iḍāfī). It is called ‘relative’ in the sense that its existence is 
possible. This is contrasted with the absolute nonexistence (ʿadam muṭlaq) of things the 
existence of which is impossible altogether.391 As Chittick stresses, Ibn ʿArabī does not 
employ the immutable entities in the Platonic sense of archetypes or models for 
individuals. They are already individual beings before they come into being in the 
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phenomenal world, and hence, ‘there is no difference between the entity known in 
God’s knowledge and the entity in the cosmos, except that in the first case it is 
“nonexistent” while in the second it is “existent”’.392 Thus their reality never changes 
before or after existence. 
    Ibn ʿArabī himself states that he owes the idea of immutable entities to the 
Muʿtazilīs, while maintaining that their understanding was not perfect.393 The similarity 
is especially observed in the way the Muʿtazilīs treat the non-existent beings as ‘things’. 
Ibn ʿArabī maintains that the immutable entities in the divine knowledge are attributed 
with ‘thingness of immutability’ in the state of non-existence and then with ‘thingness 
of existence’ when they come to be in the external world.394 With regard to this, Ibn 
ʿArabī adduces the Qurʾānic verse, wherein it is suggested that God takes things as the 
objects of His attributes. He writes: 
 
‘God is powerful over each thing [Q. 2:20]’, not over what is not a thing, for 
a nothing does not accept thingness. If it did accept thingness, its reality 
would not be a nothing. But no object of knowledge departs from its reality, 
so the ruling property of a nothing is to be a nothing forever. As for that 
which is a thing, its ruling property is to be a thing forever.395  
 
As the passage indicates, in Ibn ʿArabī’s view, the immutable entities in God’s 
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knowledge have to be things in their state of non-existence. If they were to change their 
status from not a thing (lā shayʾ) to thingness (shayʾiyya), it would imply a change in 
His knowledge, which is absurd against the principle of pre-eternal divine knowledge.  
    Interestingly, this idea corresponds to the Muʿtazilī thesis stating that the 
non-existent is a thing, a controversial subject that has received a lot of scholarly 
attention. The Muʿtazilīs find textual support for this idea in the Qurʾānic verse: ‘indeed, 
Our word upon a thing when We intend it is only to say to it, “Be!” and it comes to be’ 
[Q. 16:40].396 In their view, the non-existent being has a certain kind of reality prior to 
its creation, so that God can address it when He wills it and brings it into being. 
Klein-Franke explains that if there is not a thing of which one can speak before it 
actually exists, this results, according to the Muʿtazilīs, in God’s ignorance, as it would 
mean that God gains knowledge of a thing only after He creates it.397 Consequently, the 
Muʿtazilīs conclude that ‘thingness’ can be applied not only to what already exists, but 
also to what does not exist at the present moment yet has the possibility of coming to be 
in the future. Therefore, both non-existents and existents have thingness (shayʾiyya).398  
    The Muʿtazilīs believe that the non-existent thing is a possible being that has an 
essence which determines what it is in itself.399 Its essence is known to God from 
eternity as a particular thing and is latently related to His power prior to its coming to 
be.400 When God gives its essence existence, it comes into being in the way it has 
                                                
396 Wisnovsky, ‘Notes on Avicenna,’ 184. 
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always been in itself, realising its essential attribute (e.g. the atoms’ occupying of space). 
Based on this idea, the Muʿtazilīs distinguish a thing’s essence from its existence; 
existence is an accident that happens to an essence through the divine creation.401  
    The Ashʿarīs object to the Muʿtazilī thesis that the non-existent is a thing, as it is 
tantamount to admitting that the non-existent thing has an essence of its own or an 
extra-mental reality outside of God’s knowledge prior to creation. In the view of the 
Ashʿarīs, the non-existent being is not a thing but pure nothing. It is certainly known to 
God and remains a potential object of His power. However, it does not have any essence 
nor reality in the external world before it comes to be. God causes a thing to exist and 
originates its essence at the same time, at the moment of its creation.402 Hence, the 
Ashʿarīs maintain that to speak of a thing in a state of non-existence before its creation 
is to uphold the existence of pre-existent matters that are co-eternal with God. Such a 
view violates the concept of divine unity as well as undermining the doctrine of creation 
ex nihilo.403  
    Ibn ʿArabī rebuffs the Ashʿarīs’ denial of the Muʿtazilī thesis that the non-existent 
is a thing. For his part, since God explicitly addresses the non-existent beings as things 
before creation, the immutable entities have to be things in the state of non-existence.404 
This does not mean that Ibn ʿArabī endorses the view that they have an extra-mental 
reality prior to their coming to be. He certainly insists that the immutable entities in the 
state of non-existence are attributed with their own properties (aḥkām) or the inner 
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meanings of how the things will be manifest. These properties are pre-eternally present 
in the divine knowledge and become manifest in God’s existence at the moment of His 
self-manifestation, realising what God has known about them for eternity.405 However, 
ontologically speaking, the properties of the immutable entities always remain neither 
purely existent nor purely non-existent.406 They are not entirely existent even when 
they are manifest in the phenomenal world, because they are only manifested images of 
God. Nor are they purely non-existent before God’s self-manifestation in them, as they 
are pre-eternally the objects of God’s knowledge. This idea suggests that, for Ibn ʿArabī, 
the immutable entities and their properties are things in their state of non-existence 
inasmuch as they are present in God’s knowledge, yet they do not possess realities of 
their own independently of Him. Despite this, as I will show later, Ibn Taymiyya’s 
attack on the doctrine of the immutable entities is based precisely on the view that they 
are believed to have extra-mental realities before creation. 
 
3.2.2. Ibn ʿArabī on Qurʾān 47:31 
 
    In order to explain Ibn ʿArabī’s approach to God’s pre-eternal knowledge of His 
creation, his treatment of the verse ‘We [God] will test you until We know [who strive 
for the sake of God]’ [Q. 47:31] deserves special attention. As we shall see, Ibn 
Taymiyya disproves Ibn ʿArabī’s interpretation of this verse, whereas al-Shaʿrānī tries 
to understand it in relation to the issue of divine predestination, dismissing Ibn ʿArabī’s 
approach to it. 
    The prima facie sense of ‘until We know’ causes a theological problem. It implies 
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that God comes to know who strives after having not known, contradicting the notion of 
divine perfect knowledge. In the chapter on the word of Luqmān in Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, Ibn 
ʿArabī refers to the divine name ‘the All-Aware’ (al-khabīr) and defines it to mean that 
God is knowing through actual experience (ʿālim ʿan ikhtibār). He then applies this idea 
to the meaning of the verse ‘I will test you until We know’. That is to say, Ibn ʿArabī 
holds that God has revealed Himself as acquiring knowledge through experience (ʿilm 
dhawq/ ʿilm al-adhwāq) when He already knows what the things really are prior to their 
coming to be. Based on this observation, Ibn ʿArabī classifies God’s knowledge into 
two: His pre-eternal and absolute knowledge (ʿilm muṭlaq) of the world in its state of 
non-existence – which can be identified as the divine knowledge of the immutable 
entities – and His knowledge of the world through actual experience. 
    This approach to ‘until We know’ seems to pose little doctrinal threat. The 
majority of the Sunni Qurʾān commentators, such as the Shāfiʿī jurist Abū Muḥammad 
al-Baghawī (d. 515-516/1121-1122 or 510/1117), the Ḥanbalī jurist Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 
597/1200), Shāfiʿī Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), the Mālikī jurist Abū ʿAbd Allāh 
al-Qurṭbī (d. 621/1273), and Shāfiʿī jurists Jalāl al-Din al-Maḥallī (d. 864/1459) and 
al-Suyūṭī uphold similar views on it. They maintain that God knows each being before 
creation, and yet He also comes to know who in reality strives when they are created in 
the concrete world. This means that God rewards those who actually strive, not through 
His knowledge of their potential actions but through His knowledge of their concrete 
actions.407 These scholars see God’s knowledge of the world’s beings prior to the 
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divine creation as knowledge of the invisible (ʿilm al-ghayb), 408  whereas God’s 
knowledge of the created world is knowledge of the visible (ʿilm al-shahāda),409 actual 
knowledge (ʿilm fiʿlī),410 manifested knowledge (ʿilm ẓūhūr),411 and knowledge of 
existent beings (ʿilm wujūd, ʿilm al-wujūd).412 
    Ibn ʿArabī’s stance on ‘until We know’ becomes controversial when he further 
explicates it in relation to his mystical cosmology. According to him, divine knowledge 
through experience depends on what the creatures experience in the actual world. From 
this perspective, God’s knowledge of them is qualified and limited (muqayyad) by 
human faculties and organs. Now, based on the doctrine of the oneness of existence, the 
real subject of phenomenal experience is ultimately God. For God said of Himself that 
He is the essence (ʿayn) of the servant’s faculties as is suggested in ‘I [God] was his 
hearing through which he hears, his sight through which he sees [...]’.413 As a result, it 
is God who in reality acts through the servants’ sight, hearing, speech, and limbs and 
acquires knowledge through His experience in the image of His creation.  
    Ibn ʿArabī does not take this as entailing literal unification between God’s essence 
and that of His creation. As discussed earlier, there are no other essences in the cosmos 
that can be unified with that of God, as there is only God’s essence. With regard to this, 
Ibn ʿArabī writes:  
 
The essence (ʿayn) that is called a servant is no other than God Himself, but 
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this is not to say that the essence of the servant is God Himself […] for He 
is the only essence that exists in all relationships [between God and the 
world].414  
 
Hence, in Ibn ʿArabī’s view, when the servants know things in this world, God is the 
actual knower of them, without entailing unificationism between Him and creation. 
    The identification of God’s knowledge with that of His creation through the 
doctrine of the oneness of existence is explicitly stated in the chapter of the word of 
Jesus in Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam. In it, Ibn ʿArabī refers to the dialogue between God and Jesus 
when He was at the station called ‘“until We know” [Q. 47:31] and indeed He knew 
(maqām ḥattā naʿlam wa-yaʿlam)’.415 Quoting the Qurʾānic episode, Ibn ʿArabī notes 
that when God asked Jesus: ‘did you say to the people “take me and my mother as gods 
besides Allah?”’ [Q. 5:116], Jesus answered by saying: ‘if I had said that then You 
would have already known [if this was the case or not] [ibid.]’.416 To this, Ibn ʿArabī 
adds the following comment, incorporating the aspect of the oneness of existence. It 
reads:  
 
‘If I [Jesus] had actually said that then You would have already known it’, 
because You [God] are the speaker in my image. Whoever says something, 
he knows what he has said and You are the mouth (lisān) through which I 
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speak, as the Prophet reported to us about his Lord in the hadith ‘I [God] am 
his mouth through which he speaks’. Thus, God made Himself (huwwiyya) 
identical to the mouth of the speaker, attributing speech to His servant […] 
and the speaker is indeed God.417 
  
The passage indicates that when the servant articulates something and immediately 
knows what he has said, God also comes to know what he has said; rather, it is actually 
God who has spoken through his faculties as the real speaker and His is the real knower. 
Hence, at the station of ‘“until We know” and indeed He knew’, God attains knowledge 
of created beings through experiencing the creatures’ speech as His speech, while He 
knows everything in its state of non-existence through His absolute knowledge. 
Following this idea, when the creatures gain knowledge of something, God knows it too. 
As we shall see shortly, the identification of God’s knowledge with that of His creation 
comes to be condemned by Ibn Taymiyya as heretical. 
 
3.2.3. Critique of Immutable Entities and Divine Knowledge 
 
    Considerable criticisms were raised against the notion of the immutable entities by 
Ibn Taymiyya. Knysh, and more recently Akkach, have extensively analysed this topic. 
To recapitulate their studies, Ibn Taymiyya attacks the theory of the immutable entities 
based on the following points: (1) Ibn ʿArabī’s assumption that the immutable entities 
in their state of non-existence always have empirical counterparts in concrete reality is 
wrong. This is because one can imagine the essences of things that only exist mentally 
                                                
417 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 132/146.  
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but not externally, such as a mountain of sapphire, a sea of mercury and a man of gold. 
(2) The idea that the immutable entities first exist in God’s knowledge and are then 
given existence through His creation implies that the immutable entities are uncreated 
and that existence is superadded to the essence. This view is opposed to the opinions of 
the people of the Sunna, who believe that when God brings something into existence, 
He creates its essence and existence at the same time.418 (3) If the immutable entities 
were things by themselves in their state of non-existence, uncreated by God (majʿūla), it 
would infringe upon the Sunni dogma of God’s creation ex nihilo. (4) This point further 
denies God’s being the creator of the world by confining His role to that of the giver of 
existence to the immutable entities. (5) In relation to (4), the assumption of entities that 
are immutable in the divine knowledge leads to the denial of God’s omnipotence, as it 
implies that He cannot change the course of events that is pre-eternally determined by 
the properties of the immutable entities.419  
    Incorporating the findings of previous studies, in what follows, I aim to 
demonstrate the criticism of the immutable entities raised by such scholars as Ibn 
Taymiyya and Ibn al-Ahdal, detailing the points that are the most relevant to 
al-Shaʿrānī’s treatment of this theory. I will mainly examine three subjects: (1) the 
rejection of the view that the immutable entities have extra-mental realities outside of 
God’s knowledge; (2) the attribution of belief in the world’s eternity and in determinism 
to Ibn ʿArabī; and (3) Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of Ibn ʿArabī’s understanding of ‘until 
We know’. The study will help situate al-Shaʿrānī’s arguments in context by relating 
                                                
418 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 4, 19. 
419 Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 100-105; Akkach, Letters of a Sufi, Scholar, 42-51. Knysh also analyses 
al-Taftāzānī’s refutation of the immutable entities from the ontological aspect. This is directed 
more towards al-Qūnawī than Ibn ʿArabī. See Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 153-158. I am not going to 
examine al-Taftāzānī’s arguments here, as al-Shaʿrānī’s presentation of the immutable entities is 
submitted as a response to Ibn Taymiyya’s critique rather than to that of al-Taftāzānī. 
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them to these points of criticism. 
    According to Ibn Taymiyya, the theory of the immutable entities is built on two 
teachings: the tenet that the world’s existence is identical to that of God and the thesis 
that the non-existent being is ‘a thing’ and is present in a state of non-existence.420 Ibn 
Taymiyya attributes the latter thesis to the Muʿtazilīs, who maintain that the 
non-existent possible being is a thing that has an essence of its own. He argues that, 
similarly to the Muʿtazilīs’ stance, the immutable entities proposed by Ibn ʿArabī 
possess extra-mental realities in their state of non-existence independently of God. For 
Ibn Taymiyya, a difference between the Muʿtazilīs and Ibn ʿArabī with regard to this 
point is that while the former at least upholds God’s creation of the non-existent thing in 
the world, the latter identifies the world’s existence with that of God, thereby denying 
Him the divine role of creator, as well as the fundamental distinction between God and 
His creation.421 
    Ibn Taymiyya admits that the non-existent being can be called a thing as long as it 
is entirely dependent upon God’s knowledge without having any real essence of its own. 
Referring to the verse ‘the earthquake of the hour will be a tremendous thing (shayʾ)’ [Q. 
22:1], he states that this is a report about a future event, not a current one, and that 
describing a future event as a ‘thing’ is only possible with reference to God’s 
knowledge and decree of it (taqdīr).422 In his view, since an essence is created at the 
moment of the creation of its existence, even if it is designated as a thing in the divine 
speech, a thing which is a future event possesses no essence.  
    Ibn Taymiyya believes that the error of Ibn ʿArabī and his followers lies in taking 
                                                
420 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 4, 8-9. 
421 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 4, 8, 86-87. 
422 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 4, 18. 
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the non-existent being as a thing in itself. According to Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn ʿArabī 
falsely imagines – based on the verse ‘His order to a thing when He wills it is that He 
says to it “Be!” and it is’ [Q. 36:82] – that there are non-existent essences which are 
called things prior to their creation and that they are pre-eternally present outside of 
God’s knowledge.423 With respect to this, Ibn Taymiyya writes: 
 
If one says that the non-existent being is a thing in the [divine] knowledge, 
existent in the [divine] knowledge, or present (thābit) in the [divine] 
knowledge, this is correct, whereas if he says [like Ibn ʿArabī and others] that 
the non-existent is a thing by itself [with an independent reality that has its 
external existence], this is wrong.424  
 
Here, it is important to note that Ibn Taymiyya’s view of the immutable entities – that 
they are non-existent things that have extra-mental realities in themselves, upon which 
God bestows existence and create the world – entails the denial of creation ex nihilo. In 
other words, the theory of the immutable entities leads to the espousal of the world’s 
eternity.  
    Recent scholarship agrees that the tenet of the world’s eternity is certainly not a 
part of Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching.425 Nowhere does Ibn ʿArabī express his endorsement of 
the world’s eternity in the way that philosophers like Avicenna do.426 Nevertheless, the 
attribution of this idea to Ibn ʿArabī seems to have been relatively common amongst his 
detractors before al-Shaʿrānī. According to Knysh, the Syrian Shāfiʿī and Ashʿarī 
                                                
423 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 4, 18.  
424 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 4, 17. 
425 Izutsu, Sufism, 162; Chittick, The Sufi Path, 84; Cillis, Free Will, 184-185.  
426 For the position of Avicenna on this issue, see McGiniss, Avicenna, 178-208. 
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theologian Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 660/1262), who is considered to be the earliest 
detractor of Ibn ʿArabī, declares Ibn ʿArabī an unbeliever for advocating the world’s 
eternity. Ibn Taymiyya himself counts the world’s eternity as one of the heretical 
professions often ascribed to Ibn ʿArabī.427  
    As Ibn Taymiyya carefully points out, Ibn ʿArabī’s thought is not technically 
identical to that of the philosophers. This is based on Ibn Taymiyya’s understanding that 
whereas the philosophers establish the existence of both God and the world, Ibn ʿArabī 
ultimately denies the world’s existence by identifying it as that of God.428 The Meccan 
historian Taqī al-Dīn al-Fāsī (d. 832/1429) holds a similar view to that of Ibn Taymiyya. 
While referring to Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s accusation that Ibn ʿArabī promotes the world’s 
eternity, al-Fāsī believes that Ibn ʿArabī’s identification of God with the world is more 
heretical than the beliefs of the philosophers who identify God as the necessary 
existence from which all beings proceed from eternity.429 Based on this observation, 
Knysh maintains that, in the opinions of Ibn Taymiyya and al-Fāṣī, Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s 
criticism of Ibn ʿArabī as a proponent of the world’s eternity missed the target. By the 
time of Ibn Taymiyya, let alone al-Fāṣī, argues Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching was too 
well known to have been confused with that of the eternalists.430  
    Despite Knysh’s conclusion, the Yemeni Ashʿarī Ibn al-Ahdal repeatedly 
associates Ibn ʿArabī and his followers with belief in the world’s eternity.431 In Ibn 
al-Ahdal’s view, the tenet of the oneness of existence necessarily accompanies the idea 
of the world’s eternity. If the world is unified with God, who is pre-eternal, and each 
                                                
427 On Ibn Taymiyya’s view on creation theory and his espousal of the world’s eternity, see 
Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy, 70-95.  
428 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 4, 82. 
429 al-Fāsī, al-ʿIqd al-thamīn, vol. 2, 170. 
430 Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 69-72. 
431 Ibn al-Ahdal, Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ, 182-185/vol. 2, 626-632. 
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entity is considered to be identical to God, the world must be eternal like Him.432 Ibn 
al-Ahdal references the aforementioned Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām, the Damascene historian 
Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348), and the Egyptian jurist Ibn al-Zarkashī (d. 
794/1392) as those who condemned Ibn ʿArabī for preaching the world’s eternity.433 
Ibn al-Ahdal also notes that Ibn ʿArabī and his followers were known in Damascus in 
this period as the group of unificationists whose thought was identified as that of the 
philosophers.434 Against Knysh’s reading, these findings from Ibn al-Ahdal’s text 
indicate that the attribution of the world’s eternity to Ibn ʿArabī was still held amongst 
his opponents well after Ibn Taymiyya (who died in 728/1328), and most probably after 
al-Fāsī (who died in 932/1429, while Ibn al-Ahdal died in 855/1481).  
    Even though Ibn al-Ahdal does not clearly relate the teaching of the immutable 
entities to belief in the world’s eternity, strikingly, El-Rouayheb’s finding confirms this 
relationship. According to his study, the sixteenth-century Egyptian scholar 
al-Fārisukūrī, who castigated al-Shaʿrānī’s al-Mīzān al-dharriyya as monistic (as I 
mentioned in Chapter 1), denounced Ibn ʿArabī and his followers as advocates of the 
world’s eternity for their espousal of the immutable entities.435 This is an insightful 
suggestion indicating the connection between the immutable entities and the charge of 
the world’s eternity amongst Ibn ʿArabī’s opponents. The widespread attribution of the 
world’s eternity to Ibn ʿArabī explains al-Shaʿrānī’s effort to distance Ibn ʿArabī’s 
teachings from this view.436 As I will show later, al-Shaʿrānī insists that the theory of 
immutable entities in fact supports the dogma of creation ex nihilo. 
                                                
432 Ibn al-Ahdal, Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ, 184, 197, 207/vol. 2, 632, 662, 729.  
433 Ibn al-Ahdal, Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ, 207, 225-226, 230/vol. 2, 690, 729, 739-740. 
434 Ibn al-Ahdal, Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ, 230/vol. 2, 739-740. 
435 El-Rouayheb, ‘Heresy and Sufism,’ 364-365. 
436 This is explicit in many of his works; al-Shaʿrānī, al-Ajwiba al-marḍiyya, 404-407; al-Mīzān 
al-khiḍriyya, fol. 40b; al-Qawl al-mubīn; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 52 
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    Ibn al-Ahdal also accuses Ibn ʿArabī and his followers of promoting determinism 
(jabr) or of being determinists (jabriyya).437 Quoting Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Ahdal calls 
Ibn ʿArabī and his followers ‘the deterministic Sufis’ (al-mutaṣawwifa al-jabriyya), 
whereby Ibn al-Ahdal attacks them for not making a distinction between receiving 
divine guidance and going astray, between obedience and disobedience, and between 
those who go to paradise and those who go to hell.438 If everything is predetermined 
prior to the divine creation by the immutable entities, these teachings lose their values, 
which is heretical.  
    It must be noted that, in Ibn al-Ahdal’s understanding, human actions according to 
Ibn ʿArabī are forced upon them by their own immutable entities, rather than by God. 
With regard to this, Ibn al-Ahdal observes that, in Ibn ʿArabī’s view, the world’s entities 
come into being as distinctive beings, not through God’s will and choice, but through 
their own preparedness (istiʿdād).439 Preparedness in Ibn ʿArabī’s thought is what 
specifies the extent to which each immutable entity can manifest divine 
self-manifestation.440 Its determination is pre-eternal and unchangeable. Thus, human 
beings act in the way their immutable entities have foreordained.441 This deterministic 
view, that the immutable entities force actions upon humans, further places God under 
the compulsion (iḍṭirār) of what the immutable entities of His creation determine.442 
                                                
437 Ibn al-Ahdal, Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ, 226, 280/vol. 2, 729, 857-858. Determinism conventionally 
means that human beings are forced to act in a certain manner, with God being the real agent. 
For more on this, see Holtzman, ‘Debating the Doctrine of jabr,’ 61-63. 
438 Ibn al-Ahdal, Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ, 233/vol. 2, 745; Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ fatāwī, vol. 3, 78-79. 
Ibn Taymiyya does not actually use the expression ‘the deterministic Sufis’. He only talks about 
a group of people in error who contemplate divine destiny. A reference to the deterministic 
Sufis is inserted here by Ibn al-Ahdal. 
439 Ibn al-Ahdal, Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ, 190/vol. 2, 647-648.  
440 For more details on this concept, see Izutsu, Sufism, 175-182; Chittick, The Sufi Path, 91-94.  
441 For information on the secondary literature concerning the debates as to whether or not Ibn 
ʿArabī indeed held a deterministic view, see Alsamaani, ‘An Analytic Philosophical Approach,’ 
121-123. 
442 Ibn al-Ahdal, Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ, 190/vol. 2, 647-648.  
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    The deterministic nature of the immutable entities is closely related to what Ibn 
Taymiyya sees as another major problem concerning this theory. As Knysh writes, if 
God were to create the world in accordance with the properties of the uncreated and 
pre-eternal immutable entities, it would strip God of His omnipotence by limiting His 
role to bringing them into existence, while denying Him power to change their 
course.443 Objecting to this view that the immutable entities restrict God’s omnipotence, 
Ibn Taymiyya writes as follows:  
 
God is then incapable of increasing or decreasing even a grain or a drop of 
rain in the world. Nor can He change the height of humans beings […], 
move the position of a stone or running water, guide the astray to a right 
path and lead the guided astray, or move the stationary object and stop the 
moving object. In a nutshell, God cannot do anything other than what is 
found (mā wujida) and what is found is the essence (ʿayn) that is immutable 
(thābita) in its state of non-existence. Hence, He cannot do more than what 
is manifest (ẓuhūr) in these entities.444 
 
According to Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn ʿArabī describes the situation in which God cannot do 
other than what He knows of the immutable entities as ‘the mystery of divine 
predestination’ (sirr al-qadar). Following this idea, Ibn Taymiyya concludes that the 
destiny of phenomenal beings is predetermined by their immutable entities and that it is 
the immutable entities that do good and evil and are praised and punished.445  
                                                
443 Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 102; Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 4, 21. 
444 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 4, 59. 
445 Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 102; Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 4, 21, 58. 
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    Further to this analysis, not only does the teaching of the immutable entities deny 
God His omnipotence, but it also damages His omniscience in that God’s knowledge of 
His creation occurs to Him, not from Himself but from His knowledge of the immutable 
entities in their state of non-existence. The issue of divine omniscience is pertinent to 
al-Shaʿrānī’s presentation of the immutable entities; hence, I will consider this topic 
below. 
    According to Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn ʿArabī perceives the immutable entities that 
possess extra-mental realities as being real in themselves and dispensable for God 
(ghanī). This view entails the implication that God is in need of the immutable entities 
in order for Him to acquire the knowledge of creation from them (istafāda), which 
amounts to the denial of God’s perfect and self-sufficient knowledge.446 With regard to 
this idea, Ibn Taymiyya critiques Ibn ʿArabī’s approach to ‘until We know’ (as 
discussed earlier) as being based on the doctrine of the oneness of existence and the 
identification of God’s existence with that of His creation. In Ibn Taymiyya’s mind, Ibn 
ʿArabī believes that just as human beings come to know things that they did not know, 
God also knows them after having not known them previously. In other words, God 
does not know what would occur to His creation in the world (i.e. the immutable 
entities), until His servants come to know them first in the phenomenal world (because 
God is identical with His creation and His knowledge is the same as that of His 
creation). Following this observation, Ibn Taymiyya concludes that Ibn ʿArabī identifies 
the renewal of the creatures’ knowledge with the renewal of God’s knowledge 
(tajaddud), depriving Him of the knowledge of divine predestination (qadar).447 The 
                                                
446 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 4, 21, 58. 
447 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasaʾil, vol. 4, 54, 60. Ibn Taymiyya does not state here how he 
interprets ‘until We know’. However, the exegesis of one of his disciples, the Syrian Ḥanbalī 
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thesis of the immutable entities, combined with the tenet of the oneness of existence, 
thus jeopardises God’s foreknowledge of His creation.  
    According to Ibn Taymiyya, it is not permitted to hold that God’s knowledge is 
gained from the immutable entities the realities of which are independent from Him.448 
Since God is self-sufficient in His knowledge, it is incumbent that He knows His 
creation from eternity without supposing the existence of other beings from which He 
acquires knowledge. Regarding this critique of the immutable entities, it must be noted 
that Ibn Taymiyya misunderstands Ibn ʿArabī’s position. It is true that, within the 
context of Ibn ʿArabī’s ontological worldview, God comes to know things in the 
external world through actual experience and that when the servants know something, 
God knows it too as a real knower. However, he does not hold that God’s knowledge is 
renewed when His creation comes into being, nor does he believe that God was ignorant 
of the world’s beings before acquiring knowledge of them in this world. For Ibn ʿArabī, 
God is pre-eternally the perfect knower of all beings through His absolute knowledge of 
the immutable entities. 
    I have so far examined the criticisms of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Ahdal against the 
theory of the immutable entities. I have especially looked at their attacks from three 
perspectives, clarifying the following points. Firstly, Ibn Taymiyya objects that the 
immutable entities have extra-mental realities independently of God’s knowledge. 
Secondly, Ibn al-Ahdal condemns Ibn ʿArabī for advocating the world’s eternity – a 
                                                                                                                                          
historian Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373) might give us a clue. According to Ibn Kathīr, there is no 
doubt that God knows everything prior to its coming to be. The expression of ‘until We know’ 
is only related to its actual occurrence in the world. Hence, it should be read as ‘so that We 
know’ or ‘so that We see’ who strives in concrete reality. See Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr. This can be 
taken as the standard interpretation amongst the traditionalists, as well as amongst many 
Ashʿarīs scholars, whom I mentioned earlier.  
448 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasaʾil, vol. 4, 59-60. 
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charge that was widely attributed to Ibn ʿArabī prior to al-Shaʿrānī – as well as for 
being deterministic. Lastly, and quite intriguingly, Ibn Taymiyya denies Ibn ʿArabī’s 
interpretation of ‘until We know’ stating that God comes to acquire knowledge of the 
His creation after He did not know of them, as this idea results in undermining the 
notion of divine perfect knowledge. As we shall see next, these observations are related 
to al-Shaʿrānī’s understanding of the immutable entities and his approach to divine 
knowledge.  
 
3.2.4. Al-Shaʿrānī on Immutable Entities 
 
    This section concerns al-Shaʿrānī’s presentation of the immutable entities in 
al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya and al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, the theological writings 
addressed to non-advanced mystics and theologians. I will demonstrate how al-Shaʿrānī 
accepts some key aspects of the immutable entities and offers the teaching as a solution 
to certain theological issues, highlighting the extent of his reception of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
thought. For our purposes, we shall consider three themes: (1) al-Shaʿrānī’s 
endorsement of creation ex nihilo based on the thesis of the non-existent being a thing; 
(2) his treatment of God’s foreknowledge, predestination and human accountability; and 
(3) his interpretation of the verse ‘until We know’. As will become clear, al-Shaʿrānī’s 
arguments show some correspondence in ideas, if not directly, to those of the critics of 
the immutable entities, with the aim of undermining their positions. The examination of 
this subject, together with our observations in Chapter 2, will thus situate al-Shaʿrānī’s 
endeavour of defending Ibn ʿArabī in the scholarly context of his own period. 
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3.2.4.1. Immutable Entities and Creation ex nihilo 
 
    Al-Shaʿrānī’s presentation of the immutable entities resembles that of Ibn ʿArabī 
on many points. Amongst them is the thesis that the immutable entities are things in 
their state of non-existence. In the texts addressed not only to non-advanced mystics but 
also to theologians, al-Shaʿrānī openly supports the Muʿtazilī thesis of the non-existent 
being as a thing by referring to the verse ‘indeed God is powerful over each thing’ [Q. 
3:165]. To underline this view, al-Shaʿrānī quotes the aforementioned passage by Ibn 
ʿArabī on ‘thingness’ (shayʾiyya) and maintains that thingness is a pre-eternal 
property.449 If an existent being is a thing attributed with thingness, it should have the 
same property in its state of non-existence prior to its coming to be. If one supposes the 
transition of the reality of that which is not a thing (lā shāyʾ) to that which is a thing in 
the process of creation, this is to postulate change in His pre-eternal, unchangeable 
knowledge. In other words, the divine knowledge is renewed when that which was not a 
thing comes into being as that which is a thing. This conclusion is absurd, and 
accordingly, the premise that the non-existent being was not a thing prior to divine 
creation is proved wrong. Thus, the non-existent being is already a thing in God’s 
knowledge even before its creation.  
    Al-Shaʿrānī sees the non-existent things, which are present in God’s knowledge, as 
being the immutable entities. They are the possible beings of the world’s entities that 
come into being by receiving existence from God.450 Since it is impossible to imagine a 
moment when His perfect knowledge lacks its objects, the immutable entities in their 
                                                
449 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 211; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 99; Ibn ʿArabī, 
al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya vol. 2, 171; cf., vol. 4, 108.  
450 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 210-221; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 98-99. 
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state of non-existence must be pre-eternal like God. Nevertheless, there is an 
ontological difference between the divine and these entities. While the objects of God’s 
knowledge remain to be the objects of creation, God is always their creator.451 
    Like Ibn ʿArabī, al-Shaʿrānī does not hold that the immutable entities possess 
extra-mental realities. In al-Shaʿrānī’s view, the immutable entities are things only 
inasmuch as they are present in the divine knowledge, and not independently of it. 
Therefore, the idea of the immutable entities does not undermine the tenet of creation ex 
nihilo, as no independent realities exist before creation; rather, and intriguingly, it helps 
complement the doctrine by reconciling the positions of the Ashʿarīs and the Muʿtazilīs 
in regards to the creation theory.  
    In order to explain this point, al-Shaʿrānī refers to two types of non-existence, 
‘absolute non-existence’ (ʿadam muṭlaq) and ‘relative non-existence’ (ʿadam īḍāfī), 
which I have mentioned earlier when discussing Ibn ʿArabī’s view of the immutable 
entities. I have translated below a passage from al-Shaʿrānī’s al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 
from the section entitled ‘the illusion of bringing the world into existence from absolute 
non-existence that precedes it.’ It reads: 
 
 To those who are under the illusion (tawahhum) that God brought the 
world into existence from absolute non-existence (ʿadam muṭlaq) that 
precedes it [its existence], like some of the Ashʿarīs, I answered as follows. 
Know this my brothers. There are two types of non-existence, absolute 
non-existence and relative non-existence (ʿadam īḍāfī). As for absolute 
non-existence, God’s knowledge does not include it and it will never have 
                                                
451 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 166, 172; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 53. See also 
Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 261-262. 
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existence, because absolute non-existence does not pertain to an entity that 
is present (ʿayn thābita) in His knowledge. On the contrary, relative 
non-existence, which people speak of, pertains to an entity that is present 
in God’s knowledge. Relative non-existence is therefore non-existent only 
in respect of the creatures’ knowledge, but it is existent in relation to 
God’s knowledge.452 
 
As the passage shows, the immutable entities prior to their creation are characterised 
with relative non-existence in the sense that they are known to God and have the 
possibility of coming into being. In this regard, divine creation is understood to be 
creation based on the immutable entities in their state of relative non-existence.  
    Al-Shaʿrānī insists that it is impossible to posit creation out of absolute 
non-existence. God cannot create what He does not will and He cannot will what He 
does not know. If He knows something before the creation, it has to be present in His 
knowledge pre-eternally. If it were possible for Him to create what His knowledge did 
not contain, the world must have existed by itself independently of God, which is 
absurd. Consequently, the world is created out of immutable entities that are known to 
God from eternity. And in order for Him to know them, the immutable entities have to 
be things in their state of relative non-existence.453  
                                                
452  al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 209-210. See also al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt 
wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 98. 
453 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 213-214; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 100. In 
relation to this, al-Shaʿrānī writes:  
 
It was already affirmed through the decisive evidence of God’s words such as 
‘does He who created not know?’ [Q. 67:14] and ‘He is the Knower of all things’ 
[Q. 42:12] that He is the knower of everything, that His knowledge is eternal, that 
He originated us without any preceding archetype (mithāl), and that we were 
brought into existence in accordance with what we were in His knowledge. If this 
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    Following this idea, al-Shaʿrānī maintains that the Ashʿarī theologians’ thesis of 
the non-existence being ‘not a thing’ – as they gathered from the verse ‘I already 
created you before when you were not a thing’ [Q. 19:9] – should be understood to 
entail that the non-existent is ‘not a thing’ only in relation to the creatures’ perception, 
but not in God’s knowledge wherein it is already a thing. The world is thus attributed as 
eternal in His knowledge and as temporally originated in its manifestation in the visible 
world (ʿālam al-shahāda).454 Al-Shaʿrānī here notes that the philosophers wrongly 
advocated the world’s eternity based on the observation that the world is from eternity 
the object of the pre-eternal knowledge of God; while saying so, they did not realise the 
temporality of the world when it actually comes into existence.455  
    Dismissing faith in the world’s eternity as upheld by the philosophers, al-Shaʿrānī 
tries to show the superiority of Ibn ʿArabī’s view on the world’s creation based on the 
theory of the immutable entities, demonstrating its reconciliatory role between the two 
theological parties of the Muʿtazilīs and the Ashʿarīs. With respect to this, al-Shaʿrānī 
writes: 
 
The reconciliation (jamʿ) of the words of the Muʿtazilīs and the Ashʿarīs 
holds true (yaṣiḥḥ), for the words of the Ashʿarīs can mean that whatever is 
brought into existence by [God’s command] ‘Be!’ is brought into existence 
from nonexistence in the state of relative nonexistence, not in the state of 
                                                                                                                                          
were not the case, we would be brought into existence in accordance with what He 
does not know. God does not will what He does not know, and He does not bring 
into existence what He does not will. This means that we would be existing by 
ourselves […]. Yet it has already been affirmed by decisive proof that our 
existence is from non-existence, that is, from relative non-existence’ [al-Shaʿrānī, 
al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 213-214].   
 
454 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 103, 209-211; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 100. 
455 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 100. 
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absolute nonexistence. On the other hand, the words of the Muʿtazilīs can 
mean that the whole world is brought into existence from that which has 
presence (thubūt) in the [divine] knowledge but [does] not [possess a] state 
of concrete existence (wujūd ẓāhir). If this is the case, then the world is 
pre-eternal in the [divine] knowledge and temporally originated in its 
manifestation [into the external world] (ẓuhūr).456 
 
According to al-Shaʿrānī, the Ashʿarīs hold that the world is created out of absolute 
nothingness, whereas the Muʿtazilīs believe that it is created out of a non-existent thing 
that has extra-mental reality.457 He then presents the doctrine of the immutable entities 
in the state of non-existence as what mediates between these positions. In al-Shaʿrānī’s 
view, it harmoniously combines the Ashʿarī thesis of creation ex nihilo – by interpreting 
nihilo as relative nonexistence – with the Muʿtazilī tenet of the non-existent thing – by 
rejecting the idea that it possesses an extra-mental reality.  
    Al-Shaʿrānī’s view – that the immutable entities reconcile the position of the 
Ashʿarīs and that of the Muʿtazilīs concerning the creation theory – is drawn from an 
examination of Ibn ʿArabī’s presentation of the immutable entities, and in this sense, 
                                                
456 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 211. See also al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, 
vol. 1, 99. 
457 Al-Shaʿrānī quotes the Ashʿarī theologian and al-Suyūṭī’s teacher Jalāl al-Dīn al-Maḥallī 
from his commentary on al-Jamʿ al-jawāmiʿ and writes as follows: 
 
The non-existent being (maʿdūm) is not a thing extra-mentally; it does not have any 
essence (dhāt) nor is it present (thābit), that is to say, it does not have any reality 
(ḥaqīqa) in the external world. The non-existent being only gains reality when it 
comes to exist in the external world. This is what al-Maḥallī said and it was also 
the view of many other theologians [i.e. the Ashʿarīs]. On the other hand, most of 
the Muʿtazilīs maintained that the non-existent possible being is indeed a thing 
extra-mentally; that is, it has an affirmed reality (ḥaqīqa muqarrara) [al-Shaʿrānī, 
al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 199]. 
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there may not seem to be much originality in al-Shaʿrānī’s thought. Nevertheless, our 
observation is significant in that it is al-Shaʿrānī, regarded in present scholarship as an 
Ashʿarī scholar and a mediocre apologist for Ibn ʿArabī, who arrives at the conclusion 
that the theory of the immutable entities can synthesise the views of the two opposing 
theological groups of Muʿtazilism and Ashʿarism. Furthermore, this reconciliatory role 
of the immutable entities affirms the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, thereby disproving 
the charge of the world’s eternity that was commonly attributed to Ibn ʿArabī prior to 
al-Shaʿrānī. As I will show below, the notion of the immutable entities further secures 
belief in divine predestination and human accountability, along with the notion of 
divine foreknowledge. 
 
3.2.4.2. Immutable Entities and Divine Predestination  
 
    Earlier, I referred to Ibn Taymiyya’s attack concerning the deterministic 
implications of the immutable entities. As we have seen, based on the observation that 
God gains knowledge of His creation not from Himself but from the immutable entities 
in their state of non-existence, Ibn Taymiyya accuses Ibn ʿArabī of claiming that God 
comes to know things after not knowing them, thereby undermining God’s 
foreknowledge of creation and divine predestination. Ibn al-Ahdal, on the other hand, 
censures Ibn ʿArabī for being a determinist in the sense that his teaching entails that 
God’s creation is pre-eternally determined by the properties of the non-existent 
immutable entities and cannot be changed.  
    Although al-Shaʿrānī does not name these critics, his presentation of the immutable 
entities suggests that he tried to make sense of these critiques by demonstrating how 
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these entities guarantee the notions of divine predestination and human accountability, 
as well as divine foreknowledge. Borrowing Ibn ʿArabī’s words, al-Shaʿrānī states that 
God does not have any effect upon the course of events that is predetermined by each 
immutable entity. The knowledge of something is always preceded by the presence of 
the known object. Therefore, God only knows that which has been pre-eternally present 
in His knowledge, without entailing a change in the objects of His knowledge.458 In 
al-Shaʿrānī’s view, these immutable entities that God necessarily knows from eternity 
are not His creation, because His knowledge has no beginning and neither do its objects. 
Based on this idea, divine creation occurs when God gives existence to what He has 
pre-eternally known, and the world comes to be just as it has always been in His 
knowledge. In this regard, al-Shaʿrānī maintains that the immutable entities are entirely 
dependent upon God for their existence, as the decision regarding whether to bring them 
out of the realm of divine knowledge into the visible world is made through God’s will 
and choice, while God in no way depends on their existence.459 
    To al-Shaʿrānī’s mind, the unchangeable and uncreated nature of the immutable 
entities protects the notion of divine predestination and human accountability, rather 
than violating God’s perfect foreknowledge or promoting determinism. He argues that 
those who do not know God (jāhil bi-Allah) might protest to Him by asking how He can 
punish them for what He has predestined from eternity, despite His foreknowledge that 
they will not be able to defy these foreordained actions. To them, it appears unfair for 
God to make them accountable for their deeds when He is the creator of their realities, 
                                                
458 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 166, 171. See also Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, 
vol. 4, 222-223. 
459 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 159; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 202. 
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attributes, and faculties and they can only behave as He orders.460 In al-Shaʿrānī’s view, 
this kind of complaint is resolved through a proper understanding of the immutable 
entities. For him, God is certainly the creator of the existence of the immutable entities, 
but not of their realities, which have been predetermined and are immutable in the 
divine knowledge. This idea does not diminish God’s omnipotence, as the immutable 
entities are dependent upon His knowledge and are forever nonexistent in it unless they 
are given existence. Rather, the idea establishes human beings’ accountability for 
whatever their immutable entities have specified for them in this world.461 Following 
this idea, when something deplorable happens to a person, he should blame himself or 
what his immutable entity has pre-eternally determined, but not God, as is suggested in 
the verse ‘We [God] did not wrong them but they wronged themselves’ [Q. 16:118].462 
For al-Shaʿrānī, this is the attitude required from non-advanced mystics.  
    In order to make sense of the fixed character of the immutable entities, al-Shaʿrānī 
also mentions al-Ghazālī’s statement ‘there is nothing in possibility more wondrous 
than what is’ or ‘there is no possible world more wondrous than the current world’ 
(laysa fī l-imkān abdaʿ min mā kāna). As Ormsby carefully demonstrated, this remark 
stirred controversy among later generations, as it was taken to entail God’s imperfection 
in lacking the power to create a better world. As far as I am aware, al-Shaʿrānī refers to 
al-Ghazālī’s statement in four of his texts, two of which are mentioned by Ormsby.463 
In these texts, al-Shaʿrānī takes two approaches to the statement. One of them is to 
                                                
460 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 154-156. 
461 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 156-162, 167, 171; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 
119, 201-202. 
462 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 157. See also Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 
4, 16. 
463 Ormsby names two texts, al-Ajwiba al-marḍiyya and al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir. Ormsby, 
Theodicy in Islamic Thought, 119, n. 90. Two more titles I have found are al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya 
and al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya. In Ormsby’s study, al-Shaʿrānī is introduced as a scholar who was 
in favour of this saying, but his view remained unexamined. 
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associate ‘there is nothing in possibility […]’ with a denial of belief in the world’s 
eternity. Regarding this, al-Shaʿrānī writes:  
 
God is characterised with the level (rutba) of eternity, while the world is 
characterised with the level of temporal origination; since God’s creation 
will never leave the level of temporal origination, al-Ghazālī’s statement 
becomes true.464  
 
As the passage implies, al-Shaʿrānī takes al-Ghazālī’s expression ‘more wondrous’ to 
mean that the world goes beyond its level of temporal origination until it becomes 
eternal like God. However, the current world, which is temporally originated, can never 
be so wondrous as to attain the level of eternity. Therefore, al-Ghazālī’s statement is 
true in the sense that it denies belief in the world’s eternity.  
    Another interesting interpretation is approached through the issue of God’s 
foreknowledge and predestination. Quoting ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ, al-Shaʿrānī states that the 
prophet is a prophet from all eternity, and so is the friend of God, the rebel, the 
unbeliever, the hypocrite, and so on. And every one of them is perfect in their own way 
in the sense that they are all brought into existence from the divine knowledge through 
God’s favour and generosity.465 With regard to this, al-Shaʿrānī writes: 
 
The pre-eternal knowledge is not receptive to any increase at all (lā yaqbal 
                                                
464 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Ajwiba al-marḍiyya, 431-432; al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 76a; al-Qawāʿid 
al-kashfiyya, 125; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 51, 138. In al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, 
al-Shaʿrānī notes that this is a quotation from al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya. However, I have not 
been able to identify its location in al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya.  
465 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 76 
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ziyāda), nor is the object of His knowledge [receptive to any increase]. Hence, 
the profession that there is nothing in the divine knowledge more wondrous 
than this world becomes true (laysa fī ʿilm al-ḥaqq abdaʿ min mā kāna) 
[…].466 
 
Here, al-Shaʿrānī understands al-Ghazālī’s statement in relation to the pre-eternity and 
fixity of God’s foreknowledge and its objects (i.e. the immutable entities). In 
al-Shaʿrānī’s view, the current world is created in accordance with God’s perfect 
knowledge of creation or the immutable entities. Since divine knowledge is not 
receptive to change, this world must be the only possible and the most wondrous one, 
thus justifying divine predestination. 
    Markedly, this approach is contrasted with Ibn ʿArabī’s treatment of the same 
statement. As Chittick notes, Ibn ʿArabī frequently adduces ‘there is nothing in 
possibility [...]’ in al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya within the context of the ontology of God’s 
self-manifestation. For Ibn ʿArabī, the current world holds perfection, not because it is 
in accordance with God’s foreknowledge, but rather because it is manifest as the perfect 
image of God as His locus.467 On the other hand, al-Shaʿrānī’s interpretation of ‘there is 
nothing in possibility [...]’ avoids any reference to Ibn ʿArabī’s cosmological 
speculation. While supporting Ibn ʿArabī’s idea of divine creation of the world 
following the courses predetermined by the immutable entities, al-Shaʿrānī does not 
discuss al-Ghazālī’s remark in relation to the monistic worldview of ontological divine 
self-manifestation.  
                                                
466 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 76a.  
467 For reference to Ibn ʿArabī’s citation of the saying, see Chittick, The Sufi Path, 409, n. 6; 
Abrahamov, Ibn ʿArabī and the Sufis, 120, n. 22. 
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    As the above discussions show, in al-Shaʿrānī’s view, the teaching of the 
immutable entities should be understood in relation to the support of divine 
predestination and human accountability. This is also suggested in one of the passages 
in al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, which reads:  
 
It is now clear that the determinists (jabriyya) and others would not have 
fallen into what they fell into, except by their attesting (shuhūd) one aspect of 
the creation; namely, the temporal origination and the created nature of the 
servants [based on God’s predetermination]. If they [the determinists] had 
attested another aspect of the servants, that is to say, their eternal nature in 
God’s knowledge [i.e. the world as the immutable entities that are uncreated 
and that predetermine their course from eternity], they would have attributed 
the decisive argument (al-ḥujja) [concerning who is accountable] to God 
against themselves [and taken responsibility for their actions from the 
perspective that their uncreated immutable entities determine their events]. Be 
aware so as not to let this slip out of mind.468  
 
As the passage indicates, for al-Shaʿrānī, Ibn ʿArabī is not an upholder of pure 
determinism in the sense that God forces humans to act in a certain manner. This is 
because unlike the determinists who dismiss human responsibility, Ibn ʿArabī advocates 
the idea of the uncreated immutable entities that predetermine the future events of each 
being from eternity. In other words, these entities, which are uncreated, make human 
                                                
468 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 205. A reference to the argument (al-ḥujja) 
derives from the Qurʾān 6:149, which says: ‘to God belongs the decisive argument (ḥujja 
bāligha); if He had willed, He would have guided all of you.’ 
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beings accountable for their actions. Yet belief in the immutable entities does not 
necessarily mean a denial of divine predestination, because they do not have 
extra-mental realities in themselves and are entirely dependent on God. As I showed, 
they rather secure the notion of predestination in that they are present in the divine 
pre-eternal knowledge from eternity without beginning and are entirely dependent upon 
Him.  
    It has become clear that al-Shaʿrānī treats Ibn ʿArabī’s theory of the immutable 
entities as guaranteeing the notions of divine foreknowledge, predestination and human 
accountability, not as the ontological teaching of the divine self-manifestation. With 
regard to this, al-Shaʿrānī notes that those who are not aware of the immutable entities 
may complain to God concerning what His knowledge has foreordained when a 
calamity hits them. However, those who have realised that God only creates what their 
immutable entities in the divine knowledge have predetermined accept whatever 
happens to them in this external world. Importantly, in al-Shaʿrānī’s view, it is the 
mystical unveiling that enables a person to be aware of this situation.469 Only through 
the mystical discipline does he attain the intricate combination of divine 
predetermination and human accountability. For al-Shaʿrānī, this is the core doctrine of 
Ibn ʿArabī’s immutable entities as relating the mystical discipline with the theological 
issues, without discussing them in the context of the ontological worldview. 
   
3.2.4.3. Al-Shaʿrānī on the Interpretation of Qurʾān 47:31  
 
    In the analysis of al-Ghazālī’s statement ‘there is nothing in possibility [...]’, we 
                                                
469 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 158-161, 171; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 119, 
204-205. 
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have seen that al-Shaʿrānī’s treatment of the immutable entities excludes Ibn ʿArabī’s 
ontology of God’s self-manifestation. In order to expose the extent of his acceptance of 
Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching, it is important to examine al-Shaʿrānī’s understanding of ‘We 
[God] will test you until We know [who strives for the sake of God]’ [Q. 47:31]. This is 
where al-Shaʿrānī’s stance clearly differs from that of Ibn ʿArabī. 
    As I demonstrated, Ibn ʿArabī interprets ‘until We know’ in accordance with his 
tenet of the oneness of existence. In his view, the verse means that when a person 
performs an act in this world, God knows it too as the real performer and knower of this 
action, even though He knows it pre-eternally prior to its coming to be. Ibn Taymiyya 
condemns Ibn ʿArabī’s reading of ‘until We know’ as heretical, as it supposes the 
identification of God’s existence with that of the world, as well as the renewal of His 
knowledge, undermining His perfect, pre-eternal knowledge. As I will demonstrate, the 
approach al-Shaʿrānī takes to the scriptural expression in question is understood as a 
form of conciliation towards this criticism, whereby, in keeping with what I have 
discussed earlier, he balances God’s foreknowledge of creation with human 
accountability. 
    Al-Shaʿrānī takes several approaches to the meaning of ‘until We know’. One of 
them resembles the interpretation of many Qurʾān commentators. As mentioned earlier, 
they understand the verse by associating it with God’s knowledge of visible, actual 
things while He already knows all beings through His knowledge of the uncreated, 
invisible world.470 In explaining the same verse, al-Shaʿrānī similarly states that God 
                                                
470 Al-Shaʿrānī explains the Ashʿarī approach to ‘until We know’ as reliant upon the notion of 
‘a relation’ (taʿalluq) between God’s knowledge and the objects of His knowledge, and refutes 
it. The rational theologians maintain that when the world’s beings go through a change, it is a 
relation that changes, not His knowledge. In this way, they try to protect immutability of the 
divine attributes. For al-Shaʿrānī as well as for Ibn ʿArabī, however, these theologians’ idea of 
the origination of a relation (ḥudūth al-taʿalluq), as things appear and disappear, causes a 
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already knows in potency (bi-l-quwwa) who strives prior to the creation, and He also 
knows in actuality (bi-l-fiʿl) who strives after they come to be in the phenomenal 
world.471  
    It is noteworthy that, following the idea that God knows all beings from eternity 
prior to their coming to be, including the changes they go through, al-Shaʿrānī denies 
(against the critique of Ibn Taymiyya) the renewal of God’s knowledge at any point. 
Al-Shaʿrānī then introduces a different interpretation of it. He writes:  
 
To those who had imagined that God acquires knowledge of His creation 
after He did not [possess that knowledge] – as befell a group of 
weak-minded people (ahl al-fahm al-saqīm) based on the divine report ‘We 
[God] will test you until We know’ – I have answered as follows. It is 
prohibited to have faith in the view [that God acquires knowledge of His 
creation]. For God has always been the knower of all things prior to their 
coming to be in the phenomenal world (ʿālam al-shahāda). Then He 
brought them into existence [from His knowledge] into the phenomenal 
world in accordance with what He has known. Even when things are 
renewed (tajaddud), His knowledge of them will not get renewed, as I noted 
in the beginning. All beings of different ranks with various images are thus 
pre-eternally known to God.472  
                                                                                                                                          
doctrinal issue. If God comes to know things in this world differently from how He used to 
know them by changing a relation between His knowledge and its objects, the concept of time is 
applied to God, which is absurd. See more on this in al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 
165-172; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 119; Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 2, 692. 
On the teaching on relations, see Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought, 151-152; al-Āmidī, 
Abkār al-afkār, vol. 1, 477-478; Ghāyat al-marām, 77. 
471 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 158. 
472 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 168. Cf., al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 98. 
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As the passage clearly indicates, al-Shaʿrānī holds the view that God does not acquire 
His knowledge anew, as He knows everything from eternity. Nevertheless, he admits 
the possibility that weak-minded people – or those whom he views as commoners – 
would support the idea of the renewal of God’s knowledge; in al-Shaʿrānī’s view, as a 
courtesy (adab) and submission to God (taslīm), they prefer to believe in the prima facie 
sense of the divine report.473 Thus, they take the verse ‘until We know’ at face value 
and imagine that God comes to know things from His creation when they are created, 
just as human beings acquire new knowledge after having not known.474  
    Remarkably, building on this observation, al-Shaʿrānī interprets ‘until We know’ 
from a different perspective, whereby he promotes faith in its prima facie sense in the 
context of his mystical discipline. With respect to this, one of his passages reads:  
 
‘Until We know’, that is to say, until Our knowledge of what We knew 
about your states prior to testing you becomes manifest to you [and then 
God comes to know them in the phenomenal world through actual 
experience]. This is [God’s] descent to [people’s] minds [tanazzul lil-ʿuqūl] 
as is seen in other reports of divine attributes, the prima facie sense of which 
[ẓāhir] is close to the anthropomorphic attributes [qurb min ṣifāt tashbīh].475 
 
In a similar vein, al-Shaʿrānī further states:  
 
                                                
473 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 159.  
474 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 167-168.  
475 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 169. 
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 God’s intention in the prima facie sense of ‘We will test you until We 
know’ is related to the meaning of ‘the All-Aware’; that is to say, He 
acquires the knowledge [of His creation through experience] after the 
[actual] trial, not before that, although God is the knower of all that 
happens to His creation prior to their existence or their manifestation 
[through His absolute knowledge]. It is thence from His mercy that God 
descends to the minds of His servants [tanazzul li-ʿuqūl ʿibādi-hi]. This is 
similar to His descent to their minds in the reports of God sitting upon the 
throne, His descent to the lowest heaven, and so on, even when the prima 
facie senses of these [expressions, which are anthropomorphic] contradict 
the divine attributes that declare His incomparability.476 
 
In these passages, al-Shaʿrānī acknowledges that the prima facie sense of ‘until We 
know’ is anthropomorphic. Therefore, the literal acceptance of its meaning is 
impermissible, as it leads to pure anthropomorphism, undermining the notion of divine 
incomparability. Nevertheless, at the same time, al-Shaʿrānī maintains that the divine 
message has to be believed as such, because God has revealed it Himself.477  
    In order to affirm the prima facie sense of the anthropomorphic attributes while 
rejecting literal anthropomorphism, al-Shaʿrānī employs the expression ‘His [God’s] 
descent to people’s minds’. This is an important notion within his mystical worldview. 
To put it shortly, it means that God describes Himself with various features of His 
creatures in order to facilitate people’s understanding of God in their minds. I will 
                                                
476 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 172. 
477 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 172. 
 207 
discuss the details of this in Chapter 4.478 For now, suffice it to note that following the 
idea of God’s descent to people’s minds, al-Shaʿrānī justifies the anthropomorphic 
meaning of ‘until We know’ as securing human accountability and their prayers to God. 
That is to say, a belief that God acquires knowledge of the world’s beings from those 
beings makes it worthwhile for people to appeal to God – for instance, when pleading 
with Him to show them mercy or to grant them patience in the face of ordeals – even 
though God knows everything in advance. Thus, the prima facie sense of ‘until We 
know’, along with the deterministic nature of the immutable entities, makes humans 
responsible for their actions and encourages them to accept their tribulations, as well as 
to appeal to God in times of need.479  
                                                
478 See also al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 116-117, wherein he writes as follows 
(the first paragraph is taken from al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, whereas the second one is 
al-Shaʿrānī’s own comment): 
 
Ibn ʿArabī writes in Chapter 552 [of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya] regarding the meaning 
of the divine name ‘the All-Aware’ (khabīr) as follows: Know this my brother, the 
All-Aware is that which obtains knowledge through experience (ikhtibār). This is 
reported in the prima facie snse of the divine report ‘We will test you until We know’ 
requires [Q. 47:31].  
  May God be above this requirement; rather, He knows all that will occur to the 
servants. And therefore, did He [not] create [them in accordance with what He knew]? 
Nevertheless, God descends (nazzala) to the level (manzila) of one who acquires 
knowledge, just like He lowered Himself to our reasons in the verse of sitting upon the 
throne, descent to the world’s heaven and others. This is so despite the fact that these 
reports deny the divine attributes of incomparability (tanzīh) [al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt 
wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 116-117].  
 
As I will discuss in the next chapter, quoting a lot from Ibn ʿArabī, the discussions 
concerning the expression ‘God’s descent to people’s minds’ in relation to the divine 
anthropomorphic reports are unique to al-Shaʿrānī. They are actually his main concern in 
his theological project.  
479 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 157-159. His passage on this goes as follows:  
 
Some mystics have stated that God did not report this [that is, ‘We will test you 
until We know’] except as the corridor (dihlīz) through which they establish the 
decisive argument of their accountability to themselves, or as ‘the [divine] descent 
to their minds’ (tanazzulan li-ʿuqūli-him) in order for God to demonstrate to them 
the veracity of their supplication for the divine love, contentment with the divine 
decree, and patience under the divine trial. This is so despite the consensus of all 
religious communities that God knows everything that happens to His servants in 
the future of this world and the hereafter [al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 
158]. 
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    Al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to ‘until We know’, as discussed above, differs from that 
of commoners. It is certain that, by having faith in the prima facie sense of the report 
that God does not know what actions they would take, the commoners also ascribe 
accountability to themselves. However, in al-Shaʿrānī’s view, without the mystical 
awareness that their immutable entities, not God, have predetermined what happens to 
them from eternity, they are likely to protest to God and against His predestination 
when things go wrong. 480  This is also different from the view of the Qurʾān 
commentators who accept neither the literalistic approach to ‘until We know’ nor the 
notion of the immutable entities.  
    Furthermore, and most markedly, al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to ‘until We know’ in 
relation to its prima facie sense disagrees with Ibn ʿArabī’s view on the same verse, 
which identifies God’s knowledge with that of creation based on his tenet of the 
oneness of existence. As I demonstrated, while supporting some features of the 
immutable entities, in the texts addressed to non-advanced mystics and theologians, 
al-Shaʿrānī avoids the monistic implications of the teaching proposed by Ibn ʿArabī. 
Thus, instead of discussing ‘until We know’ within the context of the ontological 
worldview, al-Shaʿrānī holds that its prima facie sense has to be believed as such in 
order to make humans accountable for their actions despite God’s foreknowledge of 
creation – on the condition that it does not accompany a purely anthropomorphic 
implication that God in reality comes to know that which He did not know.  
    To conclude this section on the theory of the immutable entities, I have first 
                                                                                                                                          
 
Note that al-Shaʿrānī again refers to the expression of ‘the descent to their minds’ in this 
passage in order to make sense of people’s pleas and prayers to God in times of trial, 
when in reality their destiny is pre-determined and fixed in His knowledge through the 
immutable entities.  
480 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 160. 
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demonstrated al-Shaʿrānī’s support of Ibn ʿArabī’s tenets of the non-existent thing and 
creation ex nihilo (i.e. creation out of relative nonexistence). Like Ibn ʿArabī, 
al-Shaʿrānī identifies the non-existent things that are pre-eternally known to God as the 
immutable entities. As I pointed out, these immutable entities do not have extra-mental 
realities outside God’s knowledge. Rather, in al-Shaʿrānī’s view, they are dependent 
upon His knowledge.  
    I have also shown that al-Shaʿrānī presents the idea of the immutable entities as a 
means of reconciliation between the Muʿtazilī view and that of the Ashʿarīs on divine 
creation. The outcome of his discussion is to demonstrate Ibn ʿArabī’s superiority to the 
views of these theological groups, as well as to refute the attribution to Ibn ʿArabī of 
belief in the world’s eternity, widely attributed to him before al-Shaʿrānī.  
    Furthermore, I have argued that, in al-Shaʿrānī’s view, the assumption that God 
cannot change the course of events fixed by the immutable entities actually proves 
people’s accountability for their actions, thereby protecting belief in divine perfect 
knowledge and predestination, rather than undermining divine omnipotence and 
omniscience as Ibn Taymiyya claims. To al-Shaʿrānī’s mind, this is one of the most 
important features of the notion of the immutable entities. It enables the mystics who 
have this awareness to balance divine predestination with human accountability.  
    Lastly, and most significantly, with regard to the extent of al-Shaʿrānī’s reception 
of Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching, I have demonstrated that al-Shaʿrānī avoids discussing the 
immutable entities within the context of ontological divine self-manifestation, nor does 
he promote the identification of God’s knowledge with that of His creation through the 
report ‘until We know’. Al-Shaʿrānī rather insists on faith in this scripture without 
acceptance of pure anthropomorphism. In his view, its prima facie sense has to be 
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believed, as the idea of God’s acquiring knowledge of creation makes people’s 
supplication to Him meaningful and preserves their accountability. This is a striking 
finding indicating al-Shaʿrānī’s intention to explain the anthropomorphic expression 





    The objective of this chapter was first to examine al-Shaʿrānī’s acceptance of the 
doctrine of the oneness of existence. I have argued that in al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, a 
relatively early work of al-Shaʿrānī addressed to advanced mystics, he clearly supports 
this tenet, along with the ontological theory of God’s self-manifestation in the world’s 
beings, the idea of the perfect man, and the aforementioned thesis as the world He/not 
He. Most importantly, our observation differs from existing scholarship, which 
perceives al-Shaʿrānī as a moderate Sufi who is not interested in Ibn ʿArabī’s monistic 
teachings. 
    Another objective of this chapter was to consider al-Shaʿrānī’s treatment of the 
immutable entities, the theory that is essential to the ontology of Ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism. 
Based on an analysis of al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir and al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, which 
are written for non-advanced mystics and theologians, I discussed that al-Shaʿrānī’s 
presentation of the immutable entities is very palatable. As I showed, al-Shaʿrānī 
certainly advocates some of the key features of the teaching: that the immutable entities 
are the non-existent things which are present in God’s knowledge prior to creation; that 
the immutable entities are characterised with relative nonexistence; and that God cannot 
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change what the immutable have predetermined from eternity. However, in contrast to 
Ibn ʿArabī, al-Shaʿrānī does not situate this teaching within the ontology of God’s 
self-manifestation or the oneness of existence. Excluding the ontological implications of 
the immutable entities, al-Shaʿrānī discusses them, instead, in relation to certain 
theological issues, focusing on how the immutable entities complement belief in 
creation ex nihilo, secure the notion of divine predestination and the attribution of 
accountability to human beings, and protect the notion of God’s perfect knowledge.  
    The selection of these particular topics shows al-Shaʿrānī’s intention to respond to 
Ibn ʿArabī’s antagonists such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Ahdal. Thus this observation 
helps us to understand al-Shaʿrānī’s defence of Ibn ʿArabī in the intellectual backdrop 
of his period. It also highlights al-Shaʿrānī’s attempts to present the mystical teaching 
within the context of theological discipline. 
    The findings of this chapter, in conjunction with those of the previous chapter, 
expose variations in al-Shaʿrānī’s reception of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought across his works, as 
well as the centrality of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings throughout al-Shaʿrānī’s scholarly life. 
The opposing views submitted by al-Shaʿrānī (i.e. his simultaneous support and denial 
of Ibn ʿArabī’s ontological worldview) should not be taken negatively as entailing 
contradiction and confusion in his thought. Rather, the contrast results from his 
methodology of carefully taking different stances depending on the audience. As I noted, 
the date of composition of al-Shaʿrānī’s works would also suggest a development in his 
theological position. He was possibly more interested in showing his support for Ibn 
ʿArabī’s ontological worldview when he wrote al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, and then 
gradually became inclined to present it in a different manner for non-advanced mystics 
and theologians with the objective of defending Ibn ʿArabī.  
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    In the next chapter, by focusing on the issue of the anthropomorphic attributes of 
God, I will discuss al-Shaʿrānī’s interpretation of Ibn ʿArabī’s theory of divine 
self-manifestation as a perceptual and visionary experience. There, I will examine how 
al-Shaʿrānī approaches the theological problem of the anthropomorphic attributes based 































Al-Shaʿrānī on Anthropomorphism 
 
 In the second part of Chapter 3, we briefly examined al-Shaʿrānī’s attempt to 
discuss theological issues within the sphere of mystical discipline. I argued that he 
endorses the prima facie sense of ‘until We know’ [Q. 47:31], that is to say, the idea 
that God acquires knowledge of the world’s beings from those beings, which makes it 
worthwhile for people to appeal to God. According to al-Shaʿrānī, the anthropomorphic 
meaning should be retained as indicating ‘God’s descent to people’s minds’, despite the 
reality that God already knows everything.  
     ‘God’s descent to people’s minds’ is a key expression to which al-Shaʿrānī draws 
much attention in his theological works addressed to non-advanced mystics and 
theologians. The objective of the current chapter is to explore this idea further and to 
analyse al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to the anthropomorphic attributes. Here, I shall 
investigate the central question of this thesis, concerning the integration of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
teachings into al-Shaʿrānī’s own mystical and theological worldview. It will emerge that, 
like Ibn ʿArabī, al-Shaʿrānī intends to synthesise the opposing notions of divine tanzīh 
and tashbīh – yet crucially, he does so within the framework of visionary divine 
self-manifestation, not in relation to ontological divine self-manifestation. It will be 
demonstrated that while he confirms Ibn ʿArabī’s core theories of the synthesis of 
tanzīh and tashbīh and of divine self-manifestation, al-Shaʿrānī remarkably 
recontextualises them in his theological works in an attempt to defend Ibn ʿArabī. In 
this regard, the previously mentioned comment by Winter, that al-Shaʿrānī distorts the 
intended meanings of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings, may well hold true. However, as we shall 
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see in this chapter, al-Shaʿrānī’s purported ‘distortion’ is in fact a creative 
reinterpretation of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought in a way that suits al-Shaʿrānī’s theological 
project. Therefore, this topic, hitherto uninvestigated, merits close examination in terms 
of understanding al-Shaʿrānī’s reception of Ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism – especially in the 
view of his distinctive theological endeavour of defending Ibn ʿArabī.  
    This chapter consequently treats four topics. It begins with a brief overview of the 
notions of divine incomparability (tanzīh) and anthropomorphism (tashbīh), and 
considers Ibn ʿArabī’s views on them. The second section concerns al-Shaʿrānī’s 
refutation of the rational theologians’ figurative interpretation (taʾwīl), to which he was 
originally introduced by Ibn ʿArabī. It should be noted that whilst he is dismissive of 
figurative interpretation, al-Shaʿrānī allows its use for commoners, who may otherwise 
naively believe in pure anthropomorphism. However, when addressing the mystics – 
especially the non-advanced ones – al-Shaʿrānī encourages faith in the prima facie sense 
of the anthropomorphic attributes, all the while avoiding any implication of literal 
anthropomorphism.  
    The structure of this particular teaching is the subject of the third section. By 
focusing on the aforementioned expressions ‘God’s descent to people’s minds’ and the 
‘balance’ (al-mīzān) between the two levels of divine self-manifestation, I first 
investigate al-Shaʿrānī’s treatment of the tenet of tashbīh, in the sense of God’s 
assimilating Himself to creation through the perceptual similarity evoked in the mind. 
As I will show, within the context of these teachings, al-Shaʿrānī promotes faith in the 
prima facie sense for a practical reason. I then discuss his espousal of the theory of 
visionary divine self-manifestation through which God describes Himself as having 
various attributes in scripture, in contrast to ontological divine self-manifestation, 
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whereby God becomes manifest in the world’s beings. It will emerge that, based on his 
own understanding of divine self-manifestation, al-Shaʿrānī combines the two principles 
of tanzīh and tashbīh, just like Ibn ʿArabī, but with the different objective of solving the 
issue of the anthropomorphic attributes, rather than explaining the ontological reality of 
the world. 
    The last section of this chapter concerns al-Shaʿrānī’s resemblance to the Ḥanbalī 
traditionalists in terms of their approaches to the anthropomorphic attributes. It will be 
argued that al-Shaʿrānī intends to establish a certain similarity between Ibn ʿArabī and 
the Ḥanbalīs in terms of their rejection of pure anthropomorphism. As we shall see, 
al-Shaʿrānī’s stance on the anthropomorphic attributes is characterised by a combination 
of the traditionalist position and Ibn ʿArabī’s theophany. The study of this topic will 
thus illuminate the innovativeness of al-Shaʿrānī’s theological project, dedicated to 
non-advanced mystics and theologians.  
 
4.1. Divine Incomparability (tanzīh) and Anthropomorphism (tashbīh) 
 
    Over the centuries and throughout the intellectual history of Islam, the issues of 
divine incomparability and anthropomorphism were extensively debated. This subject 
has attracted much scholarly interest.481 In what follows, I provide a brief account of 
these notions and restate how each theological group deals with the references in 
scripture to God’s anthropomorphic attributes. I will then consider Ibn ʿArabī’s view on 
the synthesis of tanzīh and tashbīh.  
 
                                                
481 For information on secondary sources, see Shah, ‘Tanzīh and Tashbīh.’ 
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4.1.1. Anthropomorphism: Overview 
 
    The notion of tanzīh, which literally means ‘to declare something above something 
else’, is drawn from the Qurʾānic statements that describe God as being peerless and 
unique, such as ‘nothing is like Him’ [Q. 42:11]. Generally speaking, most theologians 
tried to defend the principle of God’s incomparability to the world. On the other hand, 
the term tashbīh – the literal meaning of which is ‘to make something similar’ or ‘to 
liken/compare something to something else’ – is often employed as a pejorative 
expression to condemn someone who is deemed to have breached the dogma of divine 
incomparability. The associated term is corporealism (tajsīm), which literally means ‘to 
make something corporeal’ or ‘to give something a body.’ Historically, no theological 
groups declared themselves as anthropomorphists (mushabbiha) or corporealists 
(mujassima). These terms were primarily used in a polemical context as a way to 
censure the opposing position on the divine anthropomorphic attributes.  
    The anthropomorphic attributes are the various scriptural descriptions of God that 
are based on traits of creatures. These include corporeal features (e.g. His hearing, sight, 
hands, and legs); physical actions (e.g. His sitting upon the throne and His descent to 
the world’s heaven); human-like emotions (e.g. His anger and laughs); and spatial 
expressions (e.g. His being closer to human beings than the jugular vein [Q. 50:16], His 
nearness to the prophet at a distance of two bow lengths [Q. 53:49], and His being with 
creation in any place [Q. 57:4]). 
    A problem arose amongst Muslim scholars as to how to address these attributes 
without violating the notion of divine incomparability. Throughout the history, 
theological groups took three different approaches to understanding the 
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anthropomorphic attributes: the noncognitive approach known as bi-lā kayfa, figurative 
interpretation (taʾwīl), and the delegation of knowledge to God (tafwīḍ). Before 
comparing their position with al-Shaʿrānī’s, I briefly summarise each stance below.  
    The first approach, the bi-lā kayfa formula, encourages one to accept the 
anthropomorphic attributes in the way that they were reported, but without enquiring 
about their real meaning or their relation to God. For example, God sitting upon the 
throne should be affirmed; however, His sitting is unlike human sitting, and no one 
knows what the expression really means when applied to God. This position is primarily 
associated with the traditionalist Ḥanbalīs, who stressed the importance of transmitting 
the report rigidly as it came down to them.482 In their view, affirming (ithbāt) the prima 
facie sense (ẓāhir) of the anthropomorphic expressions does not necessarily lead one to 
acknowledge the physical, corporeal features of God or to compare God to His creation, 
as there is absolutely no likeness between the divine reality and that of creation.483 
Thus, many Ḥanbalīs uphold faith in the prima facie sense of the anthropomorphic 
reports, but do not claim any apprehension of their real meaning or modality. This 
‘noninterventionist’484 or ‘noncognitive’485 doctrine is recognised as bi-lā kayfa (which 
is conventionally translated as ‘without modality’, ‘without asking how’, or ‘without 
further comment)’.486 The formula was developed as a rejection against the position of 
                                                
482 Williams maintains that up until the end of the formative period of Islamic theology (i.e., 
third-fourth/ninth-tenth century), many scholars had little problem with accepting 
anthropomorphic attributes in the form in which they were reported. See Williams, ‘Aspects of 
the Creed,’ 441-463. 
483 A hadith of Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795), ‘God sitting upon the Throne is known, but its 
modality (kayf) is unknown,’ is often adduced to describe this position.  
484 Swartz, A Medieval Critique, 123, n.176. 
485 Shihadeh, ‘Three Apologetic Stances,’ 3-4.   
486  Abrahamov, ‘Bi-lā kayfa doctrine,’ 365; Holtzman, Anthropomorphism. Amongst the 
Ashʿarī scholars, the bi-lā kayfa formula came to mean ‘without attributing any corporeal 
qualities to God. Frank, ‘Elements,’ 155-160; Holtzman, Anthropomorphism, 188.  
 218 
pure anthropomorphism and figurative interpretation.487 The Ḥanbalīs’ noncognitive 
method invited criticism from rational theologians for being literalistic. It eventually led 
to the trial of Ibn Ḥanbal – the founder of this theological group – who was arrested and 
charged for promoting pure anthropomorphism (tashbīh).488 
    Another well-established approach to the anthropomorphic attributes is to interpret 
them figuratively. Adopted by rational theologians – such as the Muʿtazilīs and later the 
Ashʿarīs – the figurative, non-literal interpretation (taʾwīl) is defined as an effort to 
replace the prima facie sense of the Qurʾānic verses with the tropical, figurative sense 
by positing the problematic verses as metaphors or tropes (majāz). This method is based 
on analysis of the conventional usage of each word in Arabic language, poetry, and 
scripture.489 For instance, since hand (yad) in Arabic can be metaphorically employed 
to mean ‘favour’, ‘power’, or ‘aid’, rational theologians interpreted God’s hands to 
mean His favour or power. This enabled them to avoid the literal likening of God to His 
creation. Accordingly, the verse ‘a hand of God is over their hands’ [Q. 48:10] 
figuratively means that ‘God’s goodness (iḥsān) towards creatures is greater than their 
goodness towards Him’ or that ‘God’s aid (nuṣra) to creatures is stronger than their aid’. 
                                                
487 Abrahamov, ‘Bi-lā kayfa doctrine,’ 378; Holtzman, Anthropomorphism, 189. 
488 In order to refute the charges of heresy, later Ḥanbalīs like Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201) and 
Ibn Taymiyya adopted a more rationalistic approach. See Holtzman, ‘Does God really laugh?’ 
184-200; Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy, 46-69; ‘Ḥanbalī Theology,’ 633-641; Swartz, A 
Medieval Critique. 
489 Swartz, A Medieval Critique, 58; Gleave, ‘Conceptions of the Literal Sense,’ 183-190. After 
converting from the Muʿtazilī group, the founder of the Ashʿarī school, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī 
(d. 324/935-6), is believed to have endorsed the affirmation of the anthropomorphic attributes as 
they were reported, and adhered to a bi-lā kayfa doctrine like the Ḥanbalīs, whilst objecting to 
the Muʿtazilīs’ figurative interpretation. However, as the Ashʿarī school inclined more towards 
the usage of reason in developing arguments against the Muʿtazilīs, later Ashʿarīs like Ibn Fūrak 
(d. 406/1015), al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037), al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), 
and al-Rāzī eventually adopted figurative interpretation as their main method to treat scripture 
(Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism, 6-8; Frank, ‘Elements,’ 168; Holtzman, Anthropomorphism, 
234-245, 306-312). During the medieval period when the influence of the Muʿtazilīṣ waned, this 
brought about contention between the Ashʿarīs who employed figurative interpretation of the 
anthropomorphic attributes and the Ḥanbalīs who refused it based on their belief that such 
expressions should be taken literally (Bell, Love Theory, 47-62). 
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In the view of the rational theologians’ reasoning, this reading is more fitted to God’s 
nature, because His goodness or His aid is indeed greater than that of His creation. By 
elucidating the linguistically and theologically acceptable figurative meaning as an 
alternative to the prima facie one, these theologians endeavoured to avoid 
anthropomorphism, thereby securing divine incomparability.490 
    In addition to the bi-lā kayfa doctrine of the traditionalists and the figurative 
interpretation of rational theologians, there existed one other strategy to help deal with 
anthropomorphic expressions. This strategy is called ‘the delegation of knowledge to 
God’ (tafwīḍ). Theologians associated it with the esteemed position of the pious 
predecessors (salaf). The Ashʿarīs also approved the delegation of knowledge as 
another interpretive method for those who do not intend to employ figurative 
interpretation.491 Similarly to figurative interpretation, this approach rejects the prima 
facie sense of scripture in order to dismiss pure anthropomorphism. However, unlike 
figurative interpretation, which aims to find the non-literal, figurative sense as an 
alternative, this approach does not seek another meaning, and instead entrusts the 
knowledge of the intended meaning entirely to God.492 With respect to this, Shihadeh 
writes: 
 
Others, especially within the kalām tradition, espoused the ‘stronger’ attitude 
of ‘delegation’ (tafwīḍ, which means the same as taslīm ‘acquiescent assent’), 
whereby one affirms merely the words in ambiguous scriptural statements as 
they are in their original form, and suspends the ordinary meanings thereof, 
                                                
490 El-Rouayheb, ‘Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī,’ 275; Spevack, The Archetypal, 128-129. 
491 Hoover, ‘Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya,’ 269. 
492 El-Rouayheb, ‘From Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī,’ 275-287; Spevack, The Archetypal, 126-133. 
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‘delegating’ the matter to God. For them, modality is inseparable from the 
ordinary meaning of an expression; wherefore, it will be irrational to affirm 
the latter but suspend the former. Both attitudes are ascribed by their 
proponents to the pious predecessors (salaf).493 
 
In contrast to the bi-lā kayfa formula, which accepts the prima facie sense and denies 
the knowledge of its modality when applied to God, delegation affirms the divine 
message in the original manner and denies our ability to understand its meaning entirely. 
El-Rouayheb analyses the difference between delegation and the bi-lā kayfa formula as 
follows: 
 
The former [delegation] is that we do not know the meaning of a word such 
as istawā or yad when used of God, but know that it does not mean ‘to sit’ or 
‘hand’, while the latter [bi-lā kayfa] is that we do know what the expressions 
mean, but do not know what it is like for God to be seated or have a hand.494 
 
    Al-Shaʿrānī perceives Ibn ʿArabī as a proponent of delegation and acquiescent 
assent (taslīm) who also disregarded figurative interpretation. It should be noted, 
however, that al-Shaʿrānī’s understanding of delegation seems rather similar to the bi-lā 
kayfa formula. One of his passages reads: 
 
They [theologians] were then divided in their opinions over whether they 
should interpret the ambiguous expression or delegate (yufawwiḍ) the 
                                                
493 Shihadeh, ‘Three Apologetic Stances,’ 4. 
494 El-Rouayheb, ‘From Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī,’ 282. 
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knowledge of its meaning. That is to say, to delegate the intention of it 
(murād) to God, while declaring Him incomparable (tanzīh) to the prima 
facie sense of the expression (ẓāhir al-lafẓ); and this is our state of delegation. 
The pious predecessors adopted acquiescent assent, whereas the late scholars 
(khalaf) opted for figurative interpretation.495 
 
Following this passage, al-Shaʿrānī describes the pious predecessors’ acquiescent assent 
as having faith in what God has reported in the way He has intended, leaving the 
knowledge of its modality to God without any inquiry as to what it really is. This 
comment implies acceptance of the prima facie sense, but denial of its modality. If this 
is the case, it is the very definition of the bi-lā kayfa theory, rather than that of 
delegation. Al-Shaʿrānī then connects this view with Ibn ʿArabī, by way of evidencing 
the latter’s loyalty to the pious predecessors.496 As we shall see next, however, this 
position is only one side of Ibn ʿArabī’s approach to the anthropomorphic attributes. His 
real intention is to establish the problematic expressions as aspects of ontological 
similarity between God and the world.  
 
4.1.2. Ibn ʿArabī on the Synthesis of Tanzīh and Tashbīh 
 
    Regardless of their differences, the three approaches I have explained above all 
agree on two points: the espousal of divine incomparability and the rejection of literal 
anthropomorphism. Consequently, and in the view of the theologians, the notions of 
tanzīh (which establishes God’s uniqueness) and tashbīh (which compares God to His 
                                                
495 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 141-142. 
496 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 142-145. 
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creation) are incompatible. This explains the negative reaction of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
opponents against his synthesis of ‘divine incomparability’ and ‘anthropomorphism’ 
(which can also be translated, as I we shall see, as divine immanence or divine 
similarity).497 In what follows, I summarise Ibn ʿArabī’s approach to synthesising 
tanzīh and tashbīh, with a special emphasis on the criticism it incited from certain 
Ashʿarī scholars, such as al-Biqāʿī and Ibn al-Ahdal. Later on, Ibn ʿArabī’s view will be 
compared to al-Shaʿrānī’s synthesis of tanzīh and tashbīh.  
    As I noted in Chapter 1, based on the theory of ontological divine 
self-manifestation, Ibn ʿArabī sees the world as simultaneously He and not He.498 In 
other words, from one perspective, the world is God as His loci, and in this sense He is 
immanent in creation and similar to it (tashbīh). From another perspective, however, the 
world is not God in reality, because His essence, which is the only existence in the 
cosmos, is absolutely incomparable to the world’s beings (tanzīh). Ibn ʿArabī argues 
that this thesis is drawn from the observation of two distinct relations (nisbatayn) 
through which God reveals Himself in scripture: the relation of divine incomparability 
on the one hand and ‘the relation of the divine descent to people’s imagination through 
striking divine immanence’ (nisba tanazzul ilā al-khayāl bi-ḍarb min al-tashbīh) on the 
other.499 The former relation is shown in the verse ‘nothing is like Him’, whereas the 
latter is suggested in anthropomorphic passages, such as ‘wherever you may see, there 
is a face of God’ [Q. 2:115], amongst others. According to Ibn ʿArabī, the faculty of 
                                                
497 Chittick, The Sufi Path, 68-76. 
498 Chittick, The Sufi Path, 112-115, 361-369. 
499 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 2, 3. In Chittick, The Sufi Path, 277, it is translated 
as ‘descent to the imagination through striking a kind of similarity’. I chose the word ‘divine 
immanence’ for the translation of tashbīh, as ‘similarity’ alone does not really transmit the 
implication of the cosmological resemblance that occurs between God and the world through 
His self-manifestations and the doctrine of the oneness of existence; it must be noted, however, 
that for Ibn ʿArabī, God is not literally similar to His creation in terms of His essence. 
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imagination, not reason, allows one to realise divine manifestations in creation. 
Therefore, it is said that God descends to people’s imagination in order for His 
immanence in the world to be perceived by it.500  
    In Ibn ʿArabī’s view, a mystic who has realised the reality of the cosmos being 
He/not He, and affirmed the notions of divine incomparability and immanence, is called 
the possessor of the two eyes (dhuʾ-l-ʿaynayn). He can see God both as one in His 
essence and many through His manifestations in the world.501 This does not mean that 
Ibn ʿArabī believes in pure anthropomorphism in the sense of assuming physical or 
corporeal features in God. For him, the world’s beings are the images of His 
manifestations, and as such they are not identical to Him in a real sense. Ibn ʿArabī thus 
approves of the notion of tashbīh as far as it is understood in relation to cosmological 
divine self-manifestation and the doctrine of the oneness of existence. In respect of this, 
El-Rouayheb writes as follows: 
 
According to Ibn ʿArabī and his followers, the tension between the tanzīh 
demanded by theology and the tashbīh suggested by certain passages in the 
Qurʾān and Sunna was ultimately resolved by invoking the notion of divine 
epiphany or manifestation (tajallī). God is in Himself radically different 
from anything created, but He can manifest Himself in the world of created 
phenomena. All references to God’s anthropomorphic and spatial attributes 
should be understood to refer to the divine epiphanies, and not to the divine 
                                                
500 According to Ibn ʿArabī, in the world of imagination, which stands between the spiritual 
world and the corporeal world, formless things become corporealised. It is where the divine 
self-manifestations take place. For more details on the role of the faculty of imagination and the 
world of imagination, see Chittick, The Sufi Path, 115-118; Imaginal Worlds, 70-79; ‘Ibn 
Arabi.’ 
501 Chittick, The Sufi Path, 356-363. 
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Self.502   
 
Ibn ʿArabī’s approach to tanzīh and tashbīh through the theory of divine 
self-manifestation was shared by his later followers, such as the Shāfiʿī Ibrāhīm 
al-Kūrānī (d. 1101/1690) and ʿAbd al-Ghanī Nābulusī, both of whom openly defended 
the tenet of the oneness of existence. In their view, despite his espousal of God’s 
immanence in the world, Ibn ʿArabī was not an upholder of literal anthropomorphism, 
as he would immediately stress the otherness of God’s essence and the oneness of His 
single reality.503   
    In modern scholarship, Ibn ʿArabī’s idea of the synthesis of divine incomparability 
and divine immanence is considered one of the central doctrines of his mysticism.504 It 
was also a controversial topic for his adversaries. As I discussed in Chapter 1, one of 
Ibn ʿArabī’s critics, al-Biqāʿī, describes the objective of the mystical path according to 
Ibn ʿArabī as realising God’s immanence in the world’s beings yet affirming His 
incomparability to them. Al-Biqāʿī then objects to this teaching, for it leads to justifying 
the idol-worshippers who see God’s presence in worldly objects, thereby identifying 
God with creation.505 With respect to this, al-Biqāʿī quotes part of the poem from Ibn 
ʿArabī’s Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, which goes as follows: 
 
If you only speak of His incomparability (tanzīh), you limit Him 
(muqayyid).  
And if you only talk about His immanence (tashbīh), you define Him 
                                                
502 El-Rouayheb, ‘From Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī,’ 302.  
503 El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 312-346. For al-Nābulusī, see Akkach, ʿAbd 
al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī.  
504 Izutsu, Sufism, 48-87; Chittick, The Sufi Path, 68-76, 356-378.   
505 al-Biqāʿī, Tanbīh al-ghabī, 41-53. 
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(muḥaddid).  
If you speak of the two, you are right.  
Then, you are an Imam and a master (sayyid) in mystic knowledge.506 
 
According to Ibn ʿArabī, since God manifested Himself in the world’s beings, one has 
to declare God both incomparable and immanent in order to complete the mystic path. 
For al-Biqāʿī, however, the idea of divine immanence in the world is utterly 
unacceptable. Ibn al-Ahdal also adduces the same part of the above poem, introducing it 
as testament to Ibn ʿArabī’s synthesis of divine incomparability and immanence 
(al-jamʿ bayna al-tanzīh wa-l-tashbīh). Ibn al-Ahdal then condemns it as an admission 
of gross anthropomorphism that promotes literal identification between God and 
creation.507  
    As I showed in Chapter 3, in al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, al-Shaʿrānī supports the 
combination of divine incomparability and immanence based on the theory of 
ontological divine self-manifestation.508 However, and as we shall see in the current 
chapter, this does not encapsulate his entire mysticism. Elsewhere in his theological 
works addressed to non-advanced mystics and theologians, al-Shaʿrānī endorses the 
synthesis of tanzīh and tashbīh in the different context of visionary divine 
self-manifestation, thereby reinterpreting Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching in relation to his own 
mystical and theological worldview. Before considering this topic, let me first 
investigate al-Shaʿrānī’s rejection of figurative interpretation.  
   
 
                                                
506 Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 55/70; al-Biqāʿī, Tanbīh al-ghabī, 44. 
507 Ibn Ahdal, Kashf al-ghiṭāʾ, 189-190/vol. 2, 646. 
508 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 125-152. 
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4.2. Al-Shaʿrānī on Figurative Interpretation 
 
    As I noted earlier, Ibn ʿArabī was dismissive of the use of figurative interpretation 
and speculative theology. 509  For him, mystical experience is superior to human 
reasoning. The divine anthropomorphic attributes should therefore be treated through 
the mystical discipline of the oneness of existence and understood in relation to divine 
immanence in the world. Al-Shaʿrānī adopted the same negative stance on human 
reasoning, expressing his disapproval of figurative interpretation in many of his 
theological works intended for both advanced mystics and non-advanced mystics. These 
texts include: al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, Kashf al-ḥijāb, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 
al-Qawāʿid al-khiḍriyya, al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, and al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir. 
Al-Shaʿrānī’s repeated rejections of figurative interpretation suggest that this is one of 
the chief aims of his theological project. However, his dismissal of figurative 
interpretation does not necessarily mean that he deals with the anthropomorphic 
attributes in the way Ibn ʿArabī does. I will discuss this point in the next section.  
    The main concern of the present section is to detail al-Shaʿrānī’s denial of 
figurative interpretation. He borrows most of his arguments on this issue from Ibn 
ʿArabī’s Lawāqiḥ al-asrār wa-l-lawāʾiḥ al-anwār and al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya. 
Although Ibn ʿArabī’s criticism of figurative interpretation has been pointed out in 
recent scholarship, its details have barely been examined.510 Moreover, since Lawāqiḥ 
al-asrār remains unstudied, a recurring reference to some of its passages throughout 
al-Shaʿrānī’s texts merits special attention, especially in terms of understanding Ibn 
                                                
509 Chittick, The Sufi Path, 73, 201-202; El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 281, 285. 
510 Chittick, The Sufi Path, 199-202; El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 275.  
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ʿArabī’s teaching.511 
    Al-Shaʿrānī’s positions on figurative interpretation are founded on two arguments: 
(1) that there is originally no metaphor and anthropomorphism in scripture, and (2) that 
the figurative sense with which the rational theologians replaced the prima facie sense is 
in fact another form of anthropomorphism. It will become clear that al-Shaʿrānī, 
following Ibn ʿArabī’s idea, broadens the meaning of tashbīh by applying it not only to 
pure anthropomorphism, which can be caused by literally having faith in the prima facie 
sense of the anthropomorphic attributes, but also to another form of anthropomorphism, 
which is itself originated through the non-literal, figurative meaning.  
    It bears reiterating that al-Shaʿrānī’s rejection of figurative interpretation is 
primarily addressed to mystics and theologians. For commoners, on the other hand, he 
rather recommends figurative interpretation and urges them to replace the prima facie 
sense with the figurative one, in order to prevent them from upholding literal 
anthropomorphism. 
 
4.2.1. Anthropomorphism in Scripture 
 
    A staring point of al-Shaʿrānī’s denial of figurative interpretation is his conviction 
that a person who interprets scripture in an attempt to avoid pure anthropomorphism 
trusts reason over the divine message. Such a person is therefore weaker in faith than 
one who simply believes in the prima facie sense of God’s revelations. By interpreting 
scripture figuratively, there is also the risk of arriving at something that is not what God 
                                                
511 Lawāqiḥ al-asrār was reportedly compiled by one of Ibn ʿArabī’s disciple, Ibn Sawdakīn (d. 
636/1248), as a collection of his teacher’s remarks. Although the text was recently published in 
2015, I have unfortunately not been able to access it.  
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originally intended.512 In addition to this, for al-Shaʿrānī, one of the fundamental issues 
concerning figurative interpretation is that the anthropomorphism which rational 
theologians attempt to avoid is not actually found in scripture. This is based on his view 
that the metaphor or trope (majāz) does not originally exist in Arabic.  
    Al-Shaʿrānī’s view on this point is attributed to Ibn ʿArabī’s Lawāqiḥ al-asrār. 
Quoting a passage from Lawāqiḥ al-asrār, in which it is stated that every scriptural 
expression is employed in a literal, veridical sense (ḥaqīqatan), al-Shaʿrānī writes as 
follows: 
 
Those who have realised the truth have already agreed that there is no 
metaphor (majāz) in Arabic; people employed the terms in regard to what 
they referred to literally (ḥaqīqatan). Consequently, they applied the word 
‘hand’ (yad) to refer to power (qudra), organs (jāriḥa), and also to favour 
(maʿrūf). Even if someone claims that a hand in each case is employed 
metaphorically and hence they have to be transferred (naql) [to a figurative 
sense], there is no way of doing this [because it is not intended to be 
metaphorical]. When they said that ‘someone is a lion’, they put it that way 
in a literal sense. This is based on their language [i.e. Arabic] in which a 
courageous person is [conventionally] designated a lion. Therefore, they 
used the term, ‘lion’, [in order to refer to a courageous person], not 
metaphorically but literally (ḥaqīqatan wa-lā majāzan).  
    If the matter is like this, then you will understand that all of the reports 
in the Qurʾān and the Sunna where a reference to the divine hand, eye, side, 
                                                
512 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 93; al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 248. 
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fingers and so forth is made, none of them requires the comparing of God to 
creation (tashbīh). This is because it [the comparing of God to creation] 
only occurs through employing certain expressions such as [the preposition 
of] ‘like’ (mithl) which means being equal (musāwī), or ‘as’ (kāf) of an 
attribute [in order to indicate the comparison]. Things without these two are 
nothing but equivocal terms (alfāẓ ishtirāk) [and not metaphors]. 
Accordingly, when the anthropomorphic attributes were revealed in the 
Qurʾān and the Sunna, they were attributed to each entity (dhāt) [in a literal 
sense] in accordance with what the reality (ḥaqīqa) of that entity demands 
[and hence, there is no figurative sense and no anthropomorphism to 
avoid].513  
 
In the conventional view, ‘someone is a lion’ is a metaphorical expression, according to 
which a person’s courageousness is likened to that of a lion. Hence, the meaning of 
‘lion’ must be transferred to the non-literal, figurative sense of a courageous person. In 
contrast to this, in the view of al-Shaʿrānī, the word ‘lion’ can be understood as literally 
meaning ‘a courageous person’. Rather than endeavouring to uncover the expression’s 
alternative, non-literal meaning, the expression is perceived to represent a separate 
reality from that of a ferocious animal. For al-Shaʿrānī, the same thing is said of the 
divine anthropomorphic attributes; they are reported not in a figurative sense but in a 
literal sense. This is underpinned by the observation that they are accompanied by 
certain prepositions such as ‘like’ or ‘as’, which indicate the comparison of God to 
something else (tashbīh). Henceforth, there is no need to engage in figurative 
                                                
513 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 94; al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 247; al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, 
fol. 72a; al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fol. 118a-b. al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1. 147.  
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interpretation to avoid anthropomorphism. The meanings of the anthropomorphic 
attributes can be affirmed in their original manner, even if the reality of those attributes 
is not known.  
    As the above passage shows, al-Shaʿrānī sees the anthropomorphic expressions as 
equivocal terms (alfāẓ ishtirāk), each of which signifies a separate reality.514 An 
equivocal term is defined as a word which carries multiple meanings in one form and is 
applicable to different referents. For example, the word yad in Arabic can mean a 
physical hand, power, and favour, and ʿayn can refer to an eye, a spring of water, and 
the letter ʿayn of the Arabic alphabet; yet each reality is evidently distinct from the other. 
According to al-Shaʿrānī, rational theologians understand equivocal terms in relation to 
the dichotomy between literal speech (ḥaqīqa) and non-literal, figurative speech 
(majāz). 515  For instance, in keeping with the view of the rational theologians, 
al-Shaʿrānī argues that the word ‘finger’ (iṣbaʿ) is an equivocal term which is applied to 
a physical hand in the literal sense, and to a favour (niʿma) or an influence (athar) in the 
figurative sense. Hence, God’s fingers as alluded to in the following hadith, ‘the heart of 
a believer lies between two fingers of the Merciful one’, are interpreted metaphorically 
to mean God’s dual favour of granting existence (ʾījād) and succour (imdād).516 By this 
means, the rational theologians reject the prima facie sense that could lead to pure 
anthropomorphism, opting instead for the figurative sense that suits God’s 
                                                
514 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 148. The idea is originally taken from Ibn 
ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 95. 
515 The dichotomy between ḥaqīqa and majāz was most likely conceived after the 3rd/9th 
century by the Muʿtazilīs as a hermeneutical device to avoid reading the anthropomorphic 
expressions at face value. For more on this, see Heinrichs, ‘On the Genesis,’ 111-117; Ovadia, 
Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 201-206. 
516 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 148. Cf., Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, 
vol. 1, 95-96. 
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incomparability and authority.517 
    On the other hand, al-Shaʿrānī’s reading of the anthropomorphic attributes as being 
equivocal terms disposes of the dichotomy between the literal sense and the 
metaphorical sense. According to him, anthropomorphic expressions are applicable both 
to God and to His creatures in a literal sense; furthermore, they are understood without 
figurative interpretation. This does not blur the sheer distinction between God and 
creation, because each term refers to the distinct reality of its referent.518 For instance, 
God’s hand and a human being’s hand have no resemblance to each other, and both can 
be acknowledged in a literal sense on condition that the reality of the divine hand is 
never believed to be known. Al-Shaʿrānī states that this is supported by the divine 
statement that ‘nothing is like Him’, in which God Himself explicitly denied 
anthropomorphism, that is, actual similarity between the divine and the world.519 
Despite this, the rational theologians wrongly imagine that the affirmation of the prima 
facie sense of the anthropomorphic attributes amounts to literal anthropomorphism, and 
thus choose to read them as metaphors, interpreting them figuratively. In opposition to 
this, al-Shaʿrānī maintains that, because of the sheer distinction between God’s reality 
and that of His creation, those attributes do not actually lead to anthropomorphism.520 
                                                
517 On the usage of ḥaqīqa-majāz and ẓāhir-taʾwīl, see Weigelt, ‘Samaritan Bible,’ 223; Gleave, 
‘Conceptions of the Literal Sense,’ 183-203. 
518 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 96. 
519 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 147-148.  
520 Ibn ʿArabī expresses a similar opinion in al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya as follows: 
 
I am amazed at two groups of the Ashʿarīs and the pure anthropomorphist 
(mujassima) in their mistakes concerning an equivocal term. How can they bring this 
to the likening of God to the creatures (tashbīh) when it only occurs between two 
things through the word ‘like’ (mithl) or ‘as’ of an attribute (ṣifa) in language? And 
it is difficult to find in the Qurʾān and the Sunna anthropomorphism as they 
imagined […]. [Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 43 (Translated in 
Chittick, The Sufi Path, 73)]. 
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Moreover, and as we shall see shortly, the practice of figurative interpretation, though 
aimed at avoiding anthropomorphism, actually engenders another type of 
anthropomorphism.  
    Here, al-Shaʿrānī’s explicit stance on the denial of the figurative sense of 
anthropomorphic expressions is worth noting, particularly because his other teachers 
and colleagues, Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī,521 Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ramlī,522 and Ibn Ḥajar 
al-Haytamī 523  engaged in figurative interpretation. 524  This is another case that 
demonstrates the important influence of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings on al-Shaʿrānī’s thought. 
Ibn ʿArabī’s dismissive attitude towards figurative interpretation is most probably 
related to his sympathy with certain principles of the Ẓāhirī school of Law, which also 
denied the presence of the figurative sense in the Qurʾān.525  
    Another striking finding here is the similarity between Ibn ʿArabī/al-Shaʿrānī and 
Ibn Taymiyya in terms of the rejection of the figurative sense. As Shah observes, Ibn 
Taymiyya denounced both the occurrence of the figurative sense in scripture as well as 
the dichotomy between the literal and the figurative senses, attributing them to the later 
development advanced by theological groups such as the Muʿtazila. 526  Ibn 
ʿArabī/al-Shaʿrānī and Ibn Taymiyya also agree in their opposition to the application of 
                                                
521 al-Anṣārī, Iḥkām, vol. 1, 49, 67-68. Nevertheless, al-Shaʿrānī sees al-Anṣārī as a scholar who 
was dismissive of figurative interpretation. See al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 2a. 
522  al-Ramlī, Fatāwā, vol.4, 286-285, printed on the margins of Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, 
al-Fatāwā al-kubrā al-fiqhiyya. 
523 For Ibn Ḥajar’s position, see El-Rouayheb, ‘From Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī,’ 271-275. 
524 As for al-Suyūṭī’s view on this subject, see Holtzman and Ovadia, ‘On Divine Aboveness,’ 
263-264; Shah, ‘Philological Endeavours (Part II),’ 60. 
525 Osman, The Ẓāhirī Madhhab, 43, 46, 212. For the reasons behind the Ẓāhirīs’ rejection of 
the figurative sense, see Heinrichs, ‘On the Figurative (majāz),’ 260-265. With regard to the 
question of whether Ibn ʿArabī was a member of the Ẓāhirī school of Law, see Dajani, ‘Ibn 
ʿArabī’s Conception,’ 90-150. 
526 Shah, ‘Philological Endeavours (Part II),’ 44-53; ‘Classical Islamic Discourse,’ 334-339. Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya held a similar position. See, Holtzman and Ovadia, ‘On Divine Aboveness,’ 
258; Shah, ‘Philological Endeavours (Part II),’ 53-59. 
 233 
figurative interpretation. 527  Nevertheless, as Hoover notes, Ibn ʿArabī differs 
fundamentally from Ibn Taymiyya in his view of the mystical discipline, and so does 
al-Shaʿrānī. As I will later demonstrate, al-Shaʿrānī clearly disagrees with Ibn Taymiyya 
and other Ḥanbalī scholars over the treatment of the anthropomorphic attributes within 
the context of the mystical teaching. 
 
4.2.2. Figurative Sense as a Form of Anthropomorphism 
 
    After rejecting figurative interpretation by explaining that there is no metaphor in 
scripture and no anthropomorphism through which God is compared to creation, 
al-Shaʿrānī sets out to refute figurative interpretation further by demonstrating that it 
engenders another kind of anthropomorphism. For this belief, he refers to the account of 
God sitting upon the throne (istawāʾ ʿalā al-arsh) [Q. 7:54, 20:5, 25:59, 32:4]. As is 
well known, the rational theologians refused to acknowledge the prima facie sense of 
this passage in order to avoid assuming God’s physical movement from one place to 
another.528 They thus interpret ‘sitting’ (istiwāʾ) figuratively as ‘God’s conquering’ or 
‘God’s making Himself a master of’ (istīlāʾ). This interpretation derives from a line of 
poetry that goes: ‘Bishr conquered Iraq’ or ‘Bishr made himself a master of Iraq’ 
(istawā Bishr ʿalā al-ʿIrāq, which literally means that Bishr sat upon Iraq). Regarding 
the throne upon which God is revealed to have sat, it is interpreted as ‘a seat of 
sovereignty’ (sarīr al-mulk).529 Hence, the figurative sense of ‘God sitting upon the 
                                                
527 Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy, 47-48.   
528 al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, vol. 17, 14. 
529 al-Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf, 651; al-Suyūṭī, Tafsīr al-Jalālayn, 157, 312. By saying that 
‘God sits upon a seat of sovereignty in the way that befits Him’, al-Suyūṭī intends to avoid 
interpreting sitting (istawā) as conquering (istawlā). 
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throne’ is specified as ‘God gaining control of the world’ or ‘God possessing power 
(istiqdār) over the world’.530 This became a standard interpretation of the verse of the 
throne amongst the Muʿtazilīs and the late Ashʿarīs such as al-Juwaynī and al-Rāzī.531    
    Defying this interpretive approach, al-Shaʿrānī maintains that as soon as the 
theologians replace the prima facie sense of God sitting with His gaining control of the 
world (istawlā), they come to liken God to the very meaning they have just drawn. In 
his view, the figurative sense proposed by the rational theologians is a newly originated 
being, and as such, God should not be compared to it. With respect to this, al-Shaʿrānī 
gives the following account: 
 
Then, the following thing has become certain to us: God is not likened to 
corporeal bodies (al-ajsām). [If He is likened to corporeal bodies] then He 
becomes physically settled (mustaqirr). 532  Also God is not likened to 
conceptual meanings (maʿānī). [If He is likened to conceptual meanings] 
then His sitting (istiwāʾu-hu) becomes His gaining sovereignty (istīlāʾ 
fī-qahr). If this is the case then we will say: whoever relates God to the 
conceptual meanings has already slipped into the likening of God (tashbīh) 
to the originated meanings (maʿānī muḥdatha). If the likening of God to the 
originated beings (muḥdathāt; i.e. God gaining sovereignty) has already 
occurred [through figurative interpretation], then how could they [the rational 
theologians] disprove those [anthropomorphists] who advocated settling 
                                                
530 al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, vol. 22, 6-7; al-Juwaynī, Lumaʿ al-adilla, 108. 
531  For more details on this topic, see Achtar, ‘Contact Between Theology’; Holtzman, 
Anthropomorphism. 
532 As for the rational theologians’ refutation of taking God sitting as His settling in repose, see 
Fitzgerald, ‘Creation in Tafsīr al-Kabīr.’  
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(istiqrār), which is one of the attributes of sensory perception (ṣifāt al-ḥiss), 
when both of them [i.e. settling and gaining sovereignty] are originated.533 
 
Here, al-Shaʿrānī expands the definition of anthropomorphism to include not only the 
likening of God to the physical and corporeal features, but also the likening of God to 
the figurative meanings that are drawn through figurative interpretation. In his view, 
comparing God to the meanings newly conceived by human beings equates to 
bestowing upon Him anthropomorphic features. As such, the use of figurative 
interpretation should not be permitted.    
    Furthermore, al-Shaʿrānī demonstrates that figurative interpretation leads to a 
change in God, thereby contradicting His perfection. As I noted earlier, the rational 
theologians interpret the throne to mean God’s sovereignty (mulk), the seat of which 
God comes to possess (istawlā). Refuting this reading, al-Shaʿrānī argues that the reality 
of possessing (istīlāʾ) requires the occurrence of a new qualification (turūʾ wasf). This is 
based on the observation that someone only comes to possess something following a 
state in which he did not possess. Applied to the verses in which God sits upon the 
throne, this means that the absence of God’s sovereignty of the world precedes the 
origination of His sovereignty.534 This conclusion is absurd, because it is impossible to 
assume that God did not possess a certain attribute in the beginning, only to acquire it 
later.  
    It is noteworthy that al-Shaʿrānī’s approach here is similar to the Ḥanbalī jurist, Ibn 
al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200). According to Ibn al-Jawzī, the reality of istawlā is that someone 
                                                
533 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 95; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 149-150; al-Mīzān 
al-khiḍriyya, fol. 47b; al-Mīzān al-sunniyya, fol. 19a. A similar argument is found in Ibn ʿArabī, 
al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 43-44; Chittick, The Sufi Path, 73. 
534 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 95-96. 
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comes to possess something after he did not. Theologically speaking, this meaning is 
not suited to God, as He has been in possession of everything from eternity. The 
figurative sense that the rational theologians propose as an alternative to the prima facie 
sense thus turns out to be illogical, not least for suggesting that there is something God 
has not yet possessed. Ibn al-Jawzī therefore denounces figurative interpretation, 
likening it to the unbeliever (mulḥid) stripping God of His attributes (taʿtīl) or the 
anthropomorphist (mujassima) comparing God to His creatures (tashbīh).535 Yet again, 
the significant difference between al-Shaʿrānī and Ibn al-Jawzī as well as other Ḥanbalīs 
lies in their treatment of the mystical discipline, in particular their stances on tashbīh. I 
will return to this subject shortly. 
    Following these arguments, al-Shaʿrānī concludes his refutation of figurative 
interpretation as follows:  
 
Sitting (istiwāʾ) is a well-known attribution (nisba maʿlūma), and it is related 
to each referent [whether it is God or humans] in accordance with what the 
reality of that referent requires.536 If this is the case, then how can one say 
that God sat upon the throne just like Bishr sat upon Iraq (istawā)? We 
already know Bishr in definition and in reality, and we know how Bishr’s 
sitting is attributed to Iraq [i.e. in the sense of conquering or gaining control 
of Iraq]. Is then the reality of the One who sits upon the throne analogous to 
the reality of Bishr who sat upon Iraq, so that a correlation (muqābala) and 
correspondence (munāsaba) [between God’s sitting and Bishr’s sitting] 
                                                
535 Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād al-masīr, 500. With regard to al-Rāzī’s response to this kind of criticism, 
see al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, vol. 20, 7. 
536 This part is originally found in Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 44, translated in 
in Chittick, The Sufi Path, 73. 
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becomes real? [It cannot be analogous, as their realities are fundamentally 
different.] We have already realised that ‘nothing is like Him’, and 
accordingly, there is no correspondence [between the divine reality and the 
reality of Bishr].537  
    The conclusion is that they [i.e. those who figuratively interpret the 
divine message] only departed from the likening of God to a temporally 
originated thing [tashbīh bi-muḥdathin mā; i.e. His physical sitting] to the 
likening of God to another temporally originated thing [i.e. His conquering or 
gaining control of the world], which is better than the former in terms of its 
meaning [fawqah fī l-maʿnā]. Thus, human reason in its attempt to declare 
God incomparable did not reach the level of ‘nothing is like Him’ in the 
end.538  
 
In the first paragraph, al-Shaʿrānī perceives ‘sitting’ as a common attribution applicable 
both to God and to creatures. In keeping with the notion of the equivocal terms, this 
does not mean that the reality that each sitting refers to is the same. The reality of 
Bishr’s sitting is of course known, whereas the divine sitting is not. Since nothing is like 
God, it is impossible to apply the figurative sense of Bishr’s sitting to that of God by 
positing a correspondence between them.  
    Building upon these observations, in the second paragraph al-Shaʿrānī reiterates 
that the rational theologians’ attempts to replace the prima facie sense with the 
figurative sense in the hope of avoiding anthropomorphism ironically leads to another 
kind of anthropomorphism; they only shift from the likening of God’s action to the 
                                                
537 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 96. 
538 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 96. 
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physical sitting, to the likening of His action to the newly originated meaning of 
conquering or sovereignty.539 They thus fail to attain God’s incomparability, which 
they had originally aimed to secure.540  
    As a possible alternative to figurative interpretation, al-Shaʿrānī offers a different 
type of interpretation that does not require the likening of God to originated beings; 
namely, interpretation of the scripture through the scripture (tafsīr al-qurʾān 
bi-l-qurʾān). Here, al-Shaʿrānī refers to the text of the Ashʿarī theologian, Abū Ṭāhir 
al-Qazwīnī (d. 756/1355), entitled Sirāj al-ʿuqūl.541 According to al-Qazwīnī, ‘God 
sitting’ can be read as ‘completion of the creation’ (istitmām). This is based on the use 
                                                
539 Another example demonstrating how figurative interpretation incurs anthropomorphism is 
observed in the hadith, ‘God descends to the world’s heaven every night’. Al-Shaʿrānī argues 
that most of the rational theologians, including the traditionalists, prefer to interpret this hadith 
to mean either a descent of His command or His angel, without taking it as a descent of God 
Himself. However, their interpretation that God’s angel or His command descends from Him 
leads to confining God in a specific direction, thereby promoting anthropomorphism. In 
al-Shaʿrānī’s view, the relation (nisba) between God and His attribute of descent to the world’s 
heaven should not be denied, and it ought to be believed as such without figurative 
interpretation (al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 162). 
540 According to al-Shaʿrānī, divine incomparability is secured only by having faith in scriptural 
expressions, such as ‘nothing is like Him’, and not through reasoning. This is because God 
would then be a substratum for the act of human reasoning, which is absurd. In relation to this, 
quoting his teacher ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ, al-Shaʿrānī writes: 
 
Then our teacher [ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ] said as follows. God only ordered those who 
think with reason (ʿuqalāʾ) to declare Him incomparable with what He has transmitted 
through revelation, but not with their reason […]. It is prohibited that God’s essence 
becomes a substratum (maḥall) for what the unbelievers (mulḥidūn) described Him 
with. God is incomparable in His essence by Himself (li-nafsi-hi) and He does not 
become incomparable by a servant’s declaring God incomparable (tanzīh). For this 
reason, the divine incomparability amongst scholars is achieved only by knowing it, 
and not by making it [through reasoning] (huwa ʿilmun lā ʿamalun). For, if it were by 
making it [through reasoning], God who is incomparable by Himself would become a 
substratum for the effect of this act (ʿamal) […]. We can never attain God’s absolute 
incomparability (tanzīh muṭlaq) disengaged from the likening of God to the creatures 
(tashbīh), because His absolute incomparability is only provided by revelation (sumiʿa 
fī l-sharʿ) and it is not found in reason (ʿaql). The highest point their reasons have 
reached is their declaration that God’s sitting is compared to that of Bishr over his 
kingdom [i.e. gaining sovereignty] [al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 96-97]. 
  
541 The copy of the manuscript is available at the British Library. However, I obtained access to 
it too late to consider it here. Unfortunately, little is known about who al-Qazwīnī was. Given 
al-Shaʿrānī’s frequent references to this figure, further research on him and his text is necessary 
in order to fully understand al-Shaʿrānī’s theological position. 
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of istawā in other Qurʾānic verses, such as ‘when he came of age and became mature 
(istawā)’ [Q. 28:14] in the sense of ‘when his youth was completed (istatamma)’, or 
‘like a seed that produces its shoots and strengthens them so that they become thick and 
settle upon their stalks (istawā)’ [Q. 48:29] in the sense of ‘when the seed has come to a 
completion and become strong (istatamma).’ Al-Qazwīnī then observes that whenever 
‘God sitting upon the throne’ is mentioned in the Qurʾān, it always follows a reference 
to the divine creation of heaven and the earth [Q. 7:45; 10:3, 20:4-5, 25:59, 32:4, 57:4]. 
Therefore, the verse of the throne can be taken to mean that God’s creation settled upon 
the throne (istawā) – that is to say, His creation came to completion (istatamma) with 
the creation of the throne, which is the greatest creation of all. This interpretive method 
differs from figurative interpretation in that it neither relies on external sources other 
than scripture, nor replaces the prima facie sense with the figurative sense. Al-Shaʿrānī 
notes that al-Qazwīnī’s approach is distinguished that of both early and late scholars, 
and it eventually came to be criticised.542 This is an interesting example indicating 
al-Shaʿrānī’s dependence on the opinion of the lesser-known, less popular Ashʿarī 
theologian. 
    Regardless of proposing a different approach to the anthropomorphic attributes, 
al-Shaʿrānī’s focus is primarily set on affirming the attributes in relation to his 
worldview of God’s visionary self-manifestation. It is based on this framework that a 
mystic can strike the perfect balance between tanzīh and tashbīh. I will now further 
explore this subject.        
 
 
                                                
542 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 144-146; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 139-141. 
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4.3. Al-Shaʿrānī on Anthropomorphic Attributes 
 
    The objective of this section is to consider al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to the 
anthropomorphic attributes and to discuss his reinterpretation and integration of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s teaching into his own mystical and theological worldview. In particular, I will 
examine how al-Shaʿrānī treats the anthropomorphic attributes differently from both the 
theologians and from Ibn ʿArabī. As I will show, based on belief in what can be called 
visionary divine self-manifestation, rather than cosmological and ontological divine 
self-manifestation, al-Shaʿrānī upholds the notion of tashbīh and supports the prima 
facie sense of the anthropomorphic attributes for a practical purpose, while at the same 
time excluding the implications of pure anthropomorphism and divine immanence. The 
findings of this section will highlight al-Shaʿrānī’s prominence in the defence of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s thought. 
    In what follows, I first investigate al-Shaʿrānī’s view on the anthropomorphic 
attributes of God, focusing on his understanding of the following notions: ‘the balance’ 
(al-mīzān) between the two levels of non-delimitation and delimitation; ‘God’s descent 
to people’s minds’ (tanazzul lil-ʿuqūl); and ‘divine self-assimilation’ (tashbīh) to 
creation through perceptual similarity. While doing so, I will clarify a practical role that 
faith in the prima facie sense of the anthropomorphic attributes serves. In the following 
section, I turn to al-Shaʿrānī’s presentation of the notion of visionary divine 
self-manifestation, examining in particular his reinterpretation and recontextualisation 
of a statement by Ibn ʿArabī. Finally, in order to further clarify al-Shaʿrānī’s position, I 
consider the likeness of his views to those of the Ḥanbalīs, as well as his difference 
from them concerning their approaches to the subject of the anthropomorphic attributes. 
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4.3.1. The Function of Anthropomorphic Attributes 
 
    Earlier, I mentioned that al-Shaʿrānī associates Ibn ʿArabī’s stance on the 
anthropomorphic attributes with the approach of the pious predecessors, who ‘delegated’ 
meaning to God, and upheld acquiescent assent. Although Ibn ʿArabī supports these 
ideas, it must be reiterated that his position is not limited to them. We have already seen 
that, based on the ontological theory of divine self-manifestation, Ibn ʿArabī perceives 
the anthropomorphic attributes in relation to the oneness of existence and divine 
immanence in the world’s beings. Hence, the hadith that says that ‘God created Adam 
in His image’ is interpreted as ‘God manifests His image in Adam who is the perfect 
man’. Another passage, ‘I [God] am his hearing with which he hears’, is taken to mean 
that God is indeed His servant’s hearing, since there is only His essence in the cosmos. 
Similarly to Ibn ʿArabī, al-Shaʿrānī expresses support for the idea of delegating 
meaning to God.543 Nevertheless, as is the case with Ibn ʿArabī, al-Shaʿrānī also takes 
another approach to the anthropomorphic attributes. As we shall see, al-Shaʿrānī 
employs the prima facie sense of the attributes for a practical purpose within the context 
of his own mystical teaching.  
    In order to detail al-Shaʿrānī’s position on the anthropomorphic attributes, the 
current section focuses on three of his key ideas in his theological works – ‘the balance’, 
‘the divine descent to people’s minds’, and ‘divine self-assimilation’ – and clarifies the 
function of the anthropomorphic attributes. In addition to this, I will also consider the 
differences between al-Shaʿrānī’s and Ibn ʿArabī’s positions regarding these key 
                                                
543 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 141-142. 
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concepts. It will emerge that the most striking feature of al-Shaʿrānī’s view of tashbīh is 
that it only upholds similarity between God and the external world on a perceptual level. 
In other words, and contrary to Ibn ʿArabī’s proposition, al-Shaʿrānī’s interpretation of 
tashbīh does not signify God’s ontological identification with the external world. 
    It needs to be reminded, first of all, that the word mīzān bears a resemblance to the 
title of al-Shaʿrānī’s famous jurisprudential work, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, in which he 
develops a notion of the balance between the two extremes of the Law: stringency 
(tashdīd/ʿazīma) and leniency (takhfīf/rukhṣa). With regard to this, Dajani argues that 
according to al-Shaʿrānī, every legal issue can have two rulings: the more stringent 
ruling for those who are able to execute it, and the more lenient ruling for those who are 
unable to follow the former. Through the notion of the balance of the Law, al-Shaʿrānī 
attempts to clarify the ostensible contradictions that appear in scripture, thereby 
allowing the co-existence of different legal opinions suitable for people of different 
abilities.544  
    On the contrary, in his theological works, al-Shaʿrānī considers the balance in 
relation to the theory of divine self-manifestation. For his part, this balance is composed 
of the two levels of divine self-manifestation: non-delimitation (iṭlāq) and delimitation 
(taqyīd). It must be noted that al-Shaʿrānī takes two different approaches to the concepts 
of non-delimitation and delimitation – namely, ontological/cosmological and 
perceptual/textual.  
    On the one hand, in his support of Ibn ʿArabī’s ontology as discussed in Chapter 3, 
al-Shaʿrānī holds in al-Mīzān al-dharriyya that God manifests Himself to Himself at the 
divine level of non-delimitation. Following this initial manifestation, God manifests 
                                                
544 For more on this concept, see Dajani, ‘Ibn ʿArabī’s Conception of Ijtihād,’ 166-182.  
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Himself in the world’s beings at the divine level of delimitation, making Himself 
immanent in them.545 Based on this ontological worldview of divine self-manifestation, 
an accomplished and advanced mystic accepts the anthropomorphic attributes as 
testaments to God’s manifestations in creation, while upholding His sheer 
transcendence through the perspective of His essence. Such a mystic simultaneously 
affirms both divine incomparability (tanzīh) and divine immanence (tashbīh), thus 
synthesising the two notions. 546  I demonstrated that this was al-Shaʿrānī’s main 
position for advanced mystics. 
    On the other hand, in many of his other theological works addressed to 
non-advanced mystics and theologians, most notably in al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, 
al-Shaʿrānī explains divine self-manifestation from a different perspective. There, he 
stresses the idea that God manifests Himself to creation in scripture by describing 
Himself as having various attributes. According to al-Shaʿrānī, at the level of 
non-delimitation, God becomes manifest as incomparable to creation through the 
attributes of incomparability (e.g. His mightiness, loftiness, supremacy, and so on). At 
the level of delimitation, God reveals Himself to the world through the divine 
anthropomorphic attributes that make people imagine certain similarity between God 
and creation. In his view, the divine manifestations at these two levels ought to be 
upheld, as they are simply drawn from the observation of scriptural expressions.547  
    Markedly, al-Shaʿrānī identifies this level of delimitation as ‘God’s descent to our 
minds through striking similitudes that are similar to our attributes’ (tanazzul-hu 
                                                
545 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 171-172. 
546 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 152-153. 
547 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-khiḍriyya, fols. 8a-12a. 
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li-ʿuqūli-nā bi-ḍarb min al-amthāl allatī tuwahhim al-qurb min ṣifāt-nā).548 In order to 
delineate al-Shaʿrānī’s understanding of the balance between the two levels, let us 
examine the details of his idea of the divine descent to the mind, along with his espousal 
of the prima facie sense of the anthropomorphic attributes and his interpretation of 
tashbīh. 
    To my knowledge, the expression ‘God’s descent to people’s minds through 
striking similitudes (sg. mathal; pl. amthāl)’ does not appear in Ibn ʿArabī’s writings. It 
is true to say that it is similar to his aforementioned statement ‘[God’s] descent to the 
imagination through striking a kind of similarity [i.e. through divine immanence]’ 
(tanazzul ilā al-khayāl bi-ḍarb min al-tashbīh).549 Nevertheless, as I have shown, Ibn 
ʿArabī means here that one can perceive God’s immanence and see His manifestations 
in creation through the faculty of the imagination. In the main body of al-Mīzān 
al-dharriyya, and in the context of ontological divine self-manifestation, al-Shaʿrānī 
certainly refers to Ibn ʿArabī’s expression ‘God’s descent to people’s imagination’.550 
However, when al-Shaʿrānī treats the idea of ‘God’s descent to peoples’ minds through 
striking similitudes’ in his other texts, the expression bears little to no implication of 
divine immanence. In respect of this, a passage in al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya reads as 
                                                
548 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-khiḍriyya, fol. 15b. In al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir and al-Qawāʿid 
al-sunniyya, it appears as ‘God’s descent to people’s minds through striking similarity in the 
imagination’ (tanazzul li-ʿuqūl-him bi-ḍarb min al-tashbīh al-khayālī) [al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt 
wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 48; al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya, fol. 14a]. In Kashf al-ḥijāb, it is introduced as 
God’s descent to our minds (tanazzul al-ḥaqq taʿālā ilā-ʿuqūli-nā) [al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ḥijāb, 
110]. Interestingly, halfway through the argument in the last section of al-Mīzān al-dhariyya – 
which begins with: ‘Let us start to talk about the balance (mīzān); all the sections [in this text] 
were preparation (tamhīd) for the understanding of it’ – al-Shaʿrānī proceeds to discuss ‘God’s 
descent to people’s minds through striking similitudes and assimilating Himself [to creatures]’ 
(tanazzul ilā ʿuqūl-him bi-ḍarb min al-tamthīl wa-l-tashbīh) [al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 
156, 172]. Although al-Mīzān al-dharriyya is addressed to advanced mystics who are ready to 
accept Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical monism, this shift of the subject towards the end of the text 
suggests that al-Shaʿrānī’s ultimate focus was to propose the teaching of the balance that treats 
divine self-manifestation at the visionary, rather than the ontological, level. 
549 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 2, 3, translated in Chittick, The Sufi Path, 277. 




The attributes through which God descended to people’s minds (tanazzala 
al-ḥaqq taʿālā bi-hā lil-ʿuqūl) do not require the [actual] likening of any 
divine attributes to created beings (tashbīh). They are merely [used by God] 
for striking similitudes and making Himself known to [people’s] minds 
(taʿrīf). This is why neither the prophets nor the founders of the schools of 
Law needed figurative interpretation, for they knew that the 
anthropomorphic attributes (ṣifāt al-tashbīh) are not admitted to the divine 
from any aspects, regardless of what creation understands from those 
attributes […].551 
 
As the passage indicates, a demand for figurative interpretation only arises from the 
assumption that faith in the prima facie sense of the divine attributes leads believers to 
comparing God to creation. The prophets did not employ figurative interpretation, 
because they knew that the anthropomorphic attributes – which are the similitudes 
through which God descends to people’s minds – do not engender literal 
anthropomorphism.  
    Al-Shaʿrānī expounds upon the notion of the similitudes by relating them to the 
Qurʾānic idea of God’s striking similitudes or symbols (ḍarb al-amthāl).552 In reference 
                                                
551 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 7a, 
552 Ibn ʿArabī discusses a similar idea of God’s striking similitudes. He insists that the whole 
cosmos is full of similitudes for God thorough which believers come to know that He is He. 
However, his context differs markedly from that of al-Shaʿrānī. In Ibn ʿArabī’s case, the 
striking of similitudes is discussed in relation to the ontology of divine self-manifestation, 
whereas for al-Shaʿrānī, it has to do with the process of God’s descent to people’s minds 
through the perceptual similarity evoked by scriptural expressions.  
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to the divine light which the Qurʾān likens to a light in a niche (‘God is the light of the 
heavens and the earth; the similitude (mathal) of His light is like a niche within which is 
a lamp [...] He guides whom He wills to His light and He strikes similitudes to the 
people’ [Q. 24:35]), al-Shaʿrānī argues that it is impossible for the divine pre-eternal 
light to be placed in a temporally originated niche. Here, the divine light in a created 
niche does not reflect the divine reality; it is merely used as a symbol in order to 
facilitate people’s understanding of what the divine light is. Following this idea, 
al-Shaʿrānī maintains that once that which the similitude stands for is perceived, the 
image of the divine light in a niche needs to be removed from people’s minds, as it has 
served its purpose. All that is left in their minds is the image of that which the similitude 
represents553, i.e. the divine guide.  
    Like the case of the divine light in a niche, other similitudes that God strikes in 
order to reveal Himself to worldly beings do not signify any actual similarity between 
the divine and the external world. According to al-Shaʿrānī, this is contrasted with the 
concept of ‘likeness’ (mithl). A likeness equates to the thing that it signifies in every 
aspect. In contrast, a similitude is only analogous with the thing that it intends to clarify, 
or its image.554 Understanding the distinction between a likeness and a similitude 
enables us to affirm ‘the divine form’ as reported in the controversial hadiths about the 
                                                
553  al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 173; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 47. Another 
example is the divine pre-eternal speech (kalām). The divine speech is not originally 
accompanied by any sounds or letters, but it came down to human beings with sounds and 
letters so that they would understand the divine messages through them. Yet as soon as they 
know the meanings and remember the divine message by heart, the sounds and letters that are 
similitudes to the divine speech should be dismissed, for they can now recall the divine message 
without reciting or reading the text (al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 173; al-Yawāqīt 
wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 47). 
554 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 25-27, 175. Mithāl is also used as a synonym for mathal. 
The distinction between mithl and mathal/mithāl is originally proposed by Ibn ʿArabī in relation 
to his theory of cosmological imagination. On this subject, see Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 
72-77; The Sufi Path, 117.  
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dream vision of God: ‘I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form’ or ‘in the form of a 
young man’. Here, the divine form is taken as God’s similitude – but not His exact 
likeness.555 What follows is that faith in these passages in their original manner does 
not entail any actual anthropomorphism, as there is no literal similarity between the 
divine form and the form of a young man; rather, it is incumbent upon one to believe in 
the hadiths as God reported them. 
    If the anthropomorphic attributes, as divine similitudes, do not correspond to 
divine reality, what exactly is the purpose of God’s descent to people’s minds through 
them, and what is the sense in having faith in them? Al-Shaʿrānī tries to answer these 
questions while taking into consideration human beings’ recognition of God. In his view, 
the realities of the anthropomorphic attributes when applied to God are never known. 
Despite this, their prima facie sense helps people to perceive the image of God, who 
otherwise remains utterly unknown. Regarding this, al-Shaʿrānī writes:  
 
If God had not spoken to us through His names and attributes, regardless of 
the fact that [the realities of] these names and attributes are not similar (naẓīr) 
to [what we imagine from] them, we would not have understood anything 
about Him. If this had been the case, He would not have informed us of 
Himself.556 
 
As the above passage suggests, the purpose of the divine revelation of the 
                                                
555 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 26. For the interpretation of these hadiths amongst the 
Ḥanbalīs and the Ashʿarī theologians, see Gimaret, Dieu à l’image de l’homme, 148-153, 
161-164; Williams, ‘Aspects of the Creed,’ 443-447; Tajallī wa ruʾya, 174; Swartz, A Medieval 
Critique, 176-183. 
556 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Kashf al-ḥijāb, 17. 
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anthropomorphic attributes is for God to make Himself understood (taqrīb 
lil-ʾafhām).557 Therefore, the servants should be able to comprehend what God is like in 
the mind via the prima facie sense of these attributes.  
    According to al-Shaʿrānī, without God’s descent to people’s minds through the 
anthropomorphic attributes, such as His seeing and hearing, there would be a lack of 
resemblance (mujānasa) between God and human beings, which would make it difficult 
for them to love Him. Anyone who expresses love for God loves the divine similitude 
(mithāl) imagined in his mind. In respect of this, al-Shaʿrānī writes:  
 
Were it not for God’s assimilating Himself [to the world’s beings through 
the similitudes; tashbīh], the lovers would not love Him. Were it not for 
their imagining (takhayyul) God’s similitude, the lovers would not be 
related to Him (taʿallaqa).558  
 
Human beings can only understand and relate to what is similar to them. Consequently, 
God attributes Himself with features similar to theirs, so that human beings can 
establish faith in God through belief in His affinity to them – even when there is no real 
correspondence between the divine attributes and those of creation. This is the motif 
behind al-Shaʿrānī’s support for the affirmation of the anthropomorphic attributes.559  
    Here, it is imperative to observe that, while he denies the occurrence of tashbīh as 
pure anthropomorphism, al-Shaʿrānī nonetheless promotes tashbīh in the sense that God 
                                                
557 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fols., 77a-86b. 
558 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 175. This passage is taken from Ibn ʿArabī’s al-Futūḥāt 
al-Makkiyya, but it is mentioned there in the different context of the identification of God’s 
existence with that of His creation. See Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya vol. 3, 449-450. 
559  al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 175; al-Kashf al-ḥijāb, 17. This comes with the 
condition that the realities of the anthropomorphic attributes are never known to human beings. 
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assimilates Himself to creation’s attributes in order to be known through them. This 
form of tashbīh can be defined as divine self-assimilation to the images of the world’s 
beings through perceptual similarity, which the prima facie sense of the 
anthropomorphic attributes evokes in the mind, and whereby human beings recognise 
and worship God. This kind of similarity between God and creation is indicated in 
scripture and perceived only mentally, without entailing ontological similarity between 
the two. Building upon these ideas, al-Shaʿrānī retains the prima facie sense of the 
anthropomorphic attributes for a practical purpose.560  
    With regard to al-Shaʿrānī’s understanding of the function of having faith in the 
prima facie sense of the anthropomorphic attributes, I will further consider his view of 
the divine wisdom (ḥikma) behind the expressions ‘God sitting upon the throne’ and 
‘His descent to the world’s heaven’. About these passages, he writes: 
  
Know my brothers that God is the great Lord, and it is incumbent upon the 
Lord to remain in a specific presence (ḥaḍra muʿayyana), so that His servant 
can turn to it when necessary. This is regardless of the fact that God’s essence 
never accepts a space. This level (martaba) of God [as the object of humans’ 
worship] demands the creation of the throne. [After the creation of the throne] 
He then said to His servants that He sat upon it; that is to say, He became 
present upon it (ḥaḍara). Therefore, whoever seeks help from God who is 
                                                
560 It must be noted that in order to reject the notion of literal anthropomorphism, al-Shaʿrānī is 
occasionally involved with figurative interpretation. For example, quoting ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ, 
al-Shaʿrānī writes that the above-ness (fawqiyya) of God upon the throne is not ascribed to His 
physical place, but to His rank (rutba). Al-Shaʿrānī then argues that a servant’s prostration on 
the ground when contemplating God – when his intention at that time is actually directed 
upwards – shows that God is not confined to being high or low in a physical sense (al-Shaʿrānī, 
al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 139). 
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upon the throne [that is above heaven], He will answer him. A similar thing is 
said of the following hadith: ‘our Lord descends to the world’s heaven every 
night, and He says: “Who is seeking help from me so that I may answer you? 
Who is being afflicted so that I may cure him?”’ This [the report of God’s 
descent to the world’s heaven every night] is despite the fact that God listens 
to the prayer of His servants at any moment whether it is during the day and 
the night. Nevertheless, revelation is conventionally full of these descriptions 
of ‘God’s descent to the servants’ minds’ (tanazzul li-ʿuqūl al-ʿibād). 
    This situation [of God sitting upon the throne and descending to the 
world’s heaven every night] is compared to a procession of worldly kings and 
the veil that hangs down between them and their people. To God belongs the 
greatest similitude (al-mathal al-aʿlā). If He had not reported it to His 
servants and had He not descended to their minds (tanazzul-hu li-ʿuqūl-him), 
they would have remained confused, not knowing where to turn their face 
when they need to seek help from Him [...].561 
 
According to al-Shaʿrānī, the wisdom behind the prima facie sense of God’s sitting 
upon the throne and His descent to the world’s heaven – which he interprets as the 
divine descent to people’s minds – is for God to show His creation where to invoke Him 
(i.e. heaven). Even though God is not confined to any location, it is necessary to affirm 
these attributes for the sake of having humans worship God in a specific direction; 
                                                
561 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 137; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 136. Al-Shaʿrānī 
notes that this is a passage from chapter 370 of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya. However, I have not 
yet found the expression of ‘the divine descent to the mind’ (tanazzul lil-ʿuqūl) in al-Futūḥāt 
al-Makkiyya. See also al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ḥijāb, 110, where he views divine attributes as 
divine descent to the mind. 
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otherwise, they would not know where to direct their attention and would fall into 
confusion. This position, which is directed to non-advanced mystics and theologians, is 
readily contrasted with al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to God’s descent to the world’s heaven 
directed to advanced mystics. As we already discussed in Chapter 3, for advanced 
mystics, al-Shaʿrānī adduces the same hadith in support of the ontology of God’s 
self-manifestation.  
    As al-Shaʿrānī indicates in al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, the passages translated above 
are originally drawn from Chapter 370 of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya. Remarkably, he 
actually paraphrases a part of the chapter in order to recontextualise it in his own texts. 
In order to consider the nature of al-Shaʿrānī’s attitude to Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, it is 
important to compare their texts, which I will do below.  
    In the original passage of Chapter 370 of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, Ibn ʿArabī 
focuses on explaining the levels of Lordship and servanthood in relation to his mystical 
ontology. To summarise, God as the Lord of His creation creates the world in order to 
manifest His attributes in the world’s beings, whereas the world’s beings as God’s 
servants, given existence from Him, manifest the divine attributes in themselves as His 
loci. Ibn ʿArabī argues that if it were not for the levels of the Lord and the servant, that 
correlate to one another through divine self-manifestation, the world would not have 
come to exist.562 It is in this context that Ibn ʿArabī writes the following passage, which 
is paraphrased by al-Shaʿrānī. It reads:  
 
                                                
562 Ibn ʿArabī notes that this relationship between God and creation (nisba) is not existentially 
real and can only be observed in the mind. This is compared to the relationship that lies between 
humans and other animals in their belonging to the same genus of living creatures, but which 
does not exist outside the mind. Hence, everything is through His manifestations and returns to 
God alone (Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 3, 408). 
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Do you not see [that] the level of God who has no place (makān) required 
Him to create a heaven to make into a Throne (ʿarsh)? Then He mentioned 
that He ‘sat upon it’ so that people could supplicate Him and seek their needs 
from Him. Otherwise the servant would remain bewildered, not knowing 
where to turn, since God created the servant possessing directions (jiha). So 
the Real attributed Himself with aboveness (fawqiyya) in terms of heaven and 
the Throne and the fact that He encompasses all directions. He did this 
through His words, ‘Whithersoever you turn, there is the Face of God’ [Q. 
2:115], and His words, ‘Our Lord descends to the heaven of this world every 
night and says, ‘Is there any repenter? Is there any supplication? Is there 
anyone asking for forgiveness?’ And His Prophet said about Him, ‘God is in 
the kibla of him who performs the prayer.’563 All of these are properties of 
the levels [of Lordship and servanthood], if you have intelligence. If the 
levels were to disappear from the cosmos, the entities would have no 
existence whatsoever.564  
 
The last sentence of this passage indicates that Ibn ʿArabī’s objective here is to 
demonstrate the reciprocal relationship between the divine and the world based on the 
theory of ontological divine self-manifestation. This is clearly different from 
al-Shaʿrānī’s intention when he quotes the same passage. 
    Ibn ʿArabī’s subsequent discussions further confirm that the main focus of Chapter 
370 is to explain how the world comes into being when God is the only real existence. 
                                                
563 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 3, 409. 
564 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 3, 408-409. Translation taken from Chittick, The 
Sufi Path, 51. 
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There, Ibn ʿArabī refers, in passing, to the expression ‘God’s descent to His creation,’ 
and writes: 
 
If the Higher one [i.e. God] wished the lower one [i.e. creation] to know Him 
[...] it is necessary that the Higher one lets Himself be known by the lower 
one through His descent to him (yatanazzalu), because it is impossible for the 
lower one to reach the Higher one, for he has no essence of himself.565  
 
In Ibn ʿArabī’s view, the reason for God’s descent to the world is explained through His 
wish to be known by manifesting His names and attributes in creation.566 Later in the 
chapter, this idea develops into the theory of the perfect man and the cosmological 
divine self-manifestation, establishing the tenet of the oneness of existence. According 
to this theory, each existing being manifests the divine image to a certain extent in 
keeping with its own ontological level. In this regard, every entity in the cosmos is 
given relative existence, which is ultimately ascribed to God who is Himself the real 
existence. Amongst them, the perfect man alone can manifest the perfect image of 
God.567  
    Following a close reading of Chapter 370, it is evident that Ibn ʿArabī only 
references the anthropomorphic attributes – such as God’s sitting upon the throne and 
His descent to the world’s heaven – as foundations for advancing his ontological 
monism later in this chapter. Thus, in contrast to al-Shaʿrānī, Ibn ʿArabī is not 
concerned with exploring the practical wisdom behind these attributes. While Ibn 
                                                
565 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 3, 409. 
566 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 3, 409. 
567 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 3, 409. 
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ʿArabī does mention ‘God’s descent to creation’, the context for the expression differs 
distinctively from that of al-Shaʿrānī. As we have seen, whereas Ibn ʿArabī discusses 
‘God’s descent to creation’ in relation to the ontological divine self-manifestation and 
immanence in the world’s beings, al-Shaʿrānī treats ‘God’s descent to people’s minds’ 
as divine self-assimilation to creation (tashbīh), whereby human beings perceive the 
similarity between Him and the external world at a textual and perceptual level. As 
repeatedly mentioned, this notion of tashbīh is indicated in scripture through the prima 
facie sense of the anthropomorphic attributes and is evoked only in the mind for a 
practical reason, without the implication of actual anthropomorphism. 
    Before concluding this section, it must be noted that despite his acceptance of the 
prima facie sense, al-Shaʿrānī nonetheless maintains that people who have understood 
the wisdom behind these attributes should, in order to avoid pure anthropomorphism, 
turn away from their prima facie sense.568 Commoners are particularly susceptible to 
falling into literal anthropomorphism through their acceptance of the prima facie sense. 
Thus al-Shaʿrānī argues that the scholars should provide them with the figurative sense 
so that they will not commit this error.569 The view that commoners need figurative 
interpretation disagrees with that of the majority of the Ashʿarīs, who believe that it is 
actually the scholars for whom figurative interpretation is appropriate. Along with his 
                                                
568 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 6a.  
569 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 161; al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 248-249; al-Yawāqīt 
wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 142. In al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, al-Shaʿrānī notes that Ibn ʿArabī also felt 
it necessary to offer figurative interpretation to those who are at risk of falling into pure 
anthropomorphism. Al-Shaʿrānī’s disciple, al-Munāwī, shares the same view and states that the 
commoners should be given figurative interpretation so as not to believe in heretical ideas, 
whereas the knowers of God (ʿārif) ought to have faith in what God has reported, without 
assuming any relationship between the divine attributes and the creatures’ realities. See 
al-Munāwī, Fayḍ al-qadīr, 313 (Hadith no. 1934). However, El-Rouayheb points out that 
al-Munāwī sometimes engaged in figurative interpretation (El-Rouayheb, ‘From Ibn al-Ḥajar 
al-Haytamī,’ 283-284). Further research is needed in order to clarify al-Munāwī’s view on the 
anthropomorphic attributes. 
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reliance on the opinion of the lesser-known al-Qazwīnī, this is another intriguing 
example indicating al-Shaʿrānī’s unique position as a member of the Ashʿarīs.  
    With regard to non-advanced mystics, as I have discussed above, al-Shaʿrānī 
maintains that they should believe in the anthropomorphic attributes in their original 
form for practical purposes. This is not to advocate pure anthropomorphism, since the 
anthropomorphic attributes through which God assimilates Himself to the world’s 
beings do not actually correspond to divine reality. Therefore, in al-Shaʿrānī’s view, this 
divine self-assimilation, suggested in scripture and perceived in people’s minds as 
perceptual similarity, does not contradict the notion of divine incomparability. Such a 
worldview harmoniously synthesises God’s incomparability and His self-assimilation 
(tanzīh and tashbīh), thereby realising the intricate balance of divine self-manifestation 
at the two levels of non-delimitation and delimitation (iṭlāq and taqyīd), without 
entailing the ontological thesis of the world’s being He/not He.  
    In the next section, I shall further explore the subject of divine self-manifestation at 
the two levels, expounding on al-Shaʿrānī’s integration of Ibn ʿArabī’s worldview into 
his own. Together with the findings from Chapter 2, this will underline al-Shaʿrānī’s 
attempt to reinterpret the latter’s thought as being founded on a visionary experience.  
 
4.3.2. Visionary Divine Self-Manifestation 
 
    This section examines al-Shaʿrānī’s reinterpretation of the divine 
self-manifestation (tajallī) advanced by Ibn ʿArabī, and answers the central question of 
this thesis concerning al-Shaʿrānī’s integration of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings into his own 
mystical and theological worldview. In order to differentiate al-Shaʿrānī’s view of 
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divine self-manifestation from that which Ibn ʿArabī promotes in the context of his 
ontological monism, and which al-Shaʿrānī holds in al-Mīzān al-dharriyya for advanced 
mystics, in what follows, I will describe al-Shaʿrānī’s theory, as mainly discussed in 
al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, as ‘visionary divine self-manifestation’. As we shall see, some of 
the arguments concerning this idea overlap with those of the previous section, as the 
subjects are closely related to each other. Nevertheless, through the discussions on 
al-Shaʿrānī’s view on visionary divine self-manifestation, I will aim to demonstrate how 
he innovatively recontextualises Ibn ʿArabī’s thought within the context of visionary 
and experiential mysticism for non-advanced mystics and theologians.  
    In al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, al-Shaʿrānī explains the idea of visionary divine 
self-manifestation, without any implication of the oneness of existence and divine 
immanence in the world. His basic presentation of this theory is as follows. When God 
as the essence manifests Himself to Himself at the level of non-delimitation (iṭlāq), 
which al-Shaʿrānī also calls the level of His incomparability (tanzīh) and exclusive 
oneness (aḥadiyya), God lets His creation know about His absolute, pre-eternal 
existence prior to the creation of the world. This is reported, for instance, in the divine 
message ‘when there was God, and nothing was with Him’. Following this first divine 
self-manifestation, the second manifestation occurs at the level of His delimitation 
(taqyīd), which al-Shaʿrānī identifies as the level of His names and attributes, and 
relative oneness (wāḥidiyya). Through this stage, God comes to be known in the world 
by delimiting Himself through the effects of His attributes.570  
    It is important to note that al-Shaʿrānī here employs such mystically charged terms 
as exclusive oneness and inclusive oneness, which I discussed in Chapters 1 and 3 in the 
                                                
570 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fols. 8b-10b. 
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context of ontological monism, in order to describe his understanding of divine 
self-manifestation. However, and crucially, while referring to these terms in al-Mīzān 
al-khiḍriyya, al-Shaʿrānī carefully dismisses their originally intended monistic 
implications. Significantly, in this text, the second stage of divine self-manifestation at 
the level of delimitation and inclusive oneness is said to occur only in the minds or 
hearts of the believers (qulūb), and it is the awareness of this second manifestation that 
is understood to grant people knowledge of God.571 
    As discussed in the previous section, al-Shaʿrānī also explains the second level of 
divine self-manifestation as the divine descent to people’s minds through striking 
similitudes. The wisdom behind the striking of similitudes is for God to let Himself be 
known to creation by assimilating Himself to the world’s beings through the 
anthropomorphic attributes that scripture reports. 572  In other words, this divine 
self-manifestation, evidenced in scripture, evokes perceptual similarity between God 
and creation in the mind and heart, without being related to existential reality. Therefore, 
in this study, I call this form of divine self-manifestation as ‘visionary’, as opposed to 
‘ontological’, in that it concerns the process of God’s describing Himself with various 
attributes in scripture, and that the images which these attributes evoke in people’s 
minds facilitates their understanding of God. 
    In relation to the argument in the previous section concerning faith in the prima 
facie sense, al-Shaʿrānī reiterates that were it not for the similitudes that God strikes at 
the level of delimitation, no one would be able to understand anything about God. 
Hence, God describes Himself with various anthropomorphic attributes similar to those 
                                                
571 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 2a. 
572 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fols. 3a-13b. It is also described as the divine approach 
to the minds (taqrīb lil-ʿuqūl) of the believers. 
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of His creation.573 According to al-Shaʿrānī, it is for this reason that the prophet 
affirmed the faith of a slave girl who, when asked by the prophet where God was, 
answered that ‘God is in heaven’. A belief that God is located in heaven allows the 
slave girl and other servants to recognise and address God in a specific direction; 
otherwise He would not be envisaged anywhere at all. God thus manifested Himself at 
the level of delimitation for His servants, describing Himself in this way, even though 
He is not literally located upwards (i.e. in heaven).574 This anthropomorphic expression 
therefore needs to be upheld as part of visionary divine self-manifestation, whereby God 
made Himself known to His creatures as someone similar to them.  
    Another passage by al-Shaʿrānī also underpins his view that visionary divine 
self-manifestation occurs not ontologically, but rather perceptually in people’s minds, 
and that it is a mercy that God has granted us. The passage reads:  
 
It is a part of His mercy that God manifested Himself to our hearts at the level 
that resembles anthropomorphism (qurb min al-tashbīh), but without [actual] 
anthropomorphism (min ghayr tashbīh), so that our minds come to be related 
(tataʿallaqa) to knowledge [of God and know something of Him].575  
 
As I demonstrated earlier, al-Shaʿrānī encourages a form of tashbīh which evokes 
certain similarities between God and creation in our minds, while firmly denying 
tashbīh which leads to belief in the actual likeness of God to creatures. Similarly to this, 
he espouses visionary divine self-manifestation as a perceptual experience without the 
                                                
573 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fols. 8a-12b; al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 177-178.  
574 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 163-165. 
575 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 12a. The passage is ascribed to the statement of his 
Sufi teachers ʿAlī al-Marṣafī. 
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implications of ontological monism and divine immanence. 
    In keeping with this worldview of visionary divine self-manifestation, the divine 
attributes of incomparability – which attest to God’s transcendence – are ascribed to the 
level of non-delimitation, whereas the divine anthropomorphic attributes – which 
assimilate God to the images of creation – are affirmed as belonging to the level of 
delimitation and as signifying perceptual similarity between Him and the external world 
on a textual level. Following this idea, al-Shaʿrānī maintains that all of the contradicting 
opinions of theologians on the subject of the divine attributes derive from their failure to 
realise the balance between the two levels of visionary divine self-manifestation. They 
see God either as incomparable or as literally similar to the world; if they only believe 
in His incomparability (like the majority of rational theologians) while dismissing the 
aspect of His similarity, they deny any belief in the anthropomorphic attributes in their 
original form. On the other hand, if they only focus on the aspect of His similarity 
through the anthropomorphic attributes (like the anthropomorphists), this leads them to 
pure anthropomorphism.576  
    According to al-Shaʿrānī, only the mystics, who uphold the balance between the 
level of non-delimitation and that of delimitation based on the theory of visionary 
divine self-manifestation, can rightly and harmoniously synthesise both divine 
incomparability and divine self-assimilation to creation through perceptual similarity. 
Thus, they affirm the anthropomorphic attributes in scripture as a perceptual truth, 
which does not reflect divine reality, thereby resolving the tensions regarding this issue 
amongst the theologians of different schools.577 This is indeed one of al-Shaʿrānī’s 
                                                
576 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fols. 2b-3a, 13b; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 146. 
577 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 3b. Solving antagonisms between theologians is also 
set as a goal for advanced mystics (al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 172-179). However, as I 
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main goals in his theological project. 
    Having explained the structure of visionary divine self-manifestation in the 
introductory chapter of al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, al-Shaʿrānī dedicates Chapters 1 and 2 to 
the reinterpretation of Ibn ʿArabī’s statements from the perspective of this theory.578 To 
put it briefly, al-Shaʿrānī tries to resolve controversial passages in Ibn ʿArabī’s writings 
by ascribing them to the two levels of visionary divine self-manifestation. In what 
follows, I will study one of these cases, examining al-Shaʿrānī’s endeavour of 
integrating Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching into his own worldview.  
    One example of this integrative method is al-Shaʿrānī’s reinterpretation of part of 
the poem in Chapter 372 of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya. It goes as follows:  
  
When we see God in the image of human beings, we know that reason (ʿaql) 
is in the state of danger.  
Whoever delimited (qayyada) God with His reason and whoever did not 
delimit Him does not have revelation (khabar).  
Whenever God manifests Himself to me in what is similar to my image 
(ʿalā mithli ṣūratī), 
I become manifest, being incomparable to the rest of the images [that 
                                                                                                                                          
have already stressed, advanced mystics primarily understand tashbīh in relation to the notion of 
divine immanence – whereby God is viewed as the only existence in the cosmos –and see divine 
manifestations in the world’s beings. On the other hand, non-advanced mystics perceive tashbīh 
as perceptual similarity that does not bear any real resemblance to divine reality.  
578 As noted in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the titles of Chapters 1 and 2 in al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya 
are as follows: 
Chapter 1: What I saw among the poems of the Sufis who witnessed the level of 
God’s incomparability along with the level of His descent to reason or just the level 
of His incomparability. 
Chapter 2: What I saw amongst the calls from God (hawātif rabbānī) issued by those 
who witnessed the two levels of the divine incomparability and descent to reason, 
including the words of Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Niffarī. 
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become manifest in the world].579  
 
For Ibn ʿArabī, the original intention of this poem was to describe the beauty of the 
world that is created in the divine image. Each thing in the world reflects the image of 
God who is the most beautiful. As such, the world is like a divine mirror in which He 
sees Himself. Based on this idea, Ibn ʿArabī continues as follows:  
 
God is manifest (mutajallī) in every aspect, sought after in every sign of the 
world […] worshipped in every object of worship, and intended in the 
visible and invisible world. No one fails to find Him in His creation through 
his natural disposition. Hence, the entire world worships Him and glorifies 
Him.580  
 
With this expression of the monistic worldview in mind, the poem in question is read as 
signifying the theory of ontological divine self-manifestation, which reason cannot 
grasp. Every entity in the world is thus the manifestation of the divine image.  
    On the other hand, al-Shaʿrānī interprets the above quoted poem in relation to his 
idea of the two levels of non-delimitation and delimitation. After quoting Ibn ʿArabī’s 
poem verbatim, al-Shaʿrānī appends the following comment:  
 
Reason does not comprehend God as He is in Himself. It only recognises 
Him by delimiting Him (muqayyad), whether it is in a person’s heart when 
he is awake or in a dream (manāman). May God be exalted in the loftiness 
                                                
579 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 21b; Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 3, 449. 
580 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 3, 449. 
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of His essence above any images (ṣuwar). Those images [in which God 
manifests Himself] came to be attributed with a human image (ṣūra 
ādamiyya), through which it [the human image] came to acquire a certain 
honour (sharaf) that is not possessed by other images. This is for God to let 
Himself be known to His servants in that image in a dream. Thus, the 
situation returns to the two levels of the balance (mīzān); namely, 
non-delimitation (iṭlāq) and delimitation (taqyīd).581 
 
According to al-Shaʿrānī, God as divine essence is incomparable to any of the images of 
the world at the level of His non-delimitation. Human beings can only perceive God as 
being delimited in their minds at the level of His delimitation. The purpose of divine 
self-manifestation at this level is therefore for God to make Himself known through the 
anthropomorphic attributes. It is important to note in this passage that al-Shaʿrānī 
associates the image of God – through which He manifests Himself to the world – with 
an image seen in a dream, as reported in the hadith ‘I saw my Lord during sleep in the 
form (ṣūra) of a beardless young man with long hair and with sandals of gold on his 
feet’. In doing so, he crucially avoids Ibn ʿArabī’s idea of the divine image 
ontologically becoming manifest in the world’s entities.582  
    This analysis demonstrates al-Shaʿrānī’s intention to dismiss the original context of 
Ibn ʿArabī’s passages – that is to say, his ontology of divine self-manifestation – and to 
integrate them into his own worldview of visionary divine self-manifestation, whereby 
God assimilates Himself to creation through perceptual similarity as suggested in 
                                                
581 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fols. 21b-22a. 
582 For the interpretation of this hadith amongst the Ashʿarīs, see Gimaret, Dieu à l’image de 
l’homme, 163-164. 
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scripture. In al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, al-Shaʿrānī approaches other passages of Ibn ʿArabī 
with this interpretive method, ascribing the latter’s monistic statements to the levels of 
non-delimitation and delimitation of visionary divine self-manifestation.583 Hence, our 
observation establishes al-Shaʿrānī’s remarkable reinterpretation of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
mystical teaching as promoting visionary and experiential mysticism. 
 
4.3.3. Al-Shaʿrānī on the Ḥanbalī Traditionalists 
 
    When I discussed the issue of figurative interpretation earlier in this chapter, I 
pointed out an interesting correspondence between al-Shaʿrānī/Ibn ʿArabī and the 
Ḥanbalī theologian Ibn Taymiyya along with Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, in their 
dismissive attitudes towards this theological method. In order to further delineate 
                                                
583  al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fols. 16a-26b. Another interesting example to 
demonstrate this attempt is al-Shaʿrānī’s recontextualisation of a line of the poem in Chapter 3 
of Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, starting with ‘If you only speak of His incomparability (tanzīh) [...]’, which I 
quoted earlier in this chapter (4.1.2). Originally, it is concerned with the mystics’ goal of the 
synthesis of God’s incomparability and immanence through the realisation of the cosmos being 
He/not He (Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 55/70). As I explained in Chapter 1, quoting the same 
part of the poem, al-Biqāʿī and Ibn al-Ahdal condemn Ibn ʿArabī’s ostensibly pantheistic 
statement for confirming gross anthropomorphism and literal unification between God and the 
world.  
    However, at the beginning of Chapter 1 of al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, al-Shaʿrānī introduces 
the same poem by Ibn ʿArabī, but reads it in a different context. Al-Shaʿrānī’s quotation from 
the poem is as follows (the underlined words indicate a difference between the original wording 
in Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam and al-Shaʿrānī’s quotation of it):  
 
If you only speak of His incomparability (tanzīh), you define Him (muḥaddid). 
And if you only speak of defining Him (taḥdīd), you delimit Him (muqayyid). 
If you speak of the two, you are right. 
Then you are an Imam and guided (taqtadā) in Sufi knowledge [al-Shaʿrānī, 
al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 16b].  
 
Setting aside a few differences from the original text, it is highly likely that al-Shaʿrānī chooses 
to quote this controversial poem with the objective of responding to Ibn ʿArabī’s critics. 
Al-Shaʿrānī does this by reinterpreting the text differently; commenting on the poem, he writes 
that it affirms the level of divine incomparability and, crucially, that of ‘the divine descent to 
people’s minds’ (al-tanazzul lil-ʿuqūl). This comment suggests that al-Shaʿrānī aims to 
understand the synthesis of tanzīh and tashbīh expressed in this poem within the context of 
visionary divine self-manifestation (al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 16b). 
 264 
al-Shaʿrānī’s theological position, in this section, I will consider his similarity to the 
Ḥanbalī traditionalists with regard to their approaches to the anthropomorphic attributes  
    As this chapter has already demonstrated, al-Shaʿrānī encourages faith in the prima 
facie sense of the anthropomorphic attributes of God while rejecting the figurative 
interpretation of the rational theologians. In his view, the anthropomorphic attributes 
need to be believed as such, because God revealed them in scripture. This comes with 
the condition that these attributes do not represent divine reality at all, as God is 
absolutely incomparable to the physical, corporeal features that occur to people’s minds. 
Hence, the prima facie sense of the anthropomorphic attributes is known; however, their 
relations to God are never known. Therefore, the knowledge of their modality should 
not be questioned (ghayr takyīf).584 This view is similar to the bi-lā kayfa formula. An 
examination of the following two passages shows that al-Shaʿrānī’s treatment of the 
anthropomorphic attributes actually resembles that of the majority of the Ḥanbalī 
traditionalists:  
 
Amongst all of the divine attributes reported in the Qurʾān and the Sunna that 
are close to anthropomorphism (tashbīh), their meanings are understandable 
to us (maʿqūla), yet their relations to God are unknown (majhūla al-nisba ilā 
Allah), and they ought to be believed as such. For the ruling (ḥukm) that God 
gives of Himself is superior to that of reason (ʿaql).585 
                                                
584 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Kashf al-ḥijāb, 95. El-Rouayheb argues that there is a certain common 
ground between Ibn ʿArabī-inspired Sufis and traditional Ḥanbalīs on this point. El-Rouayheb 
takes as an example al-Kūrānī, who openly endorsed Ibn ʿArabī’s oneness of existence while 
showing his sympathy towards Ḥanbalī scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayim 
al-Jawziyya. See El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 275-284.  
585 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 243. Al-Shaʿrānī attributes this remark to his Sufi 




In this passage, al-Shaʿrānī calls for faith in the prima facie sense of the 
anthropomorphic attributes. With respect to this, he also writes: 
 
The people of God have agreed that one ought to have faith in scripture and 
the divine attributes, in accordance with what He knows of them, what His 
essence accepts, and what is suited to His authority. It is not permitted for us 
to reject any of them, nor is it allowed for us to ask how they are (lā takyīf); 
nor is their relation (nisba) to God the same as how they are related to us, 
because none of us knows His essence either in this life or in the hereafter, 
and we do not know how it is.586  
 
These passages indicate that al-Shaʿrānī and the Ḥanbalīs, who are representatives of 
the bi-lā kayfa formula, agree upon their initial approach to the anthropomorphic 
attributes: a belief in the prima facie sense and a rejection of inquiry about its real 
meaning.  
    In relation to this, it is worth mentioning al-Shaʿrānī’s positive view on the Ḥanbalī 
scholars in general. During al-Shaʿrānī’s lifetime, the Ḥanbalīs were the smallest school 
of Law in Cairo. They were so small that they had to invite teachers from other schools 
of Law.587 As I discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, al-Shaʿrānī felt a certain animosity 
                                                
586 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 241. A similar statement is provided in al-Futūḥāt 
al-Makkiyya. See Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 241-243. The passage is translated 
in Chittick, Sufi Path, 287-288. 
587 Winter, Society and Religion, 173-174. In Mīzān al-ṣughrā, al-Shaʿrānī mentions several 
Ḥanbalīs. One of them is his contemporary, the Ḥanbalī jurist, Aḥmad Shihāb al-Dīn al-Futūḥī 
(d. 949/1542-43), who was once against the Sufis but later changed his attitude and became an 
admirer of them. 
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towards several of Ibn ʿArabī’s Ḥanbalī antagonists, such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn 
al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya.588 Despite this, al-Shaʿrānī otherwise thought highly of the 
Ḥanbālīs, notably for the emphasis they put on the notion of divine incomparability. In 
Chapter 5 of al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, he spends several pages explaining the position of 
the Ḥanbalīs; moreover, he defends the Ḥanbalīs as well as Sufis such as Ibn ʿArabī, 
amongst others, against the charges of incarnationism, unificationism, and 
corporealism.589 Here, al-Shaʿrānī’s concern is to associate Ibn ʿArabī’s position with 
that of the early Sufis such as al-Junayd and al-Qushayrī, and also, strikingly, with the 
early Ḥanbalīs.  
    Al-Shaʿrānī respects the founder of the Ḥanbalī school, Ibn Ḥanbal, as well as the 
early Ḥanbalī scholars, as exponents of divine incomparability who, by rejecting 
figurative interpretation and pure anthropomorphism, followed the path of the pious 
predecessors.590 In order to clarify their position, al-Shaʿrānī quotes the statements of 
several of the Ḥanbalīs. For example, referencing Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119), 591 
al-Shaʿrānī notes that the Ḥanbalīs do not question the modality (kayf) of the 
anthropomorphic attributes; do not strip God of His attributes (taʿtīl) as the Muʿtazilīs 
                                                
588 In al-Ajwiba al-marḍiyya, al-Shaʿrānī refers to Abū Yazīd al-Basṭāmī’s profession to the 
effect that there is no hellfire for creation, which Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya condemned as a 
heretical statement. In response to the critic, al-Shaʿrānī defends al-Basṭāmī by stating that he 
was only veiled from perceiving hellfire for creation due to his presence with God; in such a 
mental state, every entity except God disappears from sight. Al-Shaʿrānī applies a similar 
rationale to al-Basṭāmī’s famous profession, ‘Glory be to me’, and says that al-Basṭāmī only 
issued this statement in a state where perception of the world had vanished from him due to his 
witnessing God alone, whereby he became a deputy of God (al-Shaʿrānī, al-Ajwiba al-marḍiyya, 
460-463). 
589 As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the title of Chapter 5 of al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya is: ‘Explanation 
that God’s essence does not accept increase nor decrease and that it is not temporally originated 
through His origination of the world in His essence, and explication of the impossibility of 
talking about incarnationism, unificationism, corporealism, and direction on the side of God in 
the view of all Sufis and Ḥanbalīs, and a reference to their remarks about its impossibility in 
contrast to what is often attributed to them, especially to Ibn ʿArabī’.  
590 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fols. 59b, 62a 
591 For more information on Ibn ʿAqīl, see Holtzman, ‘The Miḥna of Ibn ʿAqīl.’  
 267 
do; and in contrast with the pure anthropomorphists (mushabbiha), they do not espouse 
the likening of God to creatures (tashbīh).592 Al-Shaʿrānī also quotes Abū Yaʿlā (d. 
458/1065), 593  Abū Muḥammad al-Tamīmī (d. 488/1095), 594  and other Ḥanbalīs 
regarding their understanding of God sitting upon the throne. According to al-Shaʿrānī, 
they agree that God’s sitting is an essential attribute of God (ṣifa dhātiyya) and that it is 
real; however, His sitting is unlike human sitting, and it is not accompanied by any 
physical movement, nor does it imply God’s spatial contact with anything else. God sits 
upon the throne in the manner that He has intended; hence, it should be believed 
without further investigation into the matter’.595 Al-Shaʿrānī argues that, despite the 
fact that these Ḥanbalīs denied any actual similarity between God and creation, later 
scholars wrongly associated Ibn Ḥanbal and his school with the heretical idea of 
corporealism.596  
    Al-Shaʿrānī’s references to Ḥanbalī statements are descriptive and simple. 
Nonetheless, their presence highlights his sympathy with the school’s approach to the 
divine anthropomorphic attributes; that is to say, the acceptance of these attributes in the 
way they were reported, without suggesting that God has any real similarity with 
creation. After defending the early Ḥanbalīs as proponents of divine incomparability, 
al-Shaʿrānī turns to similarly inclined Sufis, such as Abū al-Qāsim al-Junayd (d. 
                                                
592 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 62b. 
593 Abū Yaʿlā was accused by some Ḥanbalīs of upholding an anthropomorphic view. For 
example, Ibn al-Jawzī objected to Abū Yaʿlā’s view that God’s leg, mentioned in some hadiths, 
is an essential attribute. See Swartz, A Medieval Critique, 152.  
594 Abū Muḥammad al-Tamīmī was an older contemporary of Ibn ʿAqīl in Baghdād and 
supported a non-literalist approach to the divine attributes. He was held in high regard by Ibn 
al-Jawzī (Swartz, A Medieval Critique, 61 and 125, n., 181). 
595 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 60a-b. Swartz points out that Abū Yaʿlā regards 
God’s descent as being one of the divine attributes and as being real, taking a middle road 
between literalists and those who apply figurative interpretation. See Swartz, A Medieval 
Critique, 216.  
596 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 58b.  
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298/910) and the Persian Sufi Abū ʿAlī al-Rūdbarī (d. ca. 320/ 932).597 Quoting the 
Egyptian Sufi, Dhū al-Nūn al-Miṣrī (d. 246/861), al-Shaʿrānī maintains that God’s 
sitting is a pre-eternal attribute and ought to be affirmed, without assuming any location 
in Him or upholding any actual similarity between the divine attributes and those of the 
creatures.598 Remarkably, in al-Shaʿrānī’s view, Ibn ʿArabī is also included in the same 
group as these early Ḥanbalīs and Sufis who advocate divine incomparability and deny 
the notion of literal, pure anthropomorphism.  
    As noted in Chapter 1, al-Shaʿrānī carefully excludes Ibn Taymiyya from the camp 
of these righteous Ḥanbalīs – Ibn Taymiyya was censured as a scholar who deviated 
from the school’s path.599 Nevertheless, once again, there is an interesting similarity 
between al-Shaʿrānī and Ibn Taymiyya with regard to their approaches to the 
anthropomorphic attributes. Ibn Taymiyya’s scholarly aim was to ascertain the meaning 
of the anthropomorphic attributes and to give them a concrete reality, while refusing to 
dismiss the prima facie sense. As Holtzman demonstrates, in an attempt to affirm the 
divine anthropomorphic attributes, Ibn Taymiyya does not hesitate to draw analogies 
between the divine and creatures.600 For instance, he maintains that God in reality 
(ḥaqīqatan) sits upon a throne which is above the heavens, and that He is in reality 
(ḥaqīqatan) in the direction of ‘above’. In opposition to rational theologians, he argues 
that if God were not sitting upon the throne, Muslims would not raise their hands when 
they pray to God.601 The fact that they raise their hands evinces that God in reality sits 
                                                
597 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fols. 62a-65b. 
598 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 65a. 
599 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 62a. With regard to Ibn Taymiyya’s approach to the 
anthropomorphic attributes, which was eventually censured for being literalistic, see Holtzman, 
‘Does God really laugh?; ‘The Bedouin Who Asked Questions,’ 447-463. 
600 Holtzman, ‘Does God really laugh?’ 183-199. 
601 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 1, 217; Majmūʿa fatāwā, vol. 3, 166. 
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upon the throne that is above the heavens; hence, the verse of the throne ought to be 
affirmed as such, on condition that His sitting is unlike human sitting and its modality is 
never known. 602  In this example, Ibn Taymiyya relies on common sense and 
convention to strengthen his view.603 
    Ibn Taymiyya also refers to the expression ‘God is above the throne that is glorious 
in His essence (fawq al-ʿarsh al-majīd bi-dhātihi)’, which was issued by the Mālikī 
jurist Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī (d. 386/996). According to Ibn Taymiyya, the agreed 
upon interpretation of this statement amongst the people of the Sunna is that God sits 
upon the throne in His essence in reality (ḥaqīqatan), not metaphorically, and that He is 
above the throne in His essence.604 The reality of God being upon the throne in His 
essence is thus confirmed, without questioning its modality and without literal 
anthropomorphism.605  
                                                
602 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 1, 215-216, 220. 
603 Ibn Taymiyya condemned the rational theologians, whom he describes as having detached 
themselves from their natural disposition (fiṭra) and denied God’s aboveness (Holtzman, ‘The 
Bedouin Who Asked Questions,’ 457). For more information on God’s aboveness, see 
Holtzman and Ovadia, ‘On Divine Aboveness.’  
604 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 1, 218-220; Majmūʿa fatāwā, vol. 3, 164, 166. Ibn 
Taymiyya states that this was the opinion of Yaḥyā ibn Uthmān, Ibn Abī Zayd (d. 386/996) and 
Abū ʿUmar al-Ṭalamankī (d. 428-9/1036-1037). Ibn Abī Zayd was the head of Mālikī school in 
Qayrawān and also a proponent of Ashʿarī thought (Idris, ‘Ibn Abī Zayd al-Ḳayrawānī’; 
Spevack, The Archetypal, 55). Abū ʿUmar al-Talamankī was an Andalusian scholar who 
attempted to reinvigorate Islam through mystical means (Fierro, ‘al-Ṭalamankī’; The Legacy of 
Muslim Spain, 902).  
605 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 1, 219-220. On this point, Ibn Taymiyya refers to 
the opinions of the early scholars such as Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778), his disciple and early 
Sufi Fuḍayl ibn ʿIyāḍ (d. 187/803), and Sufyān Ibn ʿUyayna (d. 196/811).  
    Al-Shaʿrānī’s contemporary, Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ramlī, who was a sceptic of the bi-lā kayfa 
doctrine and an advocate of figurative interpretation, also refers to the same statement ‘God is 
above the throne that is glorious in His essence (fawq al-ʿarsh al-majīd bi-dhātihi)’. In order to 
avoid the anthropomorphic implication that God is above the throne in reality, al-Ramlī quotes 
the interpretative method issued by al-Ashʿarī’s teacher Abu ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303-303/ 
915-916). According to this, the first possible interpretation of the above remark is to ascribe ‘in 
His essence’ to the throne; hence, ‘God is above the throne that is glorious in its essence of 
mightiness or loftiness’. ‘Aboveness’ (fawqiyya) in this context is taken conceptually (maʿnawī) 
to mean ‘His perfection’ and ‘authority’ (makāna), not ‘His physical location’ and ‘direction’ 
which cannot be applied to God. If the throne here is understood as ‘His realm’ (mulk), the 
statement means ‘God’s subjugation of His creation’ (qahr). On the other hand, if the pronoun 
of ‘in His essence’ is ascribed to God, not to the throne, it means that God has the conceptual 
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    Ibn Taymiyya’s literalistic approach infuriated his Shāfiʿī-Ashʿarī antagonists, who 
rebuked him as a proponent of pure anthropomorphism and corporealism (ḥashwī, 
mushabbih, mujassim).606 They reported that Ibn Taymiyya, when he was preaching to 
the public about God’s descent to heaven, had stepped one step down from the pulpit to 
show how He actually descends; he also declared that God sat upon the throne as he 
was then sitting.607 According to El-Rouayheb, Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī and Ibn Ḥajar 
al-Haytamī reprimanded Ibn Taymiyya for his claim that God is in reality (ḥaqīqatan) 
in the direction of ‘above’ and that He in reality (ḥaqīqatan) descends to the lowest 
heaven. In their view, these statements imply a heretical idea that God is a body and that 
He is in space.608  
    Considering this background, it is noteworthy that both al-Shaʿrānī and Ibn 
Taymiyya affirm the reality of God sitting upon the throne, accepting its prima facie 
sense. On some occasions, they also allow an analogy between God and His creation by 
appealing to people’s common sense in order to give the anthropomorphic attributes a 
certain reality. For example, Ibn Taymiyya insists that if God were not in reality sitting 
upon the throne that is in the highest heaven, Muslims would not raise their hands when 
                                                                                                                                          
aboveness in His essence, not through what is other than Himself. In this case, ‘that is glorious’ 
(al-majīd) is read with the nominative (ḍamm) to be ascribed to God, rather than the genitive 
(ḥafḍ) that is ascribed to arsh; it then means that ‘God, who is glorious in His essence, not by 
others, subjugates creation’. By this means, al-Ramlī avoids the reading of ‘in His essence’ as 
‘in reality’ (al-Ramlī, Fatāwā, vol. 4, 268; see also El-Rouayheb, ‘From Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī,’ 
281-282). 
    Ibn Taymiyya was most probably aware of this kind of hermeneutic technique submitted 
by the rational theologians. In opposition to the interpretation of ascribing ‘in His essence’ to 
the divine lofty status, he argues that the interpretation ‘God who is glorious in His essence’ is 
an expression of flagrant ignorance, for this is tantamount to saying ‘God who is merciful in His 
essence’, ‘God who is mighty in His essence’, and so on; in these cases, the expression ‘in His 
essence’ does not signify anything meaningful. Consequently, in Ibn Taymiyya’s view, ‘in His 
essence’ ought to be understood as affirming the divine reality that God is actually above the 
throne (Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 1, 218). 
606  Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy, 55; Jackson, ‘Ibn Taymiyya on Trial’; Holtzman, 
Anthropomorphism, 328-339.  
607 Holtzman, Anthropomorphism, 330-332. 
608 El-Rouayheb, ‘From Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī,’ 271-274.  
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they pray to God.609 Similarly, as we have seen, al-Shaʿrānī states that if God had not 
revealed Himself as sitting upon the throne, human beings would get perplexed and 
would not know where to look when seeking His help.610 In other words, Muslims look 
up when they pray to God, because He in reality sat upon the throne that is above the 
heavens.  
    Nevertheless, al-Shaʿrānī and Ibn Taymiyya, or more generally speaking, 
al-Shaʿrānī and the Ḥanbalīs, disagree on some fundamental points. The most obvious 
difference between them is in their treatment of tashbīh and divine self-manifestation. 
According to al-Shaʿrānī, the anthropomorphic attributes are affirmed in relation to 
visionary divine self-manifestation on two levels. In conjunction with this view, he 
endorses the synthesis of tanzīh and tashbīh, an idea that the Ḥanbalī scholars would 
adamantly reject. Despite their differences, intriguingly, these discussions demonstrate 
that al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to the anthropomorphic attributes is explained through the 
combination of the Ḥanbalīs’ discipline and Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching, taking the middle 
road between the two. 
    Before concluding the current chapter, there is one more question that needs be 
asked. I have argued in this chapter that tashbīh in al-Shaʿrānī’s thought means no more 
than divine self-assimilation to the images of creation through perceptual similarity, 
without implying any actual similarity of the divine to the external world. The prima 
facie sense of anthropomorphic attributes enables people to mentally picture the image 
of God, whereby they come to believe in Him. If tajallī is thus perceived as signifying 
                                                
609 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 1, 217. 
610 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 137; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 136. The idea 
that God sits upon the throne so that His servants know where to supplicate Him was originally 
submitted by Ibn ʿArabī. In this regard, Ibn ʿArabī also shares a similar view with Ibn Taymiyya. 
Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 3, 408-409, translated in Chittick, The Sufi Path, 51. 
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visionary, rather than ontological, divine self-manifestation, and tashbīh is understood 
through the perceptual similarity that the scriptural expressions evoke in the mind, as 
opposed to ontological similarity, what is mystical about al-Shaʿrānī’s worldview? 
What is the role of mystical experience in his thought? He partially answers these 
questions in al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir wherein he writes as follows: 
 
If someone asks about the statement issued by some people, that the 
knowledge of God (maʿrifa) does not become perfect except by knowing Him 
through the perspectives of divine incomparability and anthropomorphism [or 
divine immanence] in the sense that divine similarity exists in reality 
(ḥaqīqatan), I shall answer him as follows: we believe that there is no 
anthropomorphism in reality (tashbīh lā wujūd la-hu ḥaqīqatan). This [the 
notion of pure anthropomorphism] only occurs to certain people due to their 
poor witnessing (shuhūd) [of God] and the thickness of their veil. If their veil 
were to be removed, they would know with certainty (yaqīnan) that there is 
no [literal] anthropomorphism between God and creation in all of the 
anthropomorphic attributes that are [together] a descent [of God] to the 
servants’ minds (tanazzul). Contemplate over this, my fellow.   
    ‘The thirsty one supposes a mirage to be water from the distance; but 
when he gets closer to it, he finds nothing’ [Q. 24:39]. [This verse means 
that] he judged [the situation] with a wrong supposition. Compare this with 
the hearing of the divine speech with sounds and letters or the vision of God 
in different forms upon the manifestation of the hereafter. These expressions 
only signify the divine descent to people’s minds (tanazzul) [and not the real 
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similarity of the divine to created beings]. If God were to remove their veil, 
they would listen to His speech without any sounds and letters, and they 
would see God without any of the images that are comprehensible to human 
beings.611  
 
In the above passage, it is suggested that the anthropomorphic attributes would lead 
people, who have not attained a mystical experience, to believe in pure 
anthropomorphism. Only the process of mystical unveiling allows them to have faith in 
the prima facie sense of the anthropomorphic attributes as the divine descent to people’s 
minds, thereby acknowledging perceptual similarity between God and the external 
world – yet without entailing actual anthropomorphism. For al-Shaʿrānī, this delicate 
combination of accepting the prima facie sense in the mind, while rejecting the 
ascription of its reality to God, is only attainable by the mystics. And this is the intricate 
‘balance’ that can be realised through the awareness of visionary divine 
self-manifestations. 
    Thus, in keeping with the framework of visionary divine self-manifestation, the 
mystical experience enables one to affirm all of the divine attributes in scripture, by 
ascribing them either to the level of non-delimitation (where God manifests Himself 
through the divine attributes of incomparability) or to the level of delimitation (where 
God manifests Himself through the anthropomorphic attributes), and to synthesise the 
notions of divine incomparability and divine self-assimilation. A mystic who upholds 
these two notions is also a possessor of the mystical balance between the levels of 
non-delimitation and delimitation. In al-Shaʿrānī’s view, this is the mystical goal that 
                                                
611 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 157. 
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    The objective of this chapter was to investigate al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to the 
anthropomorphic attributes, demonstrating his difference of opinion with Ibn ʿArabī, 
and to consider his attempt to integrate Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical teaching into his own 
mystical and theological worldview. Several findings have arisen from our study.  
    Firstly, I discussed al-Shaʿrānī’s rejection of figurative interpretation as applied by 
the rational theologians. His rejection was based on the assumption that there is 
originally no trope and no anthropomorphism in scripture. In his view, figurative 
interpretation, which aims to avoid pure anthropomorphism, actually amounts to the 
comparison of God with a figurative sense. This results in another form of 
anthropomorphism through the newly originated meaning. Therefore, its use should be 
avoided, except when it is employed for commoners, who may otherwise uphold literal 
anthropomorphism. I have shown that al-Shaʿrānī’s stance on figurative interpretation 
agrees with that of Ibn ʿArabī. 
    With regard to their treatment of the anthropomorphic attributes, I have 
demonstrated that Ibn ʿArabī and al-Shaʿrānī endorse the position of the pious 
predecessors, which is known as the delegation of meaning to God – although 
al-Shaʿrānī’s understanding of delegation is closer to that of the bi-lā kayfa theory. Yet I 
have highlighted that this is only one aspect of their teaching, as both Ibn ʿArabī and 
al-Shaʿrānī address the anthropomorphic attributes from the perspective of their own 
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mystical worldview. Ibn ʿArabī’s position primarily stands on his monistic theory of 
ontological divine self-manifestation, wherein he treats the anthropomorphic attributes 
as evidence of the identification of God with creation. He thus synthesises the notions 
of divine incomparability and immanence. I have shown that al-Shaʿrānī also espouses 
the synthesis of tanzīh and tashbīh. However, his treatment of tashbīh excludes any 
possibility of pantheistic implications. As this chapter has clarified, al-Shaʿrānī 
reinterprets tashbīh as divine self-assimilation to the world’s beings through perceptual 
similarity, without implying divine immanence. Based on this idea, he perceives the 
anthropomorphic attributes as part of the divine descent to people’s minds and 
encourages faith in their prima facie sense. In al-Shaʿrānī’s view, the affirmation of 
these attributes is necessary, especially because they serve the practical purpose of 
enabling human beings to know God via the perceptual similarity evoked in the mind.  
    Furthermore, I have shown that al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to the anthropomorphic 
attributes is built on what can be called the theory of visionary divine self-manifestation. 
Al-Shaʿrānī’s explanation of this teaching is based on his observation of the scriptural 
expressions, wherein God manifests Himself at the two levels of non-delimitation and 
delimitation, describing Himself with different attributes of incomparability and 
anthropomorphism at each level. Hence, the divine anthropomorphic attributes in 
scripture ought to be believed in their original form as part of this divine 
self-manifestation. Whoever confirms these anthropomorphic attributes at the level of 
delimitation, along with the divine attributes of incomparability at the level of 
non-delimitation, is a possessor of the delicate balance between these two levels. In 
al-Shaʿrānī’s view, through the realisation of this balance, the problems surrounding the 
understanding of the divine attributes are peacefully resolved.  
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    Most significantly, al-Shaʿrānī considers that visionary divine self-manifestation is 
only concerned with the individual’s perception. This means that it only occurs on a 
perceptual and textual level, in contrast with Ibn ʿArabī’s idea of ontological divine 
self-manifestation, which reveals the existential reality of the world. With regard to this 
subject, I have underlined al-Shaʿrānī’s innovative integration of Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching 
into his own mystical and theological worldview, reinterpreting Ibn ʿArabī’s ontological 
monism as visionary and experiential mysticism. Strikingly, this accords with my 
finding from Chapter 2 that al-Shaʿrānī reads the oneness of existence as experiential 
oneness.  
    In this chapter, I have provided further evidence of the considerable similarity 
between al-Shaʿrānī and the Ḥanbalīs with regard to their literalistic approach to the 
divine anthropomorphic attributes. Of course, they fundamentally disagree on the 
espousal of divine self-manifestation and the notion of tashbīh, which the Ḥanbalīs do 
not accept. However, considering certain similarities between the two, al-Shaʿrānī’s 
stance on the anthropomorphic attributes can be perceived as taking a middle path 
between the tenet of the traditionalists and Ibn ʿArabī-inspired mysticism. 
    Lastly, another significant finding from this study is that according to al-Shaʿrānī, 
as far as non-advanced mystics are concerned, the primary role of the mystical 
unveiling is not the disclosure of the ontological reality where the world is considered to 
be God and not God; rather, based on the awareness of visionary divine 
self-manifestation, the mystical unveiling helps one to simultaneously deny the 
occurrence of pure anthropomorphism and affirm the perceptual similarity brought to 
mind by the images of the anthropomorphic attributes. In many of his theological works, 
al-Shaʿrānī’s focus is indeed set on demonstrating this idea. 
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    This chapter has thus investigated al-Shaʿrānī’s reinterpretation and integration of 
Ibn ʿArabī’s ontological teachings into his own worldview of visionary and experiential 
mysticism, through which al-Shaʿrānī approaches the anthropomorphic attributes in a 
way that differs from that of Ibn ʿArabī and other theologians. By relating the mystic 
teaching to the theological conundrum of the anthropomorphic attributes, al-Shaʿrānī 
creatively merges the mystical and theological disciplines. His theological efforts in this 
regard consequently deserve a more positive assessment in modern scholarship. In the 
next and final chapter of this study, I shall further focus on al-Shaʿrānī’s attempt to fuse 
the theological discipline with the mystical one, analysing his view on another 























Al-Shaʿrānī on God’s With-ness (maʿiyya)  
 
    In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that al-Shaʿrānī refutes the use of figurative 
interpretation and upholds faith in the prima facie sense of the anthropomorphic 
attributes. I argued that al-Shaʿrānī integrates Ibn ʿArabī’s theory of divine 
self-manifestation into his own thought by reinterpreting it as a visionary experience 
that only occurs in people’s minds. It emerged that al-Shaʿrānī tries to provide an 
answer to the theological problem of the anthropomorphic attributes from a mystical 
perspective, thereby conflating the mystical discipline with the theological sphere.   
    In order to analyse this subject further, the current chapter investigates 
al-Shaʿrānī’s treatment of the anthropomorphic notion of divine ‘with-ness’ 
(maʿiyya).612 This is reported in various Qurʾānic verses (‘God is with the patient ones’ 
[Q. 2:249]; ‘Do not grieve; indeed, God is with us’ [Q. 9:40]; ‘Indeed, God is with those 
who fear Him and those who do good’ [Q. 16:128]; ‘Indeed, I am with you both – I hear 
and I see’ [Q. 20:46]; ‘God is with you wherever you are’ [Q. 57:4]; ‘Except that He is 
with them wherever they are’ [Q. 58:7]). To put it simply, the debate over the notion of 
God’s with-ness concerns how God, who is absolutely incomparable to creation, is 
understood to be with worldly beings. As we shall see, theologians tried, on one hand, 
to figuratively interpret the above verses on God’s with-ness. On the other hand, 
                                                
612 This translation ‘with-ness’ is taken from Chittick (Chittick, The Sufi Path, 88; 
Self-Disclosure, 37). I have considered an alternative translation such as divine ‘immanence’ or 
‘indwelling’. However, as we shall see, al-Shaʿrānī employs the term maʿiyya in the sense that 
God is in reality with creation, all the while carefully excluding the idea of pure 
anthropomorphism. In other words, he upholds the prima facie sense of maʿiyya but denies any 
literal correspondence between the divine reality and that of creation. Considering this, I judged 
that ‘immanence’ and ‘indwelling’, which indicate that God is literally in creation, were not 
appropriate translations here. Therefore, I have chosen ‘with-ness’ for the sake of precision. 
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al-Shaʿrānī, who refutes the use of figurative interpretation, took another approach by 
drawing on Ibn ʿArabī’s idea of the relation between God’s essence and His attributes –
that is, his thesis that the divine attributes are identical to God Himself. In addition to 
this, and quite intriguingly, al-Shaʿrānī here relies on the teachings of the Shādhilī Sufis 
in fifteenth-century Egypt, who are almost unknown to modern scholarship. 
    Al-Shaʿrānī discusses the issue of divine with-ness in many of his theological 
works, exhibiting his great interest in this subject. Our study of this topic, which has as 
yet to be treated in modern scholarship, will thus explore al-Shaʿrānī’s commitment to 
Ibn ʿArabī’s position on the relation between God’s essence and His attributes. It will 
also reveal the influence that the little-known Shādhilī mystics had on al-Shaʿrānī’s 
thought in his approach to the issue of divine attributes. This will illuminate the 
innovative efforts they made in applying Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching to a theological topic of 
their own concern. 
    In what follows, I will explore two main arguments. First, I examine the question 
on whether or not God’s essential attributes are identical to His essence. In particular, I 
will treat the positions held by the Ashʿarīs, Muʿtazilīs, Ibn ʿArabī, and al-Shaʿrānī 
regarding this subject. Building on the findings of the first section, in the subsequent 
section, I will consider al-Shaʿrānī’s treatment of the notion of divine with-ness. I will 
expound on how he merges the teachings of Ibn ʿArabī with those of two hitherto 
unstudied Shādhilī Sufis, Muḥammad al-Maghribī (d. 910-911/1504-1506) and his 
disciple Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī (d. 914/1508-9), with a reference to Ibn Qayyim 




5.1. The Relation between God’s Essence and His Attributes 
 
    This section examines Ibn ʿArabī and al-Shaʿrānī’s shared view on the relation 
between God’s essence and His essential attributes. Within the Islamic tradition of 
rational theology, the divine essential attributes (ṣifa nafsiyya) are that which God is 
essentially characterised by and which His essence necessarily requires. Ashʿarī 
theologians primarily count seven divine essential attributes: His life, knowledge, power, 
will, hearing, sight, and speech. Permanence (baqāʾ) can also be added to these. First, I 
will briefly consider the Ashʿarīs’ and Muʿtazilīs’ opinions on the relation between 
divine essence and these attributes, a subject which has attracted much scholarly 
attention.613 This will be followed by an analysis of Ibn ʿArabī and al-Shaʿrānī’s stance 
on the subject. 
    One of the issues that the Ashʿarī theologians confronted regarding the 
understanding of the essential attributes of God is the relation of these attributes to His 
essence. According to the Ashʿarī theologians, the essential attributes are pre-eternal, as 
it is impossible to think of any moment when God was not living or knowing. However, 
this assumption posed a theological question: if God is believed to be absolutely one, 
how can the plurality of His eternal attributes in relation to divine unity be explained? 
As a solution to the problem, the Ashʿarīs devised the thesis that the essential attributes 
are neither identical to, nor other than, God Himself.  
    According to this thesis, the essential attributes are considered to be real entities 
that are distinct from God. In order for them to be meaningful, they are also distinct 
from each other. As Belo writes, ‘if God is made identical with His attributes, one is 
                                                
613 See, for example, Gimaret, La doctrine, 259-281. 
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forced to accept the absurdity that the knowledge is knowing, or that the knower is the 
knowledge’.614 In order to avoid the conclusion that the knowledge, power, and so on 
are identical to God and that God is knowing through His knowledge as much as 
through He is knowing through His power, the essential attributes ought to have 
existence independently of God, thereby sharing the quality of eternity with His essence. 
Accepting the plurality of eternal beings aside from divine essence does not violate 
divine unity. In the view of the Ashʿarīs, the essential attributes are additional to and 
inherent in the divine essence. In this regard, these attributes are other than God Himself. 
God is then the knowing, powerful, living and so on, through His attributes of 
knowledge, power, and life, which are independent entities. Yet, inasmuch as these 
attributes subsist in God, neither are they other than Him.615   
    This position stands in contrast to that of the Muʿtazilīs, whose main objective is to 
protect the concept of absolute divine unity. In their view, the thesis that the essential 
attributes have independence of their own distinctive from God’s essence leads to the 
conclusion that they are eternal in themselves, entailing the plurality of eternal beings 
apart from God. If they are eternal through another eternal being, rather than in 
themselves, this results in an infinite regress, which is absurd. For this reason, the divine 
attributes cannot be given the status of real entities, and accordingly they are identical to 
God Himself. Consequently, in the view of the Muʿtazilīs, God is knowing not through 
an attribute of knowledge that is an independent existent in itself and additional to God, 
but through knowledge that is identical to God Himself. In other words, God is knowing, 
powerful, and living in His essence. All of these divine attributes are thus reduced to the 
                                                
614 Belo, ‘Muʿtazilites,’ 122. 
615 Wisnovsky, ‘Essence and Existence,’ 33-35; Ramli, ‘The Predecessors of Ashʿarism,’ 
217-218. 
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divine essence alone.616 In maintaining this, the Muʿtazilīs did not intend to deny the 
essential attributes altogether. However, their antagonists censured their position for 
stripping God of His attributes.617  
    As Chittick points out, Ibn ʿArabī denies the Ashʿarī position on the essential 
attributes as being neither identical to nor other than God Himself. Instead, Ibn ʿArabī 
upholds a thesis that appears similar to that of the Muʿtazilīs.618 Al-Shaʿrānī shares the 
same view as Ibn ʿArabī on this issue, and explains it by quoting al-Futūḥāt 
al-Makkiyya. In what follows, based on an analysis of al-Shaʿrānī’s arguments, I shall 
discuss their shared position. 
    Quoting Ibn ʿArabī, al-Shaʿrānī explicitly dismisses the Ashʿarī view on divine 
essence and the essential attributes. The quotation reads:  
 
As for the remark of some theologians [the Ashʿarīs] that the divine attributes 
are not identical to God, this is because they assumed knowledge to be 
additional to God and denied that the attribute is the same as Him. Yet, since 
he [also] refused to affirm God without the qualification of His knowledge, 
he instead stated that knowledge is not other than God. Then, his mind got 
confused and issued a statement that his reason gave him. It goes: ‘divine 
attributes are neither identical to nor other than God Himself’. Ibn ʿArabī said 
that this is a meaningless profession with no spirit in it. It shows that the 
speaker does not possess any mystical unveiling (kashf) […]. We [the 
mystics] do not speak of [the divine attributes as being] something additional, 
                                                
616 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 108. 
617 Wisnovsky, ‘Essence and Existence,’ 33-35; Peters, God’s Created Speech, 250-252.  
618 Chittick and Morris, The Meccan Revelations, vol. 1, 48, 62, 244, n.53. 
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for our mystical unveiling coincides with the view that the divine attributes 
are identical to God Himself.619 
 
The above passage shows Ibn ʿArabī and al-Shaʿrānī’s rejection of the Ashʿarī teaching, 
as well as their espousal of the Muʿtazilī tenet which states that the divine attributes are 
identical with God’s essence.620  
    Borrowing Ibn ʿArabī’s words, al-Shaʿrānī then explains the rationale behind the 
Ashʿarī tenet which states that the essential attributes are neither identical to nor other 
than God Himself. According to al-Shaʿrānī, the Ashʿarī theologians insist that the 
essential attributes are not the same as God; for example, an attribute of knowledge is, 
according to them, removable, while the essence of a knower remains intact. This is 
based on an analogy between God and creation; in the case of human beings, it is 
possible to assume a separation between a person’s essence and the attribute of 
knowledge and imagine a man without knowledge. Should someone lose his knowledge 
and become a lunatic, he is nonetheless himself, and his essence remains the same. This 
is also supported by the observation that no human beings are knowing in their essence. 
They only become knowing by acquiring knowledge, which is additional to and 
inherent in their essence. The theologians applied this analogy to God, who is 
                                                
619  al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 219-220; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 111. 
Al-Shaʿrānī does not explicitly associate the thesis that God’s attributes are neither identical to 
nor other than God Himself with the Ashʿarīs, whereas Ibn ʿArabī names the Ashʿarīs who 
articulate this tenet. See Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 4, 236. 
620 A similar argument against the Ashʿarīs’ view is also found in the following passage:  
 
If we say that these relations [divine attributes] are things superadded to His Essence, 
that they are ontological (wujūdī), and that He possesses no perfection except through 
them – even were He not to have them – this would mean that He is imperfect in 
essence but perfect through superadded ontological thing [a passage from al-Futūḥāt 
al-Makkiyya, chapter 558, translated by Chittick, The Meccan Revelations, vol. 1, 62]. 
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all-knowing, and concluded that His attribute of knowledge is also additional to and 
subsists in His essence. Thus, they concluded that it is neither identical to nor other than 
God.621 
    Al-Shaʿrānī attempts to refute the Ashʿarī position based on the following 
observations. Firstly, al-Shaʿrānī maintains that God is perfect, knowing, powerful, and 
so on in Himself, not through something that is additional to His essence. In other 
words, God cannot be an effect of something other than Himself. If, on the other hand, 
the divine attributes of knowledge and power are viewed as entities that are distinct 
from God and additional to His essence, as the Ashʿarīs claim, and if it is presumed that 
He only becomes God who is knowing and powerful through these entities, divinity 
becomes an effect of a cause that is a divine attribute. If this were the case, it must entail 
one of two things. Either the divine attributes are the same as God Himself, or other 
than God. They cannot be the same as God, because a cause (i.e. the divine attributes) 
cannot be the cause of itself (i.e. God). Yet neither can they be other than God because 
God cannot become an effect of a cause that is not Himself. This is because a cause 
ontologically precedes its effect; thus, if God were caused by an effect other than 
Himself, God would inevitably become secondary to His cause, which is fundamentally 
absurd. Furthermore, this argument entails that God, being an effect, is in need of the 
additional entities that are causes to Himself. It also follows that the caused thing (i.e. 
God) would have plural causes (i.e. the divine attributes), through which He becomes 
God. These outcomes are altogether illogical for the divine. Hence, the original premise, 
which maintains that the divine attributes are distinctive entities and additional to His 
                                                
621 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 218; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 109; Ibn ʿArabī, 
al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 284. 
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essence, has been proved wrong.622 
    Secondly, al-Shaʿrānī insists that God cannot be ruled by something other than 
Himself. If God were to become knowing though an additional and separate attribute of 
knowledge, it would follow that the attribute that is other than God is the determinant 
(ḥukm) of His being a knower. However, it is entirely impossible to assume that God is 
ruled by something that is not Himself.623  
    Lastly, the idea that God becomes perfect only through something additional to His 
essence (i.e. the essential attributes) would entail that His essence becomes attributed 
with imperfection and deficiency when (as a hypothetical argument) these additional 
attributes do not inhere in it. The conclusion is fundamentally absurd, for God is 
constantly perfect and self-sufficient from and for all eternity.624   
    As opposed to the Ashʿarīs, al-Shaʿrānī, following Ibn ʿArabī, believes that the 
essential attributes are inseparable from God’s essence. Were it not for His attributes of 
knowledge, power and others, He would no longer be God. Consequently, the divine 
attributes are identical to His essence, not other than Himself.625 In the view of 
al-Shaʿrānī and Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching, the divine attributes are relations to God that do 
not possess separate existence independently of Him.626 This is also explained in 
relation to Ibn ʿArabī’s ontological worldview. According to this worldview, as we have 
seen in Chapter 1, God is the only real existence, and everything else is ascribed to His 
                                                
622 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 217; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 110; Ibn ʿArabī, 
al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 163. 
623 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 109; Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 3, 
468. Note that Ibn ʿArabī explicitly identifies this view with the Ashʿarīs while al-Shaʿrānī does 
not. 
624 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 218; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 109; Ibn ʿArabī, 
al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 284. 
625 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 218; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 109; Ibn ʿArabī, 
al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 284.  
626 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 217; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 108; Ibn ʿArabī, 
al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 1, 163. 
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single essence. Therefore, divine attributes cannot be real and distinctive. Otherwise, 
their independent existence would violate divine unity. It is thus concluded that God is 
knowing, powerful, and so on through attributes of knowledge and power that are 
identical to His essence.  
    It is intriguing to observe that in many of his theological works, al-Shaʿrānī 
supports Ibn ʿArabī’s statement that God’s attributes are identical to His essence – a 
thesis which was developed by the Muʿtazilīs. This not only confirms al-Shaʿrānī’s 
loyalty to Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, but also al-Shaʿrānī’s amicable attitude towards the 
Muʿtazilīs’ teachings. In fact, despite belonging to the scholarly circle of the Ashʿarīs, 
al-Shaʿrānī acknowledges a certain similarity between the Muʿtazilīs and Sufis on the 
issue of the divine attributes.627 Of course, this does not equate al-Shaʿrānī’s position 
with that of the Muʿtazilīs. A significant difference between them concerning the 
notions of the divine attributes is that, whereas the Muʿtazilīs attempt to reduce the 
anthropomorphic attributes to the realities of the essential attributes through figurative 
interpretation, al-Shaʿrānī opts for affirming the realities of the anthropomorphic 
attributes as they are, as I have already discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, as we shall 
later see, al-Shaʿrānī states that the divine attributes are identical to His essence in 
establishing the reality of divine with-ness.  
 
 
 5.2. Interpretation of Divine With-ness  
 
    In al-Shaʿrānī’s view, the thesis maintaining that the divine essential attributes are 
                                                
627 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Ajwiba al-marḍiyya, 289; al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā, 20; al-Munāwī, al-Kawākib, 
vol. 3, 436. 
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identical to God Himself is closely related to the discussion on divine with-ness. This 
section starts with a brief overview of the theologians’ approach to the notion of divine 
with-ness, with special attention given to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s views. This will be 
followed by analysis of divine with-ness in Ibn ʿArabī’s worldview. Lastly, I will 
demonstrate al-Shaʿrānī’s understanding of the notion of divine with-ness, focusing on 
the scholarly gathering that took place among the two Shādhilī mystics before him – 
Muḥammad al-Maghribī and his disciple Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī – as well as Zakariyyāʾ 
al-Anṣārī and two of his contemporaries. In this section, I aim to unveil al-Shaʿrānī’s 
innovative treatment of Ibn ʿArabī’s view and underscore the centrality of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
teaching, along with that of other Shādhilī mystics, in al-Shaʿrānī’s thought. 
 
5.2.1. Theologians on Divine With-ness 
 
    As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, the Qurʾān frequently reports that God 
is with human beings. This is observed in the Qurʾān (9:40, 20:46, 57:4, 58:7, and so 
forth). Theologians include the notion of God’s being with His creation, or divine 
with-ness (maʿiyya), amongst the anthropomorphic descriptions of God. In their view, 
the literal meaning of divine with-ness implies that God is physically with human 
beings, occupying a space in this world. In order to avoid this anthropomorphic 
implication, the majority of theologians choose to interpret the idea of divine with-ness 
figuratively.  
    On the whole, the theologians maintained that God is with His creation through 
His attributes, such as His knowledge, power, mercy and protection. Based on the 
observation that God is the Knower of everything and He is aware of whatsoever we 
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may do wherever we are, it is concluded that God is with us in His knowledge. 
Likewise, inasmuch as God is the Powerful one over every being, nothing in this world 
escapes His authority. Hence, it is surmised that God is with the world in His power. 
Many of the Ashʿarī and Māturīdī theologians, including Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 
537/1142), Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286), ʿIzz al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Salām, and Jalāl 
al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī supported this interpretive method and understood the verses on 
with-ness to mean God’s with-ness in His various attributes.628 Al-Ghazālī also writes 
that the people with reason know that God is not restricted to any direction and that He 
is with every entity in His attributes of knowledge and comprehension (iḥāṭa), whereas 
the ignorant people may take such expressions literally.629 The Muʿtazilī theologian 
Abū al-Qāsim al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) similarly upholds this approach and 
interprets Qurʾānic verse 57:4 to mean that God is present with human beings in His 
knowledge of their conversation, while at the same time being far above any place and 
location.630  
    Similarly to the rational theologians, Ibn Taymiyya interprets divine with-ness in 
relation to His attributes. According to him, God is in reality seated upon the throne in 
His essence, and He is also with human beings in His knowledge. In order to elucidate 
                                                
628 al-Maghrāwī, al-Mufassirūn, 894, 994, 1150-1151, 1170 
629 al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād, 265-267. Similarly, in relation to the notion of divine 
nearness, al-Ghazālī argues that the ignorant people take God’s nearness in the hadith, ‘whoever 
draws near Me a span of the hand, I draw near him an arm’s length’ to mean His actual nearness 
in physical distance, whereas the people with reason, or the theologians know that it only means 
His nearness in His mercy and favour. Elucidating the Qurʾānic verse 57:4, al-Rāzī also 
maintains that the theologians interpret God’s with-ness figuratively to mean with-ness in His 
knowledge, protection, or custody, in order to avoid the notion of God’s with-ness in a physical 
space and direction. For more details on al-Rāzī’s treatment of God’s with-ness, see his 
al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, vol. 29, 215-216. 
630  al-Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf, vol. 6, 62-63. Verse 57:4 reads: ‘There is no secret 
conversation of three but that He is the fourth of them, nor of five but that He is the sixth of 
them; no less than that and no more except that He is with them wherever they are’. He also 
elucidates the Qurʾānic verse 29:69 – ‘Indeed, He is with the ones who do good’ – as God’s 
nearness in His support and aid to them (al-Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf, vol. 4, 562). 
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these contradictory reports, Ibn Taymiyya insists that with-ness consists in God 
watching over and knowing His creation. As Hoover explains, this is compared to the 
situation of a traveller who was told that the moon and stars are with him, or a farther, 
who is sitting on a roof, tells his son below not to be afraid because the father is with 
him.631 Ibn Taymiyya attributes the idea that God is with His creation in His knowledge 
to the pious predecessors, such as Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778) or Ibn ʿUyayna (d. 
196/811).632 Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī also notes that the idea of God’s being with creation 
or His being near us in His knowledge dates back to the pious predecessors represented 
by Sufyān al-Thawrī and others.633 This suggests that interpreting God’s with-ness 
through the divine attributes has been a standard position amongst scholars from the 
early Islamic period.  
    With regard to the mystics who are also strong advocates of Ashʿarī theology, they 
seem to take two different approaches to divine with-ness. On the one hand, like other 
theologians, they understand divine with-ness in relation to God’s attributes. For 
example, Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī endorses al-Qushayrī’s position, which – through a 
reference to the interpretation of al-Junayd – maintains that divine with-ness means 
God’s with-ness in His aid and protection, or in His all-comprehensive knowledge. This 
allows them to deny the anthropomorphic implication of divine with-ness in the sense 
of God’s vicinity (mujāwara) and togetherness (muqārana) to creation.634  
     On the other hand, al-Anṣārī suggests that there is another approach to the notion 
of divine with-ness. In relation to this, he refers to an episode reported by the Persian 
mystic Abū ʿAlī al-Rūdbārī (d. 322/934). According to this account by al-Rūdbārī, a 
                                                
631 Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy, 55. 
632 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, vol. 1, 219-220. 
633 al-Bayhaqī, al-Asmāʾ wa al-ṣifāt, vol. 2, 341-342; Swartz, A Medieval Critique, 160, n. 114. 
634 al-Anṣārī, Iḥkām al-dalāla, vol. 1, 59. 
 290 
mystic replied to the question of God’s location by saying: ‘May God annihilate you 
(asḥaqa); how can you ask where God is?’ Commenting on this statement, al-Anṣārī 
writes:  
 
[As a comment on ‘May God annihilate you’] it means that one ought to 
forget oneself through the perfection of one’s contemplation on God. [As a 
comment on ‘how can you ask where God is?’] the Sufi was in the state of 
being present with God (fī ḥāl al-ḥaḍra maʿa Allah), wherein he perceives 
nothing but God in any moving object as well as still object. Consequently, 
God became like [the object of] his direct vision (ʿiyān). Because of such 
dominance of God over his heart, the Sufi responded in this way.635  
 
Although the passage is not directly concerned with the notion of divine with-ness, it 
implies the possibility that Sufis may experience God’s presence with them in their 
heart as a result of forgetting themselves and focusing on God, and perceive nothing but 
Him in their vision. This understanding clearly differs from the theologians’ 
interpretation of God’s presence with creation in His attributes of aid and knowledge. 
    It is noteworthy that Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya also considers the possibility that 
the mystic perceives divine presence through his direct experience with God. In one of 
the sections of his al-Wābil al-ṣayyib, wherein he enumerates the various benefits of the 
mystic remembrance of God (dhikr), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya notes that a mystic who 
remembers God (dhākir) becomes close to (qarīb) the One who is remembered 
(madhkūr); thereby the One who is remembered (God) comes to be with him. Ibn 
                                                
635 al-Anṣārī, Iḥkām al-dalāla, vol. 1, 60. 
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al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya describes this notion of divine with-ness as special with-ness 
(maʿiyya khāṣṣa). According to him, this special type of divine with-ness should be 
distinguished from the other kind of divine with-ness, namely, God’s with-ness in His 
knowledge and comprehension as agreed upon among theologians.636 Ibn al-Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya certainly acknowledges various benefits in the theologians’ divine 
with-ness in His attributes. Nevertheless, he intriguingly expresses the superiority of the 
mystics’ experience of divine with-ness, which words cannot describe and which is only 
experienced through the remembrance of God and the mystical experience of tasting 
(dhawq).637  
    While supporting this special type of with-ness based on the mystical discipline, 
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya also warns that unless a mystic is fully aware of the distinction 
between the pre-eternal God and temporally originated beings, he might take his 
mystical experience of divine with-ness as representing the existential reality of the 
world.638 This will lead to the incarnationism of the Christians or the unificationism of 
the proponents of the oneness of existence.639 It is obvious that by this remark, Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya intends to criticise Ibn ʿArabī and his followers who, in his view, 
denied the ontological distinction between the divine and the world and identified God 
with creation. For Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, they understood the meaning of divine 
with-ness in a heretical manner.  
    In relation to this, in Chapter 2, I explained that whereas Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 
condemns the ontological notion of annihilation for denying the difference between God 
and His creation, he tolerates the kind of annihilation based on a visionary experience. 
                                                
636 Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Wābil al-ṣayyib, 157. 
637 Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Wābil al-ṣayyib, 157-159. 
638 Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Wābil al-ṣayyib, 157-159. 
639 Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Wābil al-ṣayyib, 157-159. 
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A similar conclusion is interestingly drawn in the case of divine with-ness. As we have 
seen, while Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya rejects the divine with-ness that entails the 
ontological presence of God in creation, he nonetheless accepts the experiential and 
perceptual state of divine with-ness as special with-ness, whereby human beings 
experience divine presence psychologically in their minds. Strikingly, Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya’s view on this special kind of divine with-ness is referred to by Ibrāhīm 
al-Mawāhibī, whom I shall discuss shortly.  
 
5.2.2. Ibn ʿArabī on Divine with-ness 
 
    Before discussing al-Shaʿrānī’s view on divine witness, I will briefly look at Ibn 
ʿArabī’s. It must be noted that Ibn ʿArabī does not analyse the notion of divine 
with-ness in depth. It is at least certain that he considers the idea in relation to his 
mystical worldview. Based on the theory of ontological divine self-manifestation, Ibn 
ʿArabī perceives God to be with His creation inasmuch as they manifest divine names 
and attributes as His loci. In this regard, God is with them wherever they are in the 
forms of His creation, wherein God becomes manifest.640 Even when they are not yet 
existent –that is, before the world receives the divine self-manifestation – Ibn ʿArabī 
maintains that God is already with them, because they are from all eternity known to 
Him.641  
    Therefore, God is pre-eternally present with the creation in His knowledge, which 
is identical to His essence, and He is also with them in His manifestations in the world’s 
beings. In Ibn ʿArabī’s view, only the mystics can attain this divine with-ness. In one of 
                                                
640 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 2, 558; vol. 3, 101.  
641 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya vol. 2, 56.  
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the passages in al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, he describes the mystical experience of 
witnessing God’s with-ness as divine ‘union’ (waṣl) to creation and writes: 
 
The Real is perpetually in a state of ‘union’ (waṣl) with engendered 
existence. Through this He is a god. This is indicated by His words, ‘He is 
with you wherever you are’ [Q. 57:4], that is, in whatever state you have in 
nonexistence, existence, and all qualities. Such is the actual situation.  
    What takes place for the people of solicitude, the Folk of Allah, is that 
God gives them vision and unveils their insights until they witness this 
withness.642 This – that is, the gnostic’s witnessing – is what is called 
‘union.’643 So the gnostic has become joined (ittiṣāl) to witnessing the 
actual situation.644  
 
As the passage indicates, the real situation of the cosmos is that God is with all things in 
creation in a state of union, whether they are existent or non-existent, and this can only 
be grasped by mystical unveiling. There is little doubt here that Ibn ʿArabī’s approach to 
divine with-ness is built on the ontology of divine self-manifestation and the tenet of the 
oneness of existence; God is with the creatures in the sense that He is manifest in them 
in reality.  
    Similarly to this, another monistic mystic, Ibn Sabʿīn, whom I mentioned in 
Chapter 1, relates divine with-ness to his worldview of absolute unity. According to him, 
                                                
642 That is to say, until the mystics realise the situation of God being with creation in His 
pre-eternal knowledge and through His manifestation in them. 
643 This means that when a mystic receives mystical experience and witnesses the real situation 
of the world wherein the world is He/not He, he becomes as if he is unified with God. 
644 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 2, 558, translation taken from Chittick, The Sufi 
Path, 365. 
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divine with-ness – as alluded to in the verse ‘God is with those who fear Him and those 
who do good’ [Q. 16:128] – shows divine selection and solicitude for a chosen, good 
servant. Based on this idea, Ibn Sabʿīn maintains that God makes a good servant a 
divine vessel for His names and attributes, and, most notably, makes His attribute of 
goodness the essence of the good servant. In his view, much like that of Ibn ʿArabī, the 
divine attribute is not additional to the one who is attributed with it (i.e. God), but 
identical to God Himself. It follows that a good servant whose essence is identical to the 
divine attribute of goodness is God.645 It is thus concluded that God is with those who 
do good from the perspective that He is none other than those good servants. In this way, 
Ibn Sabʿīn articulates the tenet of absolute unity through the notion of divine with-ness. 
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya clearly objected to this kind of monistic worldview.  
    However, Ibn ʿArabī’s view on divine with-ness varies and lacks consistency. On 
the one hand, he denies that the divine essence can be with creation, as His essence is 
never known.646 On the other hand, he notes that the divine name ‘the Watchful one’ 
(raqīb) and its presence in creation as ‘watchfulness’ (murāqaba) imply that God is 
with us in His essence.647 In Chapter 73 of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, he also writes that 
God is with the chosen ones (aṣfiyāʾ) in being their friend (tawallī); with the prophets 
through His supporting their call to the path of God; and with the elites (khāṣṣa) 
through their dialogue with God without intermediaries, and through His intimacy with 
                                                
645 Ibn Sabʿīn, Rasāʾil, 153. 
646 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 2, 118-119.  
647 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 4, 254. In Ibn ʿArabī’s view, the Watchful one 
implies that God observes all beings, including their attributes, properties, movements, and 
minds. In order for this to be possible, God has to know their essence all-comprehensively. To 
Ibn ʿArabī’s mind, this requires the Watchful one to accompany the divine essence that is 
present with all the divine names and attributes, whereby God can watch over every being in 
creation in His knowledge, power, aid, grace, and so on. 
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them (uns); and all of these are united in the prophet Muḥammad.648 Thus Ibn ʿArabī 
understands the notion of divine with-ness through God’s actions. Furthermore, as 
noted earlier, Ibn ʿArabī insists that God is with the creatures through His knowledge, 
which is identical with His essence; hence, God is with them both in His essence and 
attributes. Interestingly, this conclusion, which is easily drawn from his arguments, is 
central to al-Shaʿrānī’s thought, but not Ibn ʿArabī’s. 
    As I have shown, Ibn ʿArabī generally perceives God’s with-ness in relation to his 
mystical ontology of divine self-manifestation; God is with creation in His pre-eternal 
knowledge and in His manifestations in them. Yet as we shall now see, the notion of 
God’s with-ness concerned al-Shaʿrānī much more than it did Ibn ʿArabī.  
 
5.2.3. Al-Shaʿrānī on Divine With-ness 
 
    Having discussed the theologians’ and Ibn ʿArabī’s views on divine with-ness, I 
turn to al-Shaʿrānī’s treatment of this concept. The discussions in this section draw on 
the description of the scholarly gathering that took place in fifteenth-century Egypt 
concerning the meaning of divine with-ness. I will especially examine al-Shaʿrānī’s 
reports of this incident, along with Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī’s unpublished and unstudied 
epistle, ‘The Light of the Sunnis in Explicating The Meaning of With-ness’ (al-Lumʿa 
al-sunniyya fī bayān maʿnā al-maʿiyya). The investigation of this subject will highlight 
al-Shaʿrānī’s relationships with lesser-known local Sufis, clarify the similarity between 
their ideas and those of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya in their understanding of God’s 
with-ness, and elucidate the extent of al-Shaʿrānī’s acceptance of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
                                                
648 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, vol. 2, 118-119.  
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teachings. 
    I begin with a brief sketch of the epistle’s author, Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī, paying 
special attention to his teacher, Muḥammad al-Maghribī. Winter mentions Muḥammad 
al-Maghribī as one of al-Shaʿrānī’s teachers from the Shādhilī order, who also taught 
al-Suyūṭī and Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī.649  Muḥammad al-Maghribī studied under the 
Shādhilī Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Sarsī (d. 861/1456), who was a disciple of the influential 
Shādhilī teacher, Muḥammad al-Ḥanafī (d. 847/1443).650  According to Geoffroy, 
Muḥammad al-Ḥanafī established the second major branch of the Shādhilī order, after 
Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Mursī’s (d. 625/1288) succession to leadership following the death of 
the Shāhdilī order’s founder, Abū Ḥasan al-Shāhdilī (d. 656/1258). Al-Sarsī, followed 
by Muḥammad al-Maghribī, inherited al-Ḥanafī’s Shādhilī branch.651  
    Muḥammad al-Maghribī was known among his fellow Egyptian scholars for his 
mastery of the fields of the Islamic Law and Sufism.652 Since al-Shaʿrānī was only 
twelve years old when Muḥammad al-Maghribī died, Winter surmises that it is unlikely 
that he was al-Shaʿrānī’s actual teacher. Winter also points out the scarcity of references 
to Muḥammad al-Maghribī in al-Shaʿrānī’s works compared to other favourite teachers 
of his. Winter therefore concludes that the influence of Muḥammad al-Maghribī on 
al-Shaʿrānī’s thought was minor. However, Winter’s analysis is not thorough, as he 
disregards references to Muḥammad al-Maghribī made by al-Shaʿrānī in such works as 
al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya and al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir in regard to the debate over the 
                                                
649 Winter, Society and Religion, 71. See also al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 12; 
al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā, 445; al-Nabhānī, Karāmat al-awliyāʾ, vol. 1, 289.  
650 Winter, Society and Religion, 71; McGregor, Sanctity and Mysticism, 175, n. 36.  
651 Geoffroy, Le Soufisme, 210. The first major branch of al-Shādhilī is the Wafāʾī order. For 
more on this branch, see McGregor, Sanctity and Mysticism.  
652 Muḥammad al-Maghribī seems to have had a close relation with the Mamluk rulers; the 
Sultan Qāʾit Bāy is reported to have sent him some money to distribute it to other Sufis, but he 
refused to receive money from the Sultan. See, al-Munāwī, Kawākib, vol. 3, 435-436. 
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notion of divine with-ness. As we shall see, this observation raises the possibility that 
Muḥammad al-Maghribī played a certain role in shaping al-Shaʿrānī’s view on this 
concept.  
    One of the disciples of Muḥammad al-Maghribī was Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī, who 
was also a student of the Shādhilī Sufi and ardent supporter of ʿAlī Wafāʾ, Abū 
al-Mawāhibī (d. ca. 911-4/1505-9).653 Aside from al-Lumʿa al-sunniyya fī bayān maʿnā 
al-maʿiyya, Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī left a commentary on Sufi aphorisms, Kitāb al-ḥikam, 
which was authored by the second successor of the Shādhilī order, Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allah (d. 
709/1310).654 He also wrote a text on the notion of divine unity, al-Tafrīḍ wa ḍawābiṭ 
qawāʿid al-tawḥīd.655 Along with Muḥammad al-Maghribī, Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī was 
under the influence of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought. According to al-Munāwī, when asked by 
his teacher al-Maghribī about his mystical experience, Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī answered 
that he had witnessed absolute unity (al-waḥda al-muṭlaqa), and that his spirit was 
elevated as a result of this.656  Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī also employs several terms 
developed by Ibn ʿArabī, such as exclusive oneness (aḥadiyya) and inclusive oneness 
(wāḥidiyya), in explaining his view on divine with-ness.657 Apart from these facts, very 
little is known about Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī.  
    Several copies of Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī’s al-Lumʿa al-sunniyya are extant in 
                                                
653 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā, 376-390. 
654 al-Ghazzī, al-Kawākib al-sāʾira, vol. 1, 110-111; Shadharāt al-dhahab, vol. 10, 90-91; 
al-Munāwī, Kawākib al-dhurriyya vol. 3, 320-321.  
655 al-Munāwī, Kawākib al-dhurriyya vol. 3, 321.  
656 al-Munāwī, Kawākib al-dhurriyya vol. 3, 320-321.  
657 al-Mawāhibī, al-Lumʿa al-sunniyya (a), fols. 2b-3a. According to Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī, 
divine with-ness is ascribed to inclusive oneness wherein God is with all beings in His attributes, 
whereas nothing is with Him at the stage of exclusive oneness wherein everything disappears in 
His oneness. Although Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī refers to Ibn al-Fāriḍ rather than Ibn ʿArabī for the 
clarification of these two terms, it is fair to assume that Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī was influenced by 
Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical worldview. A reference to exclusive oneness and inclusive oneness does 
not appear in manuscript (b). 
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manuscript form. I have access to two of these, located at the following libraries: (a) 
Dār al-Kutub, Cairo (no. cc 74160) and (b) Maktabat al-Azhar, Cairo (no. 
68390/1544).658 The work is a very short epistle, with only two to five folios contained 
in each manuscript copy. Its main theme is summarised at the beginning of the text: 
 
This is the light of the Sunnis in explicating the meaning of with-ness, as it 
appears in the Qurʾān and in the authentic hadith. Hence, it is incumbent 
upon us to have faith in it [i.e. divine with-ness] and witness to it from the 
perspective of the mystical experience (dhawqan) and reason […]. God’s 
with-ness to His creation is in His essence as well as in His attributes, as is 
understood from the divine message, ‘God is with you’. The verse’s 
meaning is gathered in relation to what the divine name ‘the Generous one’ 
(al-karīm) implies; that is to say, it is necessary for His essence to 
accompany the divine attributes in order for Him to be related to all beings 
[so that He is generous to the entirety of His creation]. Yet divine with-ness 
is unlike the with-ness of those who occupy space, because God does not 
have any likeness (mumāthala) except Himself […] divine with-ness is then 
based on what suits Him for His perfection. May God be above pure 
anthropomorphism (tashbīh).659 
 
As suggested in the passage, Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī’s objective in the epistle is to 
                                                
658 Other copies are found in the following places: Dār al-Kutub, Cairo (no. 3594); Maktaba 
al-Azhar, Cairo (no. 28624/2655; no. 55054/1208); Juma Al Majid Centre for Culture and 
Heritage, Dubai (no. 576798); Mauritania (Wallatah) – Collection of Ahl al-Ṭālib bi-Bakr, 
Mauritania (no. sp 10306). Each copy of the manuscripts contains only two to five pages. 
659 al-Mawāhibī, al-Lumʿa al-sunniyya (a), fols. 1b-2a; al-Lumʿa al-sunniyya (b), fols. 2a-2b. 
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establish the reality of God’s with-ness to creation both in His essence and in His 
attributes, without ascribing any corporeal or physical features to Him.  
    Before setting out to investigate the arguments in the epistle, I will first examine 
al-Shaʿrānī’s description of the gathering (majlis) over the meaning of divine with-ness. 
The gathering took place at al-Azhar in the year 905/1499. The main attendants were 
Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī, Muḥammad al-Maghribī, the Shāfiʿī chief judge Zakariyyāʾ 
al-Anṣārī, the Ḥanafī chief judge Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-ʿAlāʾī al-Ḥanafī (d. 
942/1535), and the Shāfiʿī jurist Burhān al-Dīn Ibn Abī Sharīf (d. 923/1517). I have 
already introduced al-Shaʿrānī’s teacher, Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī in Chapter 1. Badr al-Dīn 
Muḥammad al-ʿAlāʾī al-Ḥanafī (d. 942/1535) was one of al-Anṣārī’s later students. He 
is known for having written a chronicle of the events that had taken place in Cairo 
between the years 917/1511-934/1528. According to Escovitz, this untitled chronicle is 
considered to be among the most important historical materials of early Ottoman Egypt. 
Unfortunately, Muḥammad al-ʿAlāʾī’s chronicle has been lost. Its fragments are only 
preserved in Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī’s (d. 1061/1651) biographical dictionary, 
al-Kawākib al-sāʾira, in which al-ʿAlāʾī also recounts details of al-Anṣārī’s life.660  
    Burhān al-Dīn Ibn Abī Sharīf (d. 923/1517), also known as Ibrāhīm ibn 
Muḥammad Ibn Abī Sharīf, was a colleague of al-Anṣārī. He was well-versed in 
Qurʾānic exegesis and Ashʿarī theology. Although Ibn Abī Sharīf supported Sufism, he 
was suspicious of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings, and in particular of Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam. Ibn Abī 
Sharīf’s works include commentaries on theological works such as Jamʿ al-jawāmiʿ, 
Sharḥ al-ʿaqāʾid and ʿAqāʾid al-nasafī. In al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, al-Shaʿrānī 
frequently quotes Ibn Abī Sharīf in order to explain different theological issues. Ibn Abī 
                                                
660 Escovitz, ‘A Lost Arabic Source,’ 513–18; al-Ghazzī, al-Kawākib al-sāʾira, vol. 1, 201; vol. 
2, 71; Shadharāt al-dhahab, vol. 10, 353; al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, vol. 7, 10.  
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Sharīf also left a summary of Risāla al-Qushayrī.661 
    The events of the scholarly gathering at al-Azhar can be summarised as follows. 
Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī, Muḥammad al-ʿAlāʾī, and Ibrāhīm Abī Sharīf one day 
approached Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī, objecting to his statement that God is with creation 
not only in His names and attributes, but also in His essence. While Ibrāhīm 
al-Mawāhibī was clarifying his view with reference to the Ibn ʿArabī-influenced mystic 
Shāfiʿī-Shādhilī Muḥammad Ibn Labbān (d. 749/1349),662 his teacher Muḥammad 
al-Maghribī came in and defended Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī’s position for its confirmation 
of the notion of divine incomparability.663 At the time of this incident, al-Shaʿrānī was 
around six years old, and still living in the countryside. Therefore, he could only have 
learnt about it either from his teacher al-Anṣarī (most probably) or from Ibrāhīm 
al-Maghribī himself.664 Abundant references to this gathering in al-Shaʿrānī’s works 
suggest that it was of great interest to him – it is recorded in at least five of his works. 
These include: al-Ajwiba al-marḍiyya (in Chapter 4, on the professions of the great 
Sufis); al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā (in the entry on Muḥammad al-Maghribī); al-Qawāʿid 
al-kashfiyya (in the section titled ‘the false imagination that God in His with-ness 
occupies space’); al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya (in Chapter 6 on the meaning of ‘God is with 
you wherever you are’); and al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir (in Chapter 18, titled ‘it is 
necessary to believe that God is with us wherever we are, in His state of being in the sky, 
                                                
661 al-Munawī, al-Kawākib, vol. 3, 308-313; al-Sakhawī, Dawʾ vol.1, 134-136. For Ibn Abī 
Sharīf’s relation with Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī, see Ingalls, Subtle Innovation.  
662 Ibn Labbān grew up in Damascus and Cairo. He was investigated by jurists for his opinion 
that allegedly agrees with that of the proponents of unificationism (ittiḥādiyya) and the oneness 
of existence (waḥda). See Ibn Ḥajar al-Asqalānī, al-Durar al-kāmina vol. 3, 330-331; Geoffroy, 
Le Soufisme, 379. Al-Subkī reports that Ibn al-Labbān explained some Qurʾānic verses and 
hadiths based on mystical teaching (al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya, vol. 9, 94; Berkey, 
Popular Preaching, 52). 
663 Geoffroy, Le Soufisme, 379-380.  
664 Al-Shaʿrānī does not mention where or not he had any direct interaction with Ibrāhīm 
al-Mawāhibī. 
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seated upon the throne, in the heaven and the earth, and closer to us than the jugular 
vein’).665 The most detailed description is given in the last three works (al-Qawāʿid 
al-kashfiyya, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, and al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir). Noticeably, there is 
no reference to this gathering in al-Mīzān al-dharriyya. 666  This suggests that 
al-Shaʿrānī’s intended audience in reporting the argument on divine with-ness did not 
include advanced mystics (who are most likely able to perceive divine with-ness based 
on Ibn ʿArabī’s ontology of divine self-manifestation), but rather consist of 
non-advanced mystics and theologians who need a different approach to this notion. In 
what follows, I expound al-Shaʿrānī’s view on divine with-ness through an analysis of 
the gathering’s details, along with a close reading of Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī’s epistle. 
    In the previous section, I demonstrated that the majority of the theologians 
understand God’s with-ness to occur through His attributes of knowledge, aid, and so 
on. In their view, it is impossible to assume that God is with human beings in His 
essence, as this would imply that He is literally with them in physical space. With 
respect to their view, al-Shaʿrānī makes the following statement: 
 
It is obvious that the one who states that God is with us in His attributes is 
greater in his reverence for God than the one who says that He is with us in 
His essence and attributes, even though the attribute is inseparable from 
the One who is attributed with it [i.e. God]. This is so, because the Qurʾān 
                                                
665  It appears in the following pages; al-Ajwiba al-marḍiyya, 301; al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā; 
442-443; al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 202-204; al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fols. 68a-69b; al-Yawāqīt 
wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 90-92.   
666 In al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, al-Shaʿrānī does not talk about the thesis maintaining that divine 
attributes are identical to God Himself. Nor does he mention the meaning of divine with-ness. 
On only one occasion, he refers to the verse ‘God is with you wherever you are,’ and denies the 
implication that we are with God from eternity. In his view, God is said to be with creation in 
His knowledge pre-eternally and in His manifestation temporarily (al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān 
al-dharriyya, 159). 
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and Sunna do not speak of divine with-ness in His essence.667 
 
Like other theologians, al-Shaʿrānī here acknowledges that divine with-ness should be 
understood as occurring through God’s attributes, but not in His essence. As he implies 
in the above passage, however, the aforementioned thesis that the divine attributes are 
identical to God Himself inevitably leads to the idea that God is with creation both in 
His essence and attributes.668 
    It is worth noting that Ibn ʿArabī does not relate his thesis that the divine attributes 
are identical to God’s essence to the concept of divine with-ness. It is in the thought of 
Muḥammad al-Maghribī, Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī, and al-Shaʿrānī that this thesis is 
associated with the understanding of God’s with-ness in His essence and attributes. 
With respect to this, al-Shaʿrānī quotes Muḥammad al-Maghribī and states: 
 
Our teacher, the Shādhilī mystic, Muḥammad al-Maghribī used to say as 
follows: it is necessarily concluded from the thesis that God is with us only in 
His knowledge that the divine attributes are independent (istiqlāl) of the 
divine essence. However, this idea is forbidden. Perhaps whoever stated this 
[i.e. the theologians] said so based on the analogy of the attributes of creation. 
In other words, he [a theologian] probably observed that even when the 
knowledge of a human being was removed, his essence [as a human being] 
remained perfect, with nothing lacking in his essence. He then applied this 
                                                
667 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 205. See also al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir vol. 
1, 90; al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 68a. This remark is attributed to al-Shaʿrānī’s Sufi teacher, 
ʿAlī al-Marṣāfī.  
668 In order to support the idea of divine with-ness in essence, al-Shaʿrānī also refers to Ibn 
ʿArabī’s comment on the divine name, ‘the Watchful one. See al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid 
al-kashfiyya, 202; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 90. 
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observation to God; yet this is a wrong analogy.669   
 
Although Ibn ʿArabī is not mentioned in this passage, Muḥammad al-Maghribī’s 
reference to the theologians’ analogy – that a person’s essence remains the same even 
without his knowledge as I mentioned earlier in this chapter – would indicate his 
familiarity with Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching regarding this subject. Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī holds 
the same tenet as Muḥammad al-Maghribī that God is with creation in His essence and 
attributes, while endorsing the aforementioned Muʿtazilī thesis. With respect to this, 
Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī writes:   
 
As the Muʿtazilīs maintained, God’s attributes are identical to His essence. 
This is in contrast to [the situation of] human beings’ attributes and their 
essences; in case of human beings, their attributes are additional to their 
essences and are separable from them, whereas the divine attributes are not 
[contrary to the theologians’ analogy].670  
 
As evident in these two passages, Muḥammad al-Maghribī, Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī, and 
al-Shaʿrānī agree with the Muʿtazilī-inspired thesis of Ibn ʿArabī that the divine 
attributes are identical to His essence. They thus reject the Ashʿarī tenet that the divine 
attributes are additional to His essence and that they are independent entities. However, 
whereas the Muʿtazilīs like al-Zamakhsharī prefer to interpret divine with-ness in 
relation to God’s attribute of knowledge, and not His essence, Muḥammad al-Maghribī, 
Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī, and al-Shaʿrānī – based on the thesis that the divine attributes are 
                                                
669 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 202. 
670 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khiḍriyya, fol. 68b. 
 304 
the same as Him – maintain that God is with His creation both in His essence and 
attributes. This is an intriguing example indicating how these mystics develop an 
original teaching – first advanced by the Muʿtazilīs and then adopted by Ibn ʿArabī – by 
applying it to another theological issue.  
    Muḥammad al-Maghribī, Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī, and al-Shaʿrānī’s view was 
eventually confronted by that of the theologians and jurists who believed that God is 
with creation only in His attributes. When Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī held a gathering at 
al-Azhar over the understanding of the Qurʾānic verse 57:4, Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī, Badr 
al-Dīn al-ʿAlāʾī, and Ibrāhīm Abī Sharīf argued against Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī’s 
interpretation that God is with His creation in His essence and attributes. In response, 
Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī stated that God’s attributes cannot be separated from His essence, 
for if one could assume the existence of the divine attributes without the divine essence, 
they would become independent entities, which in his view was illogical. Thus, he 
insisted that the notion of divine with-ness in attributes necessarily entails divine 
with-ness in essence. In other words, since God is only related to the creatures through 
His attributes of knowledge of them, power over them, and so on, the idea of divine 
with-ness in essence inevitably entails divine with-ness in attributes.671  
    Hence, it is established that God is with us both in His essence and in His attributes. 
This thesis affirms the reality of God being with us in His essence. It also results in the 
notion of divine with-ness in His attributes, which is a similar view to that of the 
theologians. Remarkably, this idea (divine with-ness in essence and attributes) does not 
require figurative interpretation, which, in al-Shaʿrānī’s view, leads to 
anthropomorphism by comparing God to the newly originated meaning. 
                                                
671 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 202; al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 90-91; al-Mīzān 
al-khiḍriyya, fols. 68a-68b. 
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    Let us now consider Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī’s epistle in relation to this concept. 
According to him, the notion of divine with-ness ought to be taken literally (ḥaqīqī), not 
metaphorically (majāzī).672 This view coincides with al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to the 
anthropomorphic attributes as discussed in Chapter 4; in his view, divine hands, legs, 
and so on are employed in a literal sense in scripture, just as the lion is literally used to 
stand for a courageous person.  
    Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī asserts that the literal meaning of with-ness is that something 
accompanies another – whether it is between God and His attributes, two contingent 
beings like human beings, or the necessary being (i.e. God) and the contingent being. 
The assumption that God accompanies human beings does not necessarily entail His 
incarnation in any physical direction, time, and space, because God is utterly 
incomparable to these notions. God’s with-ness is unlike creation’s with-ness; He is 
with us in the way that is suitable for His authority and perfection, without the 
implication of anthropomorphism. In Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī’s view, as discussed earlier, 
if divine with-ness is only in God’s attributes but not in His essence as the theologians 
claim, this would result in the separation of the divine attributes from God’s essence. 
Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī maintains that this is tantamount to the assumption that the divine 
attributes keep a physical distance from the divine essence and that they occupy a 
certain space. These properties are evidently prohibited from being applied to God.673 
Therefore, divine with-ness should be understood to involve both God’s essence and 
His attributes. 
    When asked by the jurists if anyone agreed with his opinion, Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī 
                                                
672 al-Mawāhibī, al-Lumʿa al-sunniyya (a), fol. 2a. 
673  al-Mawāhibī, al-Lumʿa al-sunniyya (a), fol. 2a; al-Shaʿrānī, al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya, 
201-202.  
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named aforementioned Ibn al-Labbān. Referring to Ibn al-Labbān’s explanation of the 
meaning of God’s nearness – as seen in the hadith ‘We are nearer to him than you, but 
you do not see (yabṣur)’ [Q. 56:85] – Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī writes:  
 
This divine message demonstrates that God’s nearness to His creation is real 
nearness (qurb ḥaqīqī) – in the way that is appropriate for Him674 – for He is 
above physical place. If His nearness were in His knowledge, power, and 
other attributes675 [as the theologians would insist], God would have said 
instead ‘but you do not know [God]’ and so forth, instead of ‘but you do not 
see’. That God said ‘but you do not see’ shows that it is real nearness that can 
be perceived by mystical vision (baṣar) – when God unveils our vision.676 
Due to its function of perceiving something (idrāk), vision is not related to 
abstract qualifications (ṣifāt maʿnawiyya). It is only related to realities which 
can be seen (ḥaqāʾiq marʾiyya).677 
 
In the above passage, Ibn al-Labbān attempts to establish the reality of divine nearness 
via a literalistic approach to scripture. According to him, God said that one would not 
‘see His nearness’. Therefore, divine nearness should not be interpreted to mean His 
nearness in knowledge and other attributes, as they are not related to a vision. 
                                                
674  The underlined sentence is inserted by al-Shaʿrānī and does not originally appear in 
al-Mawāhibī’s text, nor in Ibn Labbān’s. See al-Shaʿrānī al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir vol. 1, 91; 
Ibn al-Labbān, Izāla al-shubuhāt, 130-131. 
675  In al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, it is ‘His knowledge, power, and ordering (tadbīr), for 
example.’ 
676  The underlined sentence is inserted by al-Shaʿrānī and does not originally appear in 
al-Mawāhibī’s text, nor in Ibn Labbān’s. See al-Shaʿrānī al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir vol. 1, 91; 
Ibn al-Labbān, Izāla al-shubuhāt, 130-131. 
677 al-Mawāhibī, al-Lumʿa al-sunniyya (a), fol. 2b, (b), fols. 3a-3b; al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt 
wa-l-jawāhir vol. 1, 91.  
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Accordingly, divine nearness in the verse in question means divine nearness in reality, 
which our vision can perceive – but only if accompanied by the divine unveiling. 
    In an attempt to strengthen his view on the reality of divine with-ness, Ibrāhīm 
al-Mawāhibī also treats Ibn al-Labbān’s approach to the verse, ‘We are nearer to him 
than his jugular vein’ [Q. 50:16]. This is one of the ambiguous verses that rational 
theologians prefer to interpret figuratively in order to avoid anthropomorphism. 
According to al-Rāzī, for example, the verse is interpreted to mean that God is nearer 
than the jugular vein in terms of His knowledge. This reading is based on the notion that 
our jugular vein is covered by our bodily parts and hidden from our sight, whereas 
nothing is concealed from God’s knowledge. In the sense that God even knows our 
jugular vein, which is invisible to us, His knowledge is considered to be nearer to us 
than our jugular vein. This is divine nearness in knowledge, not in essence.678  
    On the contrary, in the view of Ibn al-Labbān as well as Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī and 
al-Shaʿrānī, verse 50:16 confirms that God’s being nearer to human beings than the 
jugular vein is actually real.679 With regard to this, Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī writes as 
follows:  
 
There is no equivocality of meaning (ishtirāk) between the nearness of the 
divine attributes and the nearness of the jugular vein, for the nearness of the 
divine attributes is conceptual (maʿnawī), which differs from the nearness of 
the jugular vein – which is sensible (ḥissī).680 Therefore, a relation (nisba) 
[between God and creation] through God’s being nearer (aqrabiyya) to 
                                                
678 al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, vol. 28, 162-163. 
679 See also Ibn al-Labbān, Izāla al-shubuhāt, 45. 
680 The underlined description is inserted by al-Shaʿrānī and does not originally appear in 
al-Mawāhibī’s text. See al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 91. 
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human beings than the jugular vein, which is real, evidences the reality 
(ḥaqīqī) of divine nearness [that is to say, divine nearness is real]. This is to 
say, God’s nearness is through His essence, which necessarily entails His 
attributes.681  
 
Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī’s denial of equivocality between the nearness of the jugular vein 
and that of the divine attributes, and his subsequent espousal of the reality of divine 
nearness accord, once again, with al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to the anthropomorphic 
attributes as I discussed in Chapter 4. God informs us of His nearness through the 
sensible notion of the nearness of our jugular vein, which differs from the conceptual 
meaning of God’s nearness in His attributes. Consequently, the verse has to be believed 
as such to mean His real nearness in His essence. Yet, as the last sentence in the above 
passage indicates, divine nearness in essence entails the nearness of the divine attributes, 
as they are essentially inseparable from His essence. Therefore, as with the notion of 
divine with-ness, it is established that God is near us both in His essence and 
attributes.682  
    Remarkably, in order to justify the reality of divine with-ness, Ibrāhīm 
al-Mawāhibī references the aforementioned remark by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya about 
the special type of divine with-ness. As discussed, unlike divine with-ness in attributes, 
this special kind of with-ness enables a mystic who practices the remembrance of God 
to be present with Him in his mystical vision and perception, but not in reality. Quoting 
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī writes as follows:  
                                                
681  al-Mawāhibī, al-Lumʿa al-sunniyya (a), fol. 2b, (b), fol.3b; al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt 
wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 91.  
682 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse Ibn al-Labbān’s view on this subject. Further 
study is necessary in order to understand his theological position.  
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No words can describe this [special] with-ness and no qualifications are 
given to it, since it is only known by the mystical experience of tasting 
(dhawq). [The espousal of] this with-ness will be presumptuous, unless the 
servant differentiates between the eternal Being and the temporally 
originated being.683  
 
The reference to this statement suggests Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī’s intention to associate 
his position with what is in Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s view a sanctioned idea of divine 
with-ness. This divine with-ness is experienced by authentic mystics, who continue to 
bear witness to the absolute distinction between the divine and creation while rejecting 
with-ness in relation to Ibn ʿArabī’s ontology of divine self-manifestation. 
    According to al-Shaʿrānī’s report, Muḥammad al-Maghribī intervened in the 
gathering shortly after Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī clarified his view on the reality of divine 
with-ness and nearness in God’s essence and attributes. Addressing the jurists, 
Muḥammad al-Maghribī explained the meaning of divine with-ness in relation to divine 
foreknowledge. According to him, God is with each being pre-eternally before and after 
the creation, as everything is known to God and present in His knowledge for all 
eternity.684 Understanding with-ness in relation to divine knowledge is similar to the 
theologians’ approach, discussed earlier. However, Muḥammad al-Maghribī notes that 
anyone who wants to perceive the situation of divine with-ness from the perspective of 
mystical unveiling needs to follow a mystic path. This comment implies that, for the 
                                                
683 al-Mawāhibī, al-Lumʿa al-sunniyya (a), fols. 2b-3a. A reference to Ibn al-Qayyim’s remark 
does not appear in the manuscript (b) nor in al-Shaʿrānī’s works but in the manuscript (a). 
684 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, vol. 1, 91-92; al-Mawāhibī, al-Lumʿa al-sunniyya, (a) 
fol. 3b; (b) fols. 4a-4b. 
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mystics, there exists another approach to divine with-ness. Upon hearing this remark, 
the attending scholars reportedly showed Muḥammad al-Maghribī’s answer respect by 
kissing his hand, then left the room.  
    Intriguingly, Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī, referring to Muḥammad al-Maghribī’s 
explanation, describes the notion of God’s with-ness to creation in His pre-eternal 
knowledge as common with-ness (maʿiyya ʿāmma). This is contrasted with special 
with-ness (maʿiyya khāṣṣa), which Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī defines as the witnessing of 
common with-ness through mystical experience (shuhūd). He finds supporting evidence 
for the idea of special with-ness in the verse, ‘If you are one of those who are brought 
near to God’ [Q. 56:88], on which he comments: ‘That is to say, those to whom God 
disclosed the pleasure of [special] divine nearness’.685 Following our arguments, it is 
understood that, in contrast with common with-ness, special with-ness has to be directly 
experienced and cannot be explained. It ought to be believed not metaphorically but 
literally, and its reality must be affirmed. As indicated by Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī’s 
reference to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, the affirmation of the reality of special with-ness 
does not entail the thesis that the world is He and not He as Ibn ʿArabī asserts. In 
Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī’s view, God is with creation in reality both in His essence and 
attributes in the manner that is suitable for His incomparability.  
    Thus, al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to divine with-ness which draws on Ibrāhīm 
al-Mawāhibī’s position, in conjunction with Ibn ʿArabī’s thesis that the divine attributes 
are identical to God’s essence and inseparable from it, enables one to accept the prima 
facie sense of the verses on divine with-ness, affirming its reality through His essence 
and attributes without relying on figurative interpretation and without pure 
                                                
685 al-Mawāhibī, al-Lumʿa al-sunniyya (a), fol. 3b. This passage not appear in the manuscript 
(b). 
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anthropomorphism. Like other anthropomorphic attributes examined in Chapter 4, 
al-Shaʿrānī counts the notion of with-ness amongst the divine anthropomorphic 
attributes that belongs to the level of delimitation, treating it as part of the divine 
descent to people’s minds.686 Hence, non-advanced mystics ought to have faith in it in 





    Following the findings in Chapter 4, this chapter aimed to deepen the 
understanding of al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to the anthropomorphic attributes by 
considering his treatment of the notion of divine with-ness. To this end, I first 
investigated al-Shaʿrānī’s espousal of the theological thesis stating that the divine 
attributes are identical to His essence, which was proposed by the Muʿtazilīs and then 
supported by Ibn ʿArabī. It has emerged that, while being a member of the Ashʿarī 
theological group, al-Shaʿrānī explicitly denies their tenet that the divine attributes are 
neither identical to nor other than God Himself, and shows his commitment to the 
Muʿtazilīs’ and Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching on this matter.  
    In the section that followed, I discussed al-Shaʿrānī’s approach to the notion of 
divine with-ness. As evidenced by the analysis of al-Shaʿrānī’s report of the scholarly 
gathering regarding this concept, as well as by the contents of Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī’s 
untreated epistle, al-Shaʿrānī understands divine with-ness in relation both to God’s 
essence and to His attributes. Thus, he affirms the reality of God’s being with His 
                                                
686 al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-dharriyya, 178. 
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creation yet without actual anthropomorphism. This approach to divine with-ness – 
which differs from that of the major theologians, who figuratively interpret the concept 
in relation to God’s attributes, and also from that of Ibn ʿArabī, who discusses it within 
his theory of the ontological divine self-manifestation – demonstrates al-Shaʿrānī’s 
intellectual and theological uniqueness. 
    Furthermore, al-Shaʿrānī’s reference to the opinions of the two fifteenth-century 
Egyptian mystics – Muḥammad al-Maghribī and Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī, who have 
previously been almost unknown to modern scholarship – shows that Ibn ʿArabī’s 
supporters in the Arabic speaking world of this period actively engaged with the 
interpretation of his teachings, rather than apologetically eulogising him as a great saint. 
Most significantly, I argued that by drawing on these mystics, al-Shaʿrānī innovatively 
integrates Ibn ʿArabī’s thesis that the divine attributes are identical to His essence into 
his own understanding of divine with-ness. It also exposed an interesting similarity 
between these mystics and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya over their understanding of divine 
with-ness. 
    The evidence shown in this chapter confirms our observation in Chapter 4 that 
al-Shaʿrānī affirms the prima facie sense of the anthropomorphic attributes without 
admitting literal anthropomorphism. The present chapter has further demonstrated that 
al-Shaʿrānī upholds the reality of divine with-ness, which is in his view only attainable 
through the mystical experience, based on Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings. This analysis 
establishes, once again, the uniqueness of al-Shaʿrānī’s efforts in applying the mystical 
discipline to the theological one, thereby merging the two spheres.  
    Further research is necessary in order to better understand the teachings of 
Muḥammad al-Maghribī and Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī and to fully illustrate al-Shaʿrānī’s 
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intellectual milieu. Nevertheless, these findings contribute to the clarification and 



































      
This thesis set out to investigate al-Shaʿrānī’s reception of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings. 
Scholars have for some time agreed that al-Shaʿrānī was an uncritical apologist of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s thought, perceiving al-Shaʿrānī to be a moderate Sufi who was not interested in 
Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical worldview and who only defended him by haphazardly and 
superficially editing his statements. According to the existing scholarship, this attitude 
of admiring Ibn ʿArabī whilst staying aloof from his actual thought was standard 
amongst his other defenders in the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Arabic speaking 
world. Despite the consensus on al-Shaʿrānī’s recognition as one of the most important 
Sufis in this period, this reductive and dismissive view left those theological works of 
al-Shaʿrānī that are concerned with Ibn ʿArabī’s defence barely examined.  
The overarching objective of this study was therefore to understand al-Shaʿrānī’s 
defence of Ibn ʿArabī in a more positive and detailed manner, and to consider the extent 
to which he endorses Ibn ʿArabī’s thought. To this end, I analysed al-Shaʿrānī’s 
theological works which aim to defend Ibn ʿArabī, contextualising al-Shaʿrānī’s 
methodology within the intellectual milieu of his own period, and examining his 
approach to Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings in relation to his own theological arguments. 
From this impetus, the study provided a thorough and comprehensive analysis of 
al-Shaʿrānī’s defence of Ibn ʿArabī in a theological context, delineating the careful 
strategies that al-Shaʿrānī adopts for this purpose. In Chapter 1, the thesis showed that 
al-Shaʿrānī’s attitude towards Ibn ʿArabī was conceived against the backdrop of 
sixteenth-century Egypt. I demonstrated that al-Shaʿrānī’s teachers and colleagues –
such as al-Suyūṭī, Zakariyyāʾ al-Anṣārī, and Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī – whom previous 
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studies have labeled as apologists for Ibn ʿArabī, develop their own remarkable methods 
for defending Ibn ʿArabī. The evidence of our observation confirmed that these scholars 
reinterpret the tenet of the oneness of existence as the oneness of witnessing or 
experiential oneness, thereby placing Ibn ʿArabī in the category of the sanctioned and 
moderate mystics. In order to reinforce their position, and quite remarkably, these 
followers of Ibn ʿArabī turn to the idea proposed by one of the most famous critics of 
Ibn ʿArabī, al-Taftāzānī, who presents a spectrum with ontological, heretical mystics on 
one pole, and experiential, authentic mystics on the other. In the same chapter, I also 
highlighted the underlying theme in al-Shaʿrānī’s theological works – namely, the 
tripartite hierarchy of the articles of faith – which allows al-Shaʿrānī to disclose Ibn 
ʿArabī’s teachings differently in accordance with the needs of the readership.  
In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that, in keeping with the intellectual trend that was 
set by his teachers and colleagues, al-Shaʿrānī explicitly advances the reading of the 
oneness of existence as experiential oneness by reinterpreting Ibn ʿArabī’s actual 
remarks. This significant finding shows that al-Shaʿrānī can be viewed as one of the 
first proponents of the idea of treating the oneness of existence as the oneness of 
witnessing prior to Sirhindī. Interestingly, this approach was conceived in relation to the 
arguments made by Ibn ʿArabī’s adversaries. These findings illuminate the necessity of 
understanding al-Shaʿrānī’s theological thought in its intellectual context.  
In Chapter 3, I first provided evidence of al-Shaʿrānī’s espousal of the idea of 
ontological divine self-manifestation. Based on the tripartite hierarchy of the articles of 
faith, al-Shaʿrānī supports the theory and other ontological tenets in statements intended 
for advanced mystics. This is contrasted with the subsequent argument of the chapter 
with regard to his treatment of the theory of the immutable entities for non-advanced 
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mystics and theologians. I demonstrated that al-Shaʿrānī palatably presents the 
otherwise controversial teaching of the immutable entities in a theological context – all 
the while excluding its ontological implication – and secures the notions of creation ex 
nihilo, divine predestination, the attribution of responsibility to human beings, and 
God’s perfect knowledge of creation. The findings of this chapter, in conjunction with 
those of Chapter 2, highlight the degree of al-Shaʿrānī’s acceptance of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
mystical teachings, as well as variations between al-Shaʿrānī’s approaches to the latter 
across his different works. 	 	  
Having provided enough evidence of al-Shaʿrānī’s general approach to Ibn 
ʿArabī’s mystical thought (Chapter 2) and his multifaceted stance on some of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s key doctrines (Chapters 3), in Chapter 4, the thesis drew attention to the 
structure of al-Shaʿrānī’s integration of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings into his own theological 
and mystical worldview, giving special attention to al-Shaʿrānī’s understanding of the 
anthropomorphic attributes. I demonstrated that al-Shaʿrānī shares Ibn ʿArabī’s 
rejection of the application of figurative interpretation to the anthropomorphic attributes 
in scripture. I then showed that al-Shaʿrānī adopts Ibn ʿArabī’s tenet of the synthesis of 
tanzīh and tashbīh along with Ibn ʿArabī’s idea of divine self-manifestation. However, 
and most markedly, al-Shaʿrānī discusses these ideas in relation to his teaching on 
visionary divine self-manifestation, which is perceived in the mind, as contrasted with 
Ibn ʿArabī’s theory of cosmological divine self-manifestation, which is concerned with 
the ontological, actual reality of the world. In keeping with this notion of visionary 
divine self-manifestation, and based on the understanding of tashbīh as divine 
self-assimilation through perceptual similarity, al-Shaʿrānī promotes faith in the prima 
facie sense of the anthropomorphic attributes for practical purposes, while denying the 
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implication of pure anthropomorphism. Despite its certain similarity to the Ḥanbalī 
position, al-Shaʿrānī’s view is nonetheless mystical. As discussed, his teaching is firmly 
grounded in the belief in visionary divine self-manifestation; the synthesis of God’s 
incomparability and His self-assimilation through perceptual similarity evoked in the 
mind; and the balance of the two levels of non-delimitation and delimitation wherein 
God describes Himself with various scriptural expressions in order to make Himself 
known to creation. According to al-Shaʿrānī, all of these are attainable through mystical 
experience.  
Building on the findings of Chapter 4, in Chapter 5, I turned to the investigation 
of al-Shaʿrānī’s view on the anthropomorphic notion of divine with-ness. I first 
demonstrated his adherence to Ibn ʿArabī’s thesis that the divine essential attributes are 
identical to His essence, which clearly differs from that of the Ashʿarīs. I then argued 
that, by drawing on the opinions of the lesser known Shādhilī mystics of 
fifteenth-century Egypt – Muḥammad al-Maghribī and Ibrāhīm al-Mawāhibī – 
al-Shaʿrānī applies this tenet on the divine essential attributes to the understanding of 
the notion of divine with-ness. This is a striking observation that underlines the 
intellectual efforts of Ibn ʿArabī’s supporters during this period as they tried to 
understand his thought in the theological setting. The finding opposes recent scholarship 
claiming that these supporters merely admired Ibn ʿArabī as a great saint. Intriguingly, 
it also illuminates al-Shaʿrānī’s attempt to conflate the mystical sphere with the 
theological one. 
The centrality of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings is a consistent feature of al-Shaʿrānī’s 
thought. As we have seen, however, a hallmark of al-Shaʿrānī’s theological project is 
his reinterpretation and recontextualisation of Ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism. This establishes 
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al-Shaʿrānī’s distinction in presenting Ibn ʿArabī’s worldview in a way that is 
acceptable for a wider audience.  
    A worthwhile project would be to explore the influence al-Shaʿrānī’s defence of 
Ibn ʿArabī had upon later scholars, especially al-Shaʿrānī’s close disciple al-Munāwī. It 
is unfortunate that at this stage I am not in the position to examine the legacy left by 
al-Shaʿrānī’s theological project. However, given the popularity of al-Shaʿrānī’s works 
dedicated to the defence of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought in later generations (especially 
al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, in which al-Shaʿrānī tries to fuse the latter’s mysticism with 
the theological discipline), it is plausible to assume that al-Shaʿrānī’s well considered 
presentation of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings contributed to establishing al-Shaʿrānī’s fame as 
a populariser of Ibn ʿArabī. 
    Based on the idea of the tripartite hierarchy of the articles of faith, the structure of 
al-Shaʿrānī’s theological works would also have been helpful in restricting access to the 
in-depth contents of Ibn ʿArabī’s al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, except for advanced mystics. 
Addressing non-advanced mystics and theologians who are not prepared to be exposed 
to Ibn ʿArabī’s ontological monism, al-Shaʿrānī left behind a number of writings as 
concise textbooks elucidating Ibn ʿArabī’s thought as non-ontological, experiential 
mysticism. In these texts, al-Shaʿrānī endeavoured to highlight how some of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s doctrines are pertinent for solving certain theological problems from a mystic 
standpoint. In particular, with regard to the issue of the anthropomorphic attributes, as 
we saw in Chapter 4, al-Shaʿrānī attempts to take a middle path between the 
traditionalist and Ibn ʿArabī’s approaches by integrating Ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism into his 
own worldview, presenting it to a wider audience of non-advanced mystics and 
theologians.  
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    The assumption that al-Shaʿrānī’s abridgements of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya 
controlled access to this work among the public partly accords with Pagani’s 
observation. Although Pagani’s study (discussed in the introduction of the thesis) 
focuses on al-Shaʿrānī’s jurisprudential, rather than theological, works, his analysis 
demonstrates the likelihood that those works of al-Shaʿrānī, which explicate Ibn 
ʿArabī’s teachings, indeed facilitated the widespread dissemination of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
thought in society. 687  Dajani also observes that al-Shaʿrānī made Ibn ʿArabī’s 
jurisprudential ideas more accessible through the simplification of the latter’s 
teaching.688 Building on the findings of these studies, my analysis has shown that 
al-Shaʿrānī’s arguments certainly make Ibn ʿArabī’s mystic doctrines more acceptable 
to a broader audience of non-advanced mystics and theologians, if not the layperson as 
Dajani maintains. In other words, al-Shaʿrānī makes Ibn ʿArabī’s thought available 
beyond a small group of advanced mystics by carefully excluding its ontological 
implications and reinterpreting it. Considering these observations, al-Shaʿrānī’s works 
are very likely to have exerted a certain influence over the acceptance of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
teachings among later generations.  
    Setting this issue aside, the thesis certainly illuminated a significant feature of 
al-Shaʿrānī’s theological project – that is, merging the mystical sphere with the 
theological one, which he possibly took over from his teacher al-Anṣārī, wherein Ibn 
ʿArabī’s monistic worldview is excluded and is presented as a visionary experience. 
Most crucially, the findings of the thesis establish that al-Shaʿrānī was indeed an 
innovative and strategic thinker who dedicated meticulous efforts to the theological 
defence of Ibn ʿArabī, adopting different approaches to this end.  
                                                
687 Pagani, ‘The Meaning of the Ikhtilāf al-Madhāhib,’ 183. 
688 Dajani, ‘Ibn ʿArabī’s Conception of Ijtihād,’192-193. 
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    The evidence I have provided in this thesis therefore enables us to situate 
al-Shaʿrānī’s defence of Ibn ʿArabī in context, understand it in a more favourable light, 
and perceive al-Shaʿrānī’s creativity in his theological and mystical thought. It is 
evident that the degree of the acceptance of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings amongst his 
followers is not always monolithic, and should therefore be considered from different 
perspectives. This tells us of the necessity for further investigation of the history of 
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